





















 Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
By Selina Keesoony  
Brunel University London 












Thank you to my supervisor, Professor Abimbola Olowofoyeku, for his guidance, advice and 
genuine interest in my research. I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Ben 
Chigara for his moral support.  
 
To the Brunel Law School for supporting my research with a studentship. I am also grateful to 
the Chartered Institute of Taxation for awarding me with a research grant.  
To Professor Barry Rider OBE, Cambridge University, for his motivation. Thank you to Dr 
Meryl Dickinson for her continued support throughout my PhD.  
Thank you to my friends, Deven Mehta, Ganesh Khatri, Neha Khatri, Roberto Hanna and Hiren 
Patel, who believed in me. 
I would like to thank my mother, Devi Keesoony, for her help in proof-reading my work and 
encouragement throughout my thesis. I am also very appreciative for the continuing motivation 
























Abstract           i 
Introduction            1 
Chapter 1: Defining motive, purpose and intention……………………………………. 10 
  1.1: Criminal Law perspective…………………………………………………... 11 
             1.2: Psychological perspective……………………………………………………16 
             1.3: Philosophical perspective……………………………………………………20 
             1.4: Tax Law perspective………………………………………………………… 32 
                   1.4 (a) Trading………………………………………………………………….32 
                   1.4 (b) Expenditure……………………………………………………………..39 
    1.4 (c) Dividend stripping……………………………………………………...41 
                   1.4 (d) Targeted anti-avoidance rules…………………………………………..44 
             1.5: Conclusions…………………………………………………………………...49 
 
Chapter 2: A move towards motive, intention and purpose…………………………….53 
            2.1: Tackling tax avoidance……………………………………………………….53 
            2.2: The divide between supporters of Ramsay and Westminster……………….61 
                  2.2 (a) Supporters of Ramsay…………………………………………………...61 
                  2.2 (b) Supporters of Westminster………………………………………………75 
            2.3: Motive, intention and purpose considered across other areas of Tax law...81  
       2.3 (a) Trades, professions & vocations……………………………………….  81 
                  2.3 (b) Expenditure…………………………………………………………… 88 
                  2.3 (c) Accountancy standards…………………………………………………. 93 
           2.4: Why the “motive approach” is considered………………………................. 95   
           2.5: How motive, intention and purpose are considered………………………..  99 
                  2.5 (a) The “substance over form” doctrine……………………………………. 100 
                  2.5 (b) Purpose………………………………………………………………… 103 
       2.5 (c) Commercial or business purpose……………………………………….  106 
                  2.5 (d) The step transaction doctrine……………………………………………108 
       2.5 (e) Motive or intention……………………………………………………... 110 
          2.6: Suitability of the motive approach in Tax Law……………………………... 112 
                  2.6 (a) Is the motive approach necessary?........................................................  113 
                  2.6 (b) Restructuring transactions……………………………………………… 115 
                  2.6 (c) Inconsistencies…………………………………………………............. 117 
                  2.6 (d) Constitutional legitimacy of the motive approach……………………... 120 












Chapter 3: The GAAR provisions analysed…………………………………………….. 126 
            3.1: The GAAR: An overview……………………………………………………. 127 
            3.2: The GAAR provisions……………………………………………………….. 127 
                  3.2 (a) Tax advantage…………………………………………………………... 128 
       3.2 (b) Tax arrangement………………………………………………………... 129 
                  3.2 (c) The main purpose test…………………………………………………... 131 
                  3.2 (d) The double reasonableness test………………………………………… 134 
                  3.2 (d)(i) “Reasonableness” in Tort and Contract Law…………………………136 
                  3.2 (d)(ii) “Reasonableness” in Public Law………………………………….....138                         
       3.2 (d)(iii) Reasonable man……………………………………………………..142 
                  3.2 (e) Abuse according to the GAAR…………………………………………  143 
          3.3: Abuse according to the GAAR guidance……………………………………. 149 
          3.4: What is not abusive…………………………………………………………… 151 
          3.5: The scope of the GAAR………………………………………………………. 153 
          3.6: The Aaronson Report…………………………………………………………  156 
          3.7: Penalties………………………………………………………………………... 162 
          3.8: An EU-wide GAAR…………………………………………………………… 165 
          3.9: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………... 170 
 
Chapter 4: General anti-avoidance legislation in other jurisdictions………………… 174 
          4.1: The United States’ Economic Substance Doctrine (“ESD”)………………... 174 
                 4.1 (a) Common Law background……………………………………………… 174 
                 4.1 (b) The ESD provisions…………………………………………………….. 177 
      4.1 (c) Case Law post the American ESD……………………………….............180 
          4.2: The Australian General Anti-Avoidance Rule………………………………. 182 
                 4.2 (a) Scheme………………………………………………………………….  183 
                 4.2 (b) Tax benefit……………………………………………………………… 184 
                 4.2 (c) Purpose………………………………………………………………….  184 
          4.3: Australian Case Law post the Australian General Anti-Avoidance Rule…..187 
          4.4: The New Zealand General Anti-Avoidance Rule…………………………….191 
                 4.4 (a) Counteraction…………………………………………………………...  193 
                 4.4 (b) Case Law post the New Zealand General Anti-Avoidance Rule……….. 194 
          4.5: The South African General Anti-Avoidance Rule…………………………... 199 
                 4.5 (a) Case Law post the South African General Anti-Avoidance Rule………. 204 
          4.6: The Canadian General Anti-Avoidance Rule……………………………….. 208 
                 4.6 (a) Case Law Post the Canadian General Anti-Avoidance Rule…………….211 
          4.7: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………. 217 
 
Chapter 5: Discretion………………………………………………………………….......221 
          5.1: The ambiguous GAAR………………………………………………………... 221 
          5.2: HMRC’s role…………………………………………………………………... 223 
          5.3: Judicial discretion…………………………………………………………….. 225 
                 5.3 (a) Judicial law-making……………………………………………………...229 
                 5.3 (b) Interpretation……………………………………………………………. 237 
          5.4: Morality………………………………………………………………………... 243    






Chapter 6: Criticisms of the GAAR…………………………………………………….. 251 
          6.1: The main purpose test.......................................................................................  252 
          6.2: The double reasonableness test........................................................................  255 
          6.3: The scope of the GAAR………………………………………………………. 259 
          6.4: HMRC GAAR Guidance……………………………………………………... 261 
          6.5: The lack of a clearance system……………………………………………….. 268 
          6.6: The UK’s international competitiveness……………………………………...270 
          6.7: Complexity…………………………………………………………………….. 276 
          6.8: Uncertainty……………………………………………………………………. 279 
          6.9: Constitutional issues…………………………………………………………..  284 
          6.10: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………  290 
 
Chapter 7: Was the GAAR needed?.................................................................................. 294 
           7.1: Ramsay vs the GAAR………………………………………………………… 295 
                 7.1 (a) The overall Ramsay approach ………………………………………... 295 
                 7.1 (b) The main features of the GAAR………………………………………... 297 
                 7.1 (c) The Ramsay approach verses the GAAR……………………………….. 298 
          7.2: Contemporary tax avoidance before the GAAR……………………………. 301      
          7.3: Tax avoidance since the GAAR………………………………………………. 305 
          7.4: The GAAR as a deterrence…………………………………………………… 314 
          7.5: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..  315 
 

























This thesis examines whether the UK’s General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) unjustifiably 
permits the judiciary to take account of the taxpayer’s motives, intentions and purposes for the 
purpose of determining tax liability. It will be argued that the UK GAAR does permit 
consideration of these factors, which, it will be argued, is undesirable because of the subjective 
nature of these terms and the possibility of judges ascribing a motive, intention or purpose on 
the taxpayer which may not be factual in reality. 
Although the GAAR has attracted much commentary, there has been little to explain how the 
GAAR allows the taxpayer’s motives, intentions and purposes for embarking on an 
arrangement to be scrutinised by HMRC and the courts. This discussion hopes to fill this gap, 
especially in respect of whether and how the provisions of the GAAR can allow for a “motive 
test”, how such a test may be applied in practice, and whether the GAAR can still be considered 
to have a targeted scope in light of factors that are arguably subjective. An allied issue that is 
examined is whether the implementation of the UK GAAR was needed given that the courts 
can apply the principle established in WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC1 to cases on tax avoidance.  
In developing the arguments presented in this thesis, the approaches of a number of Western 
jurisdictions will be examined. The selected jurisdictions chosen include; the United States of 
America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada. These countries, with the 
exception of the United States of America, have a general anti-avoidance legislation in place 
and the majority of them include an anti-abuse provision in their general anti-avoidance rules.  
The thesis concludes that the UK GAAR is unique in taking into account the taxpayer’s 
intentions. The UK GAAR also makes reference to the purpose of the taxpayer’s arrangement. 
These factors, taken together, can result in scrutinisation of the taxpayer’s own motive, 
                                                          
1 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC; Eilbeck v Rawling [1981] 2 W.L.R 449, [1982] A.C. 300 
 
intention or purpose. It will be suggested that the scope of the UK GAAR is much wider than 
it was ostensibly designed to be and that it is likely to rely heavily on the discretion of judges. 
Therefore, suggestions as to the ways in which the GAAR could move towards a more 





This thesis argues that the UK General Anti-Abuse Rule permits judges to examine the 
taxpayer’s motives, intentions and purposes when determining whether the GAAR applies. It 
will be argued that such an examination is undesirable due to the subjectivity involved in this 
approach which can cause uncertainty for taxpayers and tax professionals. As the GAAR 
permits the consideration of subjective considerations, the argument that the GAAR can be 
used as a “motive test” will be made.  
Where reference is made to the GAAR as being a “motive test” or using the “motive approach”, 
this encapsulates the ability of judges and HMRC to scrutinise the taxpayer’s motives, 
intentions and purposes. The discussion is important as many judges have expressed the view 
that examining the taxpayer’s motive, intention or purpose is undesirable and unnecessary in 
determining tax liability. Whether or not judges have accepted the consideration of the concepts 
forming the “motive approach”, case law on tax avoidance demonstrates that these concepts 
are consistently discussed. Therefore, landmark cases in tax avoidance are explored to 
demonstrate that a subjective style of determining tax liability is ingrained in pre-existing case 
law. However, the terms motive, intention and purpose are frequently conflated and there has 
been little research aimed at identifying the differences between these terms. The distinctions 
between these key terms are important as the terms have different levels of subjectivity. This 
thesis aims to identify clear definitions of these terms which can be applied to cases on tax 
avoidance and understand the level of subjectivity permitted by the GAAR.  
The GAAR itself will then be examined to analyse evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
GAAR is a motive test and the potential problems associated with this. Although research has 
been conducted on the general anti-avoidance legislation of other Western jurisdictions, this 
thesis examines these pieces of legislation with the aim of uncovering whether allowing 
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subjective considerations is peculiar to the UK GAAR and if not, how a motive test operates 
in practice. The five countries analysed include; the United States, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Canada. These countries have been selected as they are comparable Western 
jurisdictions with general anti-avoidance rules in place, with the exception of the United States 
which has an Economic Substance Doctrine.  
This thesis aims to examine whether the GAAR can truly be considered targeted in light of the 
motive test and whether this consideration affects the degree of discretion left to the judiciary 
in deciding tax avoidance cases. Moreover, the GAAR has been criticised for permitting the 
exploration of subjective considerations, therefore this issue as well as general criticisms of the 
GAAR will be assessed in order to establish the extent to which subjectivity taints the GAAR. 
If it is proven that the GAAR puts the motive test on statutory footing, the fundamental question 
of whether the UK needed a GAAR will be raised to establish whether the GAAR contributes 
anything new to the pre-existing anti-avoidance measures.  
Background 
The UK government’s concerns surrounding tax avoidance have soared in recent years and 
great efforts have been made to draw the public’s attention to this alleged harmful phenomenon. 
It has been suggested that “almost overnight the UK has become a nation apparently obsessed 
with whether businesses are paying enough tax.”2 Tax avoidance, apparently, according to the 
Treasury, involves taxpayers lawfully using “tax law to get a tax advantage that Parliament 
never intended”3 which results in taxpayers paying less or no tax on their income. The GAAR 
                                                          
2 ACCA, “The UK General Anti-Abuse Rule”, <http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-
technical/tax-publications/tech-tp-ukgaar.pdf>, accessed02.06.2016, p3 
3HM Treasury, ‘Tackling Tax Avoidance’, cited in 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/197112/Tackling_tax_avoidanc
e.pdf>, accessed 09.07.2014, p5. 
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was drafted “based on the premise that the levying of tax is the principal means by which the 
state pays for the services and facilities which it provides for its citizens.”4 
Figures explaining the tax gap from a study which HMRC conducted from 2014-2015 
demonstrate the rather obvious point that tax avoidance is a source of lost revenue.5 The amount 
of revenue lost through tax avoidance during this period was £2.2 billion.6 However, the figure 
is not broken down to reveal how much of this tax was lost due to “abusive” tax avoidance. 
Although £2.2 billion in lost revenue is a big loss, it pales in comparison to the other reasons 
which HMRC provided for the existence of the tax gap. For example, HMRC’s statistics show 
that the biggest cause of the tax gap is the “hidden economy”7 “where an entire source of 
income is not declared”.8 These include “ghosts”9 which encompass “individuals who receive 
income from employment or self-employment but are not known to HMRC because they and/or 
their employers fail to declare their earnings.”10 The figures also show that losses from the 
“hidden economy”11 have persistently been rising from a loss of £4.8 billion in 2009-2010 to 
£6.4 billion in 2013 to 2014.12 In 2014-2015, this figure fell to £6.2 billion13 although, there 
has been an overall rise in revenue losses from the “hidden economy”.  
HMRC attributes £5.5 billion in lost tax revenues to a “failure to take reasonable care”14 which 
includes “customer’s carelessness and/or negligence in adequately recording their transactions 
                                                          
4 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the UK 
Tax System’, [2012] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf>, accessed 04.06.2016, p15 
5 HMRC, “UK tax gap at a glance in 2014-2015”, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/561312/HMRC-measuring-tax-




9 Ibid, p61 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid, p19 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid, p5 
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and/or in preparing their tax returns.”15 Moreover, the amount of tax lost through taxpayer 
negligence has steadily risen since 2009 from £3.7 billion in 2009-2010 to £5.5 billion in 2014-
2015.16 In 2009-2010, due to legal interpretation issues, £4.5 billion of taxes was not 
collected.17 This figure rose in 2014-2015 and problems regarding the interpretation of the law 
accounted for £5.2 billion in lost taxes.18 The tax gap caused by tax evasion has persistently 
increased over the years from £3.8 billion in 2009-2010 to £5.2 billion in 2014-2015.19 
Therefore, tax evasion accounts for more than double the tax lost through tax avoidance.  The 
costly problem of “criminal attacks”20  by “organised criminal gangs undertak[ing] co-
ordinated and systematic attacks on the tax system.”21 is also a reason why the government lost 
approximately £4.8 billion in taxes from 2014-2015.22 However, the amount of money lost 
through these types of criminal activities has reduced by approximately £1 billion between the 
years 2009-2015.23 The issue of “non-payment”24 of tax where “tax debts… are written off… 
mainly as a result of insolvency”25 has resulted in a £3.6 billion26 loss of tax revenue.  HMRC’s 
statistics reveal that the amount of tax lost through writing off debts has decreased by almost 
£1 billion since from 2009 to 2015.27 Unlike taxpayer negligence, simple taxpayer “error”,28 
“despite the customer taking reasonable care”29 is the reason why £3.2 billion in taxes was lost 
in 2014-2015.30 
 
                                                          
15 Ibid, p20 
16 Ibid, p19 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid, p5 
19 Ibid, p19 
20 Ibid, p5 
21 Ibid, p20 
22 Ibid, p19 
23 Ibid, p19 
24 Ibid, p5 
25 Ibid, p20 
26 Ibid, p5 
27 Ibid, p19 
28 Ibid, p5 
29 Ibid, p20 
30 Ibid, p5 
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The tax gap figures from 2008-2009 show that the tax gap reached £42 billion.31 However, the 
tax gap significantly lowered between 2011 and 2012 where it was £32 billion.32 Despite the 
narrowing of the tax gap during this time, the government sought to tackle tax avoidance by 
introducing the General Anti-Abuse Rule33 into the Finance Act 2013.34 Although the tax gap 
increased in 2013 to £35 billion,35 plans had already been made in 2011 to introduce the 
GAAR.36 Therefore, the GAAR was not a response to the rise in the tax gap but as a general 
response to abusive tax avoidance in general. 
It is also important to emphasise that the GAAR is only one of the government’s responses to 
tackling tax avoidance. There are other anti-avoidance measures already in place including; 
principles emanating from case law, specific anti-avoidance provisions, the principle deriving 
from WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC37 (Ramsay) and the Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes 
regime.38 However, the GAAR takes precedence over tax legislation covered by the GAAR.39 
The fact that “legislation is one of the basic building blocks for compliance”40 means that the 
GAAR must have not promote uncertainty. The GAAR as a motive test is problematic as the 
subjective factors inherent in this test can decrease the level of certainty for taxpayers in 
relation to their tax liability. However, the payment of tax must be certain as the very nature of 
                                                          
31 HM Revenue and Customs, ‘Measuring Tax Gaps 2010’, cited in < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140206164449/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/tax-gaps/mtg-
2010.pdf >, accessed 11.06.2013, p5 
32 HM Revenue and Customs, ‘Measuring Tax Gaps 2012’, cited in 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140206164448/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/tax-gaps/mtg-
2012.pdf > , accessed 09.07.2014, p2 
33 GAAR 
34 Finance Act 2013, Part 5 
35 The Guardian, ‘UK’s Tax Gap Rises by £1bn to £35bn’, reported in 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/11/uk-tax-gap-rises-hmrc-avoidance-nonpayment, accessed 
10.07.2014 
36 Aaronson. G, ‘GAAR Study: A Study to Consider Whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be 
introduced into the UK Tax System’, [2011], available at 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130321041222/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 10.07.2014 
37 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC; Eilbeck v Rawling [1981] 2 W.L.R 449, [1982] A.C. 300 
38 Part 7 Finance Act 2014 
39 s212(1) Finance Act 2013 
40 Braithwaite, V. “Taxing democracy”, [2016], Routledge, London, p1 
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paying taxes represents a selfless act wherein taxpayers are continuously “contributing a part 
of their own private revenue, in order to make up a public revenue.”41 Certainty of tax liability 
is also important given that the levying of tax has been stretched further than “its original 
purpose as a war tax for the defence of the realm.”42 Therefore, it is important that judicial 
discretion is not stretched too far that it becomes difficult to predict the outcome of tax cases. 
Furthermore, the Bill of Rights 1688 makes it clear that it is for Parliament to levy taxes 
therefore, judges should not be granted the breadth of discretion which could divide the line 
between acceptable and abusive tax avoidance. The underlying theme of the thesis focuses on 
the extent to which judges can exercise their discretion in deciding tax avoidance cases and 
whether this is incompatible with Parliament’s will.   
Thesis outline 
In order to establish definitions of the terms motive, intention and purpose, chapter 1 will 
investigate how these terms are used across Criminal Law, Psychology, Philosophy and tax 
law where these terms are regularly used. The discussion on tax law will focus on the areas of 
trading, expenditure, and dividend stripping.  
An assessment of the cases supporting the Ramsay approach and IRC v Duke of Westminster43 
(Westminster) approach will be analysed in chapter 2. Cases on trading, deductible expenditure 
and to a lesser degree, accountancy principles will be discussed as the key terms of motives, 
intentions and purposes are explicitly permitted by law in this area. Thereafter, reasons as to 
why the motive approach is used, how the motive approach is used and whether this approach 
is suitable for tax law will be evaluated.   
                                                          
41 Smith. A, ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations’, (2005), The Pennsylvania State 
University, p675. 
42 Sabine, B.E.V. “A history of income tax: The development of income tax from its beginning in 1799 to the 
present day related to the social, economic and political history of the period”, [2010], Routledge, London, p11 
43 IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] A.C. 1 
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The central provisions of the GAAR will be assessed in detail in chapter 3. Proposed penalties 
for tax avoiders will also be discussed. There will be an analysis of the anti-avoidance 
principles established in EU case law as the EU approach is also focused around abuse.  
Chapter 4 will examine the general anti-avoidance legislation of Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa and Canada. The United States’ Economic Substance Doctrine (ESD) will also be 
evaluated. Landmark cases for each jurisdiction will also be critically examined.  
The concept of discretion will be explored in chapter 5, predominantly in relation to judges and 
to a lesser extent, HMRC. The law-making capabilities of the judiciary will also be discussed. 
The judicial role of interpretation will also be discussed with a particular focus on the current 
preferred approach to construction which is the purposive approach. The concept of morality 
and the issue of whether it has a place in tax law will also be analysed.  
The criticisms of the GAAR will be analysed in chapter 6. These criticisms will be mainly 
examined from a practitioner’s perspective as they are arguably the most directly affected by 
the GAAR and are entrusted with advising clients as to their tax liabilities. The criticisms 
discussed will relate to; the GAAR’s scope, the HMRC GAAR guidance, the lack of a clearance 
system, detrimental effects on the UK’s international competitiveness, complexity, uncertainty 
and constitutional issues. 
Chapter 7 will analyse whether a GAAR was needed. In determining whether the GAAR was 
needed, it is useful to compare the components of the Ramsay approach to the main provisions 
of the GAAR to establish whether the GAAR contributes a new dimension to tackling tax 
avoidance which was not previously possible under the Ramsay approach. Thereafter, it is 






This thesis employed a doctrinal research technique. The thesis explores problematic areas with 
the current framework on tax avoidance and the UK GAAR by analysing the texts of relevant 
primary legislation, judicial decisions, and academic and practitioner commentaries. The 
textual analysis of primary legislation, particularly the provisions of the GAAR, was essential 
in order to ascertain whether a motive approach was inherent in the statute. 
The apparent similarities and overlaps between important (for the purpose of this thesis) 
concepts such as motive, intention and purpose, necessitated close scrutiny of these concepts. 
Examination of the use and understandings of these concepts in other areas (criminal law, 
psychology and philosophy) proved helpful for the purpose of developing working definitions 
for this discussion. Other areas of taxation outside the narrow area of tax avoidance that also 
proved useful included case law pertaining to trading, allowable expenditure, accountancy 
principles, and dividend stripping, particularly in relation how the taxpayer’s motive, intention 
and purpose have been utilised in these areas. These areas were chosen as they appear regularly 
to examine motives, intentions and purposes.  
A comparative approach was used to analyse the similarities and differences in the anti-
avoidance legislations of five selected Western jurisdictions and comparisons were drawn from 
them to the UK GAAR. These jurisdictions include the United States, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Canada. These countries have had anti-avoidance legislation in place for 
years and have developed a body of case law which can provide an understanding as to how 
the UK’s GAAR will operate in practice. Although, America has an economic substance 
doctrine44 rather than a general anti-avoidance rule, examining their approach is still relevant 




as some of the terms used in the ESD are akin to the UK GAAR’s approach. Case law from 
these jurisdictions was also examined to predict how the UK GAAR may operate in practice.  
In addition to academic commentaries, the HMRC GAAR guidance and the Aaronson report 
were also fundamental materials used in examining how the GAAR was intended to operate. 
As indicated earlier, professional commentaries were also examined. Much of this was 
obtained from the websites of Law and Accountancy firms. This group is arguably the most 
affected by the GAAR in practical terms, as they need to provide their clients accurate guidance 
with respect to their tax affairs. It was therefore essential to examine their reactions to the 
GAAR.   
A limitation of this thesis is that no cases have been decided under the GAAR so far. Therefore, 
it is uncertain as to how the provisions of the GAAR will be interpreted or applied by the courts. 
However, predictions are made as to how the problems identified may affect taxpayers and the 












Chapter 1: Defining motive, purpose and intention 
The jurisprudence on tax avoidance widely uses the terms motive, intention and purpose; often 
interchangeably. However, there has been no real attempt at providing definitions for these 
terms. The lack of clear definitions is problematic given that the terms have important 
connotations in tax avoidance particularly when ascertaining whether a transaction was not 
executed merely for tax avoidance reasons. Consequently, it is imperative to provide clear 
definitions for these terms to provide greater precision in the use of language and ensure that 
they are applied in the correct manner.  
The terms motive, intention and purpose have also been used widely in an array of other 
disciplines and are often used in different contexts to denote different meanings. Therefore, an 
exploration into how these terms are used in criminal law, psychology and philosophy will be 
made. These areas have been chosen as they regularly examine motives, intentions and 
purposes. Consequently, analysing how these selected areas have used the terms motive, 
intention and purpose, will provide a deeper understanding as to how these terms should be 
defined. Moreover, the way in which motive, intention and purpose are used in trading, 
expenditure, accountancy and dividend stripping will be examined in order to identify possible 
convergences in the usages of the terms. Definitions of these terms will then be created in order 
to provide clarity as to what is precisely meant by motive, intention and purpose in tax 
avoidance and what is not. These definitions will be provided in the conclusion of this chapter. 
Emphasis on these terms accordingly rejects actions explained by the general “doctrine of 
instincts”45 as this unscientific approach “ends our search and drives us into the unknown.”46 
 
                                                          
45 Snow, A.J. ‘An Approach to the Psychology of Motives’, [1926], The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 




1.1 Criminal law perspective 
Criminal law places significant weight on the mind of the defendant to determine criminal 
liability therefore, it is surprising that the terms motive, intention and purpose have not been 
defined or differentiated in this field. The subjective perception of a defendant is central as 
defendants are usually “held criminally liable only for events or consequences which they 
intended or knowingly risked.”47 The defendant’s intention and motive are significant when 
the defendant’s mens rea is sought in order to establish fault.  
There are some areas of criminal law which place much weight on the subjective intentions of 
defendants and others which do not, for example, driving offences which are strict liability 
offences. Consequently, motives are irrelevant in these cases and the person charged with the 
offence can thenceforth be “convicted without proof of intention, knowledge, recklessness or 
negligence.”48 Although strict liability offences eliminate the risk of a motive being attributed 
to the defendant, it diminishes the defendant’s “ability to explain, excuse or justify the 
conduct.”49 This can be distinguished from a more objective form of mens rea, as discussed 
below. 
Constructive liability specifically examines the defendant’s intention. “Constructive crimes”50 
are a category of crimes where the defendant sought to commit a less serious crime but is 
convicted of a crime with a heavier penalty. By analogy, in the tax avoidance field, where the 
avoidance of tax is not the aim but nevertheless the result, a tax avoidance intention may be 
attributed to the taxpayer as demonstrated in Five Oaks Properties Ltd v HMRC.51 In criminal 
law, the argument which defends imposing constructive liability rests upon an assumption that 
                                                          
47 Ashworth, A. and Horder, J. ‘Principles of Criminal Law’, [2013], 7th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
p74 
48 Ibid, p160  
49 Ibid, p162 
50 Ibid, p75 
51 Five Oaks Properties Ltd v HMRC [2006] STC (SCD) 769 
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people should be liable “for what they intended or foresaw and for what lay within their 
control.”52 Intention therefore, includes what the defendant foresaw in terms of the 
consequences of the defendant’s actions to indicate a realistic possibility of the prohibited act 
materialising and excludes remote possibilities. Foreseeability is highly subjective although the 
control requirement contributes an objective dimension to the concept of intention to curtail 
liability according to what lay within the defendant’s control, irrespective of what the defendant 
desired.53 Moreover, foresight is an important element of intention as “consequences intended 
are necessarily foreseen, but not all consequences foreseen are necessarily intended.”54 
Therefore, if the defendant foresaw a result he or she is taken to have intended that result. 
Foreseeability is thus a less certain measure of future events occurring than intentions. This is 
because what is foreseen may not materialise or may materialise differently to a person’s 
original intention.  
The subjectivity of the mens rea requirement is reinforced in “the belief principle”55 which 
relates to “what defendants believed they were doing or risking, not on actual facts which were 
not known to them at the time.”56 The belief principle strongly values the subjective beliefs of 
the defendant and disregards what he or she ought to have known, thereby discounting the need 
for an ascribed secondary intention. Implicit in the mens rea requirement is the need for an 
element of choice on the part of the defendant.57 Therefore, choice can help to form the 
definition of intention. Requiring that the defendant has made a conscious choice also implies 
that the defendant is aware of the consequences of his or her actions but has nevertheless 
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knowingly chosen to embark on a particular course of action. Proving that the defendant has 
made a conscious choice is essential in valuing the defendant’s autonomy. 58  
Whilst an intention can relate to what the defendant believed and the likelihood of it occurring 
according to what lay within the defendant’s control, a motive can be relevant when examining 
“rationale-based defences, such as self-defence and duress.”59 Where a defendant seeks to rely 
on “rationale-based defences”,60 the defendant does both the prohibited act and intends to 
commit the act. However, the motive behind committing such offences is what diminishes 
liability as there are ulterior reasons for carrying out the prohibited act. Therefore, examining 
motive scrutinises the defendant’s mind further than an intention by examining the reasons for 
embarking on the chosen act.  
Although discussing tax law, Millet sought to discuss the meanings of the terms motive, 
intention and purpose. The discussion is relevant under criminal law due to the nature of the 
example he gives to illustrate how the various definitions work in practice. Millet has asserted 
that ““motive” is the reason why; “purpose” is the aim, or object, or end in view.”61 The 
aforementioned terms are all considerations which are deliberated upon before the execution 
of an act. The term “aim” can be interpreted as meaning the same as “object”.62 “Purpose” 
denotes “object [or] thing intended.”63 Therefore, Millet argues, an intention can correspond 
with the eventual purpose. Motive relates to “that which induces a person to act”64 and can also 
connote “the purpose behind a course of action.”65 Therefore, motive and purpose can have the 
same meaning. To reinforce the connection between the two terms, “intention” is the “thing 
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intended [or] purpose.”66 Therefore, Millet’s example demonstrates how the terms “motive”, 
“purpose”, and “intention” can be conflated.  
Millet’s example shows a clear distinction between motives and purposes. He gives the 
example of a murderer’s intent to kill to illustrate his argument. Millet claims that in carrying 
out the attack, the murderer’s “motive may be greed, or jealousy, or revenge; his purpose is to 
kill.”67 The example excellently illustrates how motives are elusive and can be numerous in 
number. In Millet’s murder example, as well as the many different possible motives, the 
murderer’s purpose may not be to kill but to injure or to frighten. Moreover, the effect, or in 
Millet’s example, the death of the victim, may not be the true intended effect which is why 
intentions are an unreliable measure. In addition to this, Millet’s murder example illustrates 
how a person’s motive reveals nothing about his or her purpose.  
It is clear that motive and intention have distinct connotations in the criminal law sphere. Whilst 
intention refers to what the defendant foresaw as the probable consequences of his or her 
actions, motive refers to the defendant’s innate “emotion leading to action”68 such as envy, 
hatred or both. Moreover, in R v Mohan69 it was held that intention includes the desire to act. 
Therefore, a defendant’s intentions do not require any emotional involvement in acting.70 It is 
also material to assess the process by which to establish the particular intention which gave rise 
to criminal liability, since people generally “do things with more than one intention in mind.”71 
In criminal law, the material issue is “whether one particular intention was present when the 
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act was committed”72 and not “with what intentions D committed the act” in general.73 The 
latter question would involve digressing from ascertaining whether the defendant had the 
precise intention for the particular crime as prescribed by legislation. Tax law tends to ask the 
latter question as demonstrated in Ramsay where the judge examined “why the taxpayer had 
purchased the scheme.” 74 If tax avoidance aligns with criminal law in examining intentions, it 
will bring tax avoidance in the sphere of deciding cases based on constructive liability.  
The terms motive and intention are therefore treated as distinct in criminal law although there 
are some definitional and practical overlaps. For example, occasionally, the finding of a 
justifiable motive can mitigate the original intention. As both influences guide behaviour, 
motives and intentions may sometimes be blurred because the two mind-frames will have the 
same effect by producing the same act. Motives and intentions can co-exist but it must be 
recognised that they are different categories of influence which guide behaviour.  
From the analysis above, there are certain keywords which together can form the definition of 
intention in the context of criminal law. Therefore, a person has the necessary intention where 
he or she knowingly and consciously chose to commit the prohibited act which the person 
believed was a foreseeable consequence of his or her actions by wilful means which lay within 
his or her control. However, defining intention does not overcome practical difficulties in 
pinpointing the relevant intention because “a man may do an act with a number of intentions”75 
and can also have multiple motives. In contrast, motive examines the defendant’s reasons or 
emotional justification in committing the crime and not merely whether they wanted to or were 
practically able to commit the prohibited act. Consequently, it can be said that a motive lacks 
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objectivity. An assessment of how the criminal law has informed the discussion on tax 
avoidance will be evaluated in this chapter’s conclusion.  
1.2 Psychological perspective  
Dissecting “the consciousness of a motive”76 implies that there exists a distinction between 
“conscious”77 and “unconscious”78 motives. These types of motives relate to whether a person 
is aware of what he or she is doing or whether the person’s actions merely form part of the 
person’s character.79 It is the conscious motive which is more relevant as the unconscious 
motive “cannot as such be a factor in deliberation”80 due to its invariable intrinsic quality.  
Psychological views on the concepts of motive and intention provide an understanding of how 
these concepts relate to the individual. For example, motive has been described as “that 
characteristic tendency or disposition of a man in virtue of which a given act possesses an 
attraction for him.”81 Therefore, an individual’s motive is typically discussed in terms of why 
he or she performs an act rather than why the person refrains from acting. Thus, the 
psychological definition of motive closely corresponds to the equivalent definition in criminal 
law which involves emotions that actively guide behaviour. In addition to this, a motive exists 
only where a degree of “reflection or deliberation”82 has taken place before a person has acted. 
The requirement of a calculated and “carefully pondered design”83 excludes “instinctive or 
impulsive action.”84 Consequently, a person’s motive is formed after a fairly lengthy amount 
of deliberation.  
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Motive and intention have also been differentiated according to the degree of dominance each 
influence has in a person’s mind. In psychology, an intention has been described as existing in 
the present tense as the more conscious form of intellectual guidance as it is said to be “actually 
present to the mind of the agent at the moment of action.”85 Conversely, a motive is described 
obscurely as the unconscious guidance and is “something… at the back of a man’s mind which 
influences his decision.”86 This idea of motive as a subconscious influence links with the 
problematic notion that a person’s motive can be “hidden not only from the spectator but even 
from the agent himself.”87 Therefore, the psychological view of motive appears to portray this 
guidance as vague and incapable of accurate ascertainment, which illustrates why it is 
unsuitable for judicial determination. However, in some circumstances, a person may be aware 
of his or her motive particularly where the motives are positive motives such as love or 
admiration. Conversely, motives such as jealousy or greed may be less obvious to a person.  
Despite the subjectivity of a motive, psychology has recognised an objective dimension akin 
to the criminal law’s control requirement. It has been rationalised that “that which influences 
the mind must be something in that which is before the mind.”88 Therefore, the chosen form of 
conduct must also be realistic and capable of accomplishment. However, this objective 
component does not assist in establishing one’s motive where several avenues of action are 
present; all of which may be achievable. Establishing what is capable of achievement only 
narrows down the range of possible motives.  
The psychological perspective of a motive accentuates the individuality of the concept. Snow 
places emphasis on the individual environmental and historical factors which shape a person’s 
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motives.89 Although motives cannot be quantified, generally, “a motive is said to be selfish.”90 
Consequently, a motive is the reason for acting whereby the individual hopes to achieve an 
advantage or personal gain which can be difficult for anyone other than the individual to 
ascertain. Snow elucidates the problem of establishing motive by theorising that motives can 
differ in “case[s] of like activity of different individuals.”91 To complicate matters further, 
differences in motives can also exist during “the same activity at different times for the same 
person.”92 Therefore, the elusive nature of motive makes it difficult for anyone, including the 
judiciary, to decipher the motive of another. Stocks however, reinforces that a motive is highly 
subjective as it can be coloured by one’s personal character.93 One’s character can shape a 
person’s decision-making “since it is from his character that his projects of action draw their 
attractiveness or repulsiveness.”94 
Although character drives action, it has also been recognised that people are judged by their 
actions, not by their character, as the latter is not always known, particularly by those not 
known to the individual.95 Furthermore, a motive can be attached to blame where “the man 
does not employ his attained experience and intellectual capacity”.96 Experience and intellect 
are highly subjective traits which further reinforces the multifarious nature of motives as they 
differ greatly between different people according to what is expected of them. Moreover, 
people tend to “infer in the first instance from the act to the character and not from the character 
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to the act.”97 Consequently, the act itself should be examined first which renders an exploration 
of his or her motive unnecessary.  
Despite psychology being concerned with the minds of individuals, Stocks has rightly asserted 
that “evidence of character or motive is action.”98 Therefore, the only way to ascertain one’s 
motive is to observe the person’s actions. It is consequently futile to examine the actions of the 
individual in conjunction with his or her motives. Moreover, the scientific approach is to ask 
“what have you done?”99 rather than to question why it has been done.  
Purpose has been entangled with motive in psychology which suggests that perhaps the 
concepts cannot be disentangled. There are similarities between “the idea in mind, the purpose 
[and] desire.”100 Desire or the reason why a person is acting is also associated with motive as 
demonstrated above.  
The emphasis in psychological literature seems to be on motive as evidenced in action rather 
than being an emotion which drives action; although it is capable of both interpretations. It is 
more scientific to focus on motive as evidenced in action although it could be argued that if 
motive is evidenced in action, one only has to scrutinise the evidence unless establishing the 
relevant emotion is explicitly required in addition to the traceable action. Moreover, there is a 
logical preference to judge action based on what is conscious as even “the will, [although] not 
conscious of itself, is yet conscious of all that it enacts.”101 
From the analysis on the psychological views of motive, the definition of what a motive is 
clearer. A motive is a conscious or unconscious influence, which is coloured by a person’s 
character and formed after deliberation. It is the reason why the person performed the 
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achievable act which is typically for selfish reasons and can be an emotion. In contrast to this, 
an intention is a conscious form of intellectual guidance which is associated with the present 
tense and is followed through to the time of action.  
1.3 Philosophical perspective  
Philosophical views follow the general consensus that a motive relates to why a person acts. 
Similarly, Scott defines a motive as “that on account of which a person acts.”102 As will be 
seen, motives, intentions and purposes can differ according to what time-frame each is referring 
to.  
Scott claims that a motive is dissimilar to a justification103 which suggests that “a person can 
have a desire to do something without thinking that she ought… to do it.”104 Therefore, motives 
can lack justification. Interestingly, Anscombe suggests that intentions can also legitimately 
lack justification as when “people… give accounts of future events…they do not justify these 
accounts by producing reasons why they should be believed”.105 However, Anscombe draws a 
similarity between an intention and a command106 as they both suggest “what…would be good 
to make happen with a view to an objective”107 but it is not the objective. Moreover, whilst a 
motive can describe why a person acts, intentions are recognised by their descriptive nature.108 
It is important to recognise that both motives and intentions can exist without any subsequent 
action. Anscombe recognises that “a man can form an intention which he then does nothing to 
carry out…but the intention itself can be complete, although it remains a purely interior 
thing.”109 Similarly, a person can, for example, have a motive for murder and be questioned as 
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one of the potential suspects but, still be innocent. Nevertheless, Scheer believes that motive 
precedes action, and that, without action, there can be no motive.110 
The terms motive, intention and purpose have been generally described as “what we and others 
are doing or will do.”111 Although vague, this definition is useful as it indicates a distinction 
between what a person is presently doing and what he or she will do in the future. An intention 
can be described as a state of mind in the future tense which refers to “a course of action that a 
person has adopted as well as an objective, end or goal.”112 However, Anscombe believes that 
“intention…only occurs in present action.”113 The notion of an intention being a present 
influence derives from the fact that intentions are formed in the present and may not materialise 
although the person had the intention for his or her actions to be realised at that time. 
Anscombe’s view is more verifiable as she asserts that there cannot be a “further intention with 
which a man does what he does; and no such thing as intention for the future.”114 In contrast, a 
motive is “pointing to something past as a reason”115 and is also associated with guiding 
behaviour in the present. Therefore, motive and intention are used to indicate different time-
frames.   
Motives and intentions also differ according to the levels of persuasion they have on a person. 
For example, “a motive may prove compelling”116 although the same cannot be said about 
intentions.117 Intentions can be described as both “goals and courses of action”118 and it is for 
this reason that the judiciary switch between examining the intention of the end result and 
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intentions within the process of executing a course of action. When a person has an intention, 
the desire to act is implied; however motives reveal “what produces the desire.”119 
Interestingly, motives are related to acts which are “slightly or egregiously shady”120 although 
one can be described as having “honourable intentions.”121 Consequently, there is an element 
of deceit with motives. Moreover, analogous to the psychological view of motives being 
selfish, Scott believes that “self-interest is the only motive to which a reasonable person can 
give such absolute weight in planning her life.”122 However, the negative connotations 
associated with one’s motive cannot be applied to all types of motives as both “revenge and 
gratitude are motives.”123 Therefore, motives are not always selfish or suspicious.  
The Utilitarian view of motive emphasises the subjective nature of the concept. The Utilitarian 
viewpoint also contributes to the distinction between motive and intention and differs from the 
psychological perspective of the importance of motive as an innate feeling. The Utilitarian 
definition of motive is “the personal frame of mind which indicates why he means to do”124 the 
act. Anscombe further explains the distinction between a motive and an intention by 
rationalising that “a man’s intention is what he aims at or chooses, his motive is what 
determines the aim or choice.”125 Anscombe uses the example of when someone wants to make 
a gain and states that the “gain must be the intention, and desire of gain the motive.”126 An 
intention is “descriptive of the end”127 that an actor wishes to bring about. Therefore, an 
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intention elucidates what the choice of the actor is. In contrast, a motive precedes an intention 
as it is “what produces or brings about a choice.”128 
To the Utilitarians, it is far more significant to judge behaviour based on “the external outcome 
[and] the objective change which is made in the common world.”129 A motive is therefore 
considered to be the manifestations of one’s actions. Thus, it is “irrelevant and misleading to 
bother with the private emotional state of the doer’s mind.”130 Consequently, “acts, not feelings 
count”131 as the former is more verifiable. The Utilitarian approach also coincides with the 
criminal law descriptions of motive as involving emotions.  
The Utilitarians place emphasis on the concept of motive as involving pluralistic reasons for 
acting as the concept has been described as “certain states of consciousness which happen to 
be uppermost in a man’s mind as he acts.”132 This view differs greatly from the psychological 
description of motive which refers to a motive as being a subconscious influence.  
There are proponents of the view that these influences cannot be distinguished. To distinguish 
these influences would indicate that “there are three or four different entities ‘within me’- a 
reason, an intention, a motive or purpose- each of which explain why I did what I did.”133 
However, when these terms are dissected, it is clear that different meanings are attributed to 
them. Wilkins divides the term motive into having three different meanings; “to mark the 
presence of a reason for acting”134, “a reason for acting and to indicate that this is in fact an 
agent’s reason for acting”135 and lastly, “to mark the presence of a disposition in an agent for 
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acting in a certain way under certain kinds of circumstances.”136 Wilkins emphasises that 
merely having a reason for acting does not mean someone has in fact acted.137 The first meaning 
of motive therefore lacks coercive force and supports the aforementioned notion that motive 
can exist without action.  
The second connotation of motive provides a more active dimension by including “prepositions 
such as ‘in order to’”.138 Wilkins refers to the second meaning as “the occurrent sense of 
motive”139 and claims this form of motive most closely relates to the meaning of intention.140 
He elucidates how motive and intention can only be interchangeable where motive is used in 
this context.141 Wilkins describes an intention as being “a decision or choice to bring about a 
certain, rather specific state of affairs.”142 Wilkin’s definition of intention and motive, in the 
“occurrent sense”143, are both used in the present tense and relate to a specified future goal.144 
However, he is careful to highlight that the similarities between these terms are limited where 
“means to that goal or end”145 are discussed. In this situation, “‘intention’” is marking the 
means and “motive” the end.”146 It is impossible to combine motive with intention in this sense 
as intention is used to denote the method used and a motive can never mean a method.  
Anscombe also differentiates between the first two meanings of motive as described by Wilkins 
although does not recognise the connection between motive and intention in the second sense 
of the interpretation. Anscombe identifies an intention similar to Wilkin’s first interpretation 
of motive which lacks coercive force and refers to “a man’s intention of doing what he does.”147 
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This form of intention can be largely descriptive and merely elucidates “what a proposed action 
is.”148 The second understanding of intention is similar to a motive as it examines “his intention 
in doing it”149 or the “intention with which a man does what he does.”150 When scrutinising the 
latter meaning, Anscombe asserts that this can “often not be seen from seeing what he does.”151 
A person’s intention in carrying out an act seems to question what benefit he or she plans to 
derive from acting therefore, this limb of intention closely accords to a motive. Wilkins’ third 
sense of motive utilises “a preposition such as “from’”152 and uses emotions to describe where 
the motives derived from.153 When used in this sense, motive and intention differ greatly as an 
intention cannot be an emotion but one’s motive can be an emotion.  
Anscombe further categorises an intention as including a “reason for acting”154 which is 
differentiated from a cause.155 She makes this distinction in order to highlight that an intention 
should be voluntary as “it is a reason, as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary 
and intentional.”156 A reason is “a response to something as having a significance that is dwelt 
on by the agent…surrounded with thoughts and questions.”157 In contrast to this, a cause is 
more of a trigger external to the actor which causes the actor to act involuntarily without 
aforethought. Anscombe also likens intentions to predictions by referring to “expressions of 
intention… [as] predictions justified… by a reason for acting as opposed to a reason for 
thinking them true.”158  
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The notion of an intention being a reason for acting rather than being a cause is an important 
distinction as reasons and causes can be unclear in practice. Anscombe asserts that a motive 
“is what moves…glossed as ‘what causes’ a man’s actions.” 159 However, it must be borne in 
mind that intentional actions cannot be recognised by “any extra feature which exists when it 
is performed.”160 As Dworkin recognised, an intention is “a conscious mental state”.161 
Moreover, there are also common actions that people want to and do perform without any deep 
thought which Anscombe terms “preintentional”162 actions.  
Motives and intentions have also been differentiated according to the tense in which these terms 
are used. Anscombe divides the concept of motive according to whether it is a motive relating 
to the past, present or future. She distinguishes “backward-looking motives”163 from those 
which are “forward-looking”.164 Anscombe explains that “backward-looking motives”165 relate 
to the past166 and include motives such as “revenge…gratitude…remorse and pity”.167 These 
motives in the past tense are also differentiated from “motives-in-general”168 which Anscombe 
generally describes as an influence which is specifically thought of prior to acting.169 
Significantly, Anscombe blurs motives and intentions by stating that “a motive [is] forward-
looking if it is an intention.”170 This analogy reinforces that an intention is an influence 
associated with the future tense.  
Whilst intentions and motives broadly explain what a person will do or why the person is 
performing an act, Krikorian claims that “the purpose of an act… is observable in the results 
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of that act.”171 Purpose as an end result is clearly observable through the example “the purpose 
of a saw is to cut”172 as “the result [is] the fulfilment of [the] purpose.”173 However, Krikorian 
warns that one should not simply look for the results of an act which may be merely 
consequential174 but the “purposive result.”175 The rationale derived from the example of the 
purpose inanimate saw however cannot be applied to people in the same way. This is because 
with inanimate objects “there is a common result which is usually…accomplished.”176 It is 
more difficult to establish the purpose of a tax avoidance scheme unless similar schemes have 
been carried out in a similar way which corresponded with the common result of the type of 
scheme.  
Due to the inherent problems in examining the common result to ascertain a purpose, Krikorian 
advises to assess the “expected result of that class of act.”177 The “expected result”178 is one of 
two “levels of action”179 and is described as the “anticipation of the observer who interprets 
the activity because of prior acquaintance with certain routine[s]”.180 Consequently, a person’s 
purpose may be established by a spectator who has experience of dealing with the same 
practices. Whatever the spectator predicts is the likely result is the purpose of the act. However, 
the predicted result is not always the correct purpose.181 Even if the predicted purpose is the 
correct purpose, it may not be fulfilled.182 The second level of the act is the “subordinate acts 
which are the means for the attainment of the end.”183 The means-end relationship is important 
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to establish whether an accurate prediction of purpose can be made because “as ends become 
definite the means become definite.”184 
A purpose is aligned with a specific goal and the person usually “persist[s] until they reach the 
goal or are defeated.”185 Therefore, a person’s purpose is generally to achieve his or her 
ultimate goal. Motives can be what causes the desire although; a purpose is the “foresight or 
desire”.186 However, purposes are equally as changeable as intentions as there can be a 
“growing purpose of which we become aware at a comparatively advanced stage of our 
action.”187 Similarly, it cannot be assumed that all purposes are clear and achieved through a 
seamless relationship of steps. With “complex, confusing purposes…these relations become 
tentative, experimental and delayed.”188 
Despite the variable nature of a purpose, it is described as a conscious influence which the actor 
is aware of and works towards achieving. Unlike an unconscious motive, a purpose is “what is 
most dominant in our attention at that moment.”189 However, if a person discovers “new 
suggestions and possibilities… the final result can hardly be described as the realisation of a 
preconceived plan.”190 Therefore, a predetermined plan is intrinsic to the concept of a 
predictable purpose. However, if new ideas are considered and implemented, it may lead to a 
new purpose being sought. Moreover, the requirement of a plan connects with the idea that a 
purpose is usually discussed in the future tense as “prospective expressions”191 because “the 
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expected-result has not been accomplished.”192 Consequently, a purpose can be described “as 
a future cause which determines the present action”193 such as the means to attain the end. 
Anscombe, Wilkins and Scheer all appear to agree that intention is discussed in the present 
tense regarding future action. Moreover, if a person has a motive, intention or purpose, it 
insinuates that he or she also have a reason for acting. Therefore, the presence of a reason is a 
wide concept which is not helpful on its own in differentiating between motive, intention and 
purpose. Both motive and intention can exist without subsequent action.  
Anscombe and Finnis appear to disagree in regards to the limits as to what a person can intend. 
Anscombe believes that “agents can intend performances that are actually possible (what is 
possible falling as it does within the constraints of the actual) not performances that are merely 
conceivably possible.”194 In contrast, Finnis argues that “it is assumed that one’s actual choice 
of means can be defined in terms of what is conceivably possible.”195 However, Anscombe’s 
argument has greater merit as “she is said to identify intention by reference to the cause-effect 
sequence that might be transparent to an observer rather than by reference to the practical 
reasoning of the agent.”196 Moreover, Anscombe argues that “practical thinking about means 
has to count as determinative of one’s means, what one has to aim to do in the circumstances 
in which one is obliged to act.”197 Furthermore, Anscombe distinguished between an intention 
and a side effect198 which led her to conclude that “the inseparability of the effect—is not a 
ground for regarding it as intended.”199 
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Laurence theorised “an Anscombian approach to collective action”200 which is relevant given 
that many of tax avoidance schemes which will be discussed in chapter 2 are carried out by 
companies. He raised the problem of uncovering the intention of a group as “there is no one 
mind shared by a collective agent that might serve as the subject of psychological states”.201 
Laurence sought to ascertain the “shared intention”202 of a collective. He argues that the 
collective intention is not where “each has an individual intention with the same content as the 
individual intentions of the other agents acting. But we’re interested in a thicker sense of 
sharing an intention.”203 The latter type of intention is where the individuals within the 
collective “share in one and the same intention”.204 Laurence states that “people are acting 
together intentionally if and only if their actions can all be straightforwardly instrumentally 
rationalised by the same action.”205 
There are limits to Laurence’s argument which Laurence himself recognises. He admits that  
“sometimes the people performing a particular action may not know why they’re performing 
it, and sometimes the people who know the end that ultimately explains what everyone is doing 
may not know what particular actions are serving that end.”206 
However, despite the confusion that may arise from collective activities, Laurence maintains 
that “everyone will know something”207 due to their “non-observational knowledge”.208 
Therefore, “just as a collective agent can only act through the actions of its individual members, 
it can only know through their knowing, and reason through their reasoning”. 209 Consequently, 
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Laurence’s theory is “mysterious [as to] what it is to share an intention”.210 His theory explains 
that a group can share a purpose but their collective intentions can be difficult to ascertain even 
for members of the collective. Therefore, whilst a collective purpose may be ascertainable by 
the judiciary, a collective intention is less clear.  
From the above analysis, a motive can be said to be a compelling guidance which produces the 
desire to act. It explains why a person wants to embark on a particular course of action and can 
be pluralistic in nature. Motives also encapsulate emotions as a person may choose to act based 
on his or her emotions which are driving them unconsciously towards performing the eventual 
act. 
An intention has been portrayed as being descriptive of the steps which lead to the person’s 
objective. Intentions also reveal what the person wants to do as well as what his or her choice 
or decision is. It is used in the present tense regarding actions in the future. A person’s 
intentions are usually specific and explain what the means or method will be used to accomplish 
the eventual goal. This sense of intention referring to which methods will be used is the most 
suitable for the purposes of tax law. Intentions have also been described as what the person 
hopes to benefit and intentions in this sense can inadvertently be blurred with motive.  
A person’s purpose is a conscious guidance which relates to what his or her specific end goal 
is. It is predetermined although, like intentions, purposes are changeable. Purposes must be 
differentiated from what Krikorian terms “subordinate acts”211 which are the steps executed in 
the plan rather than the predetermined eventual result.  
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1.4 Tax law perspective 
The taxpayer’s motives, intentions and purposes are discussed at length in the area of trading 
within tax law. The clearest way to assess the context in which the judiciary use these terms is 
to examine case law. Scrutinising how motive, intention and purpose are used by the judiciary 
may help to refine further the definitions of these terms. Where the judiciary have used these 
terms interchangeably or inconsistently, the consequences of doing so will be highlighted. 
Also, the difference in outcomes where the judiciary examine subjective factors over objective 
considerations will be examined.  
1.4 (a) Trading 
Trades are not defined effectively under the Income Tax Act 2007 as the Act merely states that 
a trade “includes any venture in the nature of trade.”212 The definitional problem has been 
aided, but not resolved, by the common law due to the fact that a “‘trade’ is more indefinite 
than most words used in Acts of Parliament.”213 The badges of trade developed by the Royal 
Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income and subsequently refined and supplemented 
by the common law are used to help in establishing whether a person is trading. Interestingly, 
one of the badges allows the judiciary to examine the taxpayer’s motives where the transaction 
is deemed to be equivocal.214 In addition to the badges of trade, it has been held that judges 
should also seek to establish the existence of a commercial purpose to establish that a taxpayer 
is trading.215 As seen above, the term “purpose” has been described in philosophy as pertaining 
to the end result, and will be applied to in this context.  
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The taxpayer’s motives and purposes were considered in Iswera v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue216(Iswera). In this case, Lord Reid emphasised that as the taxpayer’s activities 
satisfied all the badges of trade, there was no need to examine the taxpayer’s purpose.217 
Nevertheless, it was held that the taxpayer was trading and a relevant consideration was the 
subjective assumption that “the appellant’s dominant motive was to make a profit.”218 
However, making a profit could be both the taxpayer’s motive and purpose and it is 
questionable why an examination of purpose was excluded. Moreover, the finding that the 
desire to make profit was a dominant motive suggests that there exists some other motive or 
motives. Lord Reid accepted that the taxpayer had “obtained what she had been seeking - an 
opportunity to reside near her daughters' school.”219 Consequently, she did not have a 
commercial purpose and even if it was submitted that she did, it was admitted that being near 
her daughter’s school was her main purpose. Therefore, she would have two purposes. 
However, if it was truly believed that there existed two purposes, their Lordships would have 
submitted that she obtained part of what she was sought by residing close to her daughter’s 
school. Nevertheless, when the issue of purposes and motives became too complex, the court 
bluntly concluded that the taxpayer’s “purpose or object alone cannot prevail over what he in 
fact [did].”220 
Iswera clearly illustrates the problems of dividing the taxpayer’s purpose into dominant and 
ancillary purposes and it has been suggested that perhaps this complex issue should not be 
brought under scrutiny at all.221 As established by the philosophical interpretation of purpose, 
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purposes are changeable although, usually a person has one distinct purpose. Any acts in 
between are merely “subordinate acts”222 which are a means to achieve that primary purpose.  
The earlier case of Religious Tract and Book Society of Scotland v R.S. Forbes223 (Forbes) took 
a different approach to that in Iswera. The court in Iswera reasoned that the taxpayer’s actions 
were decisive and that her purpose could not be material in light of activities executed.224 Had 
this reasoning been applied in Forbes, the court would have concluded that the taxpayer was 
trading. However, in Forbes, the taxpayers’ purpose of “administering religious advice”225 was 
paramount in deciding whether their colportage activities constituted trading. A finding of 
trading would have allowed the taxpayer to offset their losses against their profits made from 
their bookshop business. The court seemed to focus on the fact that the colportage activities 
did not make a profit226 although, making a profit is not one of the badges of trade and should 
therefore not be relevant. However, the colporteurs had books for sale. Thus, it can be argued 
that the colportage activities were not solely charitable as the books could have been distributed 
for free. Moreover, it is uncertain whether a preference for considering the taxpayer’s purpose 
over their motive altered the outcome of the case. 
In Iswera, had the court acknowledged that the plots of land were bought in order to achieve 
the taxpayer’s purpose of being near her daughter’s school, the trading conclusion would not 
have been reached. Similarly, in Forbes, had the court focused on the taxpayer’s purpose of 
selling religious materials which were available for sale by the colporteurs, it is likely that the 
taxpayer would have been found to be trading. The judiciary in Forbes decided that the 
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taxpayer’s primary purpose was purely religious despite the fact that the colportage activities 
comprised of “a combination of the sale of books with a missionary enterprise.”227 
The facts of Iswera are similar to those in Kirkham v Williams228 (Kirkham) however, the 
taxpayer’s intentions in the latter case were decisive. The taxpayer bought property for use as 
office space and storage. Permission and work to build a dwelling-house on the land was 
obtained and carried out after the purchase. Once sold, the issue of whether the taxpayer was 
trading was raised but the court took into account that he did not intend to reside there with his 
family.229 When making the initial purchase, the intention of the taxpayer, or the steps taken in 
order to achieve his purpose, had not “moved out of the zone of contemplation - out of the 
sphere of the tentative, the provisional and the exploratory - into the valley of decision.”230 The 
taxpayer was deemed not to be trading. The court therefore emphasised the speculative and 
changeable nature of one’s intention and in turn conveyed the stability of a decided purpose. 
Moreover, in order to examine the taxpayer’s intentions, the court effectively implied that the 
facts in Kirkham were more equivocal than in Iswera. This is because in Kirkham, the 
taxpayer’s actions pointed in a number of different directions, some of which pointed to trade, 
and some of which pointed to the acquisition of a capital asset for the business. The taxpayer’s 
tentative intentions were decisive in Kirkham whereas in Iswera, the court examined what the 
taxpayer actually did. The discrepancies between Iswera and Kirkham illustrate how examining 
intentions can drastically alter a decision.  
Interestingly, although the taxpayer’s purpose was considered paramount in Forbes, in Grove 
v YMCA,231(Grove) motive was not considered paramount despite the fact that the case 
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appeared to be equivocal. The YMCA’s undisputed purpose was said to be the “improvement 
of the spiritual, mental, social and physical condition of young men.”232 However, this 
charitable purpose was said to apply to all departments within the YMCA, excluding the 
restaurant which was found to be a trade.233 There were no issues raised of ambiguity as it was 
held that the restaurant was carried out on “usual commercial principles.”234 Due to the 
charitable intentions of the YMCA, Grove implies that a profit motive is irrelevant in 
determining whether an activity amounts to a trade as it was recognised that the restaurant 
would continue to operate irrespective of a profit.235  
The irrelevance of a profit motive was also supported in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v 
Reinhold236 (Reinhold) despite the fact that the taxpayer “admitted that he had bought the 
property not as a residence for himself but for sale”237, unlike in Iswera where the court placed 
emphasis on the isolated nature of the purchase and sale of the four properties.238 Lord Carmont 
warned that conclusions of trading should not be drawn automatically based on “a man’s 
intention not to hold an investment.”239 Similarly, Lord Russell advised against viewing the 
taxpayer’s purpose as conclusive240 as it disregards other important factors.241 Despite the self-
confessed intention to sell the property, the court held that the taxpayer was not trading and 
that an intention to make a profit on the sale of property is insufficient evidence to amount to 
trading.242 The purchase of the property was instead viewed as an investment. Reinhold 
reinforces the fact that the taxpayer’s motive is irrelevant where a transaction is deemed to be 
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unequivocal and the question of what amounts to an equivocal transaction is for the judiciary 
to decide. 
Similarly, in Taylor v Good243 (Taylor) the taxpayer was held not to be trading despite the fact 
that a profit was made. The point of contention in the case was the controversy surrounding 
whether the taxpayer engaged in “supervening trading”244 after acquiring the property which 
relied heavily on his intentions to resolve. The taxpayer purchased property and adjoining land 
with the intention of residing in it. Approximately three years later, the taxpayer’s intentions 
had changed and he sought planning permission in order to develop it before resale by building 
90 houses. The difficulty arose from the fact that “an adventure in the nature of trade had started 
at some time after the purchase.”245 When the case was heard in the High Court prior to appeal, 
the judge placed emphasis on the prerequisite of an intention to trade. Subjective considerations 
were given emphasis where Megarry J. stated that “a man cannot trade before he begins to 
trade, nor embark upon an adventure before he has thought of it.”246 In Taylor, the court 
analysed the taxpayer’s intentions in conjunction with the timing of the events. However, the 
isolated nature of the transaction also facilitated a conclusion of not trading as buying and 
selling properties was not in line with the taxpayer’s ordinary business activities.247 However, 
this point was not given weight to in Iswera.  
Although the taxpayer’s motives are examined in trading, they are meant to be considered as 
a last resort where the judge has exhausted applying the other objective badges of trade. It is 
arguable that, in tax avoidance, examining subjective factors should equally only be used as 
a last resort. The concept of what constitutes an equivocal activity is a source of the confusion 
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in trading as it determines whether the court can consider the taxpayer’s purpose or motives. 
Furthermore, there is no guidance to suggest what constitutes an equivocal transaction which 
ultimately leaves the concepts of motive, intention and purpose at the discretion of the 
judiciary. Nevertheless, the common trend appears to deem a transaction equivocal where it 
conflicts with “the way the individual makes his living.”248 Although examining the 
taxpayer’s current occupation does not aid in defining a trade, it has been held that “it is 
inevitable that the boundary line should not be precisely drawn.”249 However, the task of 
establishing whether a taxpayer is trading or merely seeks to obtain a fiscal advantage is 
assisted by the fact that there is usually a tax avoidance motive where large losses are 
generated or where tax relief is sought.250  
Consistency could be achieved through the decision as to whether there should be an 
“abandonment of motive, or, acceptance of motive… in all cases.”251 Although the case law 
on trading demonstrates that there are problems as to when motive should be examined, the 
case law in this area also illustrated the inconsistencies in scrutinising motive. An assessment 
of the area of trading reveals that the conclusions as to tax liability should be decided “by a 
detailed analysis of the terms and circumstances of the transaction itself without inquiry into 
the motives and subjective aspirations of those who affected it.”252 However, as motive is one 
of the badges of trade, it is unlikely that motive will be disregarded as a consideration. 
Although, as demonstrated, where judges are seeking the motives of the taxpayer, they are in 
fact seeking what the taxpayer’s purpose is in embarking on the transaction. Therefore, purpose 
would be a more fitting badge of trade.  
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1.4 (b) Expenditure 
In the majority of the aforementioned trading cases, it was fiscally advantageous to the taxpayer 
not to be seen as trading. However, there are circumstances where taxpayers desire to be 
classified as trading for example, to deduct losses incurred in trade from the computation of 
their profits253 which was the position in Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd. Stokes254 (Ensign 
Tankers). The taxpayers sought to deduct a $14 million spend on the production of a film 
although, no more than $3.25m was spent in reality. In this case, it was held in the High Court 
that the motives of the taxpayer are irrelevant and the focus should be on the purpose of the 
transaction.255 The House of Lords found that the arrangement was carried out “with the object 
of avoiding tax and not with the object of trading.”256 Moreover, motives and intentions were 
criticised by the Court of Appeal as being subjective257 which implies that purpose is more 
objective. Examining the “purpose or object of the transaction”258 allows for more objective 
scrutiny to be made by questioning what end the transaction appeared to be aiming for. 
However, the judge accepted that previous cases have shown that “evidence of the subjective 
intention of the parties is admissible and relevant.”259 Therefore, it is important that any 
conclusions based on subjective assessments, must be supported by evidence. Furthermore, 
despite the inherent difficulties in seeking to establish the subjective mind of a company,260 the 
intentions of the five partners of the taxpayer, Victory Partnership, was discussed in Ensign 
Tankers.261  
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Interestingly, in Ensign Tankers, there was a union of the terms object and purpose. It was held 
that “the sole object of the transaction was fiscal advantage”262 therefore, there was “no place 
for there being any commercial purpose.”263 This presupposes that a person cannot have an 
object that conflicts with his or her purpose as they are the same. However, the terms purpose 
and intention were equated and blurred in Ensign Tankers where it was assumed that as the 
“paramount intention was a fiscal advantage…it postulates the existence of some other 
purpose.”264  
In contrast to the decision in Taylor, the court did not find it relevant that the taxpayer in 
Arndale Properties Ltd. v Coates,265(Arndale) was a dealer in property. In Arndale, the 
taxpayer companies wanted the assignment of a lease of land to another subsidiary to be 
regarded as trading in order to claim loss relief among the subsidiary group. The lease was 
acquired for £2.2 million more than the market value of it. The lease was assigned by the 
property developer company, SPI, to the property dealer company, Arndale. The point of 
dispute was whether the subsequent assignment from Arndale to the subsidiary investment 
company, APTL, could be regarded as trading and therefore an allowable trading loss. The 
court held that although Arndale was a dealer in property, “the object of the assignment was to 
enable Arndale to convert the potential capital loss…into a trading loss.”266 Moreover, the lease 
was not viewed as part of Arndale’s trading stock.267 Therefore, the taxpayer companies were 
not trading nor did the taxpayers have “any intention of trading with the lease.”268 
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1.4 (c) Dividend stripping   
As demonstrated above, a profit is not indicative of trading. Dividend stripping cases also 
demonstrate how a profit or a lack of profit is not conclusive as to trading. In dividend stripping 
cases, there are generally no obvious profits made but the taxpayer can nevertheless be trading. 
Although, the more recent cases have departed from this view. A typical dividend stripping 
case involves a taxpayer who buys a company with forthcoming dividend disbursements and 
removes the profits from the business. The taxpayer then sells the shares in the business at a 
loss due to the extracted profits and claims that he or she has made an overall loss in order to 
offset the gain and avoid paying tax. In reality, no gain or loss is sustained through buying then 
selling the shares as the profits are extracted without paying tax on the profits. However, courts 
have acknowledged that the transactions entered into are genuine and cannot rightly be labelled 
sham transactions269 which have led to mixed responses among the judiciary.  
The matter of whether one could seek a fiscal advantage and still be categorised as trading was 
settled in Griffiths v J.P. Harrison Ltd270 (Harrison). The case concerned a typical dividend 
stripping scenario whereby shares of the company Claiborne Ltd. were bought and sold with 
the aim of avoiding tax. Despite the court acknowledging that the object of the transactions 
was clearly to offset the losses against the dividend the taxpayer gained in Claiborne Ltd, the 
court held by a majority, that the taxpayer was trading.271 The decision was arrived at using 
objective methods as, despite the taxpayer’s motives for dealing in shares, Viscount Simonds 
for the majority, asserted that there is “nothing that enables me to say that it is not a trading 
transaction.”272 Moreover, the irrelevancy of a profit motive was applied to its fullest in order 
to support the trading finding.273 Interestingly, Lord Denning in his dissenting speech asserted 
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that a profit motive would indicate trading.274 Lord Guest, for the majority, implied that the 
issue is not whether there is a profit motive at the beginning or during the arrangement as “the 
Revenue is not concerned with the particular method of trading: they are only concerned with 
the results of the business.”275 This suggests that the existence of a profit is given more weight 
than a profit motive when deciding whether a taxpayer is trading although; neither factor is a 
legal requirement. Moreover, the dissenting views expressed that the intentions of the taxpayer 
should be taken into account in order to arrive at the conclusion that a fiscal advantage was 
sought beneath the cloak of trading.276 However, Lord Guest concluded that the intention of 
obtaining a fiscal advantage and generating a loss were irrelevant.277  
The objective criterion formulated in CIR v Livingston278 was applied in Harrison to conclude 
that the taxpayer was trading which asked  
“whether the operations involved in it are of the same kind, and carried on in the same 
way, as those which are characteristic of ordinary trading in the line of business in 
which the venture was made.”279 
In Harrison, although the taxpayer’s motive was to obtain a fiscal advantage, the transactions 
indicated trading when viewed objectively. Conversely, in Finsbury Securities Ltd. v IRC,280 
(Finsbury) when viewed objectively, the arrangement indicated that the taxpayers sought a 
fiscal advantage and were not trading. Furthermore, little weight was attributed to the 
taxpayers’ motives in arriving at conclusion against trading. In contrast to Harrison, in 
Finsbury, the taxpayers owned preferred shares in Warshaw & Sons Ltd. which guaranteed 
that the taxpayers would receive regular dividends for the successive five years in order to 
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gradually reclaim the company’s profits.281 The company wanted the court to hold that it was 
trading in order to claim loss relief on the diminution of the shares. However, the court held 
that the scheme was constructed so that the taxpayers “did not stand to lose and that the 
company did not stand to gain”282 when the shares were later sold at a loss. The court affirmed 
the decision in Harrison by stating that even if motive was examined in that case, it made 
little difference and “it was not capable of being made better or worse”283 by doing so. 
Finsbury also involved an unusual condition in the arrangement as there was an agreement 
to hold the shares for five years which was held to be remote from ordinary share-dealing 
transactions where shares could be freely bought and sold.284 This rationale led the court to 
conclude that “it was a wholly artificial device remote from trade to secure a tax 
advantage.”285  
The issue of whether the taxpayer’s motives are relevant in deciding whether a taxpayer is 
trading was discussed at length in F.A. & A.B. Ltd. v Lupton286 (Lupton). The taxpayer 
company, a dealer in shares, sought to claim loss relief for losses sustained during the course 
of its trade. The court acknowledged that the general view is that one cannot be trading where 
the motive for entering into the transaction was to obtain a fiscal benefit although cited 
Harrison as breaking away from this trend.287 Furthermore, it was recognised that a finding of 
trading could be drastically changed “once the motive which inspired it is known.”288 
Accordingly, in Lupton, greater weight was placed on the taxpayer’s motives for embarking on 
the transaction thus the court departed from the approach in Harrison. Consequently, the court 
concluded that the taxpayer was not trading. Lupton is a landmark case which clearly illustrated 
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how the judges reasoned that the “the fiscal motive had so infected the transactions themselves 
that they had ceased to be trading transactions.”289 The dividend stripping cases are an 
important illustration of how the subjective intentions of the taxpayer can determine whether a 
person is trading. As demonstrated above, the more recent cases have placed greater emphasis 
on the subjective motives of the taxpayer in buying and selling shares in order to deny the 
taxpayers loss relief. The growing trend of examining the taxpayer’s motive and condemning 
dividend stripping operations is due to the taxpayer being seen as “a wolf in sheep’s clothing 
with the revenue as the prey.”290 
1.4 (d) Targeted anti-avoidance rules 
The research into defining the motive approach can be further strengthened by examining the 
use of the term “purpose” in targeted anti-avoidance rules.291 The Aaronson report “estimated 
that there are now more than 300 targeted anti-avoidance rules”.292 Therefore, it is useful to 
examine a selection of the TAARs which make reference to the taxpayer’s purpose in order to 
gain a deeper understanding as to how this term is used in practice.  
Many of the TAARs in tax legislation use the term “purpose” without attempting to provide a 
definition of this term. For example, the TAAR introduced by the Finance Act 2016 in relation 
to peer-to-peer lending uses the term “purpose”. The TAAR was inserted into s412I of the 
Income Tax Act 2007. The provision states that income tax relief would be permitted where 
the “loan… is not part of a scheme or arrangement the main purpose or one of the main 
purposes of which is to obtain a tax advantage”.293 Similarly, section 353 of the Income Tax 
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Act 2007 includes a TAAR in respect of community investment relief. This relates to the 
“entitlement to tax reductions in respect of amounts invested by individuals in community 
development finance institutions.”294 The TAAR states that “the investment must not be made 
as part of a scheme or arrangement the main purpose or one of the main purposes of which is 
the avoidance of tax.”295 Again, there is no attempt to define the term “purpose”.  
A TAAR was introduced in 2016 to prevent the treatment of a distribution from a company 
winding-up as being capital in nature. Therefore, the distribution would be treated as income 
for tax purposes. This change was made under s35 of the Finance Act 2016 and amends chapter 
1 of the Income Tax Act 2007. Various conditions are examined to ascertain whether this 
TAAR should apply. These conditions include whether “the individual carries on a trade or 
activity which is the same as, or similar to, that carried on by the company or an effective 51% 
subsidiary of the company.”296 More importantly, one of the conditions is that “the winding up 
forms part of arrangements the main purpose or one of the main purposes of which is the 
avoidance or reduction of a charge to income tax.”297 As will be demonstrated in chapter 3, this 
is similar to the language used in the main purpose test within the GAAR. Cullen remarked 
that the amendment to the Income Tax Act 2007 has made  
“the main purpose test objective (rather than subjective) by requiring consideration of 
the purpose of the transaction in securities or any of the transactions in securities rather 
than the purpose of a party to such a transaction or transactions.”298 
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However, Cullen recognises that the provision is “very broadly framed”.299 Moreover, as 
Ensign Tankers demonstrated, the arrangement’s purpose can become conflated with the 
taxpayer’s intentions.300  
The TAAR within section 123(4) of the Capital Allowances Act 2001 has also been the subject 
of debate in relation to the taxpayer’s purpose. The provision specifies when a ship would be 
deemed to be “used for a qualifying purpose at any time when it is let on charter in the course 
of a trade”.301 In order to be deemed a “qualifying purpose” to qualify for capital allowances, 
the person operating the ship must be “resident in the United Kingdom or carries on the trade 
there”.302 Secondly, that person must be “responsible for navigating and managing the ship”,303 
particularly in relation to the expenses.304 However, these rules do not apply where, in letting 
the ship, “the main object, or one of the main objects… was to obtain a writing-down allowance 
determined without regard to section 109 (writing-down allowances at 10%) in respect of 
expenditure incurred by any person on the provision of the ship or aircraft.”305 Therefore, the 
TAAR is drafted in the form of a main object test.  
The main object test within section 123(4) was the subject of debate in Lloyds Bank Leasing 
(No 1) Limited v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs306 (Lloyds). The 
case concerned whether Lloyds Bank leasing (No 1) was entitled to make use of the writing-
down allowance provided for under the Capital Allowances Act 2001. The claim was made in 
relation to two ships which the bank had purchased. The bank then leased the ships for 
commercial purposes to a Norwegian company. The ships were paid for over a period of four 
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years. Allowances were claimed for each payment. A company called K-Euro took over 
“possession and use of the vessels over the 20-year bareboat charter period.”307 K-Euro’s 
business was later reorganised with the effect that the ships were to be managed by K LNG.308 
The tribunal stated that the reorganisation took place  
“because it was expected that… K-Euro would make a substantial loss in operating the 
vessels and because certain of the security arrangements with respect to the lease 
structure through which K-Euro held its interest in the vessels were proving to be a 
commercial restraint upon the management and development of K-Euro's other 
business interests.”309 
The main object test was discussed where the tribunal accepted that  
“the paramount purpose of the transactions, at least taken as a whole, was commercial, 
namely the operation of the vessels by K-Euro with the objective of earning a profit and 
expanding its Atlantic basin business.”310 
However, problems arose where the tribunal considered whether “obtaining of capital 
allowances was not also a main object, even if not the paramount object, of the transactions”.311 
The tribunal were critical of the main object test under section 123(4) of the Capital Allowances 
Act 2001. The judge explained that the TAAR was unclear as “it also does not… offer any 
guide to the boundary between an object which is a main object and one which, though 
necessarily still an object, is not a main object.”312 Nevertheless, it was held that it was “quite 
impossible to reconcile with the proposition that the availability of the allowances was of mere 
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incidental interest to the various participants.”313 The tribunal acknowledged that “even if 
commercial considerations were paramount, the aim of securing the allowances had become a 
material factor.”314 Ultimately, “the obtaining of writing-down allowances at 25% was a main 
object, or one of the main objects, of the transactions into which the various parties entered”.315 
In the Lloyds case, Parliament’s intentions were clear due to the inclusion of a TAAR. The 
TAAR made it clear that “the legislative aim is to exclude from the benefit of writing-down 
allowances those who take steps to obtain them when otherwise they would not be 
available.”316 
The decision in Lloyds has been criticised for its interpretation of the main object test. 
McGowan has argued that the tribunal’s “approach illustrates how elusive the distinction is 
now between a taxpayer’s main object/purpose and a more incidental objective.”317 The 
decision was also criticised on the basis that it “provide[d] little or no guidance on how to prove 
that tax is not a main purpose/object.”318 The subjectivity of the main object test was also 
condemned as “this elusive dividing line is never satisfactorily drawn by the FTT and is very 
much in the subjective eye of the beholder”.319 The Lloyds decision was also criticised for 
having wider reaching consequences. McGowan argued that  
“it will be increasingly difficult for commercial actors to know whether tax 
considerations will be considered to be one of the main objects of a transaction, simply 
because (as in most sophisticated commercial transactions) a structure has been put 
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together with tax in mind, and with the benefit of detailed tax advice, not least to avoid 
the many "elephant traps" in the UK’s tax legislation.”320 
The ease of satisfying the main object test was also highlighted by McGowan. He remarked 
that  
“the courts have now made it difficult for taxpayers to show that tax is not "a main 
object/purpose" in any situation where they have taken tax advice, and elected to adopt 
a more rather than less tax-efficient structure for a commercial transaction.”321 
The resulting problem is that the Capital Allowances Act 2001 can be “read so broadly that it 
is disapplied only where the taxpayer did not know it would be able to receive such allowances 
or found itself by happy coincidence in the position”.322 Moreover, Lloyds demonstrated that a 
main object test can still be satisfied where there exists a genuine commercial purpose. The 
problem is not trying to distinguish between a main object or one of the main objects of the 
arrangement as both fall within the remit of the main object test. The difficulty is in attempting 
to distinguish between a main purpose and a secondary purpose which McGowan rightly 
argued is a subjective test.323  
1.5 Conclusions 
The semantic composition of the terms motive, intention and purpose have been differentiated 
to some extent. However, “some degree of polysemy is unavoidable.”324 As illustrated, there 
are several ways in which the terms can become blurred depending on the context in which 
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they are used. Nevertheless, from the above analysis, it is possible to provide demarcated 
definitions of these terms for tax law purposes.  
A motive is a conscious or unconscious guiding influence which produces the desire to act. 
This influence is the reason a person feels compelled to act. A person may have multiple 
motives which are usually coloured by his or her character, after deliberation. Motives are 
formed in relation to achievable acts which are formed through self-interested reasons. 
However, analysing motive does not reveal whether the person was objectively able to carry 
out the act. A motive in the emotional sense should not be a relevant consideration in tax law 
as it is a highly subjective interpretation of motive.  
The intricacies of one’s intentions are explicated intelligibly by Dworkin who asserts that an 
“intention is always a more complex and problematic matter”325 than simply examining a 
person “when he said or wrote or did what he did”.326 A person has an intention to perform an 
act where he or she consciously makes a decision as to what the person specifically wants to 
achieve and plans the methods or means to lead them to his or her object. The intention is 
knowingly formed in the present tense which is usually followed through to the time of action 
and is within his or her control. Intentions are descriptive and can be equated to and 
materialised in what Krikorian terms the “subordinate acts”327 taken in order to fulfil a goal.  
A purpose or object is a conscious and predetermined goal which is usually specific. However, 
purposes can change according to how the steps taken to fulfil the eventual purpose unfold. A 
purpose is the more objective measure compared to intentions and motives. Furthermore, 
Dworkin linked a purpose to interpreting the acts of community328 which suggests that it is 
                                                          
325 Dworkin, R. “Law’s Empire”, [1998], Hart Publishing, Oxford, p55 
326 Ibid 
327 Krikorian, Y.H. ‘The Meaning of Purpose’, [1930], The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 4, p101 
328 Dworkin, R. “Law’s Empire”, [1998], Hart Publishing, Oxford, p63 
51 
 
better to examine a purpose when interpreting a collective. Therefore, when examining 
corporate taxpayers, it may be intelligible to ascertain its purpose.  
The problem in tax law is that all three stages of thought are considered in adjudication and 
different judges will have their preferences as to which stage to examine. The inevitable 
inconsistency generated from this multifarious approach invariably results in different 
outcomes. This inconsistency can best be illustrated by the conflicting trading cases of Iswera, 
Forbes and Kirkham. In Iswera, the court focused on the taxpayer’s motive whilst in Forbes, 
the emphasis was on the taxpayer’s purpose. Moreover, in Kirkham, the judiciary examined 
the taxpayer’s intentions. The three trading cases illustrate that although motive is a badge of 
trade, this badge has been blurred with the terms purpose and intention. Furthermore, cases like 
Grove and Reinhold where the taxpayer’s motives are not examined can cause confusion as it 
is difficult to see why these are not considered equivocal in comparison to other ambiguous 
cases. Interestingly, although motive is a badge of trade, in Ensign, this was highly criticised 
and a preference for purpose was advocated.329  
Consistency could be generated by examining objective factors as elucidated in Livingston.330 
Furthermore, the dividend stripping case of Finsbury illustrates that objective means of 
deciding a case does not always favour the taxpayer but can nevertheless produce a reasonable 
outcome. There is no clear statutory definition of what constitutes a trade because there are 
many different varieties of trades and producing exhaustive list of them would be impossible. 
However, Taylor assisted with deciding whether a person is trading by asking whether the 
activities were in line with the taxpayer’s ordinary business.331 Although, Arndale illustrated 
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how this criterion was abused unsuccessfully and was resolved by examining the taxpayer’s 
purpose.   
The discussion on TAARs usefully demonstrates that examining whether tax issues are a main 
purpose involves examining many purposes. An arrangement which has a commercial end but 
has achieved that end through a tax-saving route is likely to come under the remit of a TAAR 
due to the breath of the main object test. Furthermore, cases such as Lloyds demonstrate that 
the existence of a commercial purpose does not negate a tax purpose.  
Whilst the subjective thoughts of the taxpayer can help to settle equivocal cases, the judiciary 
should apply objective criteria before resorting to subjective considerations. As demonstrated, 
the terms motive, intention and purpose have been used interchangeably by the judiciary 
although their meanings are different. For the purposes of this thesis, motive is what drives 
behaviour before action is carried out. In contrast, an intention is the intermediate planning 
whilst undertaking the course of action and is changeable according to what is achievable. A 
person’s purpose is what he or she aims to be the end result of the person’s action. Therefore, 
purposes are fundamental as these are what materialise and are observable. However, 
examining the taxpayer’s motive, intention or purpose are not specifically permitted by 
legislation in tax avoidance. Consequently, it is helpful to ascertain whether the taxpayer’s 








Chapter 2: A move towards motive, intention and purpose  
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain whether the practice of analysing the taxpayer’s 
motive, intention or purpose was implanted within the UK’s tax system before the GAAR was 
introduced. In establishing whether there has been a move towards considering the taxpayer’s 
cognitive influences, it is necessary to examine the common law where opinions as to 
acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance have divided the judiciary. This chapter 
demonstrates how the divide was caused by the different approaches to statutory interpretation 
and the judges’ respective views on the “substance over form” doctrine. These differences in 
adjudication effectively created a gulf between the supporters of Westminster and those of 
Ramsay. However, the Ramsay approach was placed on a pedestal and marked the move 
towards examining motive, intention and purpose. The discussion seeks to juxtapose the 
difference in approaches to tax avoidance.  
2.1 Tackling Tax Avoidance  
Until Ramsay, the applicable form of statutory interpretation was decided according to the 
clarity of the corresponding legislation. Judges could apply the literal approach without being 
accused of not also observing what the taxpayers intended by their actions through studying 
disproportionate profit and losses. Ramsay began the trend of carefully analysing the taxpayers’ 
intentions by examining their actions and the substance of the arrangement. This inevitability 
involves a degree of discretion. The conflicting approaches taken in Ramsay and Westminster 
forced subsequent cases to choose one of these approaches to follow until one of them 
eventually emerged victorious.  
In the Westminster case, the House of Lords’ views on tax avoidance was made unmistakably 
clear. Lord Tomlin famously proclaimed that “every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs 
54 
 
so as that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be.”332 
An objective approach to deciding tax liability was adopted in Westminster. The respondent 
Duke chose to pay a selection of his workers, including his gardener, in the form of an annuity 
by way of deed of covenant for a period of seven years. The covenantees were expected not to 
demand their wages as the annuity effectively paid them an amount equal to their wages, 
irrespective of whether they rendered their services. To ensure that the annuity adopted a 
different character to wages, the workers were still entitled, in theory, to request their wages 
under the deed. However, their theoretical right to claim their wages was curtailed by the terms 
of the accompanying letters to the employees which required their signed consent. The legal 
effect of executing the deed resulted in the Duke being able to deduct the annuity payments 
from his total income for tax purposes. Therefore, the same procedure of paying the employees 
could be executed directly or indirectly although the indirect method involved the avoidance 
of tax. Despite the fact that the accompanying letters created the impression of wages, his 
arrangement was successful and it was held that simply because of his “ingenuity, he cannot 
be compelled to pay an increased tax.”333 
There was a desire by the court in Westminster to understand the reasoning behind the 
arrangement and to tackle the suitability of the concept of substance over form in general. The 
court took the taxpayer’s intention into consideration by concluding that the “document was 
intended to be contractual.”334 An investigation into the substance of the arrangement was also 
made and it was acknowledged that in substance, the annuities were wages.335 However, 
despite the acknowledgement of the substance of the arrangement, Lord Tomlin bluntly 
asserted that the substance over form doctrine should be “given its quietus.”336 He criticised 
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the doctrine for basing “its support upon a misunderstanding of language.”337 Furthermore, the 
notion that examining the substance of an arrangement involves exercising discretion was 
confirmed by Lord Tomlin as he stated that the substance over form doctrine effectively prefers 
“the incertain and crooked cord of discretion [over] the golden and streight metwand of the 
law.”338 The substance over form doctrine was also attacked for compelling a taxpayer to “pay 
notwithstanding that he has so ordered his affairs that the amount of tax sought from him is not 
legally claimable.”339 Therefore, whilst the court accepted that the surrounding circumstances 
of a case should be ascertained,340 it is clear that this must not be to the detriment of taxpayers 
who are within the confines of the law. 
The substance over form doctrine was therefore dismissed due to the level of discretion 
involved and the inequitable results this approach would deliver. Furthermore, the substance 
over form doctrine led to the judiciary examining the taxpayer’s intentions. Examining the 
substance of the deed and letter would essentially involve applying a purposive approach 
whereby the judge would ascertain what Parliament intended by the taxing provision and 
whether the taxpayer’s case, in substance, falls within that provision. Consequently, the court 
adopted a literal approach to the facts as the annuity was evidenced in the deed of covenant 
despite the letter which spread doubt as to the nature of the payments. The court found no need 
to examine any surrounding substance as the covenant was clear. Therefore, it was unnecessary 
to “go beyond the legal effect of the agreements.”341 Instead, the court believed it was 
“necessary to treat the legal relations…as governed by the deed alone.”342 
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Lord Atkin recognised the possible moral outrage that could arise from the decision as the 
wealthy Duke was able to reduce his tax liability. However, Lord Atkin maintained that tax 
avoidance can be practised by anyone “whether poor and humble or wealthy and noble”343 
which indicates that it is a morally acceptable act and that the sum involved does not affect the 
acceptability of tax avoidance. Therefore, although the court in Westminster agreed that tax 
liability could potentially be decided through exercising discretion to ascertain the taxpayer’s 
intentions, this method was considered neither desirable nor equitable. Importantly, the court 
warned against allowing sham transactions to be “used as cloak to conceal a different 
transaction”344 where the “documents are not… intended to be acted upon.”345 This form of 
intention accords with Anscombe’s analysis of an intention as she states that an intention can 
exist without action.346 However, Lord Tomlin did not provide any guidance as to how to 
determine a taxpayer’s intentions. This left the concept of intention vulnerable to manipulation. 
The issue as to what amounts to acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance was also left open, 
although later cases suggested that the Westminster approach should be limited to those cases 
which involve a “single document.”347 
The desire to distinguish between cases involving one and many documents began as Ramsay 
involved a complex scheme with many documents which was admittedly beyond the creative 
ambit of the average taxpayer. The scheme was designed to enable the taxpayer company, W.T 
Ramsay Ltd., to offset a chargeable gain against artificial capital losses on share transactions. 
The taxpayer’s company banker, Slater Walker Ltd, gave the value of two loans348 to the 
taxpayer to enable it to lend the money to Caithmeade Ltd. as an investment. A profit was made 
upon selling the debt as the loan was sold at market value. Therefore, the difference between 
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the loan amount and the purchase price generated a gain. The taxpayer was also a shareholder 
in Caithmeade Ltd. Each loan was worth £218,750. However, the L2 loan was capable of being 
varied which meant that the capital gain or loss could also be varied. The interest on L2 was 
duly increased to 22% which decreased its value. The taxpayer then sold the value of 
Caithmeade’s L2 debt, which had decreased substantially in value, to Masterdene Finance Ltd. 
Consequently, the original creditor essentially made a profit using a circular scheme and the 
gain was taxable. The decision of whether the profit was a chargeable gain rested upon whether 
the L2 debt could be classified as a debt on security as its disposal would amount to a 
chargeable gain.349 
There were strong arguments in favour of not taxing the taxpayer. Fundamentally, the 
legitimacy of the individual transactions could not be questioned, as they were genuine, and 
not shams. Therefore, in order to bring the genuine transactions into the realm of taxation, the 
substance of the arrangement was examined. However, the “cardinal principle”350 exemplified 
in Westminster and echoed in Ramsay was that where a “document or transaction is genuine, 
the court cannot go behind it to some supposed underlying substance.”351 The court in Ramsay 
therefore warned that examining the substance of an arrangement is undesirable although it 
then went on to do this. The legitimacy of the individual transactions faded in significance 
where the transactions were contrasted against the entirety of the scheme which was labelled 
“artificial and fiscally ineffective.”352 The court decided to “consider the scheme as a whole.”353 
This involved examining both the factual and legal reality of the arrangement through a 
different lens. Significantly, the Ramsay approach encouraged an assessment into the 
taxpayers’ intention to discern whether the arrangement formed “the result which the parties 
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actually intended.”354 However, as Anscombe stated, intentional actions cannot be recognised 
by “any extra feature which exists when it is performed.”355 Therefore, in many cases, it is 
difficult for the judiciary to discern what the taxpayers intended. Consequently, judges may 
impute a constructive intention on the taxpayer based on an objective analysis of what the 
person actually did.  
The court in Ramsay believed that the reason for the scheme was to cancel out a gain made 
from the selling of the taxpayer’s farm which amounted to £187,977.356 The whole aim of the 
“self-cancelling”357 scheme was said to generate artificially a capital loss;358 a conclusion based 
on mathematical findings. However, it is undesirable to allow mathematical evaluations to take 
precedence and create a principle whereby “the fiscal element has so invaded the transaction 
itself that it is moulded and shaped by the fiscal elements.”359 The court was contradictory in 
its approach by asserting that taxpayers are “only to be taxed upon clear words, not upon 
‘intendment’”.360 However, the court held that the nature of the “self-cancelling” transactions 
meant that they “were from the outset designed to produce neither gain nor loss”.361 Therefore, 
the court adopted Krikorian’s definition of a purpose as he stated that “the purpose of an act… 
is observable in the results of that act.”362 The court went on to construe the facts in a holistic 
manner in order to fit the facts within the letter of the law. The undesirable practice of 
“reconstituting the facts”363 into a “composite transaction”364 was shielded behind the generally 
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accepted purposive approach which the courts adopted. However, Ramsay clearly went further 
than utilising the purposive approach as the purposive approach does not involve examining 
the facts of the case holistically. The purposive approach involves examining the purpose of 
the applicable taxing provision.  
The taxpayers’ intentions were discussed where Lord Wilberforce asserted that the “gain is 
intended not to be taxable”365 despite the fact that the taxpayer’s presumed intention is an 
“expectation without contractual force.”366 Furthermore, although the court affirmed that 
intentions should not be examined, Lord Fraser held that the L2 loan “was intended to be 
exempt from corporation tax [and]… that intention has been successfully realised.”367 
Therefore, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Fraser accord with Scheer’s view on an intention “as an 
objective, end or goal.”368 The issue of motive was also raised although it was stressed that “the 
fact that the motive for a transaction may be to avoid tax does not invalidate it.”369 Motive was 
therefore viewed as an unnecessary consideration. The court also had regard to what the 
taxpayers had “in mind when they devised the scheme”370 and questioned “why the taxpayer 
had purchased the scheme”371 although it was aforementioned that tax avoidance motives are 
irrelevant. The use of motive in this sense accords with Millet’s definition where ““motive” is 
the reason why”.372 
Once the court thoroughly examined the taxpayer’s motives and intentions in carrying out the 
scheme, the objective term “effect” was used frequently throughout the judgement possibly to 
mask any subjective considerations. However, as Anscombe argued, the fact that an action has 
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a particular effect does not necessarily mean that it was intended.373 Nevertheless, if the 
outcome was planned, it can be said that it was intended. Even the terms “aim and effect”374 
were blurred. The term “aim” reiterates the desire to examine the intention of the taxpayer 
whereas “effect” is the more objective consideration which analyses the end result. The effect 
of the scheme, as a whole, was said to be that the taxpayer was relatively in the same position 
at the beginning and end of the scheme as no loss or gain was sustained. Lord Russell, Lord 
Roskill and Lord Bridge were all in agreement with Lord Wilberforce and Lord Fraser in 
regards to the points raised in this case.  
Ramsay marked a significant change in how tax avoidance was subsequently perceived. The 
court commented that “the taxpayer does not have to put his hand in his pocket”375 in tax 
avoidance schemes. However, it does raise the question of why tax avoidance is viewed 
negatively despite the fact that the taxpayer is typically “never in a position to make a profit.”376 
Despite the court reaffirming that tax principles are for Parliament to devise,377 the practice of 
rearranging schemes is “an indiscriminate adoration of substance”378 and adopting a wide 
approach to interpreting legislation became known as the Ramsay approach. Since its creation, 
it has operated like a “doctrine to counter tax avoidance.”379 However, as later cases found, “it 
is much easier to state such a doctrine than to define its limits.”380 
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2.2 The divide between supporters of Ramsay and Westminster 
2.2 (a) Supporters of Ramsay 
The conflicting cases of Westminster and Ramsay unsurprisingly created a notable division in 
subsequent case law which generated supporters of either the Westminster approach or the 
Ramsay approach. For example, in IRC v Burmah Oil Co Ltd.381 (Burmah Oil), the court 
extracted elements of the Ramsay approach by stating that the court can “ignore the 
intermediate circular book entries and look at the end result.”382 Therefore, whilst examining 
the end result and viewing the arrangement holistically were highlighted in Ramsay, Burmah 
Oil explicitly held that it was permissible to ignore some steps in an arrangement.   
Burmah Oil concerned whether the parent company Burmah was entitled to deduct both the 
cost of shares and the sum of the acquisition of new shares in computing its tax liability. 
Burmah underwent a series of circular transactions involving the transfer of stock which 
Burmah owned in British Petroleum Company383 to its subsidiary, OMDR (Holdings) Ltd.384 
The stock was later sold at a lower price and transferred back to Burmah which resulted in a 
debt remaining from Holdings to Burmah although, this was not classified as an allowable loss 
by the court. The court contended that neither loss nor gain was made as the companies were 
in the same group. Another subsidiary of Burmah, Manchester Oil Refinery Holdings Ltd,385 
then borrowed from Burmah the same amount of debt owed by Holdings to Burmah. MORH 
then lent the loan to Holdings which repaid the money it owed to Burmah on the same day. 
Holdings subsequently made a rights issue of shares leading to Burmah applying for 700,000 
shares in Burmah Oil Trading Ltd.386 Holdings then repaid its loan to MORH which then repaid 
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this to Burmah. Holdings was dissolved shortly after and its only monetary asset was 
distributed to its shareholders, the majority of which was Burmah. 
The court preferred to examine the end result in Burmah Oil to reach the conclusion that there 
was no real loss sustained in the first circular scheme concerning the BP shares. The second 
circular scheme was also dismissed on the grounds that although a loss was sustained by 
Burmah for its acquisition of shares in Holdings, the money was returned on liquidation and 
also when the debt owed by MORH was returned. The court also considered the value of the 
BP shares which could later be realised387 and as a result of this, stated that the taxpayers 
suffered “little or no hardship”.388  
As well as examining the end result, the court also examined the “clear and stated 
intention[s]”389 of the taxpayers by asserting that the scheme was planned and executed 
“according to a timetable prepared in advance.”390 However, as Krikorian recognised, there can 
be a “growing purpose of which we become aware at a comparatively advanced stage of our 
action.”391 Moreover, Lord Fraser held that rather than purchasing the shares in Holdings, 
“no doubt the directors could have chosen, even at that stage, to abandon the scheme 
but the reality was that the decision had already been taken to carry it through to 
completion, and that was unquestionably the intention of the directors in this case, just 
as it was the intention of all parties concerned in Ramsay”.392 
Therefore, the judges in Burmail Oil recognise that in determining whether a scheme was 
planned in advanced, the judges will evaluate the taxpayer’s intentions. However, Lord Fraser 
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criticised Ramsay for examining the taxpayer’s purpose393 and stated that “the fact that the 
purpose of the scheme was tax avoidance does not carry any implication that it was in any way 
reprehensible.”394 Nevertheless, Burmah Oil also extended the holistic approach in Ramsay. 
Lord Diplock stated that Ramsay heralded  
“a significant change in the approach adopted by this House in its judicial role to a pre-
ordained series of transactions… into which there are inserted steps that have no 
commercial purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability to tax which in the absence 
of those particular steps would have been payable.”395 
The key term in Lord Diplock’s speech is “commercial purpose”396 which requires schemes to 
be examined holistically with a view to ascertaining whether they have a commercial purpose. 
The judge also considered “whether certain transactions, which on the face of them and 
according to the taxpayer's submission, resulted in an allowable capital loss, should be 
disregarded as artificial.”397 Therefore, the concept of what is real or artificial also forms part 
of the Ramsay approach.  
Interestingly, Burmah Oil demonstrated a distinct preference for the Ramsay approach by 
attacking the decision in Westminster for failing to define the limits of permissible tax 
avoidance398 despite the fact that Ramsay equally omits to define the parameters of 
unacceptable tax avoidance. Therefore, it can be argued that Burmah Oil’s apparent allegiance 
to the Ramsay approach is unjustified. However, Lord Scarman confirmed that “Ramsay's, case 
marks a significant change in the approach “adopted by this House in its judicial role” towards 
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tax avoidance schemes.”399 Lord Roskill and Lord Brandon were also in agreement with both 
Lord Fraser and Lord Diplock on the issues raised in this case.  
The Ramsay approach was also endorsed in Furniss v Dawson400 (Furniss). The judges in 
Furniss extended the Ramsay approach by including that a planned or “preordained series of 
transactions”401 is also indicative of an unacceptable tax avoidance scheme. The additional 
“preordained” element requires that the taxpayer has carefully planned the scheme and intends 
to follow it through until the end. The test assumes that there is “little or no likelihood that 
[they] would do otherwise.”402 However, Krikorian has recognised that if a person discovers 
“new suggestions and possibilities… the final result can hardly be described as the realisation 
of a preconceived plan.”403 In Furniss, the taxpayers and the wife of Mr Dawson were 
shareholders in two companies which they sought to sell to Wood Bastow Holdings Ltd. Mr 
Dawson consulted with solicitors to ascertain how stamp duty could be avoided when making 
the transaction. The solicitor advised the taxpayers to reorganise the share capital of the 
companies to be sold and establish a new investment company in the Isle of Man which they 
named Greenjacket Investments Ltd. The new company, Greenjacket, then acquired the 
reorganised share capital in order for it to then sell the shares to Wood Bastow Holdings Ltd; 
the original buyers, for the original price. Furniss followed the decision in Ramsay by 
examining the end result and discarded the additional step of setting up the Manx company. 
The court therefore treated the transaction as the original sellers making the disposition directly 
to the original purchaser.404 The method of examining the end result of a transaction was 
defended as “not…to remould the transactions but to re-analyse them.”405 This assertion 
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suggests that the courts recognise that it is undesirable to modify the facts of the case although; 
the court effectively remoulded the scheme by examining it holistically.  
Furniss discussed the taxpayers’ intentions at length due to the fact that “there was nothing 
sham about”406 the transactions therefore, the court took a different route to secure tax liability. 
The preordained arrangement of the selling of the shares to Wood Bastow Holdings Ltd. to 
take place at the end of the scheme was said to have “intended to operate as such.”407 Therefore, 
the intentions of the taxpayers were a material consideration in the eventual decision. Although 
the cases supporting Ramsay affirm that examining the facts holistically is objective, Kerr L.J. 
refined the holistic approach by scrutinising the “overall assessment of what the taxpayer 
intended to achieve.”408 Kerr L.J.’s approach admits an inextricable connection between the 
holistic approach and the taxpayer’s intentions. Nevertheless, Kerr L.J. asserted that the motive 
of taxpayers is irrelevant.409 The taxpayers’ intentions were a focal point in Furniss and was 
referred to at numerous points within the judgement. The court found that “what happened was 
what had all along been intended to happen”.410 Furniss also refined the parameters of the 
Ramsay approach. With regard to the “preordained”411 requirement, the court held that Ramsay  
“established that where one finds a series of preconceived transactions which are 
entered on solely for fiscal purposes and are clearly interconnected and mutually 
dependent on one another one should look at the overall transaction to ascertain what 
has been and what was intended to be achieved.”412 
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Therefore, Furniss established that both the intention of the parties and the purpose of the 
arrangement form part of the Ramsay approach. The reference to the interconnection of the 
steps in the arrangement also signifies that there is usually no flexibility in these types of 
transactions. 
Lord Bridge rationalised Furniss using the substance over form doctrine as he stated that this 
was appropriate given that the case involved a series of transactions.413 Lord Bridge explained 
that there were “two features of the pre-ordained scheme [which] were purely formal and had 
no effect on the substance of the composite transaction.”414 The first preordained element in 
the case was “to avoid a direct disposal of the shares to Wood Bastow”.415 The second 
preordained element was designed “to ensure that… the beneficial interest in the shares was 
held by Greenjacket”.416  
Lord Brightman also sought to further define the parameters of the Ramsay approach in 
Furniss. In regards to a “preordained series of transactions”,417 Lord Brightman held that 
“Ramsay says that this fiscal result cannot be avoided because the preordained series of steps 
are to be found in an informal arrangement instead of in a binding contract.”418 Therefore, Lord 
Brightman widened the Ramsay approach by explaining that “the day is not saved for the 
taxpayer because the arrangement is unsigned or contains the words "this is not a binding 
contract."”419 Lord Brightman also refined the Ramsay approach into a two-stage test. He stated 
that “first, there must be a pre-ordained series of transactions; or, if one likes, one single 
composite transaction.”420 However, Lord Brightman elucidated that “this composite 
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transaction may or may not include the achievement of a legitimate commercial (i.e. business) 
end.”421 He was careful to include that a set of facts can fall under the Ramsay approach even 
where there was a genuine business result as “the composite transaction does, in the instant 
case; it achieved a sale of the shares in the operating companies by the Dawsons to Wood 
Bastow. It did not in Ramsay.”422 However, in the second stage of the test, Lord Brightman 
stated that “there must be steps inserted which have no commercial (business) purpose apart 
from the avoidance of a liability to tax - not "no business effect."”423 Therefore, Lord Brightman 
emphasised the difference between a business purpose and a business effect. Under the Ramsay 
approach, it is the existence of a business purpose, not a business effect, which will make the 
Ramsay approach applicable. Ramsay was applicable in Furniss because “the inserted step was 
the introduction of Greenjacket”424 and “that inserted step had no business purpose apart from 
the deferment of tax, although it had a business effect.”425 
Lord Roskill exemplified his disapproval of the Westminster approach in Furniss. He claimed 
that  
“Westminster… has haunted the administration of this branch of the law for too long. I 
confess that I had hoped that that ghost might have found quietude with the decisions 
in Ramsay and in Burmah. Unhappily it has not. Perhaps the decision of this House in 
these appeals will now suffice as exorcism.”426 
Lord Roskill also criticised judicial opinions which sought to rely on the Westminster 
approach.427 This criticism was evident where he held that “the error, if I may venture to use 
that word, into which the courts below have fallen is that they have looked back to 1936 and 
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not forward from 1982.”428 Therefore, Lord Roskill expressed his preference for the Ramsay 
approach as opposed to the Westminster approach as the former was heard in 1982 and the 
latter was heard in 1936. Nevertheless, Westminster was decided in the House of Lords and its 
importance should not be undermined.  
Lord Scarman emphasised the role of the judiciary in deciding tax avoidance cases.429 He held 
that it would be too “ambitious… to determine finally the limit beyond which the safe channel 
of acceptable tax avoidance shelves into the dangerous shallows of unacceptable tax 
evasion.”430 As aforementioned in Burmah Oil, Lord Scarman in Furniss also discussed the 
Westminster approach as to “the limits within which this principle is to operate remain to be 
probed and determined judicially”.431 Defining the limits of the Westminster approach was said 
to be “beyond the power of the blunt instrument of legislation.”432 Lord Scarman concluded 
that ultimately, judges mould the field of tax avoidance as 
“whatever a statute may provide, it has to be interpreted and applied by the courts: and 
ultimately it will prove to be in this area of judge-made law that our elusive journey's 
end will be found.”433  
In Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v Stokes434 (Ensign Tankers), the court also favoured the 
Ramsay approach over the Westminster approach and focused on the taxpayer’s purpose for 
executing the arrangement. The taxpayer in Ensign Tankers sought to claim first year 
allowances for capital expenditure amounting to $14m which was expended on the production 
of a film. In reality, the appellants, which consisted of a partnership of four companies, 
expended $3.25m and were not liable to pay any more than this. The transactions which were 
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evidenced in 17 documents were classified as a “single composite transaction”435 which is a 
concept taken from Ramsay.436 The scheme was classified as a tax avoidance scheme as the 
first-year allowance which the appellant was claiming was equal to the film’s total cost.  
The court examined the effect of the transaction which is essentially viewing the scheme 
holistically as in Ramsay.437 Furthermore, the court allowed the purpose of the taxpayers to be 
decisive of the fiscal consequences by asserting that the taxpayers “entered into a scheme with 
the object of avoiding tax.”438 The court did not choose to only focus on those transactions with 
a commercial purpose but rather “ignore[d] all the fiscal consequences which [were] beneficial 
to the taxpayer.”439 Ensign is an example of where the legislation permits the court to assess 
the taxpayer’s purpose as section 41(1) of The Finance Act 1971 states that the expenditure 
must be made “for the purposes of the trade”.440 Therefore, Ensign Tankers is an exception to 
the general rule established in Burmah Oil that tax avoidance purposes are irrelevant. 
Lord Templeman reasoned the decision on the basis that “the tax advantage claimed by the 
taxpayer…[was] inconsistent with the true effect in law of the transaction.”441 Therefore, he 
held that “in the present case the fiscal consequences claimed by the appellant do not 
correspond to the legal consequences of the scheme documents read and construed as a 
whole.”442 However, Lord Templeman also stated that “a taxpayer who chooses a form of 
transaction which reduces his burden of tax is not to be criticised or punished or deprived of 
that reduction in tax which his ingenuity has achieved.”443 Moreover, Lord Templeman 
acknowledged that  
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“Victory Partnership expended capital in the making and exploitation of a film. That 
was a trading transaction which was not a sham and could have resulted in either a 
profit or a loss.”444 
Nevertheless, he held that the case involved “the planning and execution of a raid on the 
Treasury using the technicalities of revenue law and company law as the necessary 
weapons”.445 
Lord Templeman also raised the moral issue of the fact that  
“if successful, the scheme would have been operated at the expense of the British public 
and, whether successful or unsuccessful, involved the exploitation of British capital 
allowances for the making of a foreign film.”446 
Nevertheless, Lord Templeman recognised that tax law and morality should remain separate 
as “there is no morality in a tax and no illegality or immorality in a tax avoidance scheme”.447 
Lord Brandon448 and Lord Keith449 both concurred with Lord Templeman on the issues he 
raised. Questions of the appropriateness of moral considerations in tax law will be examined 
in chapter 5.       
Lord Goff defined unacceptable tax avoidance to convey that the facts in Ensign fit within his 
definition.450 He stated that  
“unacceptable tax avoidance typically involves the creation of complex artificial 
structures by which, as though by the wave of a magic wand, the taxpayer conjures out 
of the air a loss, or a gain, or expenditure, or whatever it may be, which otherwise would 
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never have existed. These structures are designed to achieve an adventitious tax benefit 
for the taxpayer, and in truth are no more than raids on the public funds at the expense 
of the general body of taxpayers, and as such are unacceptable.”451 
Lord Goff emphasised the importance of examining the transactions in the case as a “composite 
transaction”.452 He explained that  
“it is that composite transaction which we have to analyse, as a whole, in order to 
ascertain its true nature and effect, and to decide whether the transaction so analysed 
results, on a true construction of the relevant statutory provision, in the taxation 
consequences for which the taxpayer contends.”453 
Lord Goff also expressed that “self-cancelling payments… are typical examples of artificial 
transactions, the sole purpose of which is the avoidance of tax.”454 
Lord Jauncey acknowledged the acceptability of tax avoidance where he held that  
“when Parliament has provided that a taxpayer shall be entitled to certain allowances 
in certain circumstances I can see no reason in principle why when those circumstances 
exist he should be deprived of those allowances simply because he has sought and failed 
to engineer a situation in which he obtained allowances greater than those to which the 
circumstances entitled him.”455  
However, he qualified this tolerance of tax avoidance by stating that  
“where, as here, there is… an end result which has both financial and fiscal 
consequences, the proper approach is to disregard the steps in this scheme which have 
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no commercial purpose rather than to treat those steps as somehow affecting or 
denaturing other steps in the scheme having such a purpose.”456 
IRC v McGuckian457 (McGuckian) also praised “the new Ramsay principle”458 for liberating 
tax law from being “left behind as some island of literal interpretation”459 by promoting the 
purposive approach as a means through which tax avoidance schemes could be prevented rather 
than for legislation to be better understood. In McGuckian, the taxpayers sought to avoid tax 
payable on dividends despite the fact that there is a charge to income tax where someone 
overseas makes a gain which is enjoyed by a person domiciled in the UK under s478 of the 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970. The taxpayers had an equal share in the company 
Ballinamore. The shares in Ballinamore were transferred to a trustee of a Guernsey settlement 
named Shurltrust Ltd., with the taxpayers as the beneficiaries. When a dividend of £400,055 
became due, the trustee assigned to another company, Mallardchoice Ltd., the right to any 
dividend ordinarily payable to Ballinamore. Mallardchoice Ltd. paid £396,054 as consideration 
for the assignment. Ballinamore declared the dividend on shares held by Shurltrust and gave a 
cheque to their solicitor for Mallardchoice Ltd. The solicitor gave 99% of the sum to Shurltrust 
Ltd. and gave 1% to Mallardchoice Ltd. The assessment to income tax was on the £396,054 
received by Shurltrust Ltd. The court asserted that the assignment between Mallardchoice Ltd. 
and Shurltrust Ltd. should be disregarded for fiscal purposes. Therefore, the holistic approach 
in Ramsay was again followed by “stripping out the artificial steps and applying the provisions 
of Taxes Acts to the real transaction.”460 
McGukian undoubtedly went further than merely echoing the purposive approach in Ramsay. 
The court overtly enquired into the thought process of those involved in the scheme. Although 
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Ensign Tankers established the arrangement’s purpose can be deciphered objectively, in 
McGuckian the court held that  
“given the genesis of the composite transaction in the mind of the tax consultant, Mr 
Taylor, the only possible inference is that the assignment was inserted for the sole 
purpose of gaining a tax advantage”.461 
Therefore, it is apparent how the purpose of an arrangement can be decided through subjective 
considerations. However, when discussing tax avoidance purposes, Lord Clyde made it clear 
that  
“it is not required that the transaction should itself be carried out with that purpose. The 
statute is simply expressing the purpose of the section, not of the substance of the 
transaction.”462 
Section 478 of The Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 was drafted “for the purpose of 
preventing the avoiding by individuals ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom of liability 
to income tax”.463 Even though the applicable legislation had an anti-avoidance provision, Lord 
Clyde stated that tax avoidance purposes are still irrelevant. However, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
gave more importance to the purpose of the transactions than its effect. He claimed that  
“the question is not what was the effect of the insertion of the artificial steps but what 
was its purpose. Having identified the artificial steps inserted with that purpose and 
disregarded them, then what is left is to apply the statutory language of the taxing Act 
to the transaction carried through stripped of its artificial steps.”464 
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Therefore, McGukian reinforced the notion that the purpose of the individual transactions 
should be sought rather than the entire arrangement. Consequently, it can be said that the judges 
examined the “purposive result”465 as exemplified by Krikorian.  
The cases supporting Ramsay generally focused on examining either the purpose of the 
taxpayer or the purpose of the arrangement. The court in McGuckian also tried to make it clear 
that it “refer[red] not to the intention of the transferor of the assets or the effect of such transfer 
but to the intention of Parliament in enacting the section.”466 This is because Lord Steyn 
believed that Ramsay was  
“founded on a broad purposive interpretation, giving effect to the intention of 
Parliament. The principle enunciated in Ramsay was therefore based on an orthodox 
form of statutory interpretation.”467 
Interestingly, Lord Clyde perceptively distinguished between the purpose of the relevant taxing 
provision and the taxpayer’s purpose.468 He emphasised that it is unnecessary to prove that the 
taxpayer had a tax avoidance purpose.469 Nonetheless, the court placed great importance on the 
Ramsay approach by emphasising that it “is an approach to construction”470 which was viewed 
as an “intellectual breakthrough.”471 
Lord Cooke also placed great emphasis on the Ramsay approach as he stated that “the matter 
is clinched by the authority of W T Ramsay Ltd… and the subsequent cases in the same line”.472 
In addition to this, he stated that “the principle of looking on a planned series of steps as a 
whole transaction appears to be, as one would expect, perfectly natural and orthodox.”473 
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Moreover, Lord Cooke expressed his disapproval of Westminster as he stated that Ramsay is 
“decidedly more natural and less extreme than the decision which in 1935 a majority of their 
Lordships felt forced to reach in the Duke of Westminster's case.”474 Lord Lloyd concurred 
with the decision of the other judges.475  
2.2 (b) Supporters of Westminster 
Despite the overwhelming support for the Ramsay approach, the more recent cases have tended 
to uphold the Westminster approach. Westmoreland Investments Ltd v 
MacNiven476(Westmoreland) viewed the Ramsay approach negatively and as operating like “a 
broad spectrum antibiotic which killed off all tax avoidance schemes.”477 Westmoreland rightly 
challenged the propriety of using Ramsay as a principle of construction as “there is… only one 
principle of construction, namely to ascertain what Parliament meant by using the language of 
the statute.”478 The Ramsay approach instead focuses on “arithmetical differences”479 under the 
guise of statutory interpretation which effectively became “judicial legislation.”480 
The scheme in Westmoreland was circular therefore, could be said to fall within the ambit of 
the Ramsay approach as the borrower paid interest received from the lender. Westmoreland 
Investments Ltd481 was owned by the Electricity Supply Pension Scheme482 which was a 
superannuation and exempt from tax.483 WIL had financial difficulties and borrowed £20m 
from the scheme. On the same day, WIL paid the scheme back £14,760,00 and accounted to 
the Revenue for £5,459,400 which the scheme was able to reclaim. The scheme was repeated 
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the following year and again in 1990 until the scheme had £2m worth of assets and found a 
purchaser of WIL. However, the court in Westmoreland did not view the transactions as an 
impermissible tax avoidance scheme. Examining the motive of the taxpayer was considered 
wholly irrelevant as “one cannot disregard a transaction which comes within the statutory 
language… simply on the ground that it was entered into solely for tax reasons.”484 
Furthermore, the court rationally expressed a dislike for common law tests and held that it is 
“the statute itself which applies the tests of ordinary business.”485 Therefore, the decision in 
Westmoreland is the antithesis of Ramsay.  
Barclays Mercantile Business Finance v Mawson486 (Barclays) also refused to consider the 
intention of the taxpayers and classed the incidences which made up the scheme as 
“happenstances”487 rather than pre-planned. In Barclays, the taxpayer ran a business of 
providing capital to purchase an asset which was paid for by periodic payments wherein the 
asset was the security enabling the selling of the asset in the event of defaulting on the 
payments. The taxpayer bought capital equipment comprising of a gas pipeline from a seller 
who leased it at below market value. The difference in price was the seller’s fees although the 
seller returned the money into the taxpayer’s company as a security. The taxpayer, in 
arithmetical terms, did not make a loss as it reclaimed the money spent. However, the taxpayer 
claimed depreciation deductions. It was held that the deduction was within the statute as a 
capital investment.  
Barclays criticised supporters of the Ramsay approach for essentially “reconstituting the 
facts”488 in order to entrap the taxpayer within the purview of the taxing statute. The mere 
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presence of allowable deductions could not have “infected the whole scheme”.489 Therefore, 
the scheme could not be viewed as a sham. The fact that the scheme “was not an entirely risk 
free transaction”490 also served to reinforce the notion of a genuine transaction. Therefore, the 
more risk involved in an arrangement, the more likely it will be regarded as genuine. Barclays 
marked a significant step in tax avoidance due to claims that it “killed off the Ramsay 
doctrine.”491 
The conjoined appeals within Craven v White492(Craven) can be said to have created an 
additional test of remoteness which examines the preordained requirement in reverse. The 
remoteness test essentially asks how remote the end result is at the time of the intermediate 
transactions rather than seek to establish whether the whole arrangement was preordained, the 
latter being broader and has greater scope for judicial discretion. The facts of the case were 
similar to those in Furniss. The taxpayers in Craven owned all the shares in the company 
Queensferry and were advised by their financier to either merge the business with another or 
sell it. Both options presented themselves as equally feasible. Whilst negotiations took place to 
decide whether a merger or sale could be executed, the taxpayers acquired another company in 
the Isle of Man named Millor. As part of the scheme, Millor acquired the share capital of 
Queensferry in exchange for shares in Millor. Millor then found a buyer for Queensferry and 
sold it to the company J Ltd. for over £2m. From 1977 to 1981, Millor began to make interest-
free loans to the taxpayers until eventually; all the proceeds from the sale were transferred. The 
taxpayers were then assessed to capital gains tax on the disposal of the shares by Millor to J 
Ltd. Had the court applied the Ramsay approach, the conclusion would have been that the 
exchange of shares between Millor and Queensferry “had no business purpose apart from the 
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avoidance of tax.”493 There were also arguments that the “dominant, if not the sole, motive”494 
was to secure a tax advantage.495 However, the court maintained the approach heralded in 
Westminster; that a taxpayer can select the most tax-advantageous route in arranging their 
transactions.496 Moreover, regarding the final sale of Queensferry it was “wholly uncertain 
whether that disposal [would] take place.”497 This element of remoteness therefore served to 
uphold the scheme’s legitimacy.  
Furniss and Craven were similar on the facts of the cases although, the significant feature 
which distinguished them was the likelihood of the final sale. In Craven, it was “wholly 
uncertain whether that disposal [would] take place.”498 The certainty of the arrangement was 
further weakened as, prior to the sale, “neither the identity of the purchaser nor the price to be 
paid nor any of the other terms of the contract [were] known.”499 Therefore, the final sale was 
too remote to be classified as preordained. However, this extra-statutory caveat is inadequate 
to distinguish two very similar cases which both otherwise came within the letter of the law 
and could be viewed as acceptable tax avoidance.  
In Tower MCashback LLP 1 and another v Revenue and Customs Commissioners,500 (Tower 
MCashback) the Supreme court also adopted the Ramsay approach which was referred to as 
“the fountain-head”.501 The taxpayers wanted to claim capital allowances on expenditure 
expended on software rights. MCashback was the company which created the software which 
manufacturers could use to advertise their products to customers.502 In return for promoting 
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their products, manufacturers agreed to pay MCashback a “clearing fee”.503 In order to raise 
money to promote the software, MCashback was advised by a financial services company, 
Tower Group plc, to sell the rights of part of its software to newly-formed LLPs.504 The newly-
formed LLPs were also entitled to part of the clearing fees. LLP2 “claimed an allowable loss 
of just under £30m, £27.5m of which was for capital allowances”.505 Lord Hope explained the 
matter succinctly where he stated that the matter was 
“whether the whole of the £27.5m paid by LLP2 to MCashback under the terms of the 
software licence agreement was expenditure incurred by LLP2 on the provision of 
software within the meaning of the Capital Allowances Act 2001.”506 
He elucidated how parts of the arrangement were not artificial as the “transfer of ownership 
was itself enough to show that real expenditure was incurred.”507 However, the Lord Hope held 
that  
“much of the consideration paid by the LLPs for the software was derived from funds 
borrowed by members of the LLPs on non-recourse terms which was immediately 
passed back by way of a chain of banks to the lender.”508 
These series of events were regarded as “pre-ordained”509 and amounted to a “composite 
transaction”.510 Much of the funds “did not go to MCashback as payment for the rights in the 
software, even temporarily.”511 Contrary to the Capital Allowances Act 2001, it could not be 
proven that “the whole of the claimed expenditure of £27.5m was actually incurred on 
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acquiring rights in the software.”512 However, Lord Walker stated that the LLPs “themselves 
put up only 25% of the consideration”513 and “the remaining 75% was provided by interest-
free loans”.514 Therefore, Lord Walker concluded that the taxpayers would be entitled to an 
allowance of 25% of the expenditure claimed.515  
Lord Walker emphasised that following Barclays, “it is not enough for the revenue, in attacking 
a scheme of this sort, to point to the money going round in a circle.”516 However, he held that  
“there was not, in any meaningful sense, an incurring of expenditure of the borrowed 
money in the acquisition of software rights. It went into a loop in order to enable the 
LLPs to indulge in a tax avoidance scheme.”517  
Ascertaining the purpose of the arrangement was central to the case as  
“the transfer of ownership (or at least of rights) indicated the reality of some 
expenditure on acquiring those rights, but was not conclusive as to the whole of the 
expenditure having been for that purpose.”518 
Therefore, the court did not allow the taxpayers to claim more than the amount that was actually 
expended on the acquisition of the software rights.  
The effect of having a divide between the Ramsay approach and the Westminster approach is 
that some judges will examine the motive, intention or purpose of the taxpayer while others 
will focus on whether the facts fall within the ambit of the law and therefore the intention of 
Parliament. The danger with the former approach is that it can eclipse what Parliament intended 
simply because a tax advantage existed or the degree of certainty in an arrangement was too 
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great. However, the battle between the Ramsay approach and Westminster approach was finally 
put to rest when the GAAR was introduced. The GAAR guidance specifically states that the 
GAAR provides an “overriding statutory limit”.519 The guidance also accuses a line of cases 
which support acceptable tax avoidance, including Westminster, as “providing legitimacy to 
even the most abusive tax avoidance schemes.”520 
2.3 Motive, intention and purpose considered across other areas of tax law 
To support the hypothesis that judges hearing tax avoidance cases examine the taxpayers’ 
motive, intention or purpose it is helpful to scrutinise case law from other areas of tax law to 
establish whether assessing motive, intention and purpose is a common theme. If these 
considerations are proven to be a common theme across other areas of tax law, it will strengthen 
the argument that the GAAR may also encourage these factors to be examined in tax avoidance. 
Case law which decided whether trade profits should be taxed has shown a tendency to explore 
the taxpayer’s motive in determining tax liability. Similarly, in classifying the income and 
capital distinction, the subjective thoughts of the taxpayer in making the expenditure is often 
taken into account. To a lesser extent, accountancy has shown evidence of examining the 
taxpayer’s subjective state of mind in determining tax liability to their detriment.  
2.3 (a) Trades, professions and vocations  
The charge to income tax on trade profits is laid down under s5 of the Income Tax (Trading 
and Other Income) Act 2005521 which details that tax is payable “on the profits of a trade, 
profession or vocation.”522 The legislation does not expressly state how courts should decide 
whether a taxpayer is trading but merely states that a ‘“trade” includes any venture in the nature 
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of trade.’523 The Royal Commission on Taxation of Income and Profits524 developed badges of 
trade to assist with determining whether a person is trading. Motive is openly one of the badges 
of trade. In this area of tax law, courts are permitted to explore taxpayers’ motive where a 
transaction is considered equivocal in order to ascertain why the taxpayer embarked on a course 
of action. Specifically, courts usually assess whether there exists a “profit motive.”525 However, 
due to the highly unscientific results which considering a taxpayer’s motive would cause, 
motive is only relied on where the facts are ambiguous. The motive badge is also optional, 
indicating that not all cases are required to consider it. In addition to the motive badge, case 
law has established that “trading requires an intention to trade.”526 
Earlier case law which sought to ascertain the existence of a business placed greater emphasis 
on the internal workings of the business rather than profits. For example, in Bramwell v Lacy527 
(Bramwell) the court did not find it relevant that a hospital, which treated limited illnesses, 
accepted voluntary payments rather than regular remuneration by those who could afford it. 
The mere fact that the hospital was “in the nature” of a business”528 was sufficient to hold that 
there was a breach of covenant which forbade the establishment of a business. Despite this 
strict interpretation of what constitutes a business, the court also held that “whether it is a 
business carried on for the purposes of profit or not, is not… material.”529 Although the term 
purpose is used, Jessel M.R. is essentially referring to the irrelevancy of a profit motive. 
Therefore, the case illustrates that a profit motive is not always relevant. However, in 
subsequent case law, the existence of a profit motive was found to be of great importance.  
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Resembling Bramwell, profit motives were equally unimportant in Religious Tract and Book 
Society of Scotland v R.S. Forbes530 (Forbes). The case involved a religious book society. The 
society owned two bookshops which were undoubtedly taxable entities. However, the society 
also had colporteurs who visited people’s homes selling books and “administering religious 
advice and counsel.”531 Their colportage activities were funded by the money acquired from 
subscriptions however, it was running at a loss and it was questioned whether it could amount 
to a trade despite the lack of a profit and a profit motive.532 Unlike in Bramwell, the voluntary 
nature of the payments was not given weight to. The lack of a profit motive was described as 
“an intentional loss.”533 Therefore, rather than a profit motive, the court found the existence of 
a loss motive indicating that motive remained significant.534 However, the tax realities of the 
colportage activities were decisive in concluding that it was distinct from the profit-making 
businesses therefore, not a trade. The tax realities were that the losses arising from the 
colportage undertakings were not set off against the profits made from the businesses for tax 
purposes.535 It is dubious whether the court would arrive at the same conclusion if the facts had 
indicated a profit rather than loss which may have led to the conferral of a profit motive. Forbes 
therefore established that an intention to make a profit is important in order for an activity to 
be classified as a trade.  
As demonstrated by case law in this area, where the courts affix a constructive motive on the 
taxpayer, it can create inequitable results. For example, in Wisdom v Chamberlain536 (Wisdom), 
the taxpayer bought £200,000 worth of silver bullion to safeguard against the possible 
devaluation of the British pound. The taxpayer argued that rather than to produce a gain, the 
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aim of the purchase was to safeguard against a possible loss in the event the pound devalued.537 
However, the pound did not devalue and the value of silver increased unexpectedly leading to 
the taxpayer making a profit when he later sold his silver bullion. Rather than examine whether 
the taxpayer was motivated by making a profit, the court held that making a profit was not the 
taxpayer’s purpose by stating that “the fact that it was not an expected profit is really quite 
irrelevant.”538 Contradictorily, Harman L.J. later stated that the taxpayer’s purpose was to make 
a profit and that this was relevant by asserting that “the whole object of the transaction was to 
make a profit”.539 A profit-making purpose was therefore imputed by the courts in concluding 
that the taxpayer was trading. Wisdom illustrates how courts can consider or disregard the 
taxpayer’s purpose at will. The case also demonstrates how purposes can be imputed by the 
courts even where it is not entirely clear what the taxpayer’s purpose was. Moreover, as 
Krikorian argued, a person can have “complex [and] confusing purposes”.540 
As in Wisdom, the court in Iswera v Commissioner of Inland Revenue541 (Iswera) overlooked 
the taxpayer’s explanation for purchasing acres of land as her true motive would have negated 
trading. The taxpayer purchased a site of over two acres for the purpose of residing there and 
to be closer to her daughters’ school. A large amount of land was bought as the seller refused 
to sell her the modest plot of land she wanted in isolation. Therefore, the taxpayer later sold 
the surplus land. She was taxed on the difference between the market value of the land and the 
remaining balance owed after the sale of the surplus land. The court could not escape the 
appellant’s primary purpose of her wanting to be nearer to her daughters’ school. Consequently, 
the court sought to neutralise the issue of subjective influences by adding that “too much 
emphasis has been put on motivation”542 and a taxpayer’s “purpose or object alone cannot 
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prevail over what he in fact does.”543 Nevertheless, the court paradoxically, and contrary to the 
decision in Bramwell, concluded by stating that the appellant’s “dominant motive was to make 
a profit.”544 However, the taxpayer’s purpose was arguably to be nearer her daughter’s school 
therefore, it is “difficult to see how motive can… be relevant in cases of such clarity.”545 By 
ensuring the motive test remains optional, courts can consider motive where it indicates trading 
or omit a motive assessment even where the taxpayer’s motive is clearly unrelated to trading.  
Despite the court in Ramsay emphasising the importance of the context of transactions,546 in 
Iswera, the court ignored the wider context of why the land was purchased. The purpose of 
buying the land to reside closer to her daughters’ school was viewed as immaterial and not 
given weight to. Furthermore, the fact that she was essentially “forced to purchase a quantity 
of land which she neither wanted nor needed”547 was also deemed unimportant despite the fact 
that this reflected her motives and revealed that there was a lack of a profit motive. Iswera is a 
good example of Ashworth and Horders’ point that people generally “do things with more than 
one intention in mind.”548 
Conversely, the court in Kirkham v Williams549 (Kirkham) held that the taxpayer was not 
trading despite the profit which the taxpayer made upon reselling his property. The taxpayer 
was a demolition contractor who had differences of opinion with his local authority over storing 
his materials at his mother’s home address. After demolishing buildings for a client, he bought 
the remaining land at Havannah Mills in order for him to store his materials there and establish 
an office. From 1977 to 1982, the taxpayer used the land for limited farming activities such as 
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growing crops and rearing calves for future reselling. Soon after purchasing the land, the 
taxpayer sought planning permission for the construction of a dwelling-house which was 
granted on 1980. The Havannah Mills property was sold two years later in order to buy Sandy 
Lane farm. He was assessed to income tax for the profit made on the sale of Havannah Mills, 
assuming that the property was trading stock. An in-depth exploration into the taxpayer’s 
intentions was made in conjunction with the timing of the transactions in order to ascertain 
whether he was trading. The court concluded that “it was never the taxpayer's intention… to 
purchase Havannah Mills as a residence for himself”550 as he acquired planning permission for 
the dwelling-house subsequent to the purchase of Havannah Mills. The need for office space 
made the taxpayer’s alleged “subsidiary purpose”551 of profiting from the sale of the property 
implausible as this could not be “implemented concurrently with his principal purpose”552 of 
finding a storage place.   
The fundamental difference in Iswera and Kirkham was how the taxpayers’ respective 
intentions and purposes were construed. Significantly, both courts distinguished between 
primary and secondary purposes. In Iswera, the court held that her primary purpose was to 
trade and living nearer her daughters’ school was her secondary purpose. Conversely, in 
Kirkham, the taxpayer’s primary purpose was to obtain storage space and his secondary 
purpose was the prospect of trading. The contrast between the two cases illustrates how the 
courts finely construe and categorise a taxpayer’s purpose and the drastic impact of such 
categorisation, unconnected with fiscal realities. The taxpayer’s purpose was determinative in 
these cases and it is questionable whether the same decisions would be reached without 
considering the taxpayers’ primary and secondary purposes. The court in Kirkham defended its 
decision by stating that the intention of the taxpayer and whether they plan to dispose of the 
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property when they acquire it is conclusive.553 However, the court’s focus in Iswera was on 
what she planned to do with the building rather than why she bought the building which unfairly 
disregards the fact that the taxpayer did not want to purchase the entire plot of land. From a 
Krikorian perspective, it can be said that in Iswera, acquiring the plot of land was a 
“subordinate act”554 which was a step executed in the overall plan rather than the predetermined 
eventual result. Furthermore, as in Kirkham it cannot reasonably be argued that the taxpayer in 
Iswera was “driven by a desire to make a profit.”555 Both taxpayers bought properties for 
reasons other than profit although; both made a profit which indicates that the same decision 
should have been reached in both cases. The decision in Iswera therefore illustrates how judges 
can consider parts of taxpayers’ purpose to produce an inequitable result.  
As discussed above, Ensign Tankers was not only concerned with the issue of tax avoidance 
but also whether the taxpayer was trading. The express overlap between the two areas of tax 
law signifies that the courts can adopt trading principles to tax avoidance namely, the motive 
badge of trade. In Ensign Tankers, the Revenue sought to prove that the appellant companies 
were not trading to prevent them claiming first year allowances of $14m for capital expenditure 
expended on the production of the film. The taxpayer’s purpose was very narrowly construed 
as Lord Templeman claimed that the arrangement was designed “with the object of avoiding 
tax and not with the object of trading.”556 It is interesting that the court found it pertinent to add 
that the taxpayer planned to avoid tax as simply stating that they were not trading would have 
been sufficient. The court instead concluded that the taxpayer could not be trading as they 
planned to avoid tax; as if to say both could not be their objective. Although, Lord Templeman 
added that the solitary act of the partnership giving money for the film “would admittedly 
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constitute trading.”557 Only $3.24m of the $14m claimed was considered to be the amount 
involved in the trade as the remaining sum was part of a tax avoidance scheme that operated 
“as a corporate cancer which infect[ed] and destroy[ed] any fiscal effect advantageous to the 
taxpayer.”558 However, it is inequitable that the tax avoidance element could ruin an otherwise 
legitimate scheme.  
Despite earlier case law, the taxpayer’s motive, intention and purpose are becoming 
increasingly more important. The case law on trading reveals great inconsistencies which 
derive from assessing the taxpayer’s thoughts and the lack of attempting to establish broad 
general principles. Bramwell and Forbes demonstrate the greatest inconsistencies in relation to 
the relevance of a profit motive where voluntary payments are made. However, the existence 
of a profit or a profit motive is not one of the badges of trade which were devised in order to 
introduce uniformity to this area of law. The decisions in Kirkham and Iswera only serve to 
reinforce the inconsistencies which can arise from assessing the taxpayer’s thoughts. Moreover, 
commentators have argued that “where… [motive] is used- it seems to be an ex post facto 
justification for arriving at the result the court wanted to reach in any event.”559 
2.3 (b) Expenditure 
In deciding whether expenditure may be deductible from a taxpayer’s annual profit, the courts 
may examine the purpose behind making the payment as demonstrated by case law in this area. 
The ITTOIA 2005 sets out the conditions for deductible expenditure including; the expense 
must be both income in nature and not capital560 and “incurred wholly and exclusively for the 
purposes of the trade.”561 
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Examining the taxpayer company’s purpose based on the aims of the company and the 
detrimental consequences of not acting was objectively considered in Lawson v Johnson 
Matthey Plc (Lawson).562 The parent company, Johnson Matthey (JM), sought to help its 
subsidiary bank (J.M.B.) after it became insolvent due to financial difficulties. The financial 
hardship suffered by the subsidiary directly affected its parent company as it would attract 
negative publicity and their creditors would also lose faith in the company and demand 
repayment of money.563 The Bank of England agreed to buy the share capital of J.M.B. for £1 
on the condition that JM contributed £50m into J.M.B. The scheme successfully enabled J.M.B. 
to continue its business. The court concluded that the £50m was a revenue payment as it “did 
not bring an asset into existence and did not procure an advantage for the enduring benefit of 
the trade.”564 Lord Goff was careful to convey that the decision was not reached on the basis 
of the taxpayer’s motive or purpose.565 However, he then went on to state that the £50m 
provided was not for disposal of the shares but to salvage J.M.B. therefore, examined the 
taxpayer’s purpose.566  
The ITTOIA 2005 specifically allows courts to consider the taxpayer’ purpose by providing 
that there can be no deduction where the expenditure was disbursed on more than one purpose 
even if one purpose is wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the taxpayer’s trade.567 In 
contrast to the decision in Lawson, in Mallalieu v Drummond (Mallalieu),568 the taxpayer’s 
purpose was assessed to her detriment. A barrister sought to deduct the cost and upkeep of 
unobtrusive work wear which she was required to wear by the Bar Council. The court examined 
her purpose at the time of purchase and held, akin to Iswera and Kirkham, that she had “two 
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objects in making the expenditure,”569 the second being the “preservation of warmth and 
decency.”570 However, the distinction between the taxpayer’s primary and secondary purposes 
were seen to be less important than in Iswera and Kirkham. In Mallalieu, the court held that “it 
is immaterial… that the business purposes are the predominant purposes intended to be 
served”571 as the unconscious motive was inextricably linked to her predominant purpose. The 
duality of influences, due to the courts imposing an unconscious motive, disallowed the 
deduction. Therefore, the decision in Mallalieu concurs with Stocks’ notion that that a person’s 
motive can be “hidden not only from the spectator but even from the agent himself.”572 The 
judgement does not however accord well with those cases which “consistently maintained 
that… motive by itself is not relevant.”573 
An objective analysis was used in Vodafone Cellular Ltd v Shaw (Vodafone).574 The case 
concerned the lump sum of $30m which was sought to be deducted from the computation of 
profits after the taxpayer expended this sum to terminate a fee agreement. The taxpayer 
company was formed by a joint venture of the companies Millicom and Racal. Millicom agreed 
to grant the taxpayer company 5 licences to manufacture its products and incorporate them into 
equipment on the condition that it obtains an operating licence from the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI). However, in order for the licence to be granted the DTI insisted that the 
company form two separate subsidiary companies for the network and sale of the business. The 
company subsequently entered into share and fee agreements with Millicom. The fee 
agreement included the manufacturing licences and the supply of know-how as and when 
needed. The taxpayer agreed to pay a percentage of its profits for 15 years to Millicom in return 
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for this. However, when Millicom’s know-how became unnecessary, the fee agreement sought 
to be terminated and the taxpayer company agreed to pay $30m to extinguish their contractual 
liabilities to make recurring revenue payments. Rather than examine unsubstantiated motives, 
the court examined the agreement itself in concluding that it “was an ordinary commercial 
contract and not a capital asset”.575  The court characterised know-how as a service rather than 
an asset.576 Furthermore, objectively, the agreement could not be classified as a capital asset as 
it did not represent “the whole or virtually the whole of the taxpayer company’s business.”577  
The court agreed that the payment was revenue in nature although questions regarding the 
taxpayer’s intentions were raised in determining whether the payment was made wholly and 
exclusively for the purposes of the trade. If there was a dual purpose namely, to benefit their 
subsidiary in terminating the agreement, it could not be made wholly and exclusively for the 
taxpayer’s trade. The court rightly refused to construe the taxpayer’s intentions narrowly and 
held that it “did not consciously set out to benefit any particular one of them.”578 Moreover, the 
court asserted that questions of intention should be avoided as the “case does not involve an 
inquiry whether the directors...consciously intended to obtain a benefit.”579 The court also 
clearly made a distinction between subjective and objective considerations by examining the 
object which the taxpayer pursued in terminating the agreement rather than inquiring about the 
intended effects of the object materialising.580 It was held that the object of the parent company 
was to benefit itself and any other effect was incidental and remote. This approach supports 
Anscombe’s view that “the inseparability of the effect—is not a ground for regarding it as 
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intended.”581 If this reasoning was used in Mallalieu, the case may have had a very different 
outcome to that which was decided.  
Indian law in the area of expenditure follows UK law closely. India’s Income Tax Act 1961 
states that in order for an expense to be deductible, it must not be a capital expenditure not a 
personal expense582 and it must be “expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of 
business.”583 The Indian courts have approached the issue of compensation received from the 
termination of an agency contract with a UK company in a more straightforward manner. In 
Commissioner of Income Tax v Shaw Wallace,584 the court held that the compensation was a 
revenue payment as taxpayers should only be taxed on profits earned through their business or 
for continuance of their business.585 Therefore, no questions arose as to the taxpayer’s motive.  
American Federal law governing deductible expenditure is akin to Indian law in this area. The 
Internal Revenue Code 1986 states that deductible expenses include “all the ordinary and 
necessary expenses…incurred…in carrying on any trade” and details examples of such 
expenditure.586 The US case of Pevsner v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Pevsner)587 was 
similar to Mallalieu. The case involved the manager of a Yves St Laurent (YSL) boutique who 
was required to wear YSL clothing at work, commuting to and from work, at fashion shows 
and business luncheons.588 As in Mallalieu, the taxpayer claimed that she did not wear YSL 
clothing when she was off duty. Although the court reached the same decision as in Mallalieu 
in holding that the cost of the clothes could not be deducted, they did not consider the taxpayer’s 
motives in reaching their decision. The court followed guidance from the decision reached in 
                                                          
581 Gormally, L. ‘Intention and Side Effects: John Finnis and Elizabeth Anscombe’ cited in Keown, J. & George, 
R., ‘Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis’ [2013], Oxford University Press, Oxford, p106 
582 s37(1) Income Tax Act 1961 
583 Ibid 
584 Commissioner of Income Tax v Shaw Wallace [1931] No. 108 (Cal.) 
585 Ibid, 4 (per curiam) 
586 s162(a) Internal Revenue code 1986 
587 Pevsner v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 628 F.2d, 467 (5th Cir. 1980) 
588 Ibid, per Judge Johnson, p469 
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Donnelly v Commissioner of Internal Revenue589 that clothing could be deductible where; it is 
an occupational requirement, it cannot be worn in daily life and the taxpayer does not use it as 
such.590 The decision in Pevsner illustrates that the taxpayer’s motive or unconscious motive 
does not need to be considered in reaching a fair decision. The court reiterated the importance 
of “an objective test [as it]…promote[s] substantial fairness among the greatest number of 
taxpayers.”591 
It is clear how the motive test can be manipulated to consider primary and secondary motives, 
impose constructive unconscious motives and disallow tax benefits due to the imposition of a 
constructive motive. From the Vodafone case, it is clear that the courts should not concern 
themselves with what the taxpayer intends or hopes are the effects of the transaction after it is 
made. An objective analysis of the taxpayer’s purpose would therefore examine the taxpayer’s 
object of the transaction and would be preferable.  
2.3 (c) Accountancy Standards 
The taxpayer’s intentions have also been considered in accountancy cases; particularly where 
a trader appropriates his or her own stocks and inconsistencies arise when profits and losses 
are brought into account. For example, in Sharkey v Wernher592 (Sharkey) the taxpayer 
appropriated her stock for her own use in a non-arm’s length transaction. She owned two 
enterprises namely a stud farm and racing stables. The stud farm engaged in profitable activities 
such as the selling of produce from the stud farm and the servicing of mares by the taxpayer’s 
stallions in exchange for fees. Therefore, the farm was undoubtedly classified the farm as a 
taxable entity under s31(1)(a) of the Finance Act 1948. However, her private racing stables 
                                                          
589 Donnelly v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1959) 
590 Ibid, 412 (Judge Waterman) 
591 Pevsner v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1980] 628 F.2d 467, 471 (Judge Johnson) 
592 Sharkey v Wernher [1955] 3 W.L.R. 671, [1956] A.C. 58 
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were not classified as a taxable entity as it was regarded as “recreational activities”593 and 
therefore did not generate profits. In 1948, the taxpayer transferred five horses from her stud 
farm to her racing stables. The question in dispute was whether the taxpayer should be liable 
for income tax on the cost or market value of the horses, the latter being substantially higher. 
However, as the taxpayer entered the cost value of the transfer into her accounts, the court 
stated that she acquiesced that some value should be brought into account.594 The court held 
that she should be taxed on the market value of the horses. The taxpayer’s intentions were 
persuasive rather than decisive although it is interesting that the court extracted the taxpayer’s 
agreement to be taxed by her actions. However, as Anscombe argues, an intention can “often 
not be seen from seeing what he does.”595 
In Sharkey it is clear that the taxpayer’s intentions were used to extract the higher amount of 
tax. However, some may argue that Sharkey merely followed the principle previously 
established in Watson Brothers v Hornby (HM Inspector of Taxes)596 (Watson). In Watson, day 
old chicks were transferred from the appellant’s hatchery business to the appellant’s farm. It 
was held that a sum must be brought into account when computing the profits of the hatchery 
to reflect that the transfer was a taxable activity. Therefore, Watson established that a taxpayer 
must pay tax where they appropriate their trading stock under this principle. Unlike in Sharkey, 
the taxpayer sought to establish market value as the correct computation to demonstrate a loss 
as the market value was lower than cost value. The Revenue argued that cost value was the 
correct computation. However, no reference to the taxpayer’s motives was made indicating that 
motive is an unnecessary consideration when ascertaining what value should be brought into 
account. However, in Sharkey, by following the decision in Watson, the court effectively 
                                                          
593 Ibid, 67 (Viscount Simonds) 
594 Ibid, 66 
595 Anscombe, G.E.M. ‘Intention’, [1963], 2nd edn, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p9 
596 Watson Brothers v Hornby (HM Inspector of Taxes) [1942] 2 All ER 506 K.B.  
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departed from the decision in Briton Ferry Steel Co Ltd v Barry597 which found cost value to 
be the correct value.  
If the Revenue argues that cost or market value should be imputed into the taxpayer’s accounts 
based on whichever sum is higher, it can generate precedential inconsistencies where the 
Revenue’s will is adhered to. Indian courts have found fault with accepting market value as the 
correct computation. This is because market value assumes that the taxpayer intends to make a 
profit and Indian courts have therefore held that “a man cannot be compelled to make a profit 
out of any particular transaction.”598 Furthermore, while the court in Sharkey took into account 
the market value of the transactions, Indian courts found it “unreal and…artificial to separate 
the business from its owner.”599 The uncertainty inherent in the adjudication allows judges to 
use their discretion to place greater weight on particular facts in order to arrive at certain 
decisions.600 
It is therefore, apparent that the motive approach is considered widely across various areas of 
tax law. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the approach has leaked into the realms of tax 
avoidance. However, as demonstrated, the motive approach can cause considerable 
inconsistencies and inequitable results even in areas where it is specifically permitted. 
Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain why the motive approach is utilised in tax avoidance.  
2.4 Why the “motive approach” is considered 
The concept of examining intentions is not intrinsically damaging although when the intention 
of the taxpayer is considered rather than Parliament’s intention as evidenced in legislation, it 
can create broad approaches to deciding tax avoidance cases such as the Ramsay approach. 
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599 Ibid, 223 
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However, as demonstrated by the cases supporting Ramsay, the taxpayer’s motive, intention or 
purpose is assessed by the courts. Therefore, it is helpful to examine why and when the 
taxpayer’s motive, intention or purpose is taken into account in order to rationalise later 
whether applying the motive approach is necessary in calculating tax liability. As the 
taxpayer’s intentions are usually evidenced in the documents used in tax avoidance schemes, 
it is important to understand the methods judges can use to import a constructive motive on the 
taxpayer. The move from objective considerations to subjective interpretations of tax cases will 
be observed further to reinforce the main hypothesis that the motive, intention or purpose of 
the taxpayer is frequently assessed in tax avoidance cases.  
As aforementioned, a long line of cases has arguably implemented the motive approach in 
deciding tax liability, although, it is questionable as to why the motive approach may have been 
introduced in the area of tax avoidance. The motive approach also confers much power in the 
hands of the judiciary. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the reasons behind such a conferral 
of power. Furthermore, assessing the relationship between the motive approach and the desire 
to secure tax liability can demonstrate why the motive approach is an effective anti-avoidance 
tool, particularly where an arrangement is complex or where large sums of money are involved.  
In the cases which tended to consider the taxpayer’s motives, intentions or purposes namely, 
the cases supporting Ramsay, there was a general disapproval of tax avoidance schemes. 
Therefore, courts tended to defend their use of extra-statutory principles and extended them as 
demonstrated in Furniss where there was a tax avoidance scheme which the court wished to 
obstruct. Consequently, the motive approach may be applied as a means to stifle tax avoidance 
schemes which is plausible given the government’s graduating dislike of tax avoiders. 
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Fundamentally, tax avoidance is permissible which is why it is unclear as to why a “pre-planned 
tax-saving scheme”601 should give rise to condemnation.  
Importantly, where the court assesses the taxpayers’ motive, intention or purpose, it involves 
judicial discretion. Consequently, the motive approach in cases may have been upheld due to 
the fact that “discretion is also associated with a lower amenability to legal challenge as 
compared with rule-based decision making.”602 
As the motive approach is a product of judicial discretion, it enjoys a large degree of immunity 
from being abandoned in subsequent cases. On the other hand, Parliament’s explicit intention 
is unlikely to be challenged whereas judicial “decisions are [generally] more difficult to 
defend.”603 Despite the difficulty in defending the motive approach, many cases have acceded 
to this approach. Lord Wilberforce defended the permissibility of the discretionary manner in 
which tax avoidance cases are decided by emphasising that an otherwise “step by step 
dissecting approach…would be a denial…of the true judicial process.”604 However, judges 
must firstly construe the facts in accordance with the law before resorting to using their 
discretion as they are subordinate to Parliament.  
The motive approach may also be utilised as a device to secure tax liability where the court 
cannot claim that the arrangement is a sham. For example, in Furniss, the court admitted that 
the scheme could not be considered a sham. Therefore, the court inserted an element of 
subjectivity by stating that the taxpayer’s intention remained the same throughout the scheme 
and that the thought of selling the companies to the original buyers ceaselessly resided in the 
taxpayer’s mind.605 The court therefore relied on the continuity of intention. Similarly, in 
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98 
 
Mallelieu, the expenditure on work wear could not be prevented from being deducted unless 
the court explored the taxpayer’s unconscious purpose. Therefore, the taxpayer’s purpose was 
assessed in order to secure the payment of tax. However, in Kirkham, the taxpayer’s intentions 
were scrutinised in order to secure tax relief for the taxpayer.606 
The pre-planned nature of tax schemes has attracted condemnation by the courts which may 
also be a reason why the motives, intentions or purposes of taxpayer are assessed. Taxpayers 
may be criticised for entering a realm of unreality in their schemes and courts disallow this by 
asserting that “artificial tax avoidance scheme does not alter the incidence of tax.”607 However, 
an artificial motive imputed on the taxpayer cannot categorically result in a chargeable gain.  
As demonstrated in Ramsay and Burmah Oil, judges will examine what the intention of the 
taxpayer is in embarking on the scheme where the scheme is complex or involves a variety of 
documents. Rather than the courts untangling the web of transactions, it is far simpler for the 
courts to speculate what the taxpayer may have been thinking at the time of embarking upon 
the arrangement and ascertain whether this motive, intention or purpose accords with the end 
result which bypasses the intermediate transactions. In order to avoid the intricacies of the 
transactions involved, the court viewed them as “a composite transaction or a number of 
interdependent transactions.”608 The motive of the taxpayer in relation to the entire scheme is 
then examined. However, scrutinising the taxpayer’s motive in each individual scheme would 
not necessarily result in an unacceptable tax avoidance motive. Furthermore, this approach 
ignores the will of Parliament, is unmeasurable and can generate unfair results. In addition to 
this, the ability to choose the relevant facts and the possible multiplicity of parties in an 
arrangement also allows the court to decide whose motive to uphold. 
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Even judges have recognised that a transaction may be challenged simply due to the enormous 
amount of capital involved.609 There is some truth to this observation as those cases which 
support the Ramsay approach including, Ramsay itself, Burmah Oil, Furniss, Craven, Engsign 
Tankers and McGuckian all involved taxable sums in excess of £100,000 and substantially 
higher in some. For example, in Burmah Oil, the assessment to income tax was on £3 million. 
Therefore, the motive approach may be used to ensure these sums are taxed to increase 
government funds. Moreover, as Ramsay illustrated, there is a general judicial aversion to 
arrangements where “the taxpayer does not have to put his hand in his pocket”610 due to the 
existence of a “self-cancelling”611 transaction. Therefore, when there is no profit or loss, the 
motive approach is likely to be applied.  
The motive approach therefore appears to be employed to make the role of adjudication simpler 
rather than the outcome for the taxpayer fairer. It is a means through which the judiciary can 
secure tax liability in the absence of a sham arrangement although it is arguable that an 
arrangement should not be labelled unacceptable where there is no sham. As motive was not a 
statutory requirement when the Ramsay line of cases were decided, it is important to analyse 
how the courts developed the motive approach without being seen to act unconstitutionally.  
2.5 How motive, intention and purpose are considered 
It is important to understand the circumstances in which the courts would resort to considering 
the motive approach. This will help to determine the degree to which motive is relied upon and 
whether it is necessary. Judges have commonly used seemingly objective measures when 
applying the motive approach such as; the substance over form doctrine, purpose of the 
transaction, whether there exists a business purpose and the step transaction doctrine. However, 
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in some cases judges do not attempt to conceal subjective considerations and discuss the issue 
of motive openly. The problem with the Ramsay approach’s wide requirements is that it left it 
“open to later courts to interpret them in ‘inventive’ ways”612 which allowed the motive 
approach to born.  
2.5 (a) The “substance over form” doctrine 
The motive approach is commonly examined where judges explore the substance of the scheme 
rather than its form. However, it is important to note that the courts may not necessarily admit 
to favouring form to substance. For example in Ramsay, Lord Wilberforce criticised the use of 
substance where there is “a document or transaction [which] is genuine.”613 Nevertheless, he 
stated that it is permissible to consider the context of a transaction,614 or where it “was intended 
to have effect…as an ingredient of a wider transaction intended as a whole.”615 Therefore, 
although Lord Wilberforce discouraged examining the substance of an arrangement, he then 
contradictorily advocated assessing the effect of the transaction and importantly, the taxpayer’s 
intention. The decision in Ramsay also demonstrated that the courts prefer to impose a 
constructive intention than to give effect to the parties’ true motive as it “cannot be…desirable 
to…arrive at a conclusion which corresponds with the parties' own intentions.”616 
Consequently, Lord Wilberforce encouraged the assignment of a constructive intention which 
is established after examining the scheme holistically. However, in order to assign a 
constructive intention, judges consider the substance of the arrangement. Furthermore, it can 
broadly be said that any consideration which deviates from the form of the arrangement reviews 
the substance of it.  
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As aforementioned, Lord Tomlin thoroughly criticised the substance over form doctrine which 
has since been utilised in cases supporting the Ramsay approach. The substance over form 
doctrine was also criticised for promoting discretion which generates uncertainty.617 In 
practice, an otherwise legitimate arrangement can be branded as an acceptable tax avoidance 
scheme and the substance over form doctrine employed in order to block any reliefs which the 
taxpayer would otherwise be entitled to.  
The court did not utilise the substance over form doctrine in the American case of Zenz v 
Quinlivan618 (Zenz) in deciding whether retrieval of stock on liquidation was equal to a 
dividend under the income tax code or whether the sum received could attract capital gains tax. 
Through transiently considering the substance of the arrangement, the court acknowledged that 
“redemption of said stock is essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend.”619 
However, the court ultimately held that the sum was not equal to a dividend as the court found 
both motive and examining substance to be irrelevant.620  
The substance over form doctrine is thoroughly ingrained in UK tax law. Ramsay’s supporting 
line of cases and the approval of Ramsay in the GAAR guidance illustrate the “adoption of an 
indiscriminate adoration of substance.”621 Moreover, in McGuckian, the court held that the 
Ramsay approach involved applying the taxing provisions to the substance of the 
transactions.622 Therefore, the court in McGuckian admits an undeniable link between the 
Ramsay approach and the substance over form doctrine.  
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Significantly, Tiley made a direct correlation between examining the taxpayer’s intention and 
the substance over from doctrine.623 He observed that not only does ascertaining the end result 
of a transaction involve assessing the taxpayer’s intentions624 but the “end result test”625 is also 
“indistinguishable from the doctrine that the tax law must be applied to the substance of a 
transaction.”626 This is an important observation as examining the end results includes 
scrutinising intentions and the substance over form doctrine is similar to the scrutinising of the 
end result. The notion that there is a connection between the end result and the taxpayer’s 
intentions coincides with Scheer’s definition of intentions as both “goals and courses of 
action”.627 Consequently, considering the substance of an arrangement involves assessing the 
taxpayer’s intentions.  
Similarly, in Westminster, examining substance was viewed as having subjective connotations 
as Lord Russell expressed that he disagreed with taxing an individual based on the “court's 
view of what it considers the substance of the transaction”628 to be. Although Westminster has 
been seen as an exception due to the fact that only one document was involved, it does not 
follow why tax avoidance cases supporting Westminster and Ramsay are not in agreement 
regarding legal doctrines.  
As well as assessing the substance of arrangements rather than the form, courts also assess 
whether the “case falls within the contemplation or spirit of the statute.”629 The ‘spirit’ is an 
elusive term, capable of wide interpretation by the judiciary and developed in Ramsay as “an 
approach to construction.”630 Therefore, by scrutinising the taxpayer’s motive, intention and 
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purpose, the spirit of legislation and assessing the facts holistically, the outcome can present a 
truly distorted image of the arrangement; imposing a tax where none may have been due.  
Substance therefore gives the courts a greater measure of flexibility to interpret legislation and 
the facts of each case as widely as they wish. For example, in Ramsay, Lord Wilberforce 
displayed a significant willingness to determine the legitimacy of an arrangement without 
documentary evidence as he proclaimed that “the existence of a document may be an indicative 
factor, but absence of one is not fatal.”631 The disposition of the judges in Ramsay is in stark 
contrast to those in Westminster who regarded the covenant in that case as decisive. By 
examining substance, Lord Bridge in Furniss has held that it has “free[d] the courts from the 
shackles which… [were] imposed upon them by the Westminster case.”632 Therefore, the 
substance over form doctrine is a practice markedly different from the purposive approach 
otherwise the court would not have welcomed it as if it were new. Moreover, Edmond argues 
that  
“the reference to ‘substance of the scheme’ is another concept which is sufficiently 
‘slippery’ to provide fertile ground for disputation. It implies that a scheme will always 
have a form different from its substance when, in fact, in many cases, the form and 
substance of a transaction assailed as a scheme will be coterminous.”633  
2.5 (b) Purpose 
Among the various subjective influences encompassing the motive approach, “purpose” is the 
least deplorable. This general acceptability is due to the fact that it is usually conflated with the 
arrangement’s purpose and can therefore be accepted as a more objective measure in theory. 
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Ramsay popularised the use of the term “purpose” but also extended the reach of this term by 
discussing the taxpayer’s motive and intentions, as discussed above. Consequently, discussing 
“purpose” is a technique in which judges may scrutinise all the subjective factors under the 
motive approach.  
Examining the motives, intentions and purposes of the taxpayer is a circular mission as 
exemplified in Craven. In Craven, Lord Templeman held that a typical tax avoider 
“plans and carries out an artificial tax avoidance scheme to avoid…an assessment to 
tax by combining a taxable transaction with a tax avoidance transaction whose 
purpose is the avoidance of the assessment.”634 
However, this statement presupposes that even an acceptable tax avoidance transaction would 
fail due to the fact that a tax advantage was sought and where this was also the motive behind 
embarking on the scheme. The taxpayer’s motive alone is insufficient to differentiate 
acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance transactions.  
Lord Wilberforce in Ramsay also placed emphasis on the assumption that “the whole and only 
purpose of each scheme was the avoidance of tax.”635 Therefore, Lord Wilberforce examined 
the taxpayer’s subjective thoughts rather than viewing the transactions objectively although the 
latter would be more appropriate. The blurring of objective and subjective terms does little to 
rectify the confusion and “conflict between purpose and motive”636 as the term ‘purpose’ has 
been seen to have subjective connotations. As demonstrated in chapter 1, a motive can also 
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connote “the purpose behind a course of action.”637 However, the two terms cannot easily be 
separated as “one necessarily colours the other.”638 
In McGuckian, the court also considered the taxpayers’ purpose. Lord Browne-Wilkinson made 
an important distinction between the terms “purpose” and “effect” by stating that judges should 
not be concerned with the “effect of the insertion of the artificial steps but what was its 
purpose.”639 This reasoning is in contrast with Anscombe’s argument that “the inseparability 
of the effect—is not a ground for regarding it as intended.”640 Lord Browne- Wilkinson’s 
approach signifies that the term “purpose”, which can have subjective connotations, should be 
given priority to the objective term “effect” which also indicates that the courts are less 
concerned with fiscal realities than they are about subjective factors. Similarly, in Furniss, 
purpose was reinforced as a subjective term where the court reiterated that the commercial 
purpose must be examined and not the existence of a “business effect”641 although the latter 
would be a more objective measure. Consequently, it is difficult to defend the view that Ramsay 
did no more than encourage the finding of the “relevant transaction.”642 
There were different approaches in applying the term “effect” in Furniss and Westminster. In 
Westminster, the term was applied to the facts to conclude that “the legal effect of this deed 
was to give Allman…the right to a weekly payment.”643 However, in Furniss, the judges 
narrowed the scope of “effect” placed emphasis on whether there was a “business effect”.644 
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2.5 (c) Commercial or business purpose  
The court in McGuckian then tried to conceal its subjectivity beneath commercial 
considerations by stating that the assignment of the dividend to Mallardchoice Ltd. had no 
business purpose therefore, this artificial step should be disregarded.645 The term “business 
purpose” confines purpose to a business purpose rather than examining the taxpayer’s purposes 
in general or whether tax avoidance was a purpose by examining the business’ purposes or 
aims of the taxpayer for the benefit of the business. Furniss also used the term ‘commercial 
purpose’ to judge whether the taxpayer had engaged in an acceptable or unacceptable tax 
avoidance scheme. According to Oliver L.J., unacceptable tax avoidance is given an objective 
definition where a scheme is “without any objective economic reality and therefore incapable 
of having fiscal consequences.”646 
The holistic approach as extended in Furniss requires there to be a “preordained series of 
transactions into which are inserted steps that have no commercial purpose apart from the 
avoidance of a liability to tax.”647 Therefore, the purpose of avoiding tax must exist as well as 
having no commercial purpose which renders the latter less important and still involves 
grappling with a subjective element.  
The business purpose test derives its roots from American law and is known for its application 
in Gregory v Helvering648 (Gregory) which repeatedly affirmed that the taxpayer’s motive is 
of no significance. Despite the apparent objective term “business” imputed into the test to 
suggest it has no connections with motive, judges have succeeded in interpreting this test 
subjectively. For example, in Rice’s Toyota World Inc. v CIR649 (Rice) the court flagrantly 
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studied the taxpayer’s motives by subjectively interpreting the business purpose test. The 
taxpayer in Rice purchased a computer using recourse and non-recourse notes. He subsequently 
leased the computer back to the seller for 8 years. The taxpayer claimed depreciation 
deductions for the computer and interest deductions paid on the non-recourse notes. The 
original seller then subleased the computer which generated an income. The arrangement was 
found to be a sham in applying the business purpose test which the court held “concerns the 
motives of the taxpayer in entering the transaction.”650 The business purpose test was therefore 
applied subjectively although, economic substance was held to be an objective test.651 The 
twofold test resulted in the court taking into account both objective and subjective 
considerations by holding that the taxpayer “subjectively lacked a business purpose and the 
transaction objectively lacked economic substance.”652 The court however, allowed the interest 
deductions as “a sham transaction may contain elements whose form reflects economic 
substance.”653 
The requirement of a business or commercial purpose does little to resolve cases where there 
exists a business purpose as in Furniss. Although, the court inferred that there was a lack of a 
subjective business purpose by stating that the transactions were preordained with the intention 
of avoiding tax. Therefore, it is clear how examining whether there is a commercial or business 
purpose can involve assessments of motive particularly where a twofold test is applied which 
examines whether there is a business purpose in reality and whether the taxpayer’s motives 
involved tax avoidance.  
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2.5 (d) The step transaction doctrine 
The step transaction doctrine has also facilitated the taxpayer’s intentions being assessed. As 
Tiley observed, there are three variations to the step transaction doctrine.654 The first is the 
“binding commitment test”655 which encourages a holistic assessment of the facts as “once the 
first step has been taken there is a binding commitment to take the later ones.”656 The “mutual 
interdependence test”657 also facilitates a holistic approach where the transactions “are so 
interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would have been fruitless 
without a completion of the series.”658  
Judges have proclaimed to be either ignoring the intermediary steps in an arrangement or 
grouping the individual transactions together. Both approaches involve examining the 
arrangement holistically and “cutting the knot rather than unravelling it.”659 The final test 
examines the “end result”660 of an arrangement. This test is most capable of manipulation as it 
involves “separate transactions [being] amalgamated…when it appears that they were really 
component parts of a single transaction.”661 
Tiley overtly states that the final test involves examining the taxpayer’s intentions662 as it seeks 
to uncover what “the parties sought when they began their transaction.”663 Tiley’s approach 
therefore accords with Anscombe’s definition of an intention as being what a person “aims at 
or chooses”.664 Consequently, the step transaction doctrine does facilitate the motive approach. 
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As well as the problems inherent in determining subjective intentions, Tiley also warns that the 
“end result”665 test can encourage more judicial discretion and disturbingly allows the courts 
to decide who the relevant parties are to the arrangement.666   
All the terms used by the courts have the effect of “piercing the external manifestations of the 
taxpayer's transactions.”667 As well as the common doctrines that are employed, judges will 
also have regard to other factors in determining whether an arrangement is an unacceptable tax 
avoidance arrangement. For example, the court will evaluate the difference between 
“independent [and] interdependent steps”668 in order to form a holistic view of the events. The 
court will also examine “the timing between the steps”669 to determine whether they are 
preordained where for example, the transactions are made in close succession or on the same 
day as occurred in Burmah Oil and Ensign Tankers. Both cases were based on the fallible 
premise “that quick-step transactions are less likely to fall apart than slow ones.”670 However, 
issues of timing inevitably raise the difficult question of “how much patience did the taxpayer 
need to exercise for his tax-avoidance to be acceptable to the courts?”671 
In Furniss, the court asserted that an arrangement would be dubious where “it was all over in 
time for lunch.”672 Therefore, a taxpayer would need to insert a delay of at least a day into an 
arrangement to avoid suspicion. However, it is unlikely that the question regarding timing will 
be definitively answered and timing measurements are likely to turn on the particular facts of 
the case. Despite the uncertainty regarding timing, in IRC v Bowater Property Developments 
Ltd673 (Bowater) timing was a measurable and material factor. Among other factors, the court 
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also held that the duration of 19 months between the first and the second transactions was 
sufficient to regard the latter as an “independent transaction”674 which fell short of the 
arrangement being regarded as a “composite transaction”675 as required by the Ramsay 
approach. Therefore, the Ramsay approach did not apply.676 The court discussed the taxpayer’s 
intentions although, the Revenue found the lack of a specific buyer irrelevant.677 The court also 
stated that where the purchase of land was withdrawn, there was a “break… in the continuity 
of the intention…of Bowater.”678 Therefore, not only can judges infer primary and secondary 
motives, intentions and purposes but they can also decide when these influences cease during 
an arrangement. The break in intention meant that the arrangement could not be seen as 
preordained.679 However, transactions taking place in quick succession have been deemed to 
be “the normal sort of Ramsay situation.”680  
Timing is therefore of crucial importance to form a nexus with the succeeding transactions and 
secure tax liability. Examining the timing between the transactions therefore operates to 
neutralise a tax avoidance motive. Although, as Tiley pointed out, the intentions of the taxpayer 
can still be examined under the step transaction doctrine.  
2.5 (e) Motive or intention 
There are instances where the court overtly examined the taxpayer’s motive or intention 
without acknowledging that there may be some impropriety in doing so. Peculiarly, in Bowater 
the court displayed a general dislike towards the Ramsay approach although it discussed the 
taxpayer’s intentions. The case concerned the taxpayer, the Bowater Group, wishing to sell 
some land to another company named Milton Pipes Ltd. Prior to the agreed sale to Milton Pipes 
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Ltd., the taxpayer company sold the land to five companies within the Bowater Group in order 
to utilise the companies’ land tax development exemption. However, a couple of months later, 
the sale failed to go through due to the buyer’s lack of capital. Nonetheless, a year later, the 
buyer secured the necessary capital for the purchase of the original land and the sale was 
eventually completed several months later. The Revenue contended that the Ramsay approach 
should operate to nullify the first sale within the Bowater Group.681 However, the extension of 
the Ramsay approach operated to the Revenue’s detriment. Ironically, where the court 
interpreted the taxpayer’s intentions in favour of the taxpayer company, the Revenue asserted 
that it is irrelevant that the taxpayer “had had no specific purchaser in mind at the time of the 
first transaction.”682 This was argued despite the fact that the lack of a specific buyer weakened 
the requirement for acceptable tax avoidance arrangements to be considered preordained in 
Furniss.   
Significantly, in Bowater, the initial withdrawal of the purchase of the land by Milton Pipes 
Ltd. was seen as a “break… in the continuity of the intention…of Bowater.”683 In this case, the 
extension of the Ramsay approach in Furniss was used as a doubled-edged sword as the court 
held that “in no sense was the second transaction… preordained at the time when the first 
transaction was carried out.”684 Therefore, the argument was that there was a lack of an 
intention rather than deciphering the existence of the taxpayer’s intention. However, in utilising 
this Ramsay-style argument in reverse, the court based their conclusions on “fact[s] of which 
the events of May and July 1980 are but evidence.”685  
Applying the motive approach has seldom been used in the taxpayer’s favour although the 
Bowater case illustrates how proving the lack of intention can provide equitable results. The 
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application of the motive approach in this manner is however rare and it is unlikely that Lord 
Brightman envisaged that his preordained requirement would be employed to uphold the 
taxpayer’s position. By using the chameleon terms ‘purpose’, ‘business purpose’ and 
‘substance’, it camouflages the subjective nature of the motive approach. Each objective 
expression utilised “gives the courts another term to inject with legal meaning and anti-
avoidance venom.”686 Even if motives, intentions or purposes could be quantified, it is 
unfathomable as to why the existence of “a conscious plan”687 should attract liability. 
Therefore, the suitability of the motive approach must be examined to determine whether 
Ramsay has facilitated “an injustice caused by… judicial legislation.”688 
2.6 Suitability of the motive approach in tax law  
From examining the cases supporting the Ramsay approach, including how the term “purpose” 
can be subjectively construed and other areas of tax law, it is evident that the taxpayer’s motive 
is widely considered across the field of tax law. Due to the acceptance of the motive approach 
as a persuasive and sometimes a central factor in determining tax liability, it is important to 
establish whether assessing the taxpayer’s motive is suitable and whether it generates equitable 
results. Fundamentally, where the taxpayer’s claims do not accord with the assigned motive, 
intention or purpose this “must involve an assumption that the seller is lying.”689 Therefore, 
there must be sufficient justification for this assumption. 
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2.6 (a) Is the motive approach necessary? 
In light of the cases invoking the motive approach, the test appears unnecessary in determining 
tax liability and fundamentally is not “intellectually sustainable”690 to be applied uniformly. To 
support this view, many judges have echoed that motive is an unnecessary measurement691 
including the cases which support the Ramsay approach. Whilst many cases have conceded 
that motive is irrelevant, it is necessary to ascertain whether the motive approach is purposeless 
or whether it serves to help apportion tax liability justly.  
It is helpful to consider why some judges believe that motive is an irrelevant concern. In F.A. 
& A.B. Ltd. v Lupton692 (Lupton), Lord Morris exemplified why motive was not necessary in 
tax cases whilst simultaneously giving his opinion on the substance over form doctrine. He 
stressed that it is irrelevant because “motive does not and cannot alter or transform the essential 
and factual nature of a transaction.”693 Consequently, Lord Morris emphasised that the motive 
of the taxpayer has no bearing on deciphering the legitimacy of an arrangement. Therefore, 
Lord Morris’ view coincides with the Utilitarian notion that “acts, not feelings count”.694  
However, where motive is predicted in an artificial manner, it does modify the results of cases, 
usually in favour of the Revenue. Therefore, judges should look to the legitimacy of the 
transactions to determine tax liability rather than what was sought in embarking on the scheme. 
Lord Morris emphasised that “it is the transaction itself and its form and content which are to 
be examined.”695 Accordingly, he reinforces that examining the form of the agreement does 
not involve assessing motive which correspondingly suggests that scrutinising the substance of 
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the arrangement involves the motive approach. Lord Oliver in Craven also stressed that “the 
fact that the motive for a transaction may be to avoid tax does not invalidate it.”696 Those 
members of the judiciary who have struck down the relevance of motive have done so 
vehemently.  
Lupton was a case regarding trading, an area of law which specifically allows motive to be 
considered. Thus, if judges presiding over cases where trading is permitted reject the motive 
approach, motive should not be considered in tax avoidance cases where no such authorisation 
exists. Therefore, the motive approach is not necessary in tax avoidance and “reliance on 
motive must disappear.”697 This view accords with Stocks’ idea that “evidence of character or 
motive is action”.698  
The court in Zenz clearly established that motive was irrelevant. Despite the “circuitous 
approach”699 employed and loathed in Ramsay, the judge in Zenz also disregarded the use of 
the motive approach as he perceptively stated that “the taxpayer's motive to avoid taxation will 
not establish liability if the transaction does not do so without it.”700 Therefore, the court 
encourages examining the transaction rather than the taxpayer’s motives as motive alone is 
insufficient and unreliable.  This approach coincides with Lord Guest’s argument in Harrison, 
as outlined in chapter one, that judges should “only [be] concerned with the results of the 
business.”701 
As demonstrated in many cases involving companies for example, Burmah Oil, it is difficult 
to comprehend “how one would attribute motive to an artificial person.”702 Cases involving 
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companies could include many different people who represent the mind of the company and it 
is unreasonable to assume that they all had the same joint intention. Laurence’s “Anscombian 
approach to collective action”703 further reinforces the view that “sometimes the people who 
know the end that ultimately explains what everyone is doing may not know what particular 
actions are serving that end.”704 
The motive approach appears to be thoroughly ingrained in tax avoidance precedent. Judges 
apply the motive approach as a matter of custom although, it is not imperative to adopt the 
motive approach. However, where the motive approach is discussed, Bowater illustrates how 
the motive approach can operate in reverse to establish the lack of an avoidance motive where 
there is the real possibility of “inchoate tax planning.”705 Nevertheless, the motive approach 
should not be regarded as having any importance in tax avoidance cases and it is wholly 
unnecessary. The approach detracts from tax legislation and diverts judges into examining a 
variety of intangible possibilities.  
2.6 (b) Restructuring transactions 
As aforementioned, in order to ascertain the taxpayer’s intentions, the court restructures the 
facts of the case which is an extra-statutory practice. Due to the fact that typically many 
disposals are made, the court will “reconstruct [these] into a single direct disposal from the 
taxpayer.”706 However, this disregards the legitimacy of the intermediate transactions and the 
costs involved in executing them. Moreover, this approach only has regard to a selective motive 
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which has been artificially constructed by the courts through restructuring the scheme. This is 
ironic given the judicial criticisms aimed at taxpayers for constructing artificial arrangements.  
The practice of restructuring transactions and ignoring the intermediate transactions was also 
put under scrutiny in Craven, indicating that judges are mindful that this practice could be 
regarded as unconstitutional. It was asserted that restructuring cannot take place in every tax 
avoidance case.707 The artificial custom of restructuring would “prevent a taxpayer from 
availing himself of the fiscal immunities, privileges, allowances and other mitigating factors 
provided or permitted by Parliament.”708 As the judiciary are subordinate to Parliament, they 
must allow a transaction to benefit from the immunities laid down by Parliament.  
Lord Oliver in Craven warned against restructuring the facts of any given arrangement. He 
noted that where restructuring was utilised in Furniss, this took a “considerable step further”709 
than the original holistic formulation of the Ramsay approach. Lord Oliver asserted that the 
judges in Furniss were “reconstituting the actual constituent transactions into something that 
they were not in fact, attributing to the parties an intended result which they did not in fact 
intend.”710 Therefore, it illustrates that judges can and have attributed an intention to the 
taxpayer which is far from the realities of their motives. Additionally, Lord Oliver emphasised 
how in order to arrive at the artificial intention, judges will distort the reality of the 
arrangement. The contrived manner of ascertaining tax liability is not reasonable or permitted 
by Parliament. Moreover, Lord Oliver stated that by restructuring the transactions in Furniss, 
the judges “disapplied the specific statutory consequences”711 therefore, ignored the will of 
Parliament. Furthermore, in restructuring the schemes, it does not seek to determine what 
Parliament intended and instead focuses on what the taxpayer intended. It is therefore difficult 
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to see how the Ramsay approach was developed as an aid to construction. Lord Oliver went 
further in his critical opinion of restructuring tax arrangements by stating that even if Ramsay 
were simply an aid to construction, it should only be utilised where “that which has taken place 
is not, within the meaning of the statute.”712 
Notwithstanding Lord Oliver’s criticisms of Furniss and Ramsay, he nevertheless approved of 
the holistic approach taken in both cases by expressing that a transaction is to be viewed as a 
composite transaction where the “successive transactions are so indissolubly linked together, 
both in fact and in intention.”713 Therefore, he acknowledges that the holistic approach involves 
examining the taxpayer’s intentions. However, Lord Oliver went further than this to reinforce 
the importance of viewing transactions as a composite whole by asserting that “the court is 
both bound and entitled so to regard them.”714 By declaring that the courts are bound to follow 
the Ramsay approach, it reinforces the importance of Ramsay.   
Restructuring schemes can therefore create a misleading perception of the facts of the case. 
Despite all the arguments opposing the practice of restructuring transactions, Ramsay has 
permitted “so radical a reconstruction of the actual events”715 which is alarmingly regarded as 
“rationally and logically possible”716 by judges. However, the practice of restructuring 
arrangements heralded by Ramsay “is to legislate, not to construe.”717 
2.6 (c) Inconsistencies  
The motive approach has many complications and problems, one of which is the inevitable 
inconsistencies which arise from the test. This is because the motive approach involves looking 
into the mind of the taxpayer although “the subjective nature of this test detracts from the 
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certainty.”718 Therefore, it creates uncertainty for taxpayers as to their potential tax liability 
depending on how their motives will be interpreted. The lack of certainty also defies Adam 
Smith’s tenet of creating a better tax system namely, the need for taxes to be “certain and not 
arbitrary.”719 Furthermore, as the taxpayer’s motives, intentions or purposes cannot be 
measured or definitively determined and case law supporting the motive approach “says 
nothing about the weight to be accorded to motive,”720 it is difficult to apply the approach 
consistently.   
The precedential inconsistencies created by the motive approach can be demonstrated by the 
conflicting trading cases of Iswera and Kirkham where motive was permitted to be considered. 
Although the transaction in Iswera was not viewed as equivocal, the court nevertheless 
examined the taxpayer’s motives. Trading was held to be the primary motive in Iswera and the 
secondary motive in Kirkham. The inconsistencies could therefore have been avoided had 
motive not been assessed, then narrowly construed and subsequently ascribed.  
As well as the inconsistencies deriving from trading cases, tax avoidance has also suffered from 
inconsistencies due to the formulation of judicial doctrines. For example, in Craven, the court 
did not apply Lord Brightman’s test which he developed in Furniss despite the similarity of 
the facts. This fuels uncertainty as to the efficacy of the judicial tests as well as when they 
should be applied. Lord Oliver found differences between the two cases including that the 
events in Craven 
“were not contemporaneous. Nor were they pre-ordained or composite in the sense 
that it could be predicated with any certainty at the date of the intermediate transfer 
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what the ultimate destination of the property would be…or even whether an ultimate 
transfer would take place at all.”721 
The uncertainty of who would be the ultimate owner of the shares in the company Millor 
coupled with the doubt as to whether the shares would be disposed to J Ltd all serves to 
strengthen the unreliability of predicting the motive of the taxpayer. Moreover, the many 
varying outcomes signify that it is difficult to isolate a particular motive with any degree of 
certainty.  
The uncertainty in deciding tax avoidance cases can be said to have derived from distinguishing 
between a Westminster-style arrangement and a Ramsay-style arrangement. Ramsay was 
differentiated on the basis that the arrangement was more complex than the arrangement in 
Westminster which is why the court insisted on a holistic approach and questions of the 
taxpayer’s motive, intention and purpose arose. However, the legal “issue in Ramsay was in 
fact a very simple one.”722 Therefore, on this basis, the Ramsay approach was unnecessary and 
created avoidable inconsistencies. In addition to the common law rules emanating from 
Ramsay, the purposive approach was no longer viewed as an aid to construction where the 
legislation was ambiguous but as a customary mechanism. In order to allow the purposive 
approach to gain further importance, “judges… over-emphasise[d] a narrow version of the 
literal rule.”723 
Even with the cases supporting Ramsay, there is some uncertainty as to what the Ramsay 
approach includes due to the absence of a definition.724 What has come to be known as the 
Ramsay approach is a list of anti-avoidance tactics which are capable of being extended as 
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demonstrated by Furniss supplementing the pre-ordained requirement. It is likely that the 
Ramsay formulation purposely created a “broad-brush approach”725 to inhibit more tax 
avoidance attempts although; the broadness of the principle has caused inconsistencies in 
application.  
2.6 (d) Constitutional legitimacy of the motive approach 
Prior to the GAAR, the motive approach was not expressly permitted by Parliament and some 
could argue that “to look beyond what Parliament actually intended raises constitutional 
issues.”726 Moreover, it is undesirable to allow the development of judicial legislation, namely 
Ramsay, in “an area in which Parliament is demonstrably capable of legislating effectively but 
has not sought to do so.”727 
Many of the supporters of the Ramsay approach ironically oppose assessing motive and the 
judges have openly advocated how irrelevant this consideration is. For example, despite the 
taxpayer’s purpose being at the fore of judicial reasoning in Ensign Tankers, Lord Templeman 
contradictorily stated that judges are not “competent or obliged to decide whether there was a 
sole object or paramount intention.”728 Despite this contention, in the earlier cases of Iswera 
and Kirkham, the judiciary clearly distinguished between primary and secondary intentions. 
Lord Templeman’s assertion that the motive approach should not be considered is evidence 
that the judges themselves believe that the motive approach is an unsuitable step in concluding 
tax liability. By judges expressing their disapproval at the motive approach, it further conceals 
their discussion of motives, intentions and purposes when coupled with a tactic of concealing 
the motive approach as aforementioned. 
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By ascribing motives, intentions and purposes, judges are currently sitting at the fringes of 
constitutional legitimacy due to the  
“role of the courts as an agency for preventing taxpayers from taking advantage of the 
statutory consequences which the legislature has seen fit to attach to certain actions 
for the purpose of avoiding, minimising or postponing…tax.”729 
The judges referring to the extension of the Ramsay approach in Furniss as having “crossed 
the Rubicon”730 leaves no doubt that the anti-avoidance rules were not merely additional aids 
to construction. Furniss reinforced Ramsay as “the legal basis for Dawson is the case of 
Ramsay”731 and not the purposive approach.  
Judges have cautioned against treating Ramsay as some form of “judge-made anti-tax-
avoidance rule.”732 The case of Bowater warned that to honour the rule as such “would be 
nothing short of unconstitutional.”733 Warner J. warned that Ramsay has been “open to the 
courts to mould and develop”734 indicating that the Ramsay approach was capable of effortless 
expansion in a palpable act of defiance against Parliament. Warner J. felt so strongly about the 
issue of Ramsay being treated as an indispensable rule that he found it necessary to restate basic 
principles of levying taxation as if to indicate that they had been long forgotten on the advent 
of Ramsay. He emphasised that “under our constitution the imposition of taxation is a matter 
for Parliament”735 and specified that this referred to the House of Commons.736 The true role 
of the courts is to do no more than to “interpret and apply the legislation enacted by Parliament 
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in accordance with relevant legal principles.”737 However, in the Court of Appeal Warner J. 
declined to suggest that Ramsay is any more than a principle of examining the substance of the 
arrangement. Nonetheless, he omitted to elucidate on what he would encompass as the 
substance of an arrangement which left Ramsay condemned but not limited.738   
2.7 Conclusion 
It was not only those cases supporting the Ramsay approach which considered the taxpayer’s 
cognitive influences. Lord Atkin examined both the taxpayer’s intentions and the substance of 
the arrangement.739 Motives were held to be irrelevant in Ramsay.740 Although, the taxpayer’s 
intentions were given significant weight to at various times in the judgement in concluding that 
the taxpayer intended to generate an artificial loss to offset a chargeable gain.741 The court 
referred to the taxpayer’s motive, intention and purpose in Ramsay however, these were not 
always discussed in the correct context. Ramsay is undeniably a case involving a tax avoidance 
scheme since there were many factors, other than the taxpayer’s intentions, to suggest that it 
was. For example, there were unusual and profitable conditions attached L2.742 Therefore, 
examining the taxpayer’s motive, intention and purpose were not necessary or appropriate in 
dismissing the appellant taxpayer’s claim.  
Although Burmah upheld Ramsay, the judges nevertheless criticised Ramsay for enquiring 
about the taxpayer’s purpose and added that tax avoidance purposes are irrelevant.743 Furniss 
focused on the arrangement’s purpose, however in Ensign Tankers the court focused on the 
taxpayer’s purpose. Although Lord Clyde in McGuckian stated that it is unnecessary to 
                                                          
737 Ibid 
738 Ibid 
739 IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] A.C. 1, 13 and 15 (Lord Atkin) 
740 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC; Eilbeck v Rawling [1981] 2 W.L.R 449, [1982] A.C. 300, 323 (Lord Wilberforce) 
741 Ibid, 333 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton) 
742 Ibid, p335 
743 IRC v Burmah Oil Co Ltd. [1982] S.C. (H.L.) 114, 130 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton) 
123 
 
examine whether a tax avoidance purpose exists,744 the relevant legislation in McGuckian had 
an anti-avoidance provision.745 However, the relevant legislation in Ramsay746 made no 
reference to the purpose of the arrangement or that it must not be for tax avoidance purposes. 
Therefore, examining the taxpayer’s purpose was an extra-statutory consideration. 
Supporters of the Westminster approach tended to not examine the taxpayer’s motive, intention 
or purpose, although Craven was an exception to this and discussed how the taxpayer’s motive 
was tax avoidance.747 However, the timing of the arrangement was the focal point in Craven. 
Without explicitly stating so, the court formulated a remoteness test which examined how 
remote the end result was at the time of the intermediate transactions.748 This remoteness test 
was also applied in Barclays where the court held that the events were not pre-planned and that 
there was some risk involved which made the arrangement genuine.749 Westmoreland gave 
importance to Parliament’s intentions rather than developing another test to add to the Ramsay 
approach. 
The Ramsay approach was clearly left intentionally undefined to create a broad principle 
capable of wide interpretation with scope to extend it. However, whilst helping to formulate 
the principle, Lord Wilberforce held that “general principles against tax avoidance are…for 
Parliament to lay down.”750 Furthermore, the House of Lords in Ramsay arguably provoked 
the creation of the GAAR by signalling to Parliament that “if the taxpayer escapes the charge, 
it is for Parliament, if it disapproves of the result, to close the gap.”751 Although, Ramsay 
provided a means through which successive cases could close the gap. The subtle plea by the 
                                                          
744 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 W.L.R. 991, 1006 (Lord Clyde) 
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House of Lords indicates that the judges were insinuating that, rather than a GAAR, Parliament 
should implement a wide General Anti-Avoidance Principle. The decision in Westmoreland 
also demonstrated that “the courts have been reluctant to adopt the role of tax policeman”.752 
The decision in Wisdom demonstrates how courts can ascribe a particular motive to a taxpayer. 
Although the court conceded that the taxpayer did not expect a profit,753 the court held that the 
purpose of buying the silver bullion was to obtain a profit.754 Wisdom is similar to Iswera where 
the court discussed how motive was irrelevant but nevertheless held that the taxpayer had a 
profit motive which was ascribed to her. In contrast, the taxpayer in Kirkam made a real profit 
although was held not to be trading. Therefore, even in trading where there has been a long-
established practice of examining taxpayer motives, there is still unpredictability, inconsistency 
and “nothing about the weight to be accorded to motive”.755 
Even though the ITTOIA 2005, in the field of expenditure, permits the consideration of 
purpose,756 in Lawson the judiciary emphasised that whether a payment was capital or revenue 
in nature “does not depend upon the motive or purpose of the taxpayer.”757 Moreover, 
Mallalieu demonstrated how the courts can hold that the taxpayer had a particular purpose 
when the taxpayer herself is unaware. 
As established, there are various reasons why motives, intentions and purposes are examined. 
Firstly, it can be argued that examining cognitive influences and ascribing a particular motive, 
intention or purpose can help to secure tax liability. As discussions about cognitive influences 
require discretion, there is greater flexibility in deciding cases. Where a scheme is complex or 
                                                          
752 Slater, A.H. “Part IVA: An International Perspective”, [2013] Australian Tax Review, Vol. 42/3 149, p152 
753 Wisdom v Chamberlain [1969] 1 W.L.R. 275, 281 (Harman L.J.) 
754 Ibid, 282 
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756 s34(1)(a) ITTOIA 2005 
757 Lawson v Johnson Matthey Plc. [1992] 2 W.L.R. 826, [1992] 2 A.C. 324, 341 (Lord Goff) 
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involves many documents, it is also easier to ignore the intricacies of the scheme and determine 
what the taxpayer sought to achieve overall. 
Examining taxpayers’ motives, intentions or purpose in tax avoidance is carried out in a number 
of ways under the guise of a variety of well-known anti-avoidance principles. For example, it 
has been demonstrated in the cases supporting Ramsay how the substance over form doctrine 
can lead to examining the taxpayer’s motives, intentions or purposes. Tiley also stated how the 
step transaction doctrine is involves examining the taxpayer’s motives.758 Finally, judges have 
examined the taxpayer’s motive, intention or purpose overtly without resorting concealing the 
considerations behind an established principle or approach. 
Ramsay preferred examining the substance of transactions over their form. However, the 
substance over form approach led to an assessment of the motive approach which is 
undesirable. Therefore, a more appropriate method for assessing substance “involves 
classification rather than recharacterisation of the facts.”759 Consequently, the court in Ramsay 
should have classified each transaction as legally permissible or not rather than change their 
character. Motive is neither necessary nor expressly permitted by statute which is recognised 
by most judges presiding over tax avoidance cases. The motive approach seems to not only 
cause precedential inconsistencies but it can also be regarded as unconstitutional. Therefore, it 
is necessary to explore the provisions of the GAAR to establish whether the motive approach 
has been given approval by Parliament.  
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Chapter 3: The GAAR provisions analysed 
Introduction 
The GAAR states that it is aimed at “counteracting tax advantages arising from tax 
arrangements that are abusive.”760 The GAAR has various stages to determine whether an 
arrangement is abusive. This chapter provides an outline of the central provisions of the UK 
GAAR in order to ascertain the extent to which a taxpayer’s motive, intention or purpose can 
be subjectively examined by the judiciary. An evaluation of the meaning of the central 
provisions of the GAAR will be given. These central provisions include a tax advantage,761 a 
tax arrangement,762 the main purpose test763 and the double reasonableness test.764 Scrutinising 
the GAAR’s provisions will strengthen the argument that the GAAR allows for a significant 
amount of discretion to be exercised by the judiciary in determining whether an arrangement 
amounts to acceptable tax avoidance. In order to reinforce the view that the level of discretion 
afforded to the judiciary is undesirable, the usefulness of the guidance on what amounts to 
abuse, according to the GAAR and the GAAR guidance, will be assessed, including, what does 
not qualify as abusive. The requirements within the GAAR guidance will also be examined as 
the GAAR legislation states that the courts must take it into consideration.765 Consequently, 
when discussing the scope of the GAAR, it will be suggested that the targeted GAAR can be 
interpreted widely and has the potential to apply to a broad range of arrangements due to its 
inherent ambiguity. Lastly, the proposed penalties of the GAAR will provide an insight as to 
how the government plans to tackle the perceived problem of tax avoidance.  
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3.1 The GAAR: An overview 
The GAAR states that it applies to various taxes including; income tax,766 corporation tax,767 
capital gains tax,768 petroleum revenue tax,769 inheritance tax,770 stamp duty land tax771 and 
annual tax on enveloped dwellings.772 Despite the various judicial views on what amounts to 
acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance, the GAAR “has imposed an overriding statutory 
limit on the extent to which taxpayers can go in trying to reduce their tax bill.”773  
The GAAR has two main objectives and was introduced to operate primarily as a deterrence 
aimed at taxpayers and prospective promoters of tax avoidance schemes.774 The second 
objective of the GAAR is to “counteract the abusive tax advantage”775 by requiring a tax 
adjustment to be made.776 The GAAR was introduced by the Coalition Government in 2013 in 
order to tackle abusive tax arrangements.777 The requirements of an abusive arrangement will 
be analysed to ascertain what factors the judiciary may take into account when establishing 
whether a tax scheme is abusive.  
3.2 The GAAR provisions 
The GAAR’s provisions are laid down in Part 5 of the Finance Act 2013. The GAAR is 
separated into three key stages. Firstly, there must be a tax advantage.778 Secondly, there must 
                                                          
766 s206(3)(a) Finance Act 2013 
767 s206(3)(b) Finance Act 2013 
768 s206(3)(c) Finance Act 2013 
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773 ‘HMRC GAAR Guidance: Parts A, B and C’ cited in 
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idance_Parts_A-C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf>, accessed 24.12.2015, p5 
774 Ibid 
775 Ibid, p6 
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777 s206 Finance Act 2013 
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be a tax arrangement which is also the point at which the main purpose test is utilised.779 Lastly, 
the double reasonableness test is applied in order to establish whether an arrangement is 
abusive.780 The GAAR does not apply unless the double reasonableness test is satisfied. 
Therefore, the first two stages of the test can be seen as the preliminary stages which filter the 
permissible arrangements.  
3.2 (a) Tax advantage  
Significantly, the HMRC GAAR guidance admits that the scope of the term “tax advantage” is 
broad.781 Such broadness “sets a low threshold.”782 Moreover, the guidance asserts that “it is 
likely that many transactions that would achieve some tax advantage will fall within this 
definition.”783 The GAAR has also provided a list of examples of what can constitute a tax 
advantage.784 The broadest example is where a tax advantage is equated to the “avoidance or 
reduction of a charge to tax or an assessment to tax.”785  
Other benefits which would constitute a tax advantage include; a “relief or increased relief from 
tax”,786 a “repayment or increased repayment of tax”787 an “avoidance of a possible assessment 
to tax”,788 a “deferral of a payment of tax or advancement of a repayment of tax”789 and lastly, 
“avoidance of an obligation to deduct or account for tax”.790 The way in which a tax advantage 
has been described ensures that a diverse range of transactions will attract the GAAR. The 
definition of a tax advantage rightly should encompass reliefs, repayment and the avoidance of 
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tax. However, it is questionable as to whether a deferral should amount to avoidance since tax 
is not being avoided completely.  
3.2 (b) Tax arrangement 
The GAAR dissected the term abusive arrangement791 and provided definitions for both words 
for tax purposes. A tax arrangement is described as being where “obtaining of a tax advantage 
was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements.”792 The test can be 
criticised for the difficulty in determining whether tax avoidance was one of the main purposes 
as it would involve an exploration of all the possible purposes. Furthermore, as Krikorian 
explains, if a person discovers “new suggestions and possibilities… the final result can hardly 
be described as the realisation of a preconceived plan.”793 This test can also lead to examining 
the taxpayer’s or their advisor’s purpose and result in a purpose being imputed.  
The GAAR does not explain in great detail the meaning of an arrangement. The legislation 
broadly states that an arrangement includes an; “agreement, understanding, scheme, transaction 
or series of transactions.”794 The GAAR guidance acknowledges that the definition of a tax 
arrangement undeniably “set[s] a low threshold”795 for arrangements falling under the supposed 
targeted GAAR. Gammie has also remarked that the definition of a tax arrangement 
“encompass[es] most ordinary tax planning.”796 Moreover, others have also recognised that 
“any arrangements which have been structured in such a way as to give effect to tax advice, 
are likely to be caught.”797 
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Other tax law legislation has sought to delve deeper into the meaning of an arrangement. For 
example, under the Corporation Tax Act 2010, the legislation states what constitutes an 
arrangement for transferring reliefs according to what effect the arrangement has.798 These 
effects are based on the different possible people who could receive payment and encompass a 
company,799 a person connected with the company,800 a partner801 and “a person connected 
with another partner”.802 Therefore, the definition of an arrangement in the GAAR could also 
outline what effect each type of arrangement would have such as a circular scheme or a series 
of transactions carried out in quick succession.  
The GAAR guidance also elucidates the flexibility of the term “arrangement”. Interestingly, 
“the GAAR can be applied to an arrangement that is part of a wider arrangement or to the wider 
arrangement as a whole.”803 Therefore, the judiciary can select which the part of the 
arrangement the GAAR will be applied to. This provision is also reminiscent of how Lord 
Oliver in Craven described the underlying principle of Ramsay. He asserted that Ramsay 
promoted the use of establishing the “relevant transaction”.804 However, Lethaby justifiably 
argues that  
“the fact that elements of a commercially driven transaction can be isolated and treated 
as discrete tax arrangements for the purposes of applying the rules is particularly 
concerning.”805 
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3.2 (c) The main purpose test  
The main purpose test gives the judiciary the opportunity to examine the arrangement’s 
purpose.806 Interesting, Aaronson first envisaged the main purpose test to be subjective in his 
supplementary report, although it was acknowledged in the report that this would be 
inappropriate.807 The apparent safeguard was entitled “arrangements without tax intent”808 and 
initially, Aaronson believed that “there would be no need to give any thought to the GAAR in 
the context of transactions without any tax motivation.”809 Therefore, this shows that the initial 
conceptions of the main purpose test essentially used motive to distinguish between acceptable 
and abusive tax avoidance. However, it was recognised that the “safeguard operated on the 
basis of subjective intent.”810 Although this appears to be a minor revelation, it is significant as 
it demonstrates that those who were involved in designing the GAAR believe that the term 
“intention” has subjective connotations. The subjective affiliations with intention are 
particularly important when examining the use of it in the double reasonableness test. The 
revelation is interesting as it provides an indication as to the mindset of those who formulated 
the GAAR. Moreover, it has been recognised by some practitioners that explicitly examining 
the absence of a tax motive would be unfeasible as it is “unlikely to be satisfied in any scenario 
where a taxpayer had sought professional advice.”811 However, in practice, schemes may truly 
fail due to the inclusion of fiscal advice.  
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Judges are at liberty creatively to interpret the facts to ascribe a purpose to the arrangements. 
However, this could also extend to scrutinising the taxpayer’s purpose in embarking on the 
transactions, although Lord Clyde in McGuckian proclaimed that the taxpayer’s purpose is 
irrelevant.812 Similarly, the GAAR guidance echoes that “it is neither necessary nor appropriate 
to enquire whether any particular person… actually had that intention.”813 However, this can 
be interpreted as meaning that the relevant intention can be imputed without investigating 
whether the taxpayer actually had the intention. Despite the assurance that the taxpayer’s 
intention is both an irrelevant and inappropriate consideration, the GAAR guidance 
acknowledges that an assessment of the objective purpose of the arrangement can coincide with 
the taxpayer’s subjective intentions in practice.814 This notion corresponds with the view that 
a purpose can also denote the “object [or] thing intended.”815 Therefore, although tax law 
exudes objectivity through emphasising the separateness of the taxpayer’s intentions and the 
arrangement’s purpose, the two influences are generally regarded as potentially similar in 
practice and can overlap. The GAAR guidance then discusses the taxpayer’s purpose in the 
same context which suggests that the guidance views these terms as interchangeable.816 
Undoubtedly, there can be situations where a taxpayer intends to avoid tax and the main 
purpose of the arrangement is also to avoid tax. However, there may also be instances where 
there was no tax avoidance intention but due to a tax advantage gained, the courts infer a tax 
avoidance purpose.  
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The taxpayer’s purpose is inextricably linked to the arrangement’s purpose as the guidance 
explains that  
“it would be very rare to find a situation where objectively the obtaining of a tax 
advantage appeared to be one of the main purposes of an arrangement although, 
subjectively, the participators did not in fact have any such aim.”817 
Therefore, it is evident that HMRC views the arrangement’s purpose as being virtually 
inextricably linked to the taxpayer’s subjective purpose. This may suggest that the former 
formulation was devised in order to give the appearance of objectivity, when this was not the 
real intention. Consequently, the taxpayer’s purpose may be sought under the guise of 
examining the arrangement’s purpose. 
Deciding whether the tax advantage was the main purpose of the arrangement is deemed as a 
seemingly simple task in the HMRC GAAR guidance. It states that a tax advantage would be 
considered the main purpose of an arrangement where it  
“would not have been carried out at all were it not for the opportunity to obtain the tax 
advantage; or where any non-tax objective was secondary to the benefit of obtaining 
the tax advantage.”818 
However, the guidance acknowledges that it would be a harder task to prove that a tax 
advantage was only one of the main purposes819 which is perhaps why this part of the test 
should be excluded from the GAAR. It is important to acknowledge that if a tax advantage is 
only “one of the main purposes of the arrangement”820, it presupposes the existence of another 
or other main purposes, as stated in Ensign.821 Therefore, the task in uncovering whether the 
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tax advantage was a main purpose is complicated by untangling the competing purposes. 
Consequently, the GAAR seeks to ascertain the “purposive result”822 as advocated by 
Krikorian. The HMRC GAAR guidance advises that in order to establish whether the tax 
advantage was a main purpose, regard must be had to a two-fold test. The test seeks to uncover   
“whether a transaction which would otherwise have occurred has been reshaped, or has 
been entered into under different terms and conditions, in order to change significantly 
the tax result that would otherwise have arisen, and where the desired tax result is itself 
a substantial objective.”823 
Therefore, the two key elements in the tests questions whether the arrangement has been 
reshaped or whether the terms and conditions have been constructed so as to bring about a 
different tax result had these methods not been utilised. There is much to consider in this test 
and it is unclear how the judiciary should apply the GAAR alongside the additional tests within 
the guidance. The test does not seem particularly helpful as it still involves a degree of judicial 
discretion and restructuring of the facts.  
3.2 (d) The double reasonableness test  
The GAAR does not imply that a tax arrangement alone is sufficient to amount to an abusive 
tax arrangement. Similarly, the main purpose test is also not conclusive of an abusive 
arrangement. This indicates that a tax advantage can be the main purpose of a genuine, non-
abusive, transaction. The key term in the GAAR is “abusive” as this is what separates the 
GAAR from the pre-existing targeted anti-avoidance provisions,824 as discussed in chapter one. 
What amounts to an abusive arrangement has been defined in the “crux of the GAAR”825 which 
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is the double reasonableness test. According to the GAAR, an arrangement is abusive where it 
“cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of action in relation to the relevant tax 
provisions.”826 The test is essentially twofold. It requires both the view of the judge making the 
decision and the arrangement to be reasonable. Therefore, “the two instances of reasonableness 
operate independently of each other.”827 The double reasonableness test is vague which is 
concerning given that it is regarded as “the most important of the protections... for responsible 
tax planning.”828 The test is pivotal as it determines whether the GAAR applies. Therefore, the 
double reasonableness test effectively decides the demarcation between abusive and non-
abusive tax avoidance. 
The issue of what is reasonable has been described as involving the “type of question that if 
you have to think about it for too long, you probably have a problem and should consider 
alternative transactions or steps.”829 However, many taxpayers and advisors are likely to 
consider carefully whether their arrangement can be viewed as reasonable, particularly as the 
untested GAAR is vague. It is difficult to know what is reasonable or, more importantly, what 
amounts to unreasonable and where the demarcation between reasonable or unreasonable tax 
avoidance is. There are various ways in which the term “reasonable” can be interpreted. Tax 
advisors, corporations and HMRC are all likely to have different interpretations as to whether 
an arrangement is reasonable. Therefore, the double reasonableness test is unhelpful to 
taxpayers and the judiciary. The Aaronson report attempts to provide an objective dimension 
to the double reasonableness test by stating that an arrangement would be reasonable  
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“not only if the judge himself regards the arrangement as a reasonable exercise of 
choices of conduct but also, where he does not himself take that view, he nonetheless 
considers that such a view may reasonably be held.”830  
Reasonableness is an important concept in the GAAR. Gammie has asserted that  
“the United Kingdom has now decreed that taxpayers are not necessarily to be taxed 
according to the purpose of the Act and the reality of the arrangements but by reference 
to whether their tax arrangements can or cannot be characterised as reasonable.”831 
However, it would be more objective to consider whether the taxpayer should be taxed 
according to the specific words of the Act or the purpose of a particular provision. As the 
concept of reasonableness is of importance in deciding abusive tax avoidance cases, it will be 
explored further.  
3.2(d)(i) Reasonableness in Tort and Contract Law  
The concepts of reasonableness and the reasonable person are commonly used in Tort law.  
Therefore, it is helpful to analyse the meanings given to them to clarify how the double 
reasonableness test might operate. In Tort Law, what is reasonable has been described as “a 
rough approximation to exactness”832 because “complete exactness is neither attainable nor 
desirable.”833 However, as McKie stated, it has been recognised that  
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“the judge has to decide what ‘reasonable’ means, and it is inevitable that different 
judges may take variant views on the same question with respect to such an elastic 
term.”834  
Therefore, even with a subject like Tort Law which habitually refers to reasonableness and the 
reasonable person, it has been acknowledged that the term “reasonable” is open to 
interpretation. Consequently, standards of reasonableness are likely to vary which is why the 
double reasonableness test is not an accurate measurement for deciding whether tax avoidance 
cases are acceptable.  
The term “reasonableness” has also been used in deciding cases of negligence. Legislation in 
this area has also sought to define what “reasonableness” entails. Section 11(1) of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 outlines what it deems to encompass the “reasonableness test”.835 In 
relation to excluding negligence liability from contractual terms, the legislation states that  
“the requirement of reasonableness for the purposes of this Part of this Act… is that the 
term shall have been a fair and reasonable one to be included having regard to the 
circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the 
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made.”836 
Reasonableness is judged from the litigant’s perspective. However, even in the sphere of 
negligence where the concept of reasonableness is commonly used, James believes that the 
“reasonableness test”837 “leaves a great deal of discretion in the hands of the courts”.838 James 
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also asserts that an excessive amount of discretion will reduce certainty for those affected.839 
Therefore, the double reasonableness test in the GAAR is likely to fuel judicial discretion.  
Others argue that what can be deemed reasonable is decided on a case-by-case basis840 and that 
“reasonableness is assessed according to the special features of a case.”841 Tully also believes 
that reasonableness is difficult to define as “it is not a benchmark capable of precise definition 
or mechanical application.”842 Although, the double reasonableness test may have been 
included as “it provides flexibility for a court, the concept is vague and offers little clear or 
practical guidance to decision makers.”843 
3.2(d)(ii) “Reasonableness” in Public Law 
The concept of reasonableness has also been used in Public Law where “reasonableness [is 
used] as a test for judicial review of discretionary determinations.”844 Craig supports the notion 
that examining the reasonableness of a decision limits discretion.845 Although, Craig’s 
interpretation of reasonableness largely revolves around its meaning in judicial review 
proceedings, the interpretations are useful as he considers what reasonableness entails in 
practice. Craig believes that “reasonableness is concerned with review of the weight and 
balance accorded by the primary decision-maker”.846 Therefore, in deciding whether a 
transaction was a “reasonable course of action”,847 as prescribed by the GAAR, judges will 
undergo a balancing exercise and reasonableness will be judged on the balance of 
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probabilities.848 The balancing approach involves distinguishing between “reasoning errors that 
rob the decision of its logical integrity, or a common-sense decision reached in the light of all 
the material”.849 
Craig provides the case of R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs850 (Bancoult) as an example of balancing competing interests in 
order to reach a decision which was deemed reasonable.851 The judges had to decide whether 
it was reasonable to allow the Chagos Islanders to return to their homeland of Diego Garcia 
and fund the resettlement. The court was tasked with balancing the interests with the Chagos 
Islanders with equally pressing issues such as national security and the scale of the expenditure 
involved in the resettlement. Although the appeal was ultimately rejected, Craig believes that 
the rejection was due to the weight placed on the competing interests.852 For example,  
“Lord Hoffmann placed less weight on the islanders' interest because he found that they 
did not really wish to re-settle the islands, and were primarily seeking to improve their 
bargaining position in relation to compensation. He placed more weight on the 
governmental interest on the ground that issues of security and expenditure from the 
public purse”.853 
The landmark judicial review case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v 
Wednesbury Corporation854 (Wednesbury) also discussed the concept of reasonableness. The 
plaintiffs owned a cinema theatre and sought to challenge conditions imposed on their 
operating licence by the defendant local authority. The condition was that “no children under 
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the age of fifteen years shall be admitted to any entertainment, whether accompanied by an 
adult or not”.855 The legislation which the local authority relied on was the Sunday 
Entertainments Act 1932 which “legalized the opening of cinemas on Sundays, subject to 
certain specified conditions and subject to such conditions as the licensing authority think fit 
to impose.”856  
The concept of reasonableness came to the fore where Lord Greene M.R. discussed how 
“discretion must be exercised reasonably.”857 He made it clear that  
“the task of the court is not to decide what it thinks is reasonable, but to decide whether 
what is prima facie within the power of the local authority is a condition which no 
reasonable authority, acting within the four corners of their jurisdiction, could have 
decided to impose.”858 
In deciding whether the local authority has kept within their jurisdiction,  
“the court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing 
whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, or, 
conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters 
which they ought to take into account.”859 
However, Lord Greene M.R. stated that even where the local authority has kept within their 
jurisdiction, the court may still hold “that they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.”860  
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The concept of reasonableness can be differentiated from the concept of proportionality. The 
concept of proportionality “applies when human rights are engaged to ensure that any limitation 
on a human right is proportionate to the social and political considerations that justify that 
limitation”. 861 Therefore, “administrative measures must not be more drastic than is necessary 
for attaining the desired result.”862 Applying the test of proportionality “requires the making of 
a judgement by the primary decision-maker.”863 Therefore, the test “requires the court to judge 
whether the action taken was really needed as well as whether it was within the range of courses 
of action that could reasonably be followed”.864 
While the concept of reasonableness remains elusive, the judgement in Wednesbury affirms 
that judges should not determine whether the parties acted reasonably according to their own 
standards of what is reasonable. In relation to reasonableness, he acknowledged that “all over 
the country I have no doubt on a thing of that sort honest and sincere people hold different 
views.”865 The task is to decide whether another local authority would have acted in a similar 
way.866 Wednesbury provides an example of how the concept of reasonableness is applied in 
practice. However, Wednesbury focused more on identifying what is unreasonable. As 
discussed below, the GAAR guidance specifies that judges should not examine whether an 
arrangement would be regarded as unreasonable.867 The fact that regard has to be had as to 
whether an arrangement can be regarded as reasonable, places emphasis on the courts to 
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grapple with the concept of reasonableness. Whether or not reasonableness will be applied in 
the same manner as in Wednesbury is yet to be seen.  
3.2(d)(iii) Reasonable man 
The HMRC GAAR guidance states that it may be necessary to test whether the view as to the 
reasonableness of an arrangement is in itself reasonable.868 Therefore, it may be necessary to 
consider the requirements of a reasonable person in making that decision. In Tort Law, the 
reasonable person has been described as “not [having] the courage of Achilles, the wisdom of 
Ulysses nor the strength of Hercules”.869 The law “does not expect the reasonable person to be 
all-seeing and all-knowing, and he can therefore make “reasonable mistakes”.”870 Although, 
the reasonable person is not deemed to be an ““average person”.”871 Similarly, “the law 
requires him to show such skill as any ordinary member of the profession or calling to which 
he belongs, or claims to belong, would display.”872  
The standard of reasonableness required to make the decision is not high and allows for a 
margin of error. Consequently, the reasonableness requirement is laced with subjectivity and 
is likely to generate inconsistency in practice. In relation to testing the reasonableness of the 
decision is reasonable, Craig asserts that  
“in making the determination as to whether the contested decision was within the range 
of reasonable decisions the court is assessing the balance struck by the decision-
maker”.873 
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However, Craig commented on testing the reasonableness of a decision in relation to judicial 
review. In regards to tax law, it may not be necessary for judges to decide whether the 
arrangement was reasonable then re-examine whether their own view was reasonable. 
Therefore, Mischon de Reya’s view of a “single reasonableness test”874 appears adequate for 
the purposes of tax law.  
3.2 (e) Abusive according to the GAAR  
Due to the vagueness of the double reasonableness test alone, the Finance Act 2013 goes on to 
detail three factors which the court should be mindful of when deciphering whether an 
arrangement is abusive. Firstly, the court is permitted to examine “the substantive results of the 
arrangements”875 and whether these are “consistent with any principles on which those 
provisions are based (whether express or implied) and the policy objectives of those 
provisions.”876 The aforementioned provision is wide because it permits judges to develop 
general broad principles and also examine policy considerations. Canadian Courts have rightly 
viewed the formulation of policy by judges as undesirable as  
“to send the courts on the search for some overarching policy and then to use such a 
policy to override the wording of the provisions of the Income Tax Act would 
inappropriately place the formulation of taxation policy in the hands of the judiciary, 
requiring judges to perform a task to which they are unaccustomed and for which they 
are not equipped.”877 
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The provision regarding policy considerations has received criticism for being “a radical and 
untested departure from the established principles of statutory interpretation that [is]… unique 
to English law.”878 This is because “Ramsay did not alter the principle that the court must look 
to the words of an act of Parliament to ascertain Parliament’s intentions.”879 However, the  
“GAAR departs from this principle by requiring the taxpayer (and, ultimately, the 
court) to consider the ‘principles’ underlying a given legislative provision and, even 
worse, their policy objectives. Gone is the rule that Parliament’s words are the guide to 
its intentions.”880 
Moreover, Gothard and Austen argue that  
“how a taxpayer is supposed to divine with any certainty the ‘principles’ purportedly 
underlying a given statutory provision or the relevant policy objectives- particularly in 
such unchartered legal territory- is not explained.”881 
The GAAR also allows an investigation into the method of executing the transactions in order 
to determine “whether the means of achieving those results involves one or more contrived or 
abnormal steps.”882 There is no guidance on what would amount to an abnormal step which 
indicates that the judiciary can use their discretion in relation to how an abnormal step is 
defined. This provision is also reminiscent of the approach taken in McGuckian where Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson held that the abnormal transactions should be ignored and the legislation 
should be applied to the resulting arrangement in a holistic manner.883 However, the GAAR 
does not suggest that any abnormal steps should be ignored. Instead, the abnormal step will be 
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regarded as abusive, which relieves the courts of the task of imagining what the arrangement 
would look like had the abnormal step not been inserted. The existence of an abnormal step 
would point to abuse. As McGuckian favoured and built on the Ramsay approach, it can be 
said that the GAAR has been influenced by Ramsay and its supporting cases. Therefore, the 
advent of the GAAR has generated a shift from “a judicial GAAR to a legislative GAAR.”884 
Lastly, in determining whether an arrangement is abusive, the courts can also deliberate on 
“whether the arrangements are intended to exploit any shortcomings in those provisions.”885 
This provision is important as it indicates that the judiciary can examine the taxpayer’s 
intentions to determine whether the design of the arrangement was constructed so as to take 
advantage of loopholes in the tax system. However, as Anscombe recognised, a person’s 
intention can “often not be seen from seeing what he does.”886 As aforementioned, even HMRC 
acknowledge that there is an overlap between the arrangement’s purpose and the taxpayer’s 
intentions. The judiciary are therefore permitted to examine the arrangement’s purpose in the 
main purpose test as well as the taxpayer’s intentions. This clearly indicates that they are two 
distinct considerations. In this instance, the Finance Act 2013 has sought to include the more 
subjective term “intention” which can more easily be equated to the taxpayer’s intentions. The 
provision also serves to cloud the demarcations between abusive and non-abusive tax 
avoidance. By associating a tax avoidance intention with unacceptable tax avoidance, it implies 
that those engaging in legitimate tax avoidance schemes must do so without the corresponding 
intention. However, Anscombe argued that intentional actions cannot be recognised by “any 
extra feature which exists when it is performed.”887 Moreover, there is a 
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“inherently objective nature of tax avoidance; intention on the part of the taxpayer, 
which constitutes an essential element of evasion, is not required as a condition for the 
existence of avoidance.”888 
The aforementioned provision regarding exploiting Parliament’s shortcomings has attracted 
strong criticism for facilitating the “transferred fault of the citizen and not the responsibility of 
the Executive who perpetrated it.”889 Greenberg has largely based his criticisms on the addition 
of the term “shortcoming” in the provision.890 The worrying implication is that  
“if the drafter and the Executive get a particular piece of fiscal legislation "wrong", in 
the sense that they fail to achieve what they might have wished to achieve, they can 
absolve themselves of any responsibility, and transfer responsibility to the citizen.”891 
Greenberg therefore insinuates that the taxpayer is used as a scapegoat for lawfully taking 
advantage of inadequacies in tax legislation. Others have also remarked “that HMRC and 
parliamentary draftsmen may use [the] GAAR as a cover for inadequate draftsmanship.”892 
The burden is on the taxpayer to uncover what the legislation ought to tackle and if not, 
“penalise him or her for not working out what it was intended to achieve and how Parliament 
and the Executive meant to achieve it.”893 Moreover, Gammie also argues that  
“the UK GAAR is based on the wrong premise and does little to improve the tax system 
and address its manifest ‘shortcomings’. An objection to the GAAR is that it tolerates 
such shortcomings rather than addresses them.”894 
                                                          
888  Direct Cosmetics Ltd and Laughtons Photographs Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (C-138/86) 
[1988], [22] (per curiam) 
889 Greenberg. D, ‘Dangerous Trends in Modern Legislation’, [2015], Public Law 96, p101 
890 Ibid  
891 Ibid 
892 Gothard, C. and Austen, J. “’Abusive’ tax avoidance: what are the implications of HMRC’s draft GAAR?”, 
[2012], Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 18 No. 9, 876-885, p880 
893 Greenberg. D, ‘Dangerous Trends in Modern Legislation’, [2015], Public Law 96, p101 
894 Gammie, M. “When is avoiding tax not abusive? Comparative approaches to a GAAR in Australia and the 
United Kingdom”, [2013], 42 Australian Tax Review 279, p292 
147 
 
An apparent safeguard is that the burden is on HMRC to establish whether an arrangement 
amounts to an abusive arrangement.895 The GAAR guidance had anticipated views such as 
Greenberg’s and has asserted that these views in particular are “wholly inconsistent with one 
of the basic purposes of the GAAR, namely to deter or counteract the deliberate exploitation 
of shortcomings in legislation.”896 By the inclusion of the term “deliberate”897, the GAAR 
guidance indicates that tax avoidance must be intentional. Nevertheless, it does raise the 
argument of why the shortcomings were not blocked in the first place rather placing a blanket 
ban on avoidance with the onus on the taxpayer to respect Parliament’s shortcomings.  
Due to the ambiguous nature of the double reasonableness test, the GAAR has also sought to 
elucidate on what amounts to an abusive arrangement by outlining three key points which are 
indicative of abuse. Firstly, the GAAR warns that an arrangement resulting in profit which is 
“significantly less than the amount for economic purposes”898 would be regarded as abusive. 
The provision is very unclear as the term “economic purposes” has not been defined in the 
GAAR nor guidance therefore, it is difficult to ascertain what that amount is and consequently, 
how low a profit must be in order to constitute abuse. Gammie has also argued that  
“an economist would not think it especially helpful to refer to ‘the amount for economic 
purposes’ and a reference to the financial outcome or result of the arrangements might 
have been better.”899 
If it is presumed that the term “economic purposes” refers to a tax advantage, the requirement 
means that the arrangement must obtain a higher profit than the tax advantage gained. 
However, this is a speculative interpretation of this provision therefore, it can be interpreted in 
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other ways. For example, “economic purposes” could also refer to the amount of profit which 
one would have in a similar arrangement under slightly different terms. In this case, the 
aforementioned provision indicates that if the profit is significantly less than profit resulting 
from a similar arrangement, it would indicate abuse. As it is unclear what “economic purposes” 
means, it not only causes confusion and inconsistency in adjudication but it does little to 
provide guidance as to what will be considered abusive.  
Secondly, if the arrangement “result[s] in deductions or losses of an amount for tax purposes 
that is significantly greater than the amount for economic purposes,”900 the arrangement may 
be held to be abusive. The provision may simply be indicating that large losses or unusually 
generous deductions are indicative of abuse. However, due to the inclusion of the elusive term 
“economic purposes”, it is difficult to attribute concrete meaning to this provision. The 
deductions and losses must be much less than the “amount for economic purposes”901 which 
may mean that the deductions and losses must be less than the overall tax advantage gained. 
However, without explicit confirmation by Parliament, it is difficult to interpret this provision 
accurately.  
Lastly, wherever an arrangement leads to a “repayment or crediting of tax [that]…is unlikely 
to be paid”902 it may be conclusive of an abusive arrangement. Despite these calculation-based 
and objective tests which are indicative of abusive, the GAAR has a significant caveat which 
colours the objective provisions with an important requirement which is subject to judicial 
discretion. Although the three aforementioned examples would point to an abusive 
arrangement, the GAAR specifies that these situations would only amount to abuse if “such a 
result was not the anticipated result when the relevant tax provisions were enacted.”903 
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Therefore, the GAAR leaves open scope for considerable judicial discretion to ascertain 
whether Parliament had foreseen such results and if it is decided that Parliament had not 
foreseen the result, it amounts to an abusive arrangement. This provision is important as it 
suggests that ultimately, the GAAR will apply in all circumstances where the judiciary believe 
that Parliament had not anticipated the result of the arrangement. While it is generally accepted 
that the courts can seek to ascertain Parliament’s intentions, there is less justification for judges 
to have the task of barring arrangements which Parliament had not even contemplated. 
Moreover, “there is often fierce debate, at least in Australia, about what was or was not within 
the contemplation of Parliament when enacting a specific provision.”904 However, courts may 
decide what Parliament did not intend by examining whether the arrangement falls within the 
wording of the statute when read literally or purposively.  
The breadth of the GAAR is therefore wide and unclear. Although the GAAR is seemingly 
targeted through specifying that it should only apply to abusive arrangements, the definition of 
an abusive arrangement branches out in order to define what is an abusive arrangement, an 
arrangement and what is abusive. The assortment of tests which these definitions contain are 
wide and leaves the judiciary with little limitations or guidance in adjudication. Therefore, “the 
concept of ‘abusiveness’, which seems so clear to politicians, activists and columnists, is near-
impossible to define satisfactorily in the context of the UK tax code.”905 
3.3 Abuse according to the GAAR guidance  
The HMRC GAAR guidance describes the double reasonableness test as not being as simple 
as it appears in an attempt at ensuring objectivity and minimising judicial discretion. The 
guidance states that judges should not base their decisions on whether they believe the 
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arrangement is unreasonable or not.906 However, if an arrangement cannot be regarded as 
reasonable, it is analogous to regarding the arrangement as unreasonable. The GAAR would 
be made clearer if principles were laid down to explain what would be deemed unreasonable 
rather that than what is reasonable. A single unreasonableness test would work better as it is 
far simpler to explain what is not permitted rather than what is permitted.  
In an attempt to avoid subjectivity, the guidance states that judges must study “the range of 
reasonable views that could be held in relation to the arrangements.”907 However, this guidance 
is unhelpful as it does little to remedy the problem of subjectivity inherent in the double 
reasonableness test. The application of the test is further obscured by the possibility of a 
multitude of views arising as to the reasonability of the arrangement. The guidance states that 
where there exists a view which regards the arrangement as being reasonable, “it is necessary 
to test that view to see whether that view itself can be regarded as reasonable.”908 The 
requirements of tediously evaluating the reasonable views then testing the reasonability of the 
view in favour of the arrangement arguably creates a stratified GAAR, layered by the obligation 
to investigate and then test the views. The complexity of the double reasonableness test may 
instead lead to judges analysing whether, in their view, based on common law principles, the 
arrangement can be considered unreasonable. An investigation as to how judges have examined 
“reasonableness” based on common law principles will be explored in chapter 6. Furthermore, 
although the test is presumably designed to appear as if it is setting a higher threshold for tax 
avoidance, judges are still at liberty to define what is reasonable.  
The vagueness of the double reasonableness test fuels uncertainty and inevitable judicial 
discretion, although the GAAR guidance states that a targeted GAAR “would help reduce the 
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risk of stretched interpretation and the uncertainty which this entails.”909 Significantly, HMRC 
acknowledges that discretion leading to wide interpretation leads to uncertainty which is 
undesirable.  
The GAAR Advisory Panel is important as the GAAR states that the judiciary “must take into 
account… any opinion of the GAAR Advisory Panel about the arrangements.”910 Moreover, 
the guidance provides a safeguard to taxpayers in relation to the double reasonableness test 
which requires HMRC to consult with the independent advisory panel as to whether the 
taxpayer’s actions were reasonable before the GAAR is applied.911 However, the extent to 
which this safeguard will protect taxpayers is uncertain as the advisory panel will merely be 
consulted. Consequently, if the taxpayer’s actions are deemed to be an unreasonable course of 
action by the advisory panel, the ultimate decision lies with the judiciary to apply the wide 
GAAR provisions using their discretion. Although, the GAAR guidance also reiterates that the 
views of the advisory panel can be considered by the court.912 
3.4 What is not abusive  
Another form of defence to the taxpayer is contained in s207(5) Finance Act 2013 where it lays 
down in what circumstance an arrangement would not be viewed as abusive. The defence is a 
twofold test that requires an arrangement to firstly “accord with established practice”913 which 
the GAAR guidance states is “published material.”914 Secondly, in relation to the evidenced 
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practice, HMRC must have also “indicated its acceptance of that practice”.915 The guidance 
also infers that the location of where the acceptance is published is key to determining whether 
HMRC accepts the practice.916 Acceptance of the practice may be published “from HMRC, or 
textbooks or articles in journals”917 which includes a vast array of material. However, the 
guidance widens this selection of materials by adding that acceptance can also be indicated “by 
other evidence of what had become a common practice by the relevant time.”918 This is less 
specific as it can encompass many sources. Although, it would have been useful if the guidance 
was more specific by citing a particular source such as case law. The reason that vague sources 
are unhelpful is that, in practice, HMRC may exclude particular sources for not coming within 
the scope of their preferred source list to the detriment of the taxpayer. 
The published information alone cannot provide a defence to taxpayers unless HMRC also 
clearly indicates that it supports the practice. Therefore, this particular defence is extremely 
narrow and inevitably, subject to change. The two-stage test makes it difficult for taxpayers to 
satisfy both stages which renders the safeguard minimally protective.  
The disclosure of tax avoidance schemes919 regime may also be relevant in determining what 
is not abusive. The regime requires that “certain people must provide information to HMRC 
about avoidance schemes within 5 days of the schemes being made available or 
implemented.”920 Therefore, if HMRC have advanced notice of a scheme from the taxpayer 
and HMRC has indicated that it is content with it, the taxpayer’s scheme is less likely to attract 
the scrutiny of the GAAR. This is because HMRC has not objected to the scheme. 
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Consequently, schemes which pass the scrutiny of the DOTAS regime can be deemed not to 
be abusive.   
3.5 The scope of the GAAR   
The GAAR’s intended scope is “targeted at abusive arrangements.”921 The alleged targeted 
nature of the GAAR has been designed by the GAAR study group in order to avoid “a broad 
spectrum general anti-avoidance rule [which] would not be beneficial for the UK tax 
system.”922 The GAAR “began life as a general anti-avoidance rule but was re-designated a 
general anti-abuse rule.”923 The GAAR study group has acknowledged that creating a broader 
rule may result in “undermining the ability of business and individuals to carry out sensible 
and responsible tax planning.”924 Therefore, it is essential that the scope of the GAAR has 
clearly identifiable limitations for the sake of economic growth, if not for the ease of 
compliance for the taxpayer.  
The scope of the GAAR is particularly important as the legislative rules of the GAAR take 
precedence over common law rules. As aforementioned, the GAAR is aimed at “counteracting 
tax advantages arising from tax arrangements that are abusive.”925 The GAAR guidance itself 
attributes a wide definition to a tax arrangement which it admits will encompass many 
arrangements.926 It is uncertain why a targeted GAAR would have supplementary guidance 
indicating that a vast amount of arrangements can fall within the legislation. The GAAR 
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guidance is influential as it can be used as an aid to interpretation of the GAAR.927 Gammie 
has also stated that under the GAAR, “anything is an arrangement and everything is a tax 
advantage”928 which also reinforces the argument that the GAAR is wide.  
The GAAR was “intended to apply only to egregious, or very aggressive, tax avoidance 
schemes.”929 However, Lethaby has perceptively recognised that what amounts to egregious 
tax planning “necessarily imply value judgements”930 which insinuates the scope for 
subjectivity. Abusive tax avoidance schemes which are deemed “GAAR-able”931 are therefore 
placed in this category using discretion. Lethaby recognises that the GAAR embodies 
Parliament’s will.932 However, she stated that  
“that is not to say that I necessarily agree that the GAAR is appropriately narrowly 
framed so as to catch only the most 'egregious' transactions at which it was allegedly 
targeted. I don't agree”.933 
Furthermore, the case law on tax avoidance has illustrated that the judiciary have been probing 
the taxpayer’s intentions. Therefore, the GAAR can be said to “simply serve to legitimise a 
discretion that the courts are already exercising.”934 Consequently, whilst the GAAR “should 
not affect the large centre ground of responsible tax planning”935, there is no guarantee that it 
will not do so in practice. However, Freedman makes the very compelling argument that “even 
                                                          
927 Ibid, p3 
928 Gammie, M. “When is avoiding tax not abusive? Comparative approaches to a GAAR in Australia and the 
United Kingdom”, [2013], 42 Australian Tax Review 279, p287 
929 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p25 
930 Lethaby. H, ‘Aaronson’s GAAR’, [2012], British Tax Review 27, p32 
931 Ibid, p33 
932 Lethaby, H. “Analysis- Reflections on Tax and the City”, [2014], Tax Journal Issue 1220, 10, p11 
933 Ibid 
934 Lethaby. H, ‘Aaronson’s GAAR’, [2012], British Tax Review 27, p28 
935 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p28 
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if legitimisation were the only outcome, then this would be a worthwhile one”.936 Constitutional 
legitimisation is invariably important although, the design of the GAAR must have identifiable 
boundaries for taxpayer certainty.  
As well as the provisions being wide, the GAAR guidance also widens normal rules of evidence 
in relation to abusive arrangements.937 The court can examine “all relevant material, whether 
or not such material would be admissible in court proceedings under the normal rules of 
evidence.”938 The GAAR also takes precedence over tax legislation to which it applies.939 
The requirement of whether Parliament had anticipated the resulting arrangement is crucial in 
determining abuse. However, this provision is broad as 
“the GAAR moves away from a focus on what Parliament intended to a focus on what 
Parliament anticipated, and allows the courts to have regard to a wider range of material 
as evidence of what was anticipated.”940 
The analysis of the GAAR’s scope demonstrates that there is an “unspecified boundary set by 
the GAAR beyond which taxpayers stray at their peril”.941 The GAAR guidance has provided 
specific definitions for key terms in the GAAR and these are left purposely broad. Therefore, 
if there was any uncertainty over whether specific terms of the GAAR should be interpreted 
widely, the guidance confirms that this is the correct approach. Consequently, the scope of the 
targeted GAAR is obscured by ambiguity and the further “uncertainty as to what even the 
                                                          
936 Freedman. J, ‘GAAR as a Process and the Process of Discussing the GAAR’, [2012], British Tax Review 22, 
p24 
937 ‘HMRC GAAR Guidance: Parts A, B and C’ cited in 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399270/2__HMRC_GAAR_Gu
idance_Parts_A-C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf>, accessed 24.12.2015, p32 
938 Ibid 
939 s212(1) Finance Act 2013 
940 Lord Reed, R. “Anti-avoidance principles under Domestic and EU law”, [2016], British Tax Review 288, 
p289 
941 Gammie, M. “When is avoiding tax not abusive? Comparative approaches to a GAAR in Australia and the 
United Kingdom”, [2013], 42 Australian Tax Review 279, p283 
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architects of the draft GAAR intend to be caught by it.”942 There is also the general parallel 
concern of “whether such schemes can be accurately targeted”943 which suggests that a targeted 
GAAR is understandably challenging to design due to the inherent complexity in tax avoidance 
schemes.  
3.6 The Aaronson Report  
It is useful to analyse the recommendations and draft GAAR laid down in the Aaronson Report 
in order to establish what it recommended, why these recommendations were made and the 
extent to which the final legislation bears resemblance to the report’s recommendations. It will 
be helpful to examine whether the problems which the Aaronson report sought to avoid can be 
avoided with how the final draft of the GAAR was written.  
The scope of the GAAR was not intended to be wide as the Aaronson Report acknowledged 
that “a broad spectrum general anti-avoidance rule would not be beneficial for the UK tax 
system.”944 Similarly, Aaronson recognised that, prior to the implementation of the GAAR, 
“judges inevitably…[were] faced with the temptation to stretch the interpretation”945 of taxing 
statutes and that this caused uncertainty.946 However, as aforementioned, the scope of the 
GAAR is potentially wide and heavily relies on judicial discretion. Consequently, the GAAR 
is capable of being applied to more than “the most egregious tax avoidance schemes”.947 
The enacted GAAR is targeted at a wider range of taxes than laid down in the Aaronson Report. 
The report only envisaged “income tax, capital gains tax, corporation tax and petroleum 
                                                          
942Lethaby. H, ‘Aaronson’s GAAR’, [2012], British Tax Review 27, p35 
943 Freedman. J, ‘GAAR as a Process and the Process of Discussing the GAAR’, [2012], British Tax Review 22, 
p24 
944 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p3 
945 Ibid, p5 
946 Ibid 
947 Ibid, p20 
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revenue tax”948 to be covered by the GAAR. However, the enacted GAAR extended the 
recommendations made by Aaronson to cover inheritance tax,949 stamp duty land tax950 and 
annual tax on enveloped dwellings.951 Therefore, the enacted GAAR is undoubtedly wider than 
the scope envisaged by the Aaronson Report. It was also recommended that stamp duty land 
tax should only be included within the GAAR’s remit once the GAAR was “seen to operate 
fairly and effectively”.952 However, this recommendation went unheeded.  
As well as differences in the intended scope of the GAAR, the Aaronson Report also made it 
clear that “where there can be reasonable doubt as to which side of the line any particular 
arrangement falls on, then that doubt is to be resolved in favour of the taxpayer.”953 This 
reasoning was adopted from the words of Salmon L.J. in Fleming v Associated Newspapers954 
wherein he stated that “if in a taxing statute words are reasonably capable of two alternative 
meanings, the courts will prefer the meaning more favourable to the subject”.955 However, no 
such assurances were made in the GAAR. Instead, the GAAR guidance states that where an 
arrangement could be regarded as reasonable, that view must then be tested as to its 
reasonableness.956 
The Aaronson Report states that, in applying the GAAR,  
                                                          
948 Ibid, p7 
949 s206(3)(e) Finance Act 2013 
950 s206(3)(f) Finance Act 2013 
951 s206(3)(g) Finance Act 2013 
952 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p7 
953 Ibid, p28 
954 Fleming v Associated Newspapers [1971] 3 W.L.R. 551, [1972] Ch. 170 
955 Ibid, 192 (Salmon J.) 
956 ‘HMRC GAAR Guidance: Parts A, B and C’ cited in 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399270/2__HMRC_GAAR_Gu
idance_Parts_A-C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf>, accessed 24.12.2015, p24 
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“the starting point should be to see whether the arrangement is abnormal, in the sense 
of having abnormal features specifically designed to achieve a tax advantageous 
result.”957 
The effect of examining abnormalities in the early stages of the GAAR means that “if there is 
no such feature then it is immediately dismissed from consideration.”958 However, the GAAR 
only examines the existence of abnormal steps at the final stage when considering whether an 
arrangement is abusive. The approach taken by Aaronson would have ensured that 
arrangements which are not abusive are dismissed at an earlier stage.   
Despite the differences between the Aaronson Report and the final GAAR, there are some 
similarities. For example, the double reasonableness test is similar to the Aaronson Report’s 
equivalent that “the arrangement cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable exercise of 
choice.”959 Similarly, the main purpose test in the draft GAAR also closely resembles the main 
purpose test in the Aaronson Report.960 
As aforementioned, the GAAR does examine the taxpayer’s intentions.961 The draft GAAR in 
the Aaronson Report also examines the taxpayer’s intentions.962 Nevertheless, the report states 
that it is “unlikely that arrangements which have no tax intent at all would in fact give rise to a 
tax advantage. However, that is nonetheless possible.”963 Aaronson gives the case of Five Oaks 
Properties Ltd v HMRC964 as an example of where there was no intention to gain a tax 
advantage despite the possibility of a tax advantage being made. The case concerned five 
                                                          
957 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p31 
958 Ibid 
959 Ibid, p33 
960 Ibid, p45 
961 s207(2)(c) Finance Act 2013 
962 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p44 
963 Ibid, p35 
964 Five Oaks Properties Ltd v HMRC [2006] STC (SCD) 769 
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appellant companies which were all part of the Tribeca Group and previously members of the 
Delancey Group. The issue was whether the losses incurred by these companies, prior to the 
merging with the Tribeca Group, could be used to offset gains made by another company within 
the Tribeca Group.965 Although HMRC conceded that the “transactions were not pre-planned 
as part of a tax avoidance scheme”,966 the Special Commissioners held that the pre-entry loss 
rules prevented the companies from offsetting their losses against the gain made by a company 
in the same group. It was recognised that  
“the pre-entry loss legislation fails to deal with the present factual situation, which it is 
common ground, results from commercial transactions not intended to avoid the effect 
of the legislation.”967 
Therefore, the case illustrates how examining intentions is an unreliable consideration. 
The Aaronson report also states that “it is not necessary to demonstrate that the promoter of the 
arrangement or the parties to it subjectively intended the abnormal feature to have such 
purpose”.968 Moreover, the Aaronson report provides “that the absence of intent must be shown 
to extend to every person involved in the planning and execution of the arrangement.”969 This 
formulation of examining the taxpayer’s intentions is wider than required by the GAAR. 
However, the Aaronson report illustrates that there is scope to examine the intentions of all 
involved in the scheme which could mean imputing the intention of a tax advisor on the 
taxpayer. The requirement that every participant of the scheme must not have an intention to 
                                                          
965 Ibid [3.2] (John F. Avery Jones) 
966 Ibid [3.6]  
967 Ibid, [4.1] 
968 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p61 
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gain a tax advantage also sets a low bar for unacceptable tax planning which could widen the 
scope of the GAAR.  
Where the GAAR mentions the term “economic purposes”970 in relation to whether an 
arrangement can be regarded as abusive, this term has not been defined. However, the 
Aaronson Report provides a better understanding as to what this term means. Consequently, 
Aaronson states that an arrangement would be regarded as abusive where that  
“arrangement would, apart from the operation of this Part, result in receipts being taken 
into account for tax purposes which are significantly less than the true economic income 
profit or gain”.971  
Similarly, an arrangement would also be regarded as abusive where that  
“arrangement would, apart from the operation of this Part, result in deductions being 
taken into account for tax purposes which are significantly greater than the true 
economic cost or loss”.972 
Therefore, it is clear that the “economic purposes” requirement refers to profit and losses. 
However, this is not made clear in the GAAR. Hence, this term can still be open to 
interpretation.  
The Aaronson Report also includes hallmarks of abuse which were not included in the GAAR. 
For example, an indication of abuse is where “the arrangement includes a transaction at a value 
significantly different from market value, or otherwise on non-commercial terms”.973 The 
report also states that an arrangement could be regarded as abusive where “the arrangement, or 
                                                          
970 s207(4)(a) and s207(4)(b) Finance Act 2013 
971 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-





any element or it, is inconsistent with the legal duties of the parties to it”.974 Moreover, the 
report outlines how an arrangement is likely to be abusive where “a person, a transaction, a 
document or significant terms in a document, which would not be included if the arrangement 
were not designed to achieve an abusive tax result”.975 In addition to these factors, other 
indications of abuse include where an  
“arrangement omits a person, a transaction, a document or significant terms in a 
document which would not be omitted if the arrangement were not designed to achieve 
an abusive tax result”.976 
Furthermore, an arrangement could be abusive where it 
“includes the location of an asset or a transaction, or of the place of residence of a 
person, which would not be so located if the arrangement were not designed to achieve 
an abusive tax result.”977 
These factors are all objective considerations which would limit the amount of discretion 
exercised by the judiciary when deciding whether an arrangement is abusive.  
The report lists material which can be considered when deciding whether an arrangement is 
abusive. The list in the Aaronson Report resembles the list in the GAAR. However, the 
Aaronson report states that the courts may take into account “evidence of practice commonly 
adopted at the time of the arrangement”.978 However, the GAAR states that HMRC must have 
“indicated its acceptance of that practice”979 in order for an arrangement to be considered 
unabusive.  





978 Ibid, p50 




HMRC issued a consultation document in January 2015 detailing penalties which a tax avoider 
could be subject to. The document contains key guidance which can help to clarify the types 
of avoidance deemed unacceptable.  
Tax avoidance schemes are perpetrated by what the government terms “serial avoiders.”980 
This term has underlying criminal connotations as it resembles the term given to “serial killers”. 
The term ascribed to tax avoiders brings tax avoidance closer to tax evasion as the latter is a 
criminal offence. However, the new term “serial avoiders” coined for tax avoiders denotes 
those who regularly avoid paying their taxes and suggests that the GAAR’s scope encompasses 
a seeming small minority of avoiders. Although, despite the narrower scope of the consultation 
document, judges will follow the GAAR in practice which undoubtedly encompasses a larger 
category of taxpayers. The term “serial avoider” has been placed on statutory footing.981 
As well as the abusive arrangements described in the GAAR legislation, the government’s 
consultation document on penalties outlines the types of schemes which will be targeted. 
Worryingly, the consultation states that a characteristic of a “serial avoider” is where a taxpayer 
carries out many schemes annually “that were intended to offset their tax liability several times 
over in the hope that at least one will work.”982 A person’s hopes are equated with motives as 
previously established. The intention described is irrefutably that of the taxpayer which 
indicates that the government encourages the taxpayer’s intentions to be scrutinised when 
refining the lines between acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance. Moreover, by examining 
what the taxpayer hopes involves not only examining their intentions but also allows for their 
                                                          
980 HMRC ‘Strengthening Sanctions for Tax Avoidance’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399823/Strengthening_sanction
s_for_tax_avoidance_-_consultation_document.pdf >, accessed 30.12.2015, p7 
981 s159 Finance Act 2016 
982 HMRC ‘Strengthening Sanctions for Tax Avoidance’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399823/Strengthening_sanction
s_for_tax_avoidance_-_consultation_document.pdf >, accessed 30.12.2015, p7 
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motives to be brought into question as the term hope can be blurred with motive, as established 
earlier. The recommendation is therefore laced with subjective connotations.  
Another indicator of an improper tax avoider is where a taxpayer “repeatedly use[s] tax 
avoidance schemes to shelter the same type of income.”983 Therefore, a key factor in identifying 
an unacceptable tax avoidance scheme is the issue of regularity and consistency. This view is 
also reflected in the subsequent characteristic described in the consultation document where a 
taxpayer “repeatedly use[s] avoidance schemes to cover the majority of income or gains as they 
arise.”984 By looking at the amount of income, this indicates that HMRC are more concerned 
where larger sums of money are the subject of a tax avoidance scheme. The requirement of 
regularity is maintained through to the last provision where it states that it would be 
unacceptable if a taxpayer “often use[s] tax avoidance schemes to cover major life or 
commercial events.”985 
Due to the concern for tackling persistent tax avoiders, the government has recommended that 
a surcharge penalty should be used as a deterrence where several schemes have failed to be 
brought to fruition.986 There are also other measures aimed at “shift[ing] their behaviour”987 
which have been recommended providing that the taxpayer triggers the threshold conditions 
outlined in the government’s report.988 The conditions seek to establish whether a taxpayer; has 
a history of unsuccessfully utilising tax schemes for avoidance purposes, used a scheme 
outlined in the Promoters of Tax Avoidance Schemes Regulations 2015989 or where they have 
failed “to comply with information notices or DOTAS requirements.”990 




986 Ibid, p8 
987 Ibid 





Where a tax arrangement is found to be abusive, the GAAR specifies that counteraction of that 
advantage will be made in a manner which is “just and reasonable.”991 In order to quantify 
counteraction, judges are advised to examine  
“what transaction would have been carried out in order to achieve the same commercial 
purpose, but without including the steps or features which make the arrangement 
abusive.”992  
Therefore, the guidance also echoes Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s words in McGuckian about 
ignoring certain steps and re-evaluating the arrangement in a different light.993 The connection 
between McGuckian and the GAAR guidance also reinforces a preference for supporters of the 
Ramsay approach. In order to discover what other arrangement might have been executed with 
the aim of attaining the same commercial purpose, another test must be applied. The guidance 
asserts that this objective test questions  
“what in all the circumstances would have been the most likely transaction to have been 
carried out by a taxpayer who wished to achieve the commercial objective without 
seeking to achieve the abusive tax advantage.”994 
Consequently, at the root of counteraction is ascertaining whether there is a commercial 
purpose and if not, re-arrange the transactions by ignoring the artificial steps to ascertain the 
“real transaction.”995 Where there is a circular arrangement as in Ramsay, the judges must 
quantify counteraction based on radically “ignoring the entire arrangement.”996 
                                                          
991 s209(2) Finance Act 2013 
992 ‘HMRC GAAR Guidance: Parts A, B and C’ cited in 
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3.8 An EU-wide GAAR 
Examining EU law on tax avoidance is useful to make comparisons and establish whether the 
UK may have been inspired by EU tax law, as the EU also focuses on abuse. Furthermore, 
although the UK GAAR omitted to define abuse, in the case of Emsland-Stärke GmbH v 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas997 (Emsland) the ECJ defined abuse in the context of tax 
avoidance. The court held that abuse involves a two-stage test including; 
“first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of 
the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not 
been achieved.”998 
The court then added that examining abuse  
“requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an 
advantage from the Community rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down 
for obtaining it. The existence of that subjective element can be established, inter alia, 
by evidence of collusion between the Community exporter receiving the refunds and 
the importer of the goods in the non-member country.”999 
The subjective limb is addressed through examining an objective factor which is the existence 
of artificial steps. Although the court in Emsland examined whether the taxpayer intended to 
obtain a tax advantage, the existence of a tax advantage is included in the first stage of the UK 
GAAR.1000 Therefore, what is a determining factor of abuse in Emsland is merely the first stage 
of the GAAR which demonstrates how wide the GAAR is. The subjective limb of the GAAR 
asks whether the taxpayer sought to take advantage of flaws in the tax system.1001 Ascertaining 
                                                          
997 Emsland-Stärke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (C-110/99) [2000] ECR I-11569 
998 Ibid, [52] (per curiam) 
999 Ibid, [53] 
1000 s208 Finance Act 2013 
1001 s207(2)(c) Finance Act 2013 
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whether a taxpayer actively sought to utilise loopholes in the tax system is open to far greater 
interpretation than establishing the existence of a tax advantage.  
The UK GAAR may have been influenced by the anti-abuse principle laid down in Halifax Plc 
and others v Customs and Excise Commissioners1002 (Halifax) which was heard 8 years before 
the GAAR was introduced in the European Court of Justice.1003 The case is relevant as it 
focused on abuse, which is also the focus of the UK GAAR. Halifax involved a scheme devised 
by a bank which sought to avoid paying VAT. The bank sought to establish four call centres in 
the UK and take advantage of the VAT relief they enjoyed1004 by virtue of belonging to the 
financial services industry.1005 However, rather than claiming the 5% VAT relief on 
construction which they were entitled to deduct, Halifax sought to deduct the entire amount of 
VAT.1006 The bank executed the scheme with the help of four of its subsidiaries.1007 Halifax 
lent money to one of its subsidiaries, Leeds Permanent Development Services Ltd (Leeds), to 
fund the purchase and development of the land which included the £25,000 payment for 
VAT.1008 Leeds then entered into an agreement with another of Halifax’s subsidiaries, County 
Wide Property Investments Ltd (County), to develop the respective sites and payment was 
given in advance. Leeds claimed that it was entitled to deduct the entire amount of VAT which 
was equivalent to County’s fees.1009 Shortly after, Halifax assigned the leases to Leeds in 
respect of all four sites in return for Leeds paying a premium.1010 Leeds then reassigned the 
lease to another subsidiary named Halifax Property Investment Ltd (Property). On the same 
                                                          
1002 Halifax Plc and others v Customs and Excise Commissioners (C-255/02) [2006] Ch. 387 
1003 (ECJ) 
1004 Halifax Plc and others v Customs and Excise Commissioners (C-255/02) [2006] Ch. 387, 394 (Advocate 
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day, Property had sublet the sites to Halifax in exchange for a premium.1011 The events occurred 
during Leeds’ “partial exemption year”1012 in terms of VAT payable. County duly paid for the 
works carried out. Leeds then claimed VAT input repayment.  
The court concluded that the scheme in Halifax was abusive according to a range of factors 
which together amounted to the Halifax principle.1013 These factors included examining where 
an arrangement; “result[s] in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be 
contrary to the purpose of those provisions.”1014 Furthermore, it is reminiscent of the UK 
GAAR that the court held that “it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors that 
the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage.”1015 Therefore, a 
tax advantage must be intended and gained. However, the Halifax principle appears narrower 
than the UK GAAR as the former applies to  
“transactions carried out not in the context of normal commercial operations, but solely 
for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by Community 
law”.1016 
In contrast, the UK GAAR is far wider as gaining a tax advantage does not have to be the sole 
or main purpose of the arrangement which is elucidated in the main purpose test.1017 The judge 
in Halifax also held that the arrangement would not be regarded as abusive where it has “some 
explanation other than the mere attainment of tax advantages.”1018 Nevertheless, Sinfield 
believes that the Halifax principle is generally wide as  
                                                          
1011 Ibid 
1012 Ibid 
1013 Ibid, 436 
1014 Ibid 
1015 Ibid 
1016 Ibid, 435 
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“the terminology used by the ECJ (“abusive practice”, “tax advantage”, “transactions”) 
is deliberately generic, creating flexibility that will allow the concept of abusive 
practice to adapt to circumstances beyond the facts in Halifax and beyond VAT”.1019 
Therefore, it is possible to have a wide anti-abuse rule as the “ECJ formulate[d] an anti-abuse 
principle in much broader terms”.1020 The UK GAAR used even wider terms than the Halifax 
principle, reinforcing the notion that the GAAR is wide.  
Akin to the Ramsay approach involving ignoring artificial steps, in Halifax, the ECJ held that 
once an arrangement is found to be abusive, it “must be redefined so as to re-establish the 
situation that would have prevailed in the absence of the transactions constituting that abusive 
practice.”1021 Therefore, there are many similarities between the UK and EU law approaches 
to tax avoidance. 
Sinfield has recognised that the principles regarding abuse were viewed by the ECJ as the 
purposive approach to interpreting legislation.1022 This view was formed on the basis that the 
ECJ held “that this notion of abuse operates as a principle governing the interpretation of 
Community law”.1023 
The court expressed that it was well within its jurisdiction to establish a principle in Halifax 
which “does not require express legislative recognition by the Community legislature to render 
it applicable to the provisions”.1024 Therefore, the attitude of the court in Halifax is similar to 
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p237 
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that of the court in McGuckian wherein the court emphasised that Ramsay was no more than 
an expression of the purposive approach.1025 However, Sinfield believes that, in the Halifax 
case, “the anti-abuse concept is formulated as a general principle of prohibiting abusive 
practices rather than a principle of interpretation”.1026 Consequently, “the Halifax principle is… 
far-reaching… endowing the Court with new powers of redefinition to counter tax 
avoidance.”1027 
In reinforcing the wide nature of the Halifax principle, it is clear that Halifax was based on “the 
ECJ’s established teleological approach and its insistence on substance not form.”1028 
Moreover, Brittain argues that this teleological approach is usual for the ECJ as “the court 
frequently renders decisions which cannot be justified by reference to the language of the laws 
it is charged with interpreting.”1029 Brittain explains that “this extra-textual aspect of the court's 
jurisprudence is referred to as the "teleological" or "purposive" method of interpretation.”1030 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that Halifax represents “a restriction of formal legal rights 
under EU law where the taxpayer is relying on such rights to avoid tax.”1031 
The Halifax principle has evolved much like the Ramsay approach. As demonstrated in chapter 
2, Ramsay not only had support in subsequent cases but those cases also developed the original 
anti-avoidance principle laid down in Ramsay. The Halifax principle underwent a similar 
evolution in Cadbury Schweppes Plv v IRC (Cadbury).1032 In Cadbury, the court held that 
                                                          
1025 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 W.L.R. 991, 1000 (Lord Steyn) 
1026 Sinfield, G. “The Halifax principle as a universal GAAR for tax in the EU”, [2011] British Tax Review 235, 
p238 
1027 Ibid 
1028 Ibid, p241 
1029 Brittain, S. “Justifying the teleological methodology of the European Court of Justice: a rebuttal”, [2016], 
Irish Jurist 134, p134 
1030 Ibid 
1031 Sinfield, G. “The Halifax principle as a universal GAAR for tax in the EU”, [2011] British Tax Review 235, 
p241 
1032 Cadbury Schweppes Plc v IRC (C-196/04) [2006] ECR I-07995 
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“in order for a restriction on the freedom of establishment to be justified on the ground 
of prevention of abusive practices, the specific objective of such a restriction must be 
to prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do 
not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits 
generated by activities carried out on national territory.”1033 
Therefore, Cadbury specifically referred to examining artificial steps which Halifax did not 
focus on. The Halifax principle has also been criticised for having an “uncertain scope and 
inconsistent application.”1034 The inclusion of what is economically real has also been regarded 
as an extension of Halifax.1035 Sinfield believes that the fact that Cadbury extended Halifax 
demonstrates “that the principle of prohibiting abusive practices in Halifax is of general 
application.”1036 
3.9 Conclusion 
There are various problems with the provisions of the UK GAAR. The judiciary may be able 
conclusively to decide that an arrangement is unacceptable where a tax advantage was the main 
purpose of the arrangement. However, it is much more difficult to establish whether a tax 
advantage was one of the main purposes of embarking on the arrangement due to the existence 
of other purposes. The exercise of deciphering which purposes are the main purposes and which 
are the subordinate purposes hinders the job of the courts. Furthermore, there is no definition 
or helpful guidance as to what amounts to abuse in the double reasonableness test which confers 
significant discretionary power in the hands of the judiciary. Moreover, the existence of the 
                                                          
1033 Ibid, [55] (per curiam) 
1034 Sinfield, G. “The Halifax principle as a universal GAAR for tax in the EU”, [2011] British Tax Review 235, 
p243 
1035 Ibid 
1036 Ibid, p242 
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double reasonableness test unrealistically implies that a tax advantage can be the main purpose 
of an arrangement which HMRC deem acceptable. 
One of the crucial challenges in the GAAR is the fact that where the GAAR outlines what is 
abusive, the term “economic purposes”1037 has not been defined at all. However, despite the 
various tests, the GAAR suggests that the main issue is whether or not Parliament can be said 
to have anticipated the arrangement.1038 The GAAR guidance also does not help to define what 
amounts to an abusive arrangement. Furthermore, the GAAR’s equivocal list about what is 
abusive is unhelpful as it cites many sources which could be utilised by HMRC and is subject 
to change.  
Notably, the GAAR ensures that both the terms purpose and intention are included, suggesting 
that the GAAR seeks to examine both, and that Parliament recognises that the terms are distinct. 
The purpose of the arrangement is mentioned in the main purpose test and the taxpayer’s 
intentions are sought in s207(2)(c) of the Finance Act 2013. The principle in Halifax 
established that if there is more than one purpose, the arrangement would not be considered 
abusive.1039 If the UK were to adopt a Halifax- style approach to the GAAR, it would bring tax 
avoidance in line with the legislation on expenditure which requires that the expenditure 
“incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade.”1040 
The supplementary report also admitted that the taxpayer’s intentions should not be considered 
because of its subjective connotations.1041 To reinforce that intentions are irrelevant, the GAAR 
                                                          
1037 s207(4)(a) and s207(4)(b) Finance Act 2013 
1038 s207(4)(c) Finance Act 2013 
1039 Halifax Plc and others v Customs and Excise Commissioners (C-255/02) [2006] Ch. 387, 436 (Advocate 
General Poiares Maduro)  
1040 s34(1)(a) ITTOIA 2005 
1041 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2012] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf>, accessed 04.06.2016, p4 
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guidance also echoed this.1042 Moreover, the two-stage abuse test in Emsland highlights that 
scrutinising the intentions of the taxpayer is a subjective test.1043 Including the taxpayer’s 
intentions as a factor in determining abuse only serves to conclude the GAAR’s sub-tests with 
yet another factor which is open to interpretation. Too much discretion can lead to judges 
imputing an intention on the taxpayer that they did not intend. 
The GAAR guidance adds little substance to GAAR and its recommendations arguably make 
the taxpayer’s case more likely to fail. For example, the guidance states that the double 
reasonable test can be answered by examining all the possible reasonable views.1044 However, 
where one of those views regards the taxpayer’s arrangement as being reasonable, that view 
itself is then subject to scrutiny as to whether it is reasonable.1045 This approach arguably 
stretches the double reasonableness test further and creates a triple reasonableness test. As 
aforementioned, the first reasonableness requirement derives from the double reasonableness 
test and assesses the reasonableness of the judge’s view.1046 The second reasonableness 
requirement also derives from the double reasonableness test and evaluates whether the 
arrangement can be deemed reasonable.1047 The third reasonableness requirement derives from 
the GAAR guidance which states that where there exists a view which regards the arrangement 
as being reasonable, this view must be assessed as to its reasonableness.1048 The excessive 
reliance on subjective reasonableness merely serves to weaken the taxpayer’s position as the 
                                                          
1042 ‘HMRC GAAR Guidance: Parts A, B and C’ cited in 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399270/2__HMRC_GAAR_Gu
idance_Parts_A-C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf>, accessed 24.12.2015, p16 
1043 Emsland-Stärke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (C-110/99) [2000] ECR I-11569, per curiam, [53] 
1044 ‘HMRC GAAR Guidance: Parts A, B and C’ cited in 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399270/2__HMRC_GAAR_Gu
idance_Parts_A-C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf>, accessed 24.12.2015, p24 
1045 Ibid 
1046 s207(2) Finance Act 2013 
1047 Ibid 
1048 ‘HMRC GAAR Guidance: Parts A, B and C’ cited in 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399270/2__HMRC_GAAR_Gu
idance_Parts_A-C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf>, accessed 24.12.2015, p24 
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GAAR guidance does not state that a view which rejects the taxpayer’s arrangement must also 
be tested for its reasonableness.  
The scope of the GAAR appears to be wide, although it is designed to be targeted. This is 
undesirable as it is overly dependent on judicial discretion and subjective interpretations of key 
provisions. The GAAR has attempted to explain its provisions by including definitions of some 
of the key words including; tax advantage, abusive, arrangement and abusive arrangement 
taken as a whole. The definitions of these fundamental terms are broad. This is recognised by 
the GAAR guidance1049 however, it has two important caveats which restrain judicial 
creativity. Firstly, even if an arrangement falls within the definition of the GAAR and the 
purpose or one of its main purposes is the avoidance of tax,1050 it must amount to an abusive 
arrangement as defined by the double reasonableness test.1051 Secondly, abuse is defined 
broadly and there are many factors which constitute abuse, as laid down in the GAAR and 
GAAR guidance. However, even where one of these factors are satisfied, an arrangement will 
only be considered abusive where the result was not anticipated by Parliament.1052 As 
aforementioned this latter safeguard is extremely broad and the judiciary can widely interpret 
what Parliament intended. Disconcertingly, HMRC itself admits that wide interpretation leads 
to uncertainty.1053 Therefore, it would be helpful to examine the general anti-avoidance 
provisions in other jurisdictions to establish whether they have encountered problems with 
terminology in practice.  
 
                                                          
1049 Ibid, p9 
1050 s207(1) Finance Act 2013 
1051 s207(2) Finance Act 2013 
1052 s207(4)(c) Finance Act 2013 
1053 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p5 
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Chapter 4: General anti-avoidance legislation in other jurisdictions 
Introduction 
It has been argued earlier that the UK GAAR includes vague provisions and examines the 
arrangement’s purpose and the taxpayer’s intentions. This chapter will examine whether such 
an approach is peculiar to the UK. The Economic Substance Doctrine1054 in the USA’s Federal 
law and the general anti-avoidance rules of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada 
will be examined briefly. These jurisdictions have been selected because they have all have 
general anti-avoidance rules which have been in existence prior to the UK GAAR. 
Furthermore, the anti-avoidance rules of New Zealand, South Africa and Canada all include 
“abuse” provisions, examination of which can usefully inform the debate on the equivalent UK 
GAAR provisions. Furthermore, these jurisdictions have an established line of case law which 
can provide an indication as to how the UK’s targeted GAAR may be applied and whether 
there have been any problems in the terminology used. This chapter argues that, although the 
UK GAAR was proposed to be targeted, it is in fact wider than the anti-avoidance rules 
discussed by allowing greater scope for wide judicial discretion.  
4.1 The United States’ Economic Substance Doctrine (“ESD”) 
4.1. (a) Common Law background 
The ESD arises from US Federal case law which considers whether a business purpose exists 
in determining if a transaction is genuine and the economic reality of the arrangement. 
Therefore, it is useful to examine how the common law evolved and brought about the ESD. 
US tax law favours the substance over form approach which demonstrates a commitment to 
identifying the reason for executing the arrangements, what the arrangement achieved, and 
refuses to be confined to the parties’ agreements.  




The business purpose test was invoked in Gregory v Helvering1055 (Gregory) where the US 
Supreme Court proclaimed the irrelevance of motive several times in concluding that the 
taxpayer engaged in unacceptable tax avoidance.1056 The taxpayer transferred shares in her 
company to a new corporation which she created. She dissolved the new corporation shortly 
after its creation and transferred the shares from it to herself, which shares she subsequently 
sold. However, the arrangement did not fall within §112 of the Revenue Act of 1928 as a 
reorganisation of the taxpayer’s corporation. The court held that the scheme was carried out to 
ensure that the resulting tax burden would be less than if the shares were acquired by way of 
dividends. The absence of a “business or corporate purpose”1057 resulted in the conclusion of 
unacceptable tax avoidance. The judges examined the taxpayer’s intentions and established 
that the transaction “performed as it was intended from the beginning”1058 based on a 
“preconceived plan”.1059 Therefore, this view resembles Anscombe’s argument that “a man’s 
intention is what he aims at or chooses”.1060 Interestingly, it was held that there exists a “rule 
which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance.”1061 Sutherland J added that 
to consider motive would “deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious 
purpose”.1062 
The tendency to objectively consider the economic substance of arrangements was introduced 
in Knetsch v US.1063 The taxpayer acquired deferred annuity saving bonds from a life insurance 
company and borrowed in excess of his debt.  He repaid the company the interest in large sums 
for the year on the same day to offset the indebtedness indicating to the courts that indebtedness 
                                                          
1055 Gregory v Helvering 293 U.S. 465 (1935) 
1056 Ibid, 468-469 (Sutherland J.) 
1057 Ibid, 469 
1058 Ibid 
1059 Ibid 
1060 Anscombe, G.E.M. ‘Intention’, [1963], 2nd edn, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p18 
1061 Gregory v Helvering 293 U.S. 465 (1935), 470 (Sutherland J.) 
1062 Ibid 
1063 Knetsch v US 364 U.S. 361 (1960) 
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was never intended.1064 Only a tax advantage could be realised when examining the substance 
of the arrangement.1065 The taxpayer sought to deduct the interest from his income although, 
the court claimed that the taxpayer and insurance company created a sham arrangement as the 
only benefit was a tax advantage.1066  
In the dissenting judgement, it was recognised that “tax avoidance is a dominating motive 
behind scores of transactions. It is plainly present here.”1067 Therefore, this accords with 
Anscombe’s definition of a motive being the “desire of [the] gain”.1068 Nevertheless, the 
dissenting judge favoured the form over substance approach by recognising that the 
“transactions were real and legitimate in the insurance world and were consummated within 
the limits allowed by insurance policies”.1069 
The consideration of motive is not always the decisive factor as demonstrated by Frank Lyon 
Co. v US1070 (Frank Lyon) where the economic substance of a sale and lease-back agreement 
could not be ignored despite the apparent tax avoidance purpose.1071 The transaction was “not 
shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached”.1072 Therefore, 
the existence of economic substance could not be ignored even though tax avoidance was one 
of the main purposes of the arrangements.  
The reasoning in Frank Lyon was followed in Rice’s Toyota World Inc. v CIR1073 (Rice) where 
the court subjectively interpreted the business purpose test. The taxpayer purchased a computer 
using recourse and non-recourse notes. He subsequently leased the computer back to the seller 
                                                          
1064 Ibid, 364 (Brennan J.) 
1065 Ibid, 366 
1066 Ibid, 365 
1067 Ibid, 371 (Douglas J.)  
1068 Anscombe, G.E.M. ‘Intention’, [1963], 2nd edn, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p18 
1069 Knetsch v US 364 U.S. 361 (1960) 371 (Douglas J.) 
1070 Frank Lyon Co. v US 435 U.S. 561 (1978) 
1071 Ibid, 583 (Blackmun J.) 
1072 Ibid, 584 
1073 Rice’s Toyota World Inc. v CIR 752 F.2.d 89 (4th Cir. 1985) 
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for 8 years. The taxpayer claimed depreciation deductions for the computer and interest 
deductions paid on the non-recourse notes. The original seller then subleased the computer 
which generated an income. The arrangement was found to be a sham in applying the business 
purpose test which “concerns the motives of the taxpayer in entering the transaction.”1074 
Therefore the business purpose test was applied subjectively although, economic substance 
was held to be an objective test.1075 The court however, allowed only the interest deductions as 
“a sham transaction may contain elements whose form reflects economic substance”.1076 The 
case illustrates the flexibility of the business purpose test as it can be applied to part of an 
arrangement in the same way as the UK GAAR intends to operate. However, the GAAR can 
be applied to reject part of an arrangement whereas the US economic substance approach can 
uphold part of an arrangement.  
4.1 (b) The ESD provisions  
The Economic Substance Doctrine is far simpler than the UK GAAR as will be demonstrated. 
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 20101077 amended the Internal Revenue 
Code in order to codify the ESD1078 in 2010. The ESD lays down statutory GAAR-like 
provisions to counter avoidance. Examining the requirements of a genuine transaction as 
defined in the ESD may help decipher whether US legislation could also allow for an 
examination into the taxpayer’s purposes or intentions. Moreover, as the ESD was codified 
before the implementation of the UK GAAR, recent US tax avoidance cases may provide 
pointers as to how the UK GAAR may operate in relation to the taxpayer’s motive, intentions 
or purposes.  
                                                          
1074 Ibid, 92 (Judge Phillips) 
1075 Ibid, 95 
1076 Ibid, 96 
1077 s1409 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 2010 
1078 Internal Revenue Code 1986 s7701(o) 
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Deciding whether cases are genuine is processed through a “deceptively rule-based”1079 two-
stage test wherein both parts must be satisfied to escape tax liability. The first stage of the test 
is objective and dictates that a transaction is genuine and has economic substance where it 
“changes in a meaningful way (apart from the Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s 
economic position”.1080 This is fact-based. This stage of the test excludes purely tax benefits1081 
which means that there must be genuine profits and losses. However, the ESD guidance states 
that the taxpayer’s position would not change in a meaningful way where the transaction does 
not involve a business purpose.1082 Therefore, the business purpose test may be the more 
important test to satisfy. The guidance also indicates that the first and second stage of the test 
are intertwined. 
The second stage of the ESD is akin to, although wider than, the business purpose test 
exemplified in Gregory and analyses the taxpayer’s purpose through considering whether “the 
taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from the Federal income tax effects) for entering into 
such transaction”.1083 This stage also excludes purposes involving purely tax benefits.1084 To 
examine whether the taxpayer had a purpose which was not tax related involves assessing 
evidence beyond the face of the documents and inevitably looks into the taxpayer’s intentions. 
This half of the test has also been referred to as “the “subjective” leg of the doctrine”1085 as it 
“focus[es] on motives underlying a transaction, rather than the effects of the transaction.”1086 
However, the subjectivity is buried by “tying consideration of motives (the subjective leg of 
                                                          
1079 Madison. A.D, ‘Rationalising Tax Law by Breaking the Addiction to Economic Substance’, [2011], Idaho 
Law Review, Vol 47, p444 
1080 Internal Revenue Code 1986 s7701(o)(1)(a). 
1081 Ibid. 
1082IRS, ‘Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2010-40’, cited in <http://www.irs.gov/irb/2010-
40_IRB/ar09.html#d0e2360>, accessed 04.07.2016 
1083 Internal Revenue Code 1986 s7701(o)(1)(b) 
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the doctrine) to effect (the objective leg of the doctrine).”1087 To reinforce the subjectivity of 
the second stage of the ESD, the Joint Committee on Taxation has also published guidance on 
the ESD stating that anti-avoidance doctrines should inhibit any “tax-motivated 
transaction”.1088 Therefore, considering motive is overtly encouraged by US federal law. 
In determining whether a transaction satisfies both stages of the test within the ESD, there is a 
general rule that courts are permitted to consider the “potential for profit of a transaction.”1089 
Potential profit is evaluated by comparing how much profit would be made before tax to the 
tax allowances if the transaction were to be upheld.1090 If the pre-tax profit substantially 
outweighs the potential tax benefits, the ESD guidance states that the taxpayer’s profit motive 
will be explored.1091 Potential profit is explored as the absence of a profit and the existence of 
large tax reliefs enables tax avoidance motives to be inferred. However, a transaction may have 
a business purpose but fails to secure a potential profit. It is also difficult to predict whether a 
transaction may generate a profit. Therefore, the test may consider whether profit is a 
motive.1092 Furthermore, this provision can lead to judges frustrating an attempt to utilise tax 
laws which were enacted to provide tax benefits such as an investment.1093 
It is evident that the second stage of the ESD is more important to satisfy than the first stage as 
the latter is dependent on the second stage in order to be satisfied.1094 By placing greater weight 
on the subjective element of the ESD, Congress effectively allows for greater judicial 
                                                          
1087 Ibid 
1088 Joint Committee on Taxation, ‘Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act 
of 2010” as Amended, in Combination with the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”’, [2010], cited in 
< https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3673>, accessed 05.07.2016, p149 
1089 Internal Revenue Code 1986 s7701(o)(2)(a) 
1090 IRS, ‘Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2010-40’, cited in <http://www.irs.gov/irb/2010-
40_IRB/ar09.html#d0e2360>, accessed 04.07.2016 
1091 Ibid 
1092 Rice’s Toyota World Inc. v CIR 752 F.2.d 89 (4th Cir. 1985), 92 (Judge Phillips) 
1093 Bankman.J, ‘The Economic Substance Doctrine’, [2000], Southern California Law Review, Vol. 74:5, p13 
1094 IRS, ‘Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2010-40’, cited in <http://www.irs.gov/irb/2010-
40_IRB/ar09.html#d0e2360>, accessed 04.07.2016 
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discretion. In addition to this, the ESD has been criticised for doing “little more than restate the 
judicial formulations leaving much the same scope for interpretation”.1095 
The UK version of the business purpose doctrine examines whether there is a commercial 
purpose, as developed in Furniss. However, as demonstrated, the business purpose test has 
been applied in a subjective manner to examine taxpayers’ motive. Therefore, judges in the 
UK have the commercial purpose test at their disposal as well as the GAAR. US courts have 
held that although an arrangement may be motivated by tax avoidance, the economic substance 
of the arrangement cannot be ignored.1096 Therefore, the ESD attempts to be more objective 
than the UK GAAR. 
4.1 (c) Case Law post the American ESD  
Tax avoidance cases decided after the ESD was codified in 2010 may reveal whether the ESD, 
as construed by the courts, takes an objective or subjective approach, and whether motive is 
considered. The ESD was applied in Bank of New York Mellon Corporation v CIR.1097 The 
taxpayer bank engaged in “an elaborate series of pre-arranged steps”1098 under a structured trust 
advantaged repackaged securities (STARS) arrangement to circulate income with a UK bank 
to which it loaned money. The arrangement was designed to generate foreign tax credits, 
although it was held to lack economic substance due to the existence of tax 
“benefits…unrelated to the transaction”.1099 Furthermore, the court referred to the taxpayer’s 
“subjective business purpose”1100 illustrating that US courts treat the business purpose test as 
a subjective assessment. However, the court interpreted a subjective business purpose as 
                                                          
1095 Slater, A.H. “Part IVA: An International Perspective”, [2013] Australian Tax Review, Vol. 42/3 149, p150 
1096 Frank Lyon Co. v US 435 U.S. 561 (1978), 584 (Blackmun J.) 
1097 Bank of New York Mellon Corporation v CIR 140 T.C. No.2 (2013) 
1098 Ibid, 25 (Judge Kroupa) 
1099 Ibid, 35 
1100 Ibid, 28 
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meaning a “non-tax business purpose”1101 which is in fact involves an objective assessment of 
the facts.  
The taxpayer’s arrangement failed in Ricardo Garcia, Tax Matters Partner et al., v CIR1102 
(Ricardo). The taxpayers executed a series of transactions which lacked economic substance 
and a profit motive. The taxpayers invested in foreign currencies and purposely made losses in 
order to offset their losses against other income. The court reiterated the preference for 
examining the substance over the form of transaction by elucidating that they “don’t respect 
the form”1103 of the transactions. The judge examined the taxpayer’s intentions and concluded 
that the taxpayer “never intended to run businesses”.1104 This use of intention coincides with 
Scheer’s definition of intentions as “goals and courses of action”.1105 Consequently, it appears 
that examining the taxpayer’s intentions is becoming an increasingly important factor in US 
adjudication.  
The UK GAAR can be seen as more aggressive than the ESD. The ESD analyses whether a 
business purpose exists. Therefore, the ESD attempts to explore how the taxpayer’s 
arrangement can be upheld rather than seeking to disallow it. However, the UK GAAR begins 
the inquiry into the validity of an arrangement by immediately challenging its legitimacy. The 
UK GAAR analyses what amounts to an abusive arrangement and whether a tax advantage was 
a main purpose. Consequently, taxpayers are disadvantaged at the onset as judges are 
empowered to examine flaws in the arrangement. Had a business purpose test been enforced, 
judges may have chosen to end the inquiry into the legitimacy of arrangements upon evidence 
of a business purpose and not examine whether a tax advantage was a main purpose. If there is 
no business purpose, the provisions outlining what amounts to abuse could then be applied. 
                                                          
1101 Ibid, 29 
1102 Ricardo Garcia, Tax Matters Partner et al., v CIR T.C. Memo 2013-49 (2013) 
1103 Ibid, 61 (Judge Holmes) 
1104 Ibid 
1105 Scheer, R.K. ‘Intentions, motives and causation’, [2001], Philosophy, Vol 76, No. 297, p399 
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The section of the GAAR which discusses the amount for economic purposes1106 is the closest 
UK equivalent to examining economic substance. However, as demonstrated in chapter 3, it is 
unclear what economic purposes really means. The objective considerations are laid down in 
the GAAR guidance which is extra-statutory therefore, only has “quasi-judicial authority”.1107  
The ESD differs from the GAAR in that the ESD requires a business purpose.1108 Assessing 
the existence of a business purpose is an objective investigation rather than examining whether 
an arrangement is abusive under the GAAR, which initially explores the taxpayer’s purpose. 
The GAAR could have been clearer by considering what constitutes a genuine transaction 
rather than stating the requirements of an abusive transaction which encourages judges to begin 
by examining the taxpayer’s purposes and intentions. However, the ESD and GAAR are similar 
in that they both consider the taxpayer’s purpose. The similarities of the anti-avoidance 
legislation of the UK and US cannot be overstretched and it has been advised that 
“United Kingdom judges should be extremely wary of importing United States 
doctrines, since both the intellectual structure of the United States tax system and the 
administrative structure that underpins it are very different”.1109 
4.2 The Australian General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
The current Australian general anti-avoidance rule is contained in Part IVA of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 which applies to schemes carried out after 1981. It is important to note 
that Australia opted for a General Anti-Avoidance Rule rather than a General Anti-Abuse Rule 
and that the former is meant to be wider than the supposedly targeted UK GAAR. However, 
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O’Connell has recognised that the UK GAAR is “similar in many respects to Australia’s 
general anti-avoidance rule in Pt IVA”.1110 
The Australian general anti-avoidance rule was formerly contained in section 206 of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The problem with the former general anti-avoidance rule 
was that it was “drawn in very broad and comprehensive terms”1111 and “had the potential to 
annihilate any transaction which had any tax consequences”.1112 The discussion that follows 
will examine the provisions of Australia’s current general anti-avoidance rule. 
4.2 (a) Scheme 
The Australian general anti-avoidance rule uses the term “scheme”1113 instead of the UK 
counterpart of an “arrangement”. A scheme is defined broadly as including 
“any agreement, arrangement, understanding, promise or undertaking, whether express 
or implied and whether or not enforceable, or intended to be enforceable, by legal 
proceedings”1114 
and “any scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action or course of conduct.”1115 However, 
a scheme alone cannot be regarded as unacceptable tax avoidance and “it must be related to the 
tax benefit obtained.”1116 The meaning of a “scheme” is similar to the UK approach of an 
“arrangement” as both encompass an agreement or understanding.  
 
                                                          
1110 O’Connell, A. “The GAAR panels in Australia and the UK: identical twins or distant cousins?”, [2013], 42 
Australian Tax Review 269, p269 
1111 Cashmere, M. ‘A GAAR for the United Kingdom? The Australian experience’, [2008], British Tax Review 
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1113 s177A(1)(b) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1114 s177A(1)(a) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
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1116 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216, [9] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J.) 
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4.2 (b) Tax benefit 
A tax benefit has been defined as including  
“an amount not being included in the assessable income of the taxpayer… where that 
amount would have been included, or might reasonably be expected to have been 
included, in the assessable income of the taxpayer of that year of income if the scheme 
had not been entered into”.1117 
This provision likely refers to profit which has utilised a legitimate allowance and has 
ultimately not been included in the taxpayer’s tax return. In addition to this, another type of tax 
benefit is defined as  
“a deduction being allowable to the taxpayer in relation to a year of income where the 
whole or a part of that deduction would not have been allowable, or might reasonably 
be expected not to have been allowable… if the scheme had not been entered into”.1118 
Therefore, allowable deductions which have been obtained as part of a scheme would be 
deemed as a tax benefit under the general anti-avoidance rule. The UK GAAR’s equivalent of 
a tax advantage provides a more specific list of what constitutes a tax advantage.1119 The UK 
GAAR encompasses more than tax reliefs and deductions, as discussed in chapter 3.  
4.2 (c) Purpose 
As with the UK GAAR, in the Australian general anti-avoidance rule, the taxpayer’s purpose 
plays a central role in determining whether the taxpayer engaged in unacceptable tax 
avoidance.1120 The Australian general anti-avoidance rule applies where a person, who is not 
                                                          
1117 s177C(1)(a) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1118 s177C(1)(b) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1119 s208 Finance Act 2013 
1120 s177D Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
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necessarily the “relevant taxpayer”1121 “carried out the scheme or any part of the scheme… for 
the purpose of enabling a taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit in connection with the scheme”.1122 
Consequently, there is a strong focus on obtaining a tax benefit rather than avoiding tax 
although, the former is much wider. Similarly, the general anti-avoidance rule also applies to 
situations where the person “enabl[es] the relevant taxpayer and another taxpayer… each to 
obtain a tax benefit in connection with the scheme”1123 even though they are not the “relevant 
taxpayer”.1124  
Unlike the UK GAAR which seeks to avoid overtly examining the taxpayer’s purpose and 
instead scrutinise the arrangement’s purpose, the Australian general anti-avoidance rule 
flagrantly allows judges to examine, not only the taxpayer’s purpose but also, the purpose of 
anyone involved in the scheme. The distinction has also been raised in case law subsequent to 
the Australian general anti-avoidance rule which reaffirmed that the legislation is concerned 
with the taxpayer’s purpose and not that of that arrangement.1125 Concerns have been raised 
about the decision to allow the scrutiny of the taxpayer’s purpose rather than the arrangement’s 
purpose.1126 Furthermore, “the requisite purpose is that of someone connected with the scheme, 
who need not be the taxpayer [and] not the purpose of the scheme itself”.1127 Therefore, the 
danger is that “the purpose of the relevant taxpayer may be imputed.”1128  
In order to ascertain whether a person had the required purpose to aid one or more taxpayers to 
gain a tax benefit, judges must have regard to eight objective criteria.1129 These criteria include; 
                                                          
1121 s177D(1)(a) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
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1123 s177D(1)(b) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1124 s177D(1)(a) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1125 Commissioner of Taxation v Hart and Another (2004) 206 ALR 207, [63] (Gummow and Hayne JJ.) 
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“the manner in which the scheme was entered into or carried out”1130, “the form and substance 
of the scheme”1131, “the time at which the scheme was entered into and the length of the period 
during which the scheme was carried out”1132, “the result… that, but for this Part, would be 
achieved by the scheme”1133, “any change in the financial position… that has resulted…  from 
the scheme,”1134 “any change in the financial position of any person who has, or has had, any 
connection… with the relevant taxpayer”1135 including “the nature of any connection”1136 and 
lastly, “any other consequence for the relevant taxpayer”.1137 The criteria differ from the UK 
GAAR and US ESD in a number of ways. Firstly, the Australian general anti-avoidance rule 
respects both the form and substance.1138 Secondly, their general anti-avoidance rule surveys 
the financial position of others connected to the taxpayer1139 which undoubtedly broadens the 
scope of the legislation. Finally, the timing and length of the arrangement, which are 
occasionally considered in UK Tax as in Burmah Oil and Ensign Tankers, are investigated.  
The objective criteria in the Australian general anti-avoidance rule have received praise for 
being beneficial to both revenue officials and taxpayers.1140 Slater has argued that  
“what sets Pt IVA apart from most other anti-avoidance legislation, however, is not its 
effectiveness from a revenue perspective: it is that is sets sufficiently identifiable and 
objective criteria for its operation that taxpayers may plan their affairs with some degree 
                                                          
1130 s177D(2)(a) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1131 s177D(2)(b) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1132 s177D(2)(c) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1133 s177D(2)(d) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1134 s177D(2)(e) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1135 s177D(2)(f) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1136 s177D(2)(h) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1137 s177D(2)(g) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1138 s177D(2)(b) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1139 s177D(2)(f) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1140 Slater, A.H. “Part IVA: An International Perspective”, [2013] Australian Tax Review, Vol. 42/3 149, p149 
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of assurance that their arrangements (if they are not overly ambitious) will not fall 
within its scope.”1141 
Moreover, Gammie has stated that, compared to the UK GAAR, “Pt IVA appears the better 
construct.”1142 This is because “its virtue lies in its refusal to articulate a concept of ‘abuse’ and 
found itself on the idea that one can conclude by reference to the specified objective 
factors.”1143 However,  
“Pt IVA operates when it identifies an arrangement that confers a tax benefit while the 
UK GAAR treats almost anything as a tax arrangement but then aims to strike down 
any tax arrangement for which there is no reasonable explanation.”1144 
The Australian general anti-avoidance rule stipulates that the Commissioner can cancel the tax 
benefit gained.1145 Counteraction can occur in a number of ways according to the facts of the 
case for example, the tax benefit claimed can be computed in the assessable income.1146 
Alternatively, the deduction will not be allowable,1147 or an artificial capital loss will not be 
sustained.1148  
4.3 Australian Case Law post the Australian General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
Commentators have argued that “the cases on Part IVA generally demonstrate its breadth and 
power to strike down tax avoidance transactions.”1149 The Australian general anti-avoidance 
                                                          
1141 Ibid 
1142 Gammie, M. “When is avoiding tax not abusive? Comparative approaches to a GAAR in Australia and the 
United Kingdom”, [2013], 42 Australian Tax Review 279, p291 
1143 Ibid 
1144 Ibid 
1145 s177F Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1146 s177F(1)(a) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1147 s177F(1)(b) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1148 s177F(1)(c) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1149 Kobetsky, M., Brown, C., Fisher, R., Villios, S., and Gillies, P. “Income Tax: text, materials and essential 
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rule was applied in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spotless1150 (Spotless). The case 
concerned the taxpayer company, Spotless Services Ltd which sought to use $40 million for 
short-term investment in the Cook Islands.1151 The taxpayers claimed that the interest gained 
on the investment was deductible as they were not required to pay tax on an investment and 
they had duly paid withholding tax.1152 The transaction attracted suspicion given that the 
amount of interest earned in the Cook Islands was lower than in Australia although, the scheme 
was advantageous from a tax perspective if the investment did not attract Australian income 
tax.1153 The court concluded that “without the scheme there would have been no 
investment”.1154 In order to reach the conclusion that the arrangement did come under the 
general anti-avoidance rule, the court considered the “dominant purpose”1155 of the 
arrangement which was described as “the ruling, prevailing or most influential purpose.”1156  
The judgement in Spotless was reminiscent of Mallalieu1157 in relation to the possibility of a 
dual purpose when the court stated that “a particular course of action may be both "tax driven'' 
and bear the character of a rational commercial decision.”1158 The judges added that simply 
because a commercial purpose exists, does not negate the possibility that an arrangement was 
embarked upon to gain a tax benefit.1159 Moreover, the court stressed that the decisive factor 
was that the arrangement “was not merely tax driven but that its dominant purpose was to 
enable the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit”1160 which should be judged by the standards of “a 
reasonable person.”1161 However, this approach has been criticised as “the Court appear[ed] to 
                                                          
1150 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spotless (1996) 141 ALR 92  
1151 Ibid, 94 (per curiam) 
1152 Ibid, 95 
1153 Ibid 
1154 Ibid, 103 
1155 Ibid, 96 
1156 Ibid, 98 
1157 Mallalieu v Drummond [1983] 3 W.L.R. 409, [1983] 2 A.C. 861, 872 (Lord Brightman) 
1158 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spotless [1996] 141 ALR 92, 93 (per curiam) 
1159 Ibid 
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have simply substituted what it felt a reasonable person would conclude for the Full Federal 
Court's view.”1162 Therefore, this may also happen with the UK GAAR where the double 
reasonableness test is applied. It was also made clear that the purpose sought relates to the 
taxpayer and not the arrangement.1163 The court in Spotless openly rejected the Westminster 
approach1164, the principles of which were viewed as “muffled echoes of old arguments”.1165 
Although, the court insisted that “both form and substance”1166 were relevant. Therefore, the 
substance of the arrangement may encompass the taxpayer’s purpose.  
The Australian general anti-avoidance rule was also triggered in Commissioner of Taxation v 
Hart and Another1167 (Hart). The taxpayers in Hart took out two loans; one to fund the cost of 
the taxpayers’ private home and another for an investment property.1168 Only the interest on 
the investment property’s loan was deductible as the taxpayer used a “wealth optimiser 
structure”1169 to execute the loan. The interest on the investment property was higher than the 
interest on the taxpayers’ private residence. The taxpayers ensured that the loan for their private 
home was repaid first and allowed the interest on the investment property to accrue.1170 The 
court found the interest to be a material peculiarity as the taxpayers “willingly agreed to pay a 
higher rate of interest than was available”1171 which consequently raised suspicion because the 
interest was deductible.1172 However, the court held that the chosen structure  
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“depended entirely for its efficacy upon tax benefits generated by arrangements 
between the respondents and the lender that had no explanation other than their fiscal 
consequences.”1173 
Due to the deductibility of the interest, the court concluded that “obtaining of the additional tax 
deduction was the dominant purpose of the scheme.”1174 This accords with Millet’s definition 
of a purpose as ““purpose” is the aim, or object, or end in view.”1175 Literature given to the 
taxpayers prior to embarking on the scheme also boasted about the tax benefits which would 
be obtained through using the particular structure.1176 Therefore, the form and substance of the 
arrangement pointed to the taxpayers seeking a tax advantage.1177 The decision has been 
criticised due to the fact that a tax benefit includes “an amount not being included in the 
assessable income of the taxpayer of a year of income where that amount would have been 
included”.1178 However, “it is not too difficult to envisage a scenario in which a taxpayer will 
either enter into a scheme which produces tax benefits or no scheme at all.”1179 
The court in Hart stressed that the relevant purpose was that of the taxpayers’ and not of the 
arrangement.1180 In addition to this, the court also stated that the general anti-avoidance rule 
“does not require, or even permit, any inquiry into the subjective motives of the relevant 
taxpayers”.1181 However, in Hart, the court ensured that every aspect of the general anti-
                                                          
1173 Ibid, [18] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J.) 
1174 Ibid, [61] (Gummow and Hayne JJ.) 
1175 Millet, P. ‘Artificial tax avoidance: the English and American approach’, [1986], British Tax Review 327, 
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avoidance rule was equally satisfied in concluding that; there was a scheme, which led to a tax 
benefit and was the dominant purpose of the taxpayers.1182 
4.4 The New Zealand General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
New Zealand’s general anti-avoidance rule is contained in sBG1 and GA1 of the Income Tax 
Act 2007. Unlike the UK GAAR, the Australian general anti-avoidance rule and America’s 
ESD, the New Zealand general anti-avoidance rule does not provide any systematic tests to 
work through the stages of the legislation. Many of the key terms of the general anti-avoidance 
rule are only explained in the general definitions section of the Income Tax Act 2007 which 
creates a complex general anti-avoidance rule as not all of the relevant terms are contained 
within sBG1 and GA1. It is also important to note that the purposive approach has been placed 
on statutory footing in New Zealand under the Interpretation Act 1999 which states that “the 
meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose.”1183 
The meaning of the phrase “tax avoidance arrangement”1184 is provided for under the Act. The 
phrase is equally as broad as the Australian general anti-avoidance rule in stating that it 
encompasses “an arrangement, whether entered into by the person affected by the arrangement 
or by another person”.1185 The meaning of a tax arrangement is further broadened where the 
Act states that the general anti-avoidance rule applies where the person “directly or indirectly 
has tax avoidance as its purpose or effect”.1186 The purpose mentioned in the New Zealand 
general anti-avoidance rule is that of the taxpayer rather than the arrangement. However, the 
addition of examining the effect as well as the main purpose of the arrangement suggests that 
the arrangement may be held to be unacceptable tax avoidance although, it was not the purpose 
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of the scheme. Therefore, the New Zealand general anti-avoidance rule has a double-edged 
sword in considering both purpose and effect. A similar distinction was also recognised by 
Anscombe who elucidated that the inseparability of the effect—is not a ground for regarding it 
as intended.”1187 Furthermore, the inclusion of both terms ensures that the judiciary can tackle 
those arrangements which not only had a tax avoidance effect by which the taxpayer received 
a tax advantage but, also those arrangements which merely had the purpose of doing so, 
irrespective of whether the arrangement was successful.  
In defining a tax arrangement, the Income Tax Act 2007 also states that it includes the situation 
where an arrangement 
“has tax avoidance as 1 of its purposes or effects, whether or not any other purpose or 
effect is referable to ordinary business or family dealings, if the tax avoidance purpose 
or effect is not merely incidental”.1188 
Therefore, whether the arrangement involves tax avoidance as its main purpose or one of its 
main purposes, it is covered by the general anti-avoidance rule. The term “merely 
incidental”1189 acts as a safeguard to ensure that a tax benefit arising out of family or business 
transactions are not caught within the general anti-avoidance rule.  
As with the UK’s GAAR, the Tax Administration Act 1994 also refers to “an abusive tax 
position”1190 which has been defined as including 
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“taxpayers who, having taken an unacceptable tax position, have entered into or acted 
in respect of arrangements or interpreted or applied tax laws with a dominant purpose 
of taking, or of supporting the taking of, tax positions that reduce or remove tax 
liabilities or give tax benefits”.1191 
In the aforementioned provision, the dominant purpose discussed is that of the taxpayer. 
Therefore, if the judiciary in the UK look to New Zealand for guidance on what amounts to 
abuse, the taxpayer’s purpose may be sought.  
An “unacceptable tax position”1192 is defined as being where “if, viewed objectively, the tax 
position fails to meet the standard of being about as likely as not to be correct.”1193 The 
provision is quite vague and the standard of correctness will be decided by the judiciary who 
will invariably use their discretion as to the arrangement’s correctness. The Tax Administration 
Act 1994 also serves to catch those seeking to escape their tax liabilities under both the “general 
tax law”1194 and “a specific or general anti-avoidance tax law.”1195 Moreover, unlike with the 
UK GAAR, the onus is on taxpayers to show that they did not engage in tax avoidance.1196 
4.4 (a) Counteraction 
The New Zealand general anti-avoidance rule states that “the Commissioner may counteract a 
tax advantage that a person has obtained from or under a tax avoidance arrangement.”1197 In 
deciding whether an arrangement will be counteracted, the Commissioner will examine  
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“such amounts of assessable income, deductions, and available net losses as, in the 
Commissioner’s opinion, that person would have, or might be expected to have, or 
would in all likelihood have, had if that arrangement had not been made or entered 
into.”1198 
Therefore, the Commissioner has considerable discretion in whether a taxpayer would, might 
or is likely to have had a profit, deduction or loss had the arrangement not been carried out.  
4.4 (b) Case Law post the New Zealand General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
The breadth of the New Zealand general anti-avoidance rule was illustrated in the case of Ben 
Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue1199 (Ben Nevis) as the 
appellants in the case were not party to the agreement caught by the general anti-avoidance 
rule.1200 The facts of the case are complex and involved an elaborate structure which 
encompassed various companies and agreements. The appellants were investors in a forestry 
development project. The dispute was based on allowances which the taxpayers claimed they 
were entitled to after paying back both a licence fee for land used for forestry activities1201 and 
insurance premiums to safeguard against the forest not making the expected return.  
The likelihood of profit was also analysed in order to assess whether the scheme involved 
elements of artificiality. The arrangement raised suspicion when the court found evidence to 
suggest that “it was possible but unlikely that the net proceeds of harvesting the trees would 
exceed the cost of the premium.”1202 The unlikelihood of profit consequently led to questions 
as to “whether the appellants had a true business purpose.”1203 Therefore, profitability and the 
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existence of a business purpose are intertwined in New Zealand. Thereafter, it was concluded 
that “it was never intended that the forest would make a profit.”1204 To reinforce the lack of an 
intention to make a profit, the issue of timing was discussed. The premium was due to be paid 
in 2048 and the judiciary commented that the investors were “unlikely to be alive in 2048”.1205 
Interestingly, the court in Ben Nevis also differentiated between “legal substance”1206 and 
“business substance”.1207 The distinction was not made clear although, the judges later 
commented on the fact that “taxpayers must show that the economic purpose of the entire 
expense incurred, rather than simply the legal benefit relates to the income-earning 
process”.1208 The judges in Ben Nevis commented on the distinction between intention and 
motive.1209 Whilst acknowledging that the general anti-avoidance rule is concerned “with 
arrangements having the "intended effect" or object of altering the incidence of tax”,1210 the 
judges were careful not to confuse intention or purpose with motive.1211 Rather than exile the 
concept of motive altogether the court stated that “it is well established that motive is not 
determinative, although it may be evidence which sheds light on a purpose of tax avoidance 
and so is not wholly irrelevant.”1212 Therefore, the taxpayer’s motive is a consideration when 
examining their purpose although, not a significant consideration. However, as exemplified by 
Millet, a person can have many motives1213 which is why motive is an unreliable consideration. 
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As aforementioned, the Tax Administration Act 1994 seems to be referring to the purpose of 
the taxpayer rather than the arrangement.1214 However, this issue was debated in Ben Nevis and 
the judges concluded that the relevant purpose was that of the arrangement.1215 The appellants 
wanted the judiciary to examine their purpose.1216 Nevertheless, the court elucidated the 
distinction between the appellant’s purpose and the arrangement’s purpose. The judges held 
that the purpose of the arrangement “directs attention to features of the arrangement rather than 
intentions of a taxpayer in taking a tax position linked to the arrangement.”1217 Therefore, the 
court examined “the means employed”1218 rather than the appellant’s purposes which it equated 
with their intention.1219 As demonstrated in chapter one, “purpose” can also denote “object [or] 
thing intended.”1220 
There was also distinct disapproval of equating tax avoidance arrangements with sham 
arrangements when elucidating that the facts of Ben Nevis revealed no signs of a sham.1221 
According to the judges, “a sham exists when documents do not reflect the true nature of what 
the parties have agreed.”1222 In contrast, in a tax avoidance arrangement,  
“even though the documents may accurately reflect the transaction which the parties 
intend to implement, …the arrangement entered into gives a tax advantage which 
Parliament regards as unacceptable.”1223 
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1220 Coulson, J., et al. ‘The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary’, [1981], 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Wiltshire, 
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Therefore, a tax avoidance arrangement does not automatically also give rise to a sham 
arrangement, even if tax avoidance was the main purpose or effect of the transactions.1224  
Examining how the New Zealand general anti-avoidance rule operates is useful as it has heeded 
warnings in Ben Nevis regarding how the legislation and precedent on tax avoidance can 
conflict. The judges expounded how  
“there is little explicit guidance in the legislation and the current case law has become 
complex, through being encumbered by considerations and tests that the legislation 
does not specify.”1225 
Therefore, judges also like having clear guidance which would inhibit their discretion. Whilst 
judges invariably look to established precedent in deciding cases, the New Zealand experience 
has revealed that case law can generate even more tests. The resulting dilemma is the possibility 
of having an array of tests to consider. Therefore, the judiciary in the UK should be mindful to 
define the limits of the GAAR and the existing tests without establishing many additional tests.  
The case of Alesco New Zealand Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue1226(Alesco) upheld the 
approach taken in Ben Nevis. Alesco demonstrates that even where taxpayers obtain the advice 
of leading accountants, KPMG, and where reasons as to why the general anti-avoidance rule 
does not apply are provided during the formation of the scheme,1227 the arrangement may 
nevertheless fall under the general anti-avoidance rule. The case concerned the company 
Alesco Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, Alesco New Zealand. The subsidiary 
company sought the acquisition of two businesses, Biolab and Robinson, with the financial 
support of its parent company using an inter-company arrangement and optional convertible 
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notes.1228 The notes were issued from Alesco New Zealand to Alesco Corporation for the 
purchase of Biolab in exchange for the funding and the agreement that interest would be 
payable on the loan. However, Alesco New Zealand’s claim for interest deductions and plans 
to offset group losses were rejected by the Commissioner. 
Although “it was always intended that real money would flow from Alesco Corporation to 
Alesco NZ,”1229 suspicion was raised regarding the “intermediate arrangements”.1230 The judge 
held that the financing structure was artificial as irrespective of the optional convertible notes, 
Alesco New Zealand “would not (and did not) “incur any actual expense on an annual 
basis”.1231 Due to the financing structure utilised in Alesco, the court held that “its sole 
motivation was to find and employ the most tax effective structure”.1232 Despite the fact that 
Health J. echoed the approach in Westminster that “any taxpayer is entitled to structure its 
affairs to minimise its tax obligations by "permissible" means”,1233 he qualified the approach 
by including that an arrangement cannot be permissible where it was “not contemplated by 
Parliament”.1234  
Finally, on the issue of counteraction, the court interestingly held that, “as a matter of logic, it 
is not possible to counteract a tax advantage by allowing the taxpayer to obtain greater tax 
benefits than were actually achieved.”1235 Therefore, counteraction serves as a deterrence and 
a form of retribution as well as a means to recalculate tax owed or the deductions to be 
disallowed. 
 
                                                          
1228 Ibid, 257 
1229 Ibid, 284 
1230 Ibid, 257 
1231 Ibid, 289 
1232 Ibid, 278 
1233 Ibid, p292 
1234 Ibid 
1235 Ibid, p296 
199 
 
4.5 The South African General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
The South African general anti-avoidance rule is contained in the Income Tax Act 1962, as 
implemented in 2006, under Part IIA. It was amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 
20 of 20061236 which means that it is one of the more recent general anti-avoidance rules in the 
world.  
South Africa’s general anti-avoidance rule deals with “impermissible tax avoidance 
arrangements”.1237 Irrespective of the context of the arrangement, the general anti-avoidance 
rule states that the arrangement will be deemed “an impermissible avoidance arrangement if its 
sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit”.1238 Therefore, the arrangement’s purpose is 
a central factor in the South African general anti-avoidance rule.  
The Act then goes on to state how the general anti-avoidance rule applies in business,1239 
“context[s] other than business”1240 and “in any context”.1241 In relation to businesses, the South 
African general anti-avoidance rule seems to align broadly with the aforementioned general 
anti-avoidance rules. As well as having tax avoidance as a main purpose, the Act states that it 
will be caught by the general anti-avoidance rule if “it was entered into or carried out by means 
or in a manner which would not normally be employed for bona fide business purposes, other 
than obtaining a tax benefit”.1242 This provision is wide and could encompass an impermissible 
financial structure, as in the New Zealand case of Alesco, and a range of abnormal or artificial 
steps in an arrangement. It has been argued that in order  
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“to determine whether a transaction had bona fide business purposes, the hypothetical 
question must be asked whether businessmen generally, not motivated by tax 
considerations but rather by a bonda fide business purpose, would have structured the 
arrangement in that manner.”1243 
The use of motive in this sense coincides with Anscombe’s definition of motive as the “desire 
of [the] gain”.1244 Furthermore, in a business context, an arrangement would be impermissible 
if “it lacks commercial substance, in whole or in part”.1245 The ability to tackle part of an 
arrangement means that “the issue of identifying the actual scheme is largely nugatory.”1246 
The Act has defined a “lack of commercial substance”1247 as where  
“it would result in a significant tax benefit for a party…  but does not have a significant 
effect upon either the business risks or net cash flows… apart from any effect 
attributable to the tax benefit that would be obtained”.1248 
Therefore, commercial substance focuses more on what is quantifiable in addition to the level 
of risk involved. Consequently, if the transaction does not affect the company’s funds in a 
proportionate manner to the tax benefit obtained, suspicion will be raised. The Act has also 
provided additional guidance for the judiciary in deciphering whether an arrangement lacks 
commercial substance. As well as the commercial substance, judges may also take into account 
a situation where the “legal substance or effect of the avoidance arrangement as a whole is 
inconsistent with, or differs significantly from, the legal form of its individual steps”.1249 Legal 
substance has not been defined but may be analogous to commercial substance wherein the 
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arrangement must have tangible legal consequences on the business. The aforementioned 
provision demonstrates that South Africa has no preference for substance over form. Instead, 
both the form and substance of the arrangement must correspond with each other.  
The general anti-avoidance rule has also highlighted typical avoidance arrangements which are 
deemed unacceptable. Firstly, “round trip financing”1250 which involves moving around 
money1251 and includes a tax benefit1252 that is designed to “significantly reduce, offset or 
eliminate any business risk incurred by any party in connection with the avoidance 
arrangement.”1253 
Secondly, the existence of “an accommodating or tax indifferent party”1254 is indicative of 
unacceptable tax avoidance. The term is defined in the Act as including an amount not subject 
to tax1255or where funds are significantly “offset either by any expenditure or loss incurred by 
the party in connection with that avoidance arrangement”1256 which would otherwise have been 
subject to tax.1257 Lastly, the general anti-avoidance rule states that arrangements which have 
“elements that have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other” would lack commercial 
substance. The examples are useful as they indicate what would be deemed as unacceptable tax 
avoidance which promotes uniformity. 
After the legislation outlines how it would operate in a business context, it then states that an 
arrangement would be caught by the general anti-avoidance rule if  
                                                          
1250 s80C(2)(b)(i) Income Tax Act 1962 
1251 s80D(1)(a) Income Tax Act 1962 
1252 s80D Income Tax Act 1962 
1253 s80D(1)(b)(ii) Income Tax Act 1962 
1254 s80C(2)(b)(ii) Income Tax Act 1962 
1255 s80E(1)(a)(i) Income Tax Act 1962 
1256 s80E(1)(a)(ii) Income Tax Act 1962 
1257 s80E(b) Income Tax Act 1962 
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“in a context other than business, it was entered into or carried out by means or in a 
manner which would not normally be employed for a bona fide purpose, other than 
obtaining a tax benefit”.1258 
The aforementioned provision is very broad which suggests that the Parliament of South Africa 
is less accepting of avoidance where a business is not involved.  
Finally, the general anti-avoidance rule outlines what would amount to unacceptable tax 
avoidance “in any context”1259 which presumably would encompass business arrangements 
too. The general anti-avoidance rule states that an arrangement would not be permissible where 
it “has created rights or obligations that would not normally be created between persons dealing 
at arm’s length.”1260 Therefore, the provision suggests that the courts must scrutinise 
arrangements for the existence of abnormalities.  
The South African general anti-avoidance rule then echoes the words of the UK GAAR by 
concluding that an arrangement would not be permissible where it “would result directly or 
indirectly in the misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act”.1261 It is significant that a general 
anti-avoidance rule which is not designed to be targeted has adopted similar wording as that of 
a targeted GAAR. It would be expected that the type of language in the two forms of anti-
avoidance legislation would differ significantly. Nevertheless, South Africa specifies abuse as 
one example of what is unacceptable, and the UK GAAR specifies abuse as the only instance 
of what is unacceptable. Although, the other instance of unacceptability in South African 
GAAR also makes reference to abnormal arrangements, as aforementioned, which is similar to 
the wording in the UK GAAR.1262 Nevertheless, the abuse provision has been criticised on the 
                                                          
1258 s80A(b) Income Tax Act 1962 
1259 s80A(c) Income Tax Act 1962 
1260 s80A(c)(i) Income Tax Act 1962 
1261 s80A(c)(ii) Income Tax Act 1962 
1262 s207(2)(b) Finance Act 2013 
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basis that “it leaves room for subjectivity in that abuse can potentially mean anything to 
anyone.”1263 
The South African general anti-avoidance rule interestingly has a section regarding the 
“presumption of purpose”.1264 The provision primarily makes it clear that the burden of proof 
is on the taxpayer to show that “obtaining a tax benefit was not the sole or main purpose of the 
avoidance arrangement”.1265 As the legislation refers to the purpose of the arrangement,1266 the 
taxpayer “must establish the arrangement’s purpose, not his or her purpose.”1267 However, as 
“the arrangement itself is not a thinking entity”1268 it is difficult to establish its “intending 
purpose”.1269 Cassidy argues that the purpose of the arrangement is deliberately the object of 
scrutiny “to shift the focus of inquiry away from the subjective intent of the taxpayer”.1270 She 
has blurred intentions and purposes here although, it may be done consciously to suggest that 
examining the taxpayer’s purpose can also lead to examining the taxpayer’s intentions. Cassidy 
however, asserts that “a blend of objective and subjective considerations is necessary”.1271 
Nonetheless, the competing subjective and objective deliberations are difficult to balance and 
it is uncertain how much weight will be given to each consideration. The particular difficulty 
lies in the fact that subjective considerations cannot be quantified. Therefore, a mixture of both 
subjective and objective facts inevitably favours one approach over the other. Consequently, it 
is undesirable to examine subjective considerations in tax law as it leaves scope for judicial 
discretion.  
                                                          
1263 Kujinga, B.T. “Analysis of misuse and abuse in terms of the South African general anti-avoidance rule: 
lessons from Canada”, [2012], The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 42, p50 
1264 s80G Income Tax Act 1962 
1265 s80G(1) Income Tax Act 1962 
1266 s80A Income Tax Act 1962 





1271 Ibid, p767 
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If the taxpayer is unable satisfactorily to prove that the tax benefit was not a main purpose, the 
legislation states that “the arrangement is presumed to have been entered into or carried out for 
the sole or main purpose of obtaining a tax benefit”.1272 This provision suggests that one’s 
purpose may not actually be to obtain a tax benefit but it is deemed to be such by default, in 
absence of evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the provision works in a retrospective manner. 
Furthermore, the section on purpose confuses matters by adding that “the purpose of a step in 
or part of an avoidance arrangement may be different from a purpose attributable to the 
avoidance arrangement as a whole.”1273 However, even though the South African general anti-
avoidance rule acknowledges that part of the arrangement may be genuine, the arrangement 
will still be caught by the legislation where a tax benefit was at least one of the main purposes 
of the arrangement.  
4.5 (a) Case Law post the South African General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
The importance of commercial substance as detailed in the South African general anti-
avoidance rule1274 was also reinforced in Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
v NWK Limited (NWK Ltd).1275 NWK Limited evaded rather than avoided tax. However, the 
case is important as the South African courts had difficulty distinguishing the two concepts. 
The case concerned a loan taken out by NWK Limited (NWK) from a subsidiary of First 
National Bank (FNB) named Slab Trading Company (Pty) Ltd. (Slab). The loan was taken for 
five years and NWK sought to claim interest deductions on the loan. However, the court 
claimed that the interest deductions claimed far outweighed the actual value of the loan.  
 
                                                          
1272 s80G(1) Income Tax Act 1962 
1273 s80G(2) Income Tax Act 1962 
1274 s80C Income Tax Act 1962 
1275 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v NWK Limited (27/10) [2010] ZASCA 168 
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NWK issued promissory notes to Slab which were later sold to FNB. In exchange for Slab 
issuing the loan to NWK, NWK agreed to provide Slab tonnes of maize. However, the judge 
contended that the maize used to discharge the loan was provided by FNB to NWK.1276 Slab 
promptly sold its right to receive the maize to FNB and the court concluded that Slab’s role in 
the scheme was unnecessary.1277 NWK effectively took the loan out and delivered the maize in 
order to repurchase it from FNB later.1278 The court held that the interest on the loan was 
calculated erroneously as this figure was deduced by the taxpayers deducting the value of the 
maize from the loan. However, the maize was undervalued which meant that the interest 
amount was incorrect.1279 
The NWK Ltd case provided an example of what would be classified as “round-trip 
financing”1280 as “the money went out of FNB’s account (pursuant to the loan) and straight 
back into FNB’s account”.1281 Furthermore, the judge repeatedly commented on the idea that 
NWK only needed a loan of R50m rather than over R96m worth of promissory notes which 
were issued by NWK.1282 Therefore, it was held that the loan sum was artificially engineered 
“by taking the interest payable and calculating what capital sum was needed to generate that 
interest at the rate agreed.”1283 However, the Tax Court held that this rationale, provided by a 
Professor from a financial perspective, was inadmissible because it “did not deal with the 
intention of the parties”1284 which is necessary with tax evasion.  
 
                                                          
1276 Ibid, [26] (Lewis JA) 
1277 Ibid, [72] 
1278 Ibid, [85] 
1279 Ibid, [27] 
1280 s80D(1)(b)(ii) Income Tax Act 1962 
1281 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v NWK Limited (27/10) [2010] ZASCA 168, [61] (per 
Lewis JA) 





The judgement in NWK Limited also displayed a preference for the substance over form 
doctrine and gave reasons for doing so.1285 The judge stated that “the test… cannot simply be 
whether there is an intention to give effect to a contract in accordance with its terms.”1286 The 
judge claimed that the form of an arrangement is unreliable as  
“invariably where parties structure a transaction to achieve an objective other than the 
one ostensibly achieved they will intend to give effect to the transaction on the terms 
agreed.”1287 
Therefore, the judge advocated examining the existence of “commercial substance”.1288 
The findings of the court in the NWK Limited case is that the rationale given by the judiciary 
leaned more towards proving tax evasion than tax avoidance.1289 Surprisingly, the court seemed 
to suggest that the case could qualify as both tax evasion and tax avoidance as the judge claimed 
that there is “no reason why an invalid transaction cannot also be abnormal and concluded for 
the purposes of avoiding tax.”1290 It is also interesting that the judge referred to impermissible 
tax avoidance arrangements as “simulated transactions”1291 which is analogous to artificial 
transactions.  It can be said that the South African courts distinguished tax avoidance from tax 
evasion by stating that the latter involves simulation.1292 However, simulation is akin to 
artificiality which was a term used in UK tax avoidance cases such as Ramsay1293 and 
McGuckian.1294 The case illustrates that the creation of the South African general anti-
avoidance rule has not helped in clarifying the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion.  
                                                          
1285 Ibid, [55] 
1286 Ibid 
1287 Ibid 
1288 Ibid, [57] 
1289 Ibid, [39] 
1290 Ibid, [93] 
1291 Ibid, [38] 
1292 Ibid, [93] 
1293 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC; Eilbeck v Rawling [1981] 2 W.L.R 449, [1982] A.C. 300, 321 (Lord Wilberforce) 
1294 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 W.L.R. 991, 996 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) 
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The case of Bosch and McClelland v Commissioner of South African Revenue Services1295 
(Bosch) did not fall within the remit of the South African general anti-avoidance rule in regards 
to an employee share scheme run by the Foschini Group. The scheme was altered in 1997 in 
order to gain tax benefits advantageous to the employer and employees. The main difference 
was that the amended scheme had a time limit of 21 days from the date of notice in which the 
employees could exercise the option to acquire the shares.1296 However, the employees lacked 
many proprietary rights and liabilities over the shares until they were delivered, in three 
portions, on “the second, fourth and sixth anniversaries of the relevant notice date”.1297 The 
first appellant requested for the shares to be sold on their behalf and the second appellant 
wanted the shares transferred to him.1298 
The central question in Bosch was whether the scheme granted the employees an 
“unconditional entitlement to acquire shares upon the exercise of the option”1299 or whether the 
entitlement was only triggered on the anniversary dates.1300 However, as the scheme unfolded 
in court, it was unravelled that as the Foschini Group were obliged to repurchase the shares at 
the original purchase price if their market value fell. Therefore, “no participant would elect to 
implement a deferred purchase if the price exceeded the current market value”.1301 The ability 
to resell the shares to the Foschini Group meant that the employee could then repurchase shares 
at their lower market value.1302 Therefore, the deferred purchase was uncertain which meant 
that the employees did not have an unconditional right to acquire the shares.1303 
                                                          
1295 Bosch and McClelland v Commissioner of South African Revenue Services (A 94/2012) [2012] ZAWCHC 
188 
1296 Ibid, [12] (Davis J.) 
1297 Ibid 
1298 Ibid, [17] 
1299 Ibid, [43] 
1300 Ibid 
1301 Ibid, [76] 
1302 Ibid 
1303 Ibid, [77] 
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The court discussed the fact that if the employees opted to sell their shares but its market value 
was less than the consideration, the Foschini Group was obligated to give the employee the 
value of the consideration.1304 However, these terms were initially viewed as “uncommercial 
for no regard was had to the current value of the shares.”1305 Nevertheless, the judges admitted 
that the scheme did have a commercial purpose.1306 
The court discussed whether the arrangement came within s8A of the Income Tax Act 1962 
which states that an amount is taxable where there exists 
“any right to acquire any marketable security… if such right was obtained by the 
taxpayer… in respect of services rendered or to be rendered by him as an employee to 
an employer.”1307 
However, it was held “that delivery of the scheme shares to the appellant did not constitute the 
exercise by him or her of a right to acquire the shares for the purpose of s 8 A.”1308 Ultimately, 
the general anti-avoidance rule did not apply as the court acknowledged that according to the 
arrangement, “the object was to give employees an incentive to promote the continued growth 
of the company by giving them the opportunity to acquire share in the company.”1309 
4.6 The Canadian General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
The Canadian general anti-avoidance rule is contained in Part XVI, s245 of the Income Tax 
Act 1985. Parts of the Canadian general anti-avoidance rule are reminiscent of the UK GAAR 
in terms of the language used, as will be demonstrated. The Canadian general anti-avoidance 
rule is aimed at “deny[ing] a tax benefit that… would result, directly or indirectly, from that 
                                                          
1304 Ibid, [45] 
1305 Ibid, [75] 
1306 Ibid, [90] 
1307 s8A(1)(a) Income Tax Act 1962  
1308 Bosch and McClelland v Commissioner of South African Revenue Services (A 94/2012) [2012] ZAWCHC 
188, [93] (Davis J.) 
1309 Ibid, [12] 
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transaction or from a series of transactions”.1310 A tax benefit has been defined broadly by the 
general anti-avoidance rule which states that it “means a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax 
or other amount payable under this Act or an increase in a refund of tax or other amount under 
this Act”.1311 A transaction has been defined as including “an arrangement or event”.1312 
The Act applies to where a transaction would “result directly or indirectly in a misuse of the 
provisions”1313 of any of the Canadian taxing statutes,1314 rules,1315 regulations1316 or 
treaties.1317 The general anti-avoidance rule also applies to a transaction which “would result 
directly or indirectly in an abuse”.1318 The inclusion of the term abuse is similar to the UK’s 
targeted GAAR which is aimed at abusive transactions. The concern is that the UK’s GAAR 
is targeted because of the inclusion of the term “abusive”. However, the Canadian anti-
avoidance legislation is not meant to be targeted but still uses the term “abusive”. Therefore, 
one possible inference that may be drawn, if one is focusing on this term, is that either the UK’s 
GAAR is as wide as a general anti-avoidance rule or the Canadian general anti-avoidance rule 
is narrow and targeted. 
The meaning of an “avoidance transaction”1319 confers much discretion to the judiciary due to 
the breadth of the definition ascribed to it. An “avoidance transaction”1320 is defined as a 
transaction that  
                                                          
1310 s245(2) Income Tax Act 1985 
1311 s245(1) Income Tax Act 1985 
1312 Ibid 
1313 s245(4)(a) Income Tax Act 1985 
1314 s245(4)(a)(v) Income Tax Act 1985 
1315 s245(4)(a)(iii) Income Tax Act 1985 
1316 s245(4)(a)(ii) Income Tax Act 1985 
1317 s245(4)(a)(iv) Income Tax Act 1985 
1318 s245(4)(b) Income Tax Act 1985 




“would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the transaction may 
reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide 
purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit”.1321 
The inclusion of the terms “directly or indirectly”1322 have led to courts surmising that it 
“indicates that Parliament intended the GAAR to apply even where abuse is an indirect result 
of a transaction”,1323 allowing an excavation into the entire series of transactions.1324 
Therefore, unlike with the UK GAAR, the Canadian general anti-avoidance rule has adopted a 
single reasonableness test in analysing the transaction’s purpose.1325 Moreover, the test does 
not require there to be a commercial or business purpose like in the aforementioned 
jurisdictions. The Canadian general anti-avoidance rule simply requires there to be a “bona 
fide”1326 purpose although, this purpose must be the primary purpose of the transaction. This 
omission relieves the taxpayer of the burden of examining the laws in relation to businesses in 
comparison with other transactions, unlike with the South African general anti-avoidance rule. 
The Act makes it clear that the purpose requirement also applies where there is a “series of 
transactions”.1327  
The Canadian general anti-avoidance rule also outlines the various ways in which judges can 
approach a tax avoidance transaction.1328 Judges have the flexibility to allow or disallow “any 
deduction, exemption or exclusion in computing income”.1329 The Act also explicitly allows 
the judiciary to ignore the tax effects of the transaction before them.1330  
                                                          
1321 s245(3)(a) Income Tax Act 1985 
1322 Ibid 
1323 Lipson v R [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3, [37] (LeBel J.) 
1324 Ibid 
1325 s245(3)(a) Income Tax Act 1985 
1326 Ibid 
1327 s245(3)(b) Income Tax Act 1985 
1328 s245(5) Income Tax Act 1985 
1329 s245(5)(a) Income Tax Act 1985 
1330 s245(5)(d) Income Tax Act 1985 
211 
 
4.6 (a) Case Law Post the Canadian General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
The Canadian general anti-avoidance rule is concise. Therefore, subsequent case law regarding 
tax avoidance has sought to elucidate on the workings of the legislation. In Canada Trustco 
Mortgage Co. v R1331 (Canada Trustco) the Canadian Supreme Court helpfully discussed the 
provisions of the general anti-avoidance rule at length. The case concerned a mortgage 
company which participated in a sale and leaseback agreement involving trailers. The taxpayer 
company purchased the trailers from the sellers and leased them to another company which 
then sub-leased the trailers back to the original sellers.1332 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, 
sought to offset income from its business of leasing assets by claiming capital allowances on 
the purchase of the trailers. The court discussed that the way the taxpayer “structured and 
financed the purchase, lease and sublease of the trailers contravened the object, spirit or 
purpose”1333 of the legislation on capital allowances. The lack of financial risk in the 
arrangement also weakened the taxpayer’s argument.1334 
Canada Trustco adopted the main purpose test. As the Canadian general anti-avoidance rule 
requires arrangements to have a “bona fide”1335 purpose, the judges held that “if there are both 
tax and non-tax purposes to a transaction, it must be determined whether it was reasonable to 
conclude that the non-tax purpose was primary”1336 in order to avoid triggering the general 
anti-avoidance rule. In addition to the main purpose test, Canada Trustco also outlined the 
circumstances in which an arrangement could be considered abusive.1337 Firstly, it would be 
                                                          
1331 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v R [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 
1332 Ibid, [3] (per curiam) 
1333 Ibid, [68] 
1334 Ibid, [70] 
1335 s245(3)(a) Income Tax Act 1985 
1336 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v R [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, [27] (per curiam) 
1337 Ibid, [45] 
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abusive if “a taxpayer relies on specific provisions of the Income Tax Act in order to achieve 
an outcome that those provisions seek to prevent.”1338 
Secondly, an abusive transaction is “when a transaction defeats the underlying rationale of the 
provisions that are relied upon.”1339 This provision relates to the need to apply a purposive 
interpretation to make sure that the legislative purpose is not defeated. Lastly,  
“an arrangement that circumvents the application of certain provisions, such as specific 
anti-avoidance rules, in a manner that frustrates or defeats the object, spirit or purpose 
of those provisions”1340 
would be considered abusive. The terms “object, spirit or purpose”1341 were particularly 
emphasised throughout the judgement. Similarly, an arrangement would not be abusive where 
it “was within the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions that confer the tax benefit.”1342 The 
“object, spirit or purpose”1343 of the provisions is likely to be ascertained in relation to what 
the judges believe Parliament’s intention is. Therefore, it does not provide revolutionary 
guidance. 
In relation to the taxpayer’s motive, the court held that “whether the transactions were 
motivated by any economic, commercial, family or other non-tax purpose may form part of the 
factual context”.1344 However, the judges did not dwell on the issue of motive therefore, it was 
not considered to be a central issue in practice.  
Although a tax benefit is required by the general anti-avoidance rule, the court warned that 
when a case is heard by a Tax Court, “the magnitude of the tax benefit is not relevant at this 







1344 Ibid, [58] 
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stage of the analysis.”1345 However, this suggests that the amount of the tax benefit is relevant 
at some stage after the case is heard by the Tax Court. The amount of the tax benefit should 
not be a factor as it suggests that arrangements with higher tax benefits are more at risk of being 
caught by the general anti-avoidance rule which is discriminatory.  
It is interesting that the judges in Canada Trustco displayed an aversion towards the business 
purpose test. Examining whether the transaction was “arranged primarily for bona fide 
purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit”1346 was viewed as having “a broader scope than 
the expression “business purpose”.1347 The court disliked the business purpose test for 
narrowing the range of permissible arrangements to those with a business purpose only.1348 The 
court held that the view of what is permissible is too narrow as “Parliament wanted many 
schemes that do not have any business purpose to endure”1349 which included investments.1350 
Significantly, the court also stated that the most difficult part of the general anti-avoidance rule 
to apply was the abuse requirement1351 which suggests that the UK may undergo similar 
difficulties. The term abuse has not been defined1352 and additional problems have been 
encountered as the single reasonableness test allows for “judicial leeway in determining 
abuse.”1353 
The judgement in Canada Trustco also acknowledged that legislation is “interpreted in a 
textual, contextual and purposive way.”1354 To reinforce the importance of the purposive 
approach, it was held that the role of the general anti-avoidance rule is to “negate arrangements 
                                                          
1345 Ibid, [19] 
1346 s245(3)(a) Income Tax Act 1985 




1351 Ibid, [37] 
1352 Ibid 
1353 Ibid 
1354 Ibid, [11] 
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that would be permissible under a literal interpretation”.1355 The judges also stated that the 
Income Tax Act 1985 “must be interpreted in order to achieve consistency, predictability and 
fairness so that taxpayers may manage their affairs intelligently.”1356 Despite the guidance on 
how to approach tax avoidance cases, the court in Canada Trustco held that the distinction 
between acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance “is far from bright.”1357 The court 
ultimately held that the general anti-avoidance rule did not apply despite the rationale which 
seemed critical of the arrangement.  
Canada’s general anti-avoidance rule was however triggered in Lipson v R1358 (Lipson). The 
case concerned a married couple who sought to deduct the interest from a bank loan on their 
mortgage loan. The wife borrowed money in order to buy shares in their family company which 
the husband agreed to repay to the bank. The husband then transferred the shares to his wife 
and used the share proceeds to purchase their house. The couple acquired a mortgage for the 
house that they wished to purchase but used it to repay the loan for the company shares on the 
same day.1359 The husband then sought to deduct the interest on the mortgage loan from his 
taxable dividend income. 
The appellants sought to rely on the spousal attribution rules which state that  
“if an individual has transferred or lent property… to or for the benefit of a person who 
is the individual’s spouse or common-law partner…any income or loss… of that person 
for a taxation year from the property…is deemed to be income or a loss… of the 
individual for the year and not of that person.”1360 
                                                          
1355 Ibid, [13] 
1356 Ibid, [12] 
1357 Ibid, [16] 
1358 Lipson v R [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3 
1359 Ibid, [5] (LeBel J.) 
1360 s74.1(1) Income Tax Act 1985 
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The court was careful when discussing the purpose of the arrangement and stated that “adopting 
an “overall purpose” test under s. 245(4) would be to cause uncertainty and inconsistency for 
taxpayers.”1361 Instead, the court advocated examining “the “overall result” which more 
accurately reflects the wording of s. 245(4).”1362 Moreover, the judge presiding over the Lipson 
case did not rule out the importance of the taxpayer’s motive by holding that  
“motivation, purpose and economic substance are relevant under s. 245(4) only to the 
extent that they establish whether the transaction frustrates the purpose of the relevant 
provisions.”1363 
However, later the judge stated that the issue of motive was irrelevant.1364 The taxpayers’ 
motive or purpose was largely immaterial as the appellants had readily admitted that the 
arrangement was conducted to avoid tax.1365 Therefore, the judges had to examine whether the 
arrangement could be seen as abusive. The court held that it was an abusive arrangement as 
utilising s74.1 of the Income Tax Act 1985 enabled the husband to claim interest deductions 
“which he would not have been able to do were Mrs. Lipson dealing with him at arm’s 
length”.1366 
The dissenting judges had various qualms regarding the final decision of the Supreme Court. 
A surprising contentious issue was that the general anti-avoidance rule was invoked when there 
existed a specific anti-avoidance provision which would have been applicable.1367 Section 
74.5(11) of the Income Tax Act 1985 is a specific anti-avoidance provision aimed at tackling 
“artificial transactions”1368 which would otherwise prevent the spousal attribution rules under 
                                                          
1361 Lipson v R [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3, [16] (LeBel J.) 
1362 Ibid, [34] 
1363 Ibid, [38] 
1364 Ibid, [42] 
1365 Ibid, [11] 
1366 Ibid, [42] 
1367 Ibid, [117] (Rothstein J.) 
1368 s74.5(11) Income Tax Act 1985 
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s74.1(1) of the Income Tax Act 1985 from applying where “one of the main reasons for the 
transfer or loan was to reduce the amount of tax that would… be payable… on the income and 
gains derived from the property”.1369 When discussing the concept of abuse under s74.1(1), a 
dissenting judge stated that the meaning of abuse is 
“so broad that it would include interspousal transfers of assets at fair market value for 
bona fide economic reasons. It offers, I think, too large a field of operation for the 
GAAR.”1370   
There were concerns that the general anti-avoidance rule was being relied upon too heavily 
without first applying the relevant specific anti-avoidance provision.1371 Rothstein J. 
forewarned that  
“the GAAR is a supplementary rule. It is not a catch-all provision that the Minister can 
choose to deploy any or every time that he suspects a taxpayer of abusive tax 
avoidance.”1372 
There was also observable frustration due to the fact that the Westminster approach was not 
shown the expected acknowledgement.1373 Binnie J. expressed that due to the outcome of 
Lipson, he believed that the court was merely “paying lip service to the Duke of Westminster 
principle without taking seriously its role in promoting consistency, predictability and fairness 
in the tax system.”1374 
The limits of the general anti-avoidance rule were called into question when a dissenting judge 
warned that “the GAAR is a weapon that, unless contained by the jurisprudence, could have a 
                                                          
1369 Ibid 
1370 Lipson v R [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3, [76] (Binnie J.) 
1371 Ibid, [116] (Rothstein J.) 
1372 Ibid 




widespread, serious and unpredictable effect on legitimate tax planning.”1375 As the Canadian 
general anti-avoidance rule is similar to the UK GAAR in terms of requiring abuse, Lipson 
provides an insight into how an abusive arrangement will be determined. However, the Lipson 
judgement also offers a useful reminder that “the GAAR is only intended to operate as a 
provision of last resort.”1376  
4.7 Conclusion 
The analysis of the general anti-avoidance rules of other jurisdictions, including the United 
States of America’s ESD, demonstrates that there are various similarities and differences in 
their approach to tax avoidance. The table below illustrates an overview of the main attributes 
of the UK GAAR and how the jurisdictions analysed compare to the UK GAAR in regards to 
these attributes.  
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Although the anti-avoidance legislations of the jurisdictions analysed are designed to be broad, 
the wordings of the legislations are similar to that of the UK GAAR. The US ESD objectively 
focuses on mathematical differences in the taxpayer’s economic position. However, this is 
qualified by the business purpose test. Nevertheless, the ESD begins by asking whether the 
transaction is genuine rather than whether it is abusive which requires the judiciary to pursue 
the authenticity of the transaction rather than seek to disprove it. The ESD examines whether 
there exists a profit motive. Therefore, there is scope for subjective considerations to be 
scrutinised.  
Australia’s general anti-avoidance rule starts by examining whether the taxpayer sought a tax 
benefit. The general purpose assessed is whether a tax benefit was sought which is similar to 
the UK GAAR’s main purpose test. However, to determine the taxpayer’s purpose, the 
legislation also contains eight objective criteria which the judiciary should consider which 
minimises discretion. Moreover, unlike the Parliamentary contemplation test in the UK GAAR  
“Pt IVA does not require the court to hypothesise what may have been ‘within 
Parliamentary contemplation’ or to divine the ‘object, spirit or purpose’ of other 
provisions in order to find the rationale that underlies the words that may not be 
captured by the bare meaning of the words themselves”.1377 
New Zealand’s general anti-avoidance rule is similar to the UK GAAR. New Zealand also 
assesses whether the arrangement is abusive although, this is done in relation to the 
arrangement’s purpose. The legislation also examines whether tax avoidance is the 
arrangement’s purpose or merely the effect of the arrangement. Ben Nevis and Alesco also 
highlighted that the taxpayer’s motive is relevant. Furthermore, the judges in Ben Nevis 
differentiated between tax avoidance and shams. Ben Nevis was also significant as it heeded 
                                                          
1377 Slater, A.H. “Part IVA: An International Perspective”, [2013] Australian Tax Review, Vol. 42/3 149, p159 
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strong warnings about the need for detailed legislation to prevent a flurry of complex tests 
developing from case law.1378 Therefore, judges themselves recognise the problems of having 
too much judicial discretion. As the taxpayer’s motives were discussed in Alesco,1379 it 
illustrates how although the anti-avoidance rule discusses the purpose of the arrangement, the 
taxpayer’s motives can be examined in practice. 
South Africa’s case law demonstrates the confusion that can occur in deciding tax cases despite 
having a general-anti-avoidance rule which should minimise this problem. Furthermore, the 
issue of simulation blurred tax avoidance and tax evasion. Their anti-avoidance legislation also 
examines abuse and the arrangement’s purpose. If the UK continues to examine the taxpayer’s 
intentions as well as whether the arrangement contained elements of artificiality, the UK may 
also struggle to distinguish between tax avoidance and tax evasion.  
Canada’s General-Anti-Avoidance Rule also analyses whether there is abuse of the taxing 
statute. Canada Trustco warned that the abuse requirement is difficult to apply in practice 
therefore, the UK may face similar difficulties. As observed in Canada Trustco, Canada 
dislikes the business purpose test and instead assess whether there is a bona fide purpose.1380 
The purpose sought after works to prove the taxpayer’s case rather than disprove it like the UK 
GAAR’s approach. Moreover, Canada Trustco established that where there is more than one 
purpose for embarking on an arrangement, the purpose which is unrelated to tax must be the 
main purpose for an arrangement to be successful.1381 Therefore, Canada Trustco maintains 
that the arrangement must be examined from the point of view of supporting the taxpayer’s 
arrangement. 
                                                          
1378 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2009] 2 NZLR 289, pp309-310 
(Tipping and McGrath JJ.) 
1379 Alesco New Zealand Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] 2 NZLR 252, 278 (Heath J.) 
1380 s245(3)(a) Income Tax Act 1985 
1381 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v R [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, [27] (per curiam) 
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New Zealand, South Africa and Canada all mention abuse in their general anti-avoidance 
legislation. However, examining abuse cannot be what makes the UK GAAR targeted when it 
is the approach adopted in general anti-avoidance rules. Purpose is a strong theme emanating 
from all the anti-avoidance legislation examined. However, none of the jurisdictions analysed 
put the ability to examine the taxpayer’s intentions on statutory footing. 
Although Australia’s general anti-avoidance rule appears to be the widest, it also provides the 
greatest guidance in determining the taxpayer’s purpose. The New Zealand, South African and 
Canadian general anti-avoidance rules all mention “abuse”, which is seemingly narrow. 
However, there is less guidance. This chapter demonstrates that all the general anti-avoidance 
legislation, including the United States’ ESD, examines either the arrangement’s purpose or 
the taxpayer’s purpose. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the UK adopted the main purpose test. 
Nevertheless, while the taxpayer’s intentions and even motive were raised in the case law of 
the various jurisdictions, none of the general anti-avoidance legislation, nor the United States’ 
ESD, included the term “intention”. Therefore, the UK GAAR is unique in this respect as the 
GAAR relies on the discretion of the judiciary to uncover the taxpayer’s subjective intentions. 
In contrast to other jurisdictions, in the most crucial part of the UK GAAR which determines 
whether an arrangement is abusive, judges are permitted to examine whether the taxpayer 
intended to utilise the loopholes in the tax system.1382 The discretion so given may, if 
unconstrained or too wide, be problematic. Therefore, it is helpful to examine how much 
discretion the judiciary may actually have, and why a wide discretion may be undesirable.  
 
 
                                                          
1382 s207(2)(c) Finance Act 2013 
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Chapter 5: Discretion under the UK GAAR  
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the scope of the discretion that may be available to judges in applying 
the provisions of the GAAR. Although Parliament may have intended for the GAAR to be 
examined by the judicial in a general manner, this approach is undesirable as a wide discretion 
can cause uncertainty for taxpayers and inconsistencies in applying the GAAR. An analysis on 
the concept of judicial-law making will serve to address in what circumstances judges make 
law especially when considering that the vagueness of the GAAR would permit judges to fill 
in any gaps therein. The analysis will help to clarify whether Ramsay can be seen as an anti-
avoidance doctrine which in turn will address the view that principles like Ramsay are 
undesirable. The way in which judges interpret statutes generally will be outlined in order to 
provide an understanding as to what factors judges may consider such as their conceptions of 
what is just. HMRC’s role will also be discussed in order to establish how much involvement 
and discretion it has in the application of the GAAR, particularly when determining what is not 
abusive. Lastly, the relationship between tax law and morality will be assessed in order to 
support the proposition that the two concepts should remain separate.  
5.1 The ambiguous GAAR 
The wide nature of the GAAR unavoidably leaves room for judicial discretion. The 
implications of this will be examined. The width of the GAAR is largely due to the fact that 
the core provision which lays down what an abusive arrangement means is then divided and 
subdivided to provide a multitude of definitions for each of the key terms. Furthermore, most 
of the core terms which are defined either in the GAAR or GAAR guidance take the form of a 
test. Therefore, the judiciary are left with various definitions and tests and it is unclear how 
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they all operate together contemporaneously. The inclusion of those tests also fuels judicial 
discretion as the nature of the tests require judicial opinion.  
The GAAR is said to be targeted at tax arrangements and this term is defined within the GAAR. 
Within this definition is the requirement of a tax advantage,1383 which has its own definition in 
the GAAR.1384 The examples outlining what amounts to a tax advantage are broad, and would 
capture many arrangements.   
The problematic breadth of the GAAR stems from the fact that the terms “abusive” and 
“arrangement” have been separated and defined again in the GAAR. As aforementioned in 
chapter 3, an “arrangement” has been defined broadly in the GAAR1385 and the guidance 
reaffirms that this term has been constructed widely.1386 Although the abuse requirement is 
designed to narrow the scope of the GAAR, the initial stage of the GAAR which applies to an 
“arrangement” has been widely defined. Therefore, the initial stage of the GAAR applies to a 
variety of arrangements.   
The double reasonableness test provides a definition of what is abusive. However, the GAAR 
subsequently subdivided and defined the test to produce three more provisions which the 
judiciary are to be mindful of when applying the GAAR. These further considerations are also 
capable of additional wide interpretation. The first consideration is essentially examining the 
end result.1387 The second point seeks to uncover any artificial steps1388 although, it is not clear 
to what end these will be assessed. However, it can be presumed that artificial steps will be 
ignored. Lastly and significantly, the GAAR allows an inquiry into the intentions of the 
                                                          
1383 s206 Finance Act 2013 
1384 s208 Finance Act 2013 
1385 s214 Finance Act 2013 
1386 ‘HMRC GAAR Guidance: Parts A, B and C’ cited in 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399270/2__HMRC_GAAR_Gu
idance_Parts_A-C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf>, accessed 24.12.2015, p9 
1387 s207(2)(a) Finance Act 2013 
1388 s207(2)(b) Finance Act 2013 
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arrangement.1389 Although the GAAR makes reference to the arrangement’s intentions, this 
enquiry can become entangled with examining the taxpayer’s intentions because the 
arrangement itself cannot have an intention.  
The double reasonableness test therefore has many tiers which the judiciary must work their 
way through and it is unclear how the various stages of the test piece together. Inevitably, with 
the wide nature of the tests, judges are bound to interpret these in their own individualised ways 
and this approach could potentially generate widespread inconsistency. There is likely to be 
inconsistency until there is an established line of case law under the GAAR. Thereafter, the 
doctrine of stare decisis will provide greater certainty in the outcome of tax cases. The terms 
of the GAAR may lead to judges “interven[ing] to stop avoidance where they think that the 
avoidance is stopping the tax system from working properly or sensibly”.1390 Although Tiley 
was referring to avoidance rather than abuse, the same argument could apply to abusive 
arrangements.  
5.2 HMRC’s role 
The conditions in which an arrangement would not be considered abusive is also clouded with 
ambiguity. As aforementioned, an arrangement would not be regarded as abusive where it 
corresponds with “established practice”1391 which is wide and can raise questions as to what 
point a practice can be said to be established. However, the permissibility of this defence is 
largely curtailed by the requirement that as well as being established, HMRC must also agree 
with the practice.1392 The latter requirement may be viewed as perverse seeing as HMRC’s 
                                                          
1389 s207(2)(c) Finance Act 2013 
1390 Tiley, J. ‘Tax Avoidance Jurisprudence as Normal Law’, [2004], British Tax Review 304, p308 




main role is to collect taxes. Therefore, the GAAR provides apparent safeguards to the taxpayer 
although, when observed closely, these safeguards are not entirely reliable.   
HMRC is involved in deciding whether an arrangement amounts to an abusive arrangement in 
two important ways. Firstly, the HMRC GAAR guidance provides key information which is 
not contained in the GAAR legislation. Therefore, if the judiciary want to seek further direction 
on the legislation, they will turn to the HMRC GAAR guidance. Secondly, HMRC have 
considerable power as the legislation specifically states that acceptable schemes must be 
indicated by HMRC in their guidance.1393 As this point is contained in the GAAR legislation, 
it demonstrates Parliament’s willingness to bestow HMRC with this power. HMRC can 
therefore outline the boundaries of abusive and unabusive tax avoidance more precisely than 
the GAAR has done. Consequently, Parliament granted both HMRC and the judiciary 
significant discretion.   
There has been controversy over the fact that HMRC has published the GAAR guidance. The 
problem with HMRC being involved in writing the guidance is that “the fact that it… [is] 
drafted by HMRC is a significant divergence from the Report, which presented independent 
guidance as an important safeguard for taxpayers.”1394 Therefore, the fact that HMRC have 
drawn up guidance departs from the original plan of having guidance drafted by an independent 
panel. Furthermore, the GAAR guidance does not provide much clarification in understanding 
the GAAR which unfortunately reinforces the need for judicial discretion and reliance on the 
GAAR guidance.  
 
 
                                                          
1393 Ibid 




5.3 Judicial discretion  
Due to the many branches of the GAAR, the judiciary can interpret the legislative provisions 
broadly using their discretion. Although judges typically use their discretion when 
adjudicating, deciphering a taxpayer’s motive, intention or purpose is undesirable due to the 
inherent subjectivity involved. No case has been tried under the GAAR thus far therefore, there 
is no precedential basis from which discretion can be curbed. The dilemma which discretion 
can potentially cause is the resulting inconsistency in deciding cases which in turn may lead to 
uncertainty for taxpayers. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis and the purposive 
construction may curb discretion in practice.  
Judges are able to infer the purpose of the transactions from what they can subjectively 
ascertain from the parties’ conduct by “look[ing]…broadly at the facts even if there is no tax 
avoidance motive around”.1395 Moreover, as has been suggested, while the GAAR would allow 
for judicial discretion due to the various statutory tests, it would also encourage such discretion 
through explicitly allowing the taxpayer’s intentions to be examined. Therefore, the GAAR 
needs to be more objective and precise as  
“the objectivity of the principles removes all notion of discretion from the hands of the 
judge. He need not decide issues on the cloudy basis of social, political, or economic 
philosophy, because he has before him the clear principles of the law.”1396 
                                                          
1395 Ault. H.J. and Arnold. B.J., ‘Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis’, [2004], 2nd edn, Aspen 
Publishers, America, p133 
1396 Stroup, D.G. “Law and Language: Cardozo’s Jurisprudence and Wittgenstein’s Philosophy”, [1984], 
Valparaiso University Law Review Vol 18, No.2, p334 
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Rather than examining the taxpayer’s intentions and the arrangement’s purpose, “tax law could 
be made more certain by the more extensive use of objective tests and quantitative criteria in 
its administration.”1397 
The UK’s current tax system is largely made up of rules. Dworkin has asserted that loopholes 
in the law are “filled by judicial discretion”1398 which reinforces the notion that discretion is 
likely to be used when applying the GAAR. Discretion can involve applying subjective 
reasoning to decide the outcome of a case, and can give wider choice in deciding cases, 
compared to situations wherein the statute is clear.  
There are varying levels of discretion. At the very least, it must be acknowledged that judges 
will employ their discretion “in a weak sense”1399 when applying the GAAR. Dworkin explains 
that this soft sense of discretion can be used where “the standards an official must apply cannot 
be applied mechanically but demand the use of judgement.”1400 The GAAR has been designed 
to require the judiciary use their discretion when applying the legislation in order to determine 
whether an arrangement can be considered abusive. The requirement to consult the GAAR 
guidance, without Parliament explicitly stating the extent to which it should be relied on, 
further reinforces the necessity for judges to use their discretion. Dworkin’s other form of weak 
discretion may not be applicable to common law rules as it relates to situations wherein an 
“official has final authority to make a decision and cannot be reviewed and reversed by any 
other official.”1401  
Judges are entrusted with the task of ascertaining whether an arrangement is abusive by 
determining whether “such a result was not the anticipated result when the relevant tax 
                                                          
1397 Van Horn, L.G. ‘The Need for More Objective Tax Laws’, [1973], Taxes- The Tax Magazine, 51 Taxes 589, 
p590 
1398 Freeman. M.D.A., ‘Lloyd’s introduction to jurisprudence’, [2008], 8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 
London, p717 





provisions were enacted”1402 by Parliament. Therefore, ascertaining the intention of Parliament 
is explicitly requested by the GAAR and can also be seen as favouring the purposive approach 
which “is a relatively recent development.”1403 However, in interpreting legislation,  
“the author and the author's intention are beyond our reach. The text has been severed 
from its author and is now in our (the reader's) time and space. We cannot ask the author 
what the meaning is (in law it would be improper to do so in any event).”1404 
Therefore, it is difficult to expect “judges…[to] try to do what the legislature would have 
done.”1405 Moreover, Gammie argues that “the only intention that can be accorded to 
Parliament is in the legislative words that it uses, properly construed in accordance with its 
evident policy and purpose.”1406 
Some commentators contend that “it is for the courts to control the interpretation of the vague 
rules”.1407 Whilst it is true that many, including Parliament, are relying on the judiciary to 
interpret the GAAR and form a sturdy line of case law, it is preferable for Parliament to make 
the provisions clear in the first instance in order to provide taxpayers with certainty before case 
law has been established. Others suggest that the level of judicial discretion may be too great 
and question whether “our tax law [is] still about rules or is it really about what is acceptable 
to the court”.1408 The uncertainty of the line between acceptable and abusive tax avoidance 
have led commentators to query whether “it [has] become the case that something which 
                                                          
1402 s207(4) Finance Act 2013 
1403 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p16 
1404 Walshaw, C. “Where are we with statutory interpretation”, [2014], New Zealand Law Journal 254, [no 
pagination]  
1405 Dworkin, R. ‘Justice in Robes’, [2006], The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, London, p251 
1406 Gammie, M. “When is avoiding tax not abusive? Comparative approaches to a GAAR in Australia and the 
United Kingdom”, [2013], 42 Australian Tax Review 279, p292 
1407 Evans, C., Freedman, J., and Krever, R., ‘The Delicate Balance: Tax, Discretion and the Rule of Law’, 
[2011], IBFD, p35 
1408 Goldberg, D. “Acceptability, morality and balance in taxation”, [2000], British Tax Review 106, p107 
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mitigates tax will only succeed if it passes some judicial smell test”. “Must a tax scheme be 
fragrant to succeed?”1409 Therefore, it is evident that “Mr Aaronson has not solved the problem 
of distinguishing unacceptable from acceptable tax planning”.1410 The GAAR simply “gives a 
discretionary power to the courts to do so.”1411  
Too much judicial discretion is undesirable as  
“discretion is… associated with a lower amenability to legal challenge as compared 
with rule-based decision-making, on the basis that a failure to adhere to a rule may be 
more easily questioned than the exercise of discretion.”1412 
Moreover, “although it is an undisputed fact that judges act independently, it does not follow 
that their own views will not be reflected in their judgements.”1413 The tax system is already 
complex. Therefore, it is essential to reduce “the contribution of discretion to complexity”.1414 
Due to the discretion which the GAAR grants to the judiciary, it is essential that judges strike 
a balance between upholding the intention of Parliament and providing justice as “when people 
dispute, they take refuge in the judge and to go to the judge is to go to justice”.1415 By ensuring 
that Parliament’s will, as expressed in legislation, is upheld and taxpayers are not penalised for 
relying on Parliament’s will, this will ensure justice. Justice is expected as “the nature of the 
judge is to be a sort of animate justice”.1416 Moreover, “compliance will follow as long as 
                                                          
1409 Ibid 
1410 McKie, S. “The philosopher’s stone or the emperor’s new clothes- an old conundrum”, [2012], Private 
Client Business 124, p132 
1411 Ibid 
1412 Harris, N. “Law in a complex state: Complexity in the Law and structure of welfare”, [2013], Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, p6 
1413 Olivier, L. and Haniball, M. “International Tax: A South African perspective”, 5th edn, [2011], Siber Ink 
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taxpayers know what they are supposed to do [and] are treated in a procedurally just 
manner”.1417 The concept of justice will be discussed further later in this chapter. 
The various definitions and tests within the GAAR seem like they are restricting judicial 
discretion. However, due to the wide nature of the various definitions, the explanation of the 
various terms does little to limit discretion. Admittedly, judges are faced with a difficult task 
in applying the GAAR due to the layered nature of the legislation and have a large role in 
interpreting the legislation due to the wide provisions. Moreover, it has been argued that 
“uncertainty may itself lead to arbitrary exercises of power by unelected judges. Thus, 
to reduce the exercises of such arbitrary power, the Parliament has to extirpate as much 
vagueness from the law as is possible. It is true that this is likely to augment rather than 
to diminish the length of legislation but this is a price which has to be paid for certainty 
and to save us from the blandishments of judicial law making.”1418  
5.3 (a) Judicial law-making 
Judges have themselves elucidated that  
“the constitutional duty of the tribunals and the courts is plain: to construe the 
language of the legislation in accordance with the principles of statutory 
interpretation, to analyse the transactions in question in accordance with the 
applicable general law and to apply the correct construction of the legislation to 
them.”1419 
As a function of the judiciary is to interpret the law, there will invariably be some degree of 
discretion. Interpretation of legislation is central as “no draftsman, however fertile his 
                                                          
1417 Braithwaite, V. “Taxing democracy”, [2016], Routledge, London, p3 
1418 The Hon Justice Perram, N. “The perils of complexity: why more law is bad law”, [2010], 39 Australian Tax 
Review 179, p184 
1419 The Commissioners for HMRC v Mayes [2011] EWCA Civ 407, [17] (Mummery L.J.) 
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imagination, can think of everything.”1420 Establishing whether the judiciary can exercise a 
legislative-like function in adjudicating will reinforce Ramsay as forming a legal principle. 
This suggests that the formation of such principle can reoccur with the existence of an 
ambiguous GAAR. Furthermore, as the GAAR is ambiguous, the eventual direction which the 
GAAR will take will be moulded by the judiciary. Although this is the case with all pieces of 
legislation, it will take many years for stability in case law to occur and this could cause 
uncertainty to taxpayers in the meantime.  
As illustrated, the GAAR, being wide, confers much decision-making power in the hands of 
the judiciary. Consequently, it can be argued that “whoever has power to determine what those 
rules of conduct shall be and what shall be the remedy for their breach is potentially a 
legislator.”1421 This legislative potential was worryingly recognised by a judge, Diplock L.J. as 
he then was, who recognised that judges can be “compelled to act as legislators”.1422 The 
compulsion to act as a legislator is expected with the wide UK GAAR. However, Lord Diplock 
suggested that the legislative role of the courts is more habitual as he claims that judges 
“pretend to be no more than codifiers. But this is legal fiction.”1423 Therefore, the tendency to 
legislate through adjudication can span further than the field of tax law.  
The underlying message in Lord Diplock’s speech is not to accuse judges of intentionally 
overstepping their constitutional boundaries but to emphasise how their legislative role is an 
unavoidable result of adjudication due to the legal principle of stare decisis.1424 The creation of 
principles, which are followed by future courts, are unconsciously formed as judges are 
“rarely… explicitly concerned with future conduct.”1425 Lord Diplock expressed his views in 
                                                          
1420 Zander, M., ‘The Law-Making Process’, [2015], 7th edn, Hart Publishing Ltd., United Kingdom, p125 
1421 Diplock, K., ‘The Court as Legislators’, [1965], The Holdsworth Club of the University of Birmingham, 
cited in < http://kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CourtsAsLegistlators.pdf>, accessed 13.02.2016, p2 
1422 Ibid 
1423 Ibid 
1424 Ibid, p3 
1425 Ibid, p2 
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the 1960s, before Ramsay was established in the early 1980s. Consequently, he may not have 
envisaged that judicial activism would flourish.1426 Accordingly,  
“over a period of… 30 years, courts have moved from regarding tax as purely a statutory 
thing, liability to which is to be determined only by reading the statute, to regarding it 
as something which is as susceptible to the common law method as anything else.”1427 
To reinforce the indirect legislative role, Lord Diplock also strongly asserted that “never are 
the courts explicitly concerned with what is general.”1428 However, it can be argued that judges 
are concerned with general policy considerations, particularly in tax cases where tax avoidance 
is a topical issue. Furthermore, it can also be said that judges seek to find general legal 
principles deriving from existing case law in order to apply the same legal standard to achieve 
uniformity. Therefore, the legislative role of judges can be a positive function of the judiciary. 
Curiously, Lord Diplock asserts that the legislative role is exercised by the judiciary where the 
consequences for particular actions are decided and expected to be followed in the future.1429 
However, contrary to his earlier contention, this suggests that judges are concerned with future 
decision-making. Furthermore, their expectations may not transform into reality, particularly 
with a wide GAAR where judges can disagree as to the meanings of particular provisions. 
Although this may be the case with all legislation, there needs to be certainty with the GAAR 
as it overrides all other tax statutes.  
Pertinently, Lord Diplock discusses tax law specifically and explains how judges legislate in 
relation to this topic without necessarily intending to do so.1430 He explains how tax cases are 
                                                          
1426 Garnett, M. and Lynch, P. “Exploring British Politics”, [2016], 4th edn, Routledge, Great Britain, p203 
1427 Goldberg, D. “How clear, transparent, accessible and foreseeable is tax law and practice?”, [2013], Private 
Client Business 238, p241 
1428 Diplock, K., ‘The Court as Legislators’, [1965], The Holdsworth Club of the University of Birmingham, 
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generally concerned with “dispute[s] as to whether a particular kind of gain is taxable”1431 and 
that “whenever the court decides that kind of dispute it legislates about taxation.”1432 The court 
effectively “makes a law taxing all gains of the same kind”1433 although, levying taxes is 
Parliament’s role. However, a counter-argument is that the court is simply determining whether 
the transaction is one which Parliament has said shall be taxable.  
The uniqueness of tax cases as compared to other areas of Law is elucidated perceptively by 
Lord Diplock who enunciated that  
“anyone who has decided tax appeals knows that most of them concern transactions 
which Members of Parliament and the draftsman of the Act had not anticipated, about 
which they had never thought at all.”1434 
The elaborate schemes which are utilised in tax avoidance cases cause existing Parliamentary 
legislation to be ill-equipped to deal with the inventive variations of tax schemes which may 
be why the provisions of the GAAR are purposely wide and vaguely drafted. However, the 
GAAR should not be promoted as being targeted if the application is intended to be wide. The 
judiciary have much power by merely being the body which ultimately applies the law as  
“whoever has final authority to explain what Parliament meant by the words that it used 
makes law as much as if the explanation it has given were contained in a new Act of 
Parliament. It will need a new Act of Parliament to reverse it.”1435 
Therefore, it is evident that judges enjoy some power and this is recognised by judges 
themselves. For example, in Ramsay, Lord Wilberforce commented on the purpose of the 








scheme and sought to unravel it1436 prior to the GAAR being enacted. However, the purposive 
approach only applies to statutes not the facts of cases. 
It could be said that examining the purpose of tax schemes in Ramsay inspired Parliament to 
subsequently include this requirement in the GAAR,1437 particularly as other cases such as 
Craven discussed the lack of a business purpose at length.1438 These landmark decisions “laid 
down sub-rules which determined what classes of transactions attracted liability to tax.”1439 
The creation of Parliamentary rules as compared to judge made law differ due to the 
perspectives adopted when legislating. Lord Diplock, writing extra-judicially, suggests that the 
differences lie in the fact that Parliament attempts  
“to foresee how human beings will react in the future to a new rule of conduct in 
circumstances which of necessity will be different from those which existed before the 
law was passed.”1440 
Unlike with judge-made law, once legislation has been passed, “Parliament has no opportunity 
to explain its meaning- short of passing an amending Act”1441 which is why legislation must be 
drafted clearly in the first instance. In contrast, Lord Diplock believes that judges make law 
less creatively and according to “actual experience of what human beings have in fact done and 
what were in fact the consequences of their doing so.”1442 However, although judges are limited 
to the facts of the case before them, they can nevertheless form a principle which will apply to 
the interpretation of a particular provision or a specific gain. Some may argue that the 
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development of the common law is necessary and desirable due to the flexibility in which 
judges can create rules.1443 However, it can also be argued that principles created by the 
judiciary lack Parliamentary endorsement and are improper as judges are unelected.1444 In The 
Commissioners for HMRC v Mayes1445(Mayes), the judges displayed much deference to 
Parliament.1446 The court clearly did not like the conclusion they formed although, the judges 
acknowledged that  
“even if the courts do not like the result, they have no means at their disposal to amend 
a law enacted by Parliament. Their sole function is to decide the case on their best 
understanding of the relevant transactions and the applicable law, whatever that may 
be. Whether or not the courts approve of the outcome is beside the point. It is not for 
judges to shoulder the law-making responsibilities of Parliament.”1447 
Common law rules can be viewed as less desirable than statute law due to the lack of scrutiny 
from a democratically elected body.1448 However, the value of common law has been 
acknowledged as Laws L.J. explained how as a result of the decision in Schmidt v Secretary of 
State, “the doctrine of legitimate expectation has of course been much deployed in the 
administrative law cases”.1449 Furthermore, the doctrine  
“has become a major instrument in the common law’s insistence on fair dealing by 
public bodies, and the protection against abuse of power which the common law 
provides.”1450 
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Nevertheless, there is the additional concern that judicial precedents are habitually 
“pieced together from the statements by individual members of the Courts of the 
reasons why in particular circumstances a particular decision was reached, [and] there 
is no exclusive linguistic formula in which the rule is expressed.”1451 
The Ramsay approach is even more fragmented as it is pieced together from principles deriving 
from Ramsay and its supporting cases. Furthermore, with judicial legislation, there is always 
the underlying concern as to whether the judge-made law reflects Parliament’s will. Similarly, 
there is the additional concern that “Parliamentary law is the slave of the precise words which 
the professional draftsman chooses to express its will.”1452 
Other problems with common law rules include the fact that “judge-made law is law made in 
arrear: it is known only after it is broken”1453 which is the main problem with the fairly new 
GAAR that has yet to be tested. In addition to this, Lord Diplock also acknowledges that 
criticisms may derive from the view that “judge-made law is difficult to ascertain and often 
complicated.”1454  In elucidating the perceived problems with the creation of common law 
rules, Lord Diplock’s final and arguably weakest claim is “that judges by training, temperament 
and age are too averse to change to be entrusted with the development of rules of conduct for 
a brave new world.”1455 If this last point were true, the Ramsay approach would not have been 
created. Therefore, judges do encourage change where they feel change is needed. Due to the 
problems with common law rules, Lord Diplock explains that judges should only legislate in 
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Private law as opposed to Public law.1456 As tax law is a branch of Public law, it falls outside 
of the sphere of judicial rule-making if Lord Diplock’s theory is applied.  
Consequently, Lord Diplock elucidates how judges can create legislation primarily through 
interpretation1457 but also by means of the creation of rules derived from deciding cases.1458 
However, he does not suggest that judges are wandering into forbidden territory by legislating 
in this manner. Lord Diplock justifies the judiciary’s actions by stating that it all legitimately 
forms part of the common law.1459 Furthermore, Dworkin indicates that discretion is necessary 
for the development of law as “doctrines of legislative supremacy and precedent incline toward 
the status quo”.1460 Although evolution of legal rules is necessary, it must also be balanced with 
the need for legal certainty. The creation of principles deriving from the common law should 
only be encouraged in the absence of statutory rules.  
Having a tax system which promotes certainty is essential. Cases like Ramsay and Furniss were 
brought to court due to the uncertainty in computing the taxpayers’ liabilities. Expensive and 
lengthy hearings can be minimised with legislation which stimulates certainty for both the 
revenue and taxpayer.1461 The vague GAAR encourages considerable judicial discretion. This 
would fuel uncertainty. However, “people should be able to arrange their affairs with 
knowledge of what their resulting liability to tax will be.”1462 The level of certainty is 
diminished where there exists the ability to use significant discretion. In cases which form new 
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legal principles, the judge “has legislated new legal rights, and then applied them 
retrospectively to the case at hand.”1463 
It can be argued that the Ramsay approach was the result of judicial discretion which thereafter 
rejected the Westminster approach. Dworkin’s explanation of rules and principles help to 
support the argument that the Ramsay approach is robust. Principles “incline a decision one 
way… and they survive intact when they do not prevail”1464 which is why Ramsay survived an 
attack to its constitutional legitimacy in Westmoreland. However, rules differ from principles 
as, “when a contrary result has been reached, the rule has been abandoned or changed.”1465 
Therefore, Ramsay did form a new approach. However, Poscher argued that “the way in which 
adjudication proceeds does not depend on the norm to be implemented; rather, it depends on 
the case to be judged according to the norm.”1466 
Understandably, there exists an invariable “conflict inherent in the judicial process between the 
need for certainty and the need for change.”1467 However, it can be said that Parliament has 
sacrificed legal certainty to accommodate change by enacting the GAAR.  
5.3 (b) Interpretation 
The argument that “statutes and common law rules are often vague and must be interpreted”1468 
is convincing, particularly with the ambiguous UK GAAR. The way in which judges interpret 
the law generally is important to comprehend as it can help to provide a meaningful 
understanding of how the GAAR will be interpreted in practice. Moreover, it is important to 
understand how the taxpayer’s acts are interpreted by the judiciary. Conceptions of what is just 
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can also colour one’s interpretation. Therefore, it is necessary to decipher what conceptions of 
justice are applied in judicial interpretation of statutes. 
Interpretation has been defined as “a rational activity that gives meaning to a legal text.”1469 
Moreover, it has been acknowledged that “the application of the GAAR is a complex matter of 
statutory interpretation”.1470 Although, it has also been recognised that “an interpreter 
sometimes reaches his or her interpretive conclusion by intuition”.1471 It is important that 
judicial interpretation remains within its constitutional boundaries as levying taxes is 
Parliament’s role. A clearer explanation can be expounded in regards to Criminal law as 
although judges can interpret the law,1472 “they are not authorised to fill gaps in ways that 
define new crimes.”1473 However, as discussed above, judges presiding over cases which have 
attracted the GAAR, will have to fill in the gaps of the wide legislation. Therefore, the doctrine 
of the Separation of Powers is also an underlying issue in adjudication. Although the purposive 
interpretation has been viewed as the norm by many of the cases supporting the Ramsay 
approach, it has been recognised that 
“the excessive literalism that previously prevailed in construing tax legislation was at 
least partially attributable to a judicial acceptance that the imposition of tax is a matter 
for Parliament not the judiciary”.1474  
Therefore, the literal approach to construing tax legislation can, at the very least, be praised for 
upholding the doctrine of the Separation of Powers and generating “legal certainty and 
predictability for citizens”.1475 Similarly, it has been recognised that the purposive approach to 
interpretation is not always the most objective approach as “after all, the purpose of taxing 
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statutes is to collect tax and to approach tax cases on that understanding of their purpose may 
lead to a bias against the taxpayer.”1476 Consequently, the purposive approach may lead the 
judge to find that the scheme comes under the remit of the GAAR and is a form of unacceptable 
tax avoidance, in order to collect more taxes. Even where the purpose of a provision is to 
provide tax relief, “the GAAR will apply to deny a tax advantage where the purpose of the 
legislation is to give that advantage”1477 where an arrangement is deemed abusive. Therefore, 
the GAAR overlays all tax legislation and can deny the very tax benefits which Parliament 
explicitly permits.  
The purposive approach has also been criticised as the 
“purposive construction inevitably involves attributing a meaning to a statute different 
from that which an ordinary reading of the words gives: unless that is so, there is no 
need to construe purposively; it is only necessary to construe.”1478 
Aaronson also admitted that  
“in some cases, the Courts, under the guise of purposive interpretation, have been 
prepared to stretch the interpretation of tax legislation in order to thwart tax avoidance 
schemes which they regard as abusive.”1479 
Moreover, Aaronson recognised that  
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“the degree of willingness to do so varied from judge to judge, and also reflected the 
degree of disapproval with which the judge regarded the particular transaction. This 
produced considerable uncertainty.”1480 
The purposive approach plays a key role in tax law. Freedman states that the “GAAR… [is] 
simply…another piece of legislation to apply purposively”.1481 However, if all aspects of tax 
avoidance transactions are purposively interpreted, it can be said that the quest for examining 
purpose can cause the judiciary to stray too far from Parliament’s intentions. 
The concept of justice is central to interpretation according to Dworkin, as “justice is an 
institution we interpret.”1482 Justice is a key factor in taxation as the government reinforces the 
idea that “taxpayers should pay their fair contribution.”1483 However, what amounts to fair 
raises questions as to what standards of justice are being applied.1484 For example, “a libertarian 
thinks that income taxes are unjust because they take property from its owner without his 
consent.”1485 The libertarian perspective was clearly not the standpoint of the previous 
Coalition government which sought to tackle tax avoidance. Dworkin states that the libertarian 
view is in direct contrast with the egalitarian perspective which places emphasis on 
redistributive justice.1486 The disparity in views on justice demonstrates that in order to interpret 
the law in a uniform manner, there must be a general agreement as to what is considered just 
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whereby the “judge restores equality”.1487 However, Aristotle claims that “the just… is the 
lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair.”1488 
The GAAR guidance provides an outline of what should no longer be viewed as just. It 
dismisses “old cases to the effect that taxpayers are free to use their ingenuity to reduce their 
tax bills by any lawful means”.1489 Therefore, in interpreting legislation or cases being heard 
before them, judges are predisposed to reject cases which display marks of inventive tax 
planning. Consequently, Westminster’s influence has been undermined following the GAAR. 
Judges presiding over tax avoidance cases are more concerned with what is not permitted rather 
than what is permitted therefore, the hallmarks of tax avoidance will be discussed in chapter 7 
to facilitate a way in which there is consensus as to what is not generally just.  
Dworkin gave an account of interpretation by rationalising what he termed “constructive 
interpretation.”1490 This form of interpretation accords closely with the conventional purposive 
interpretation as the former involves “imposing purpose on an object or practice”.1491 Dworkin 
had anticipated possible abuse of interpretation through discretion but curtailed the practice of 
“constructive interpretation”1492 by stating that “it does not follow…that an interpreter can 
make of a practice…anything he would have wanted it to be”.1493 Dworkin believed that a 
restriction on interpretation stems from the idea that “the history or shape of a practice or object 
constrains the available interpretations of it”.1494 However, as illustrated by Barclays and 
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Westmoreland which departed from Ramsay, judges do not allow themselves to be constrained 
from established precedents.  
As demonstrated, judges tend to not only examine the arrangement itself but also what the 
taxpayer was seeking to achieve in executing the arrangement. An analogy can be drawn from 
the propensity to examine the taxpayer and the arrangement with how Dworkin states practices 
can be interpreted.1495 In relation to practices, he argues that it is important to analyse the 
practice rather than those performing it1496 by asserting that it is central to decipher “what it 
means, not what they mean.”1497 Therefore, it is better to examine the taxpayer’s arrangement 
rather than what they hoped to gain by executing the arrangement.  
Interpretation becomes an even greater issue when it is considered that no case has been 
brought under the GAAR yet which signifies that there is no established case law to provide 
an indication as to how the GAAR should be interpreted. Therefore, it is possible to characterise 
new cases yet to be heard under the GAAR as “hard case[s]”1498 which exist “when no settled 
rule dictates a decision either way”.1499 Dworkin asserts that these cases are resolvable by 
reference to “either policy or principle.”1500 He describes a policy as “justify[ing] a political 
decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the 
community”.1501 However, a principle has a narrower scope as Dworkin elucidates that a 
“principle justif[ies] a political decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some 
individual or group right.”1502 It is therefore evident that it is the wider policy factors which the 
judiciary will consider when interpreting the GAAR. However, any attempt at predictability is 
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curtailed by the fact that there are differing views as to what is considered just and therefore, 
what is regarded as unjust or abusive.  
Greenberg recognises that there is considerable fluidity in the wording of GAAR.1503 He 
explains that the flexibility is due to the fact “that the Government is no longer prepared to put 
up with the inconvenience of being constrained by the actual meaning of the legislation”.1504 
Therefore, by drafting in imprecise terms, “the Government [is]… taking continual control of 
what the legislation is to be taken to mean.”1505 However, it is the judiciary who invariably 
enjoy control over the meaning of legislation and HMRC over the content of the guidance.  
Despite the fact that the judiciary have wide powers in interpreting the GAAR, it is for HMRC 
to decide whether to invoke the GAAR in the first instance. Therefore,  
“the powers of judges to interpret statutes is, no doubt, significant. But unlike the power 
of legislators and the Executive, it cannot be exercised on a whim and it awaits parties 
with a court case to give it the breath of life.”1506 
5.4 Morality 
There has been an overlap between law and morality when discussing tax avoidance due to the 
widespread view that all taxpayers have to contribute their fair share of taxes. Although the 
purposive approach to the interpretation of tax law is the general view, some warn that  
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“in adopting a purposive approach to taxing statutes judges must avoid the temptation 
to import their own perceptions of the morality of the taxpayer’s conduct into the 
interpretational exercise.”1507 
There is much scope for judges to impart their views on morality due to the wide GAAR 
provisions which demand interpretation. If the GAAR is found to be too ambiguous, the 
judiciary may settle the dispute using their perceptions of what is morally correct.   
There is a threat of moral considerations being at the fore of adjudication due to the widespread 
controversy  
“about taxpayers, especially large corporations, not paying as much tax as they ought. 
But that is a debate that should take place in the court of public opinion, not the courts 
of law.”1508 
Issues of what is moral should remain separate from tax law as “intellectual biography is not a 
legal argument.”1509 However, Dworkin claimed that it can be argued that “morality is a matter 
of objective fact”.1510 He rationalised this argument by giving the crime of genocide as an 
example.1511 Dworkin asserted that  
“our opinions are not just subjective reactions to the idea of genocide, but opinions 
about its actual moral character. We think, in other words, that it is an objective matter- 
a matter of how things really are- that genocide is wrong.”1512 
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This argument rests on the belief that these opinions “are universal and…absolute. “They are 
part of the fabric of the universe, resting, as they do, on timeless, universal truths about what 
is sacred and fundamentally right or wrong.”1513 
There are arguments condemning the fact that the GAAR was formulated to satisfy concerns 
that tax avoidance is an immoral practice. The ACCA addressed the issue of morality in tax 
law1514 which became a topical issue, before the introduction of the UK GAAR, when the tax 
avoidance practices of Google, Starbucks and Amazon came to light with corresponding claims 
that tax avoidance is immoral.1515 However, the ACCA reject this notion and believe that it is 
“wrong to try to ascribe a moral value system to the calculation of a tax base”1516 as “morality 
cannot be measured in this context.”1517  
A flurry of multinational companies has engaged in tax avoidance which has attracted 
disapproval for being immoral. Generally, more people are concerned about tax avoiders as 
commentators have remarked that “10 years ago news of a company minimising its corporation 
tax would have been more likely to be inside the business pages than on the front page.”1518 
Apple had apparently been avoiding corporation tax since 2009 to 2012 in the US and 
Ireland.1519 The company had avoided paying 44 billion US dollars in tax.1520 Apple’s Irish 
subsidiaries were incorporated in Ireland but were centrally managed and controlled in 
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America.1521 Tax avoidance was achieved through a surprisingly uncomplicated plan of 
ensuring that the subsidiaries were not classified as resident in either America or Ireland for 
tax purposes.1522 Ireland determines tax residency according to where the company is centrally 
managed and controlled. However, America determines tax residency based on where the 
company was incorporated.1523 Therefore, rather than working directly with the foreign 
distributors,  
“Apple… created a trilateral scenario in which the Irish subsidiaries were inserted 
between the two companies and booked a substantial portion of the profits arising from 
the transaction.”1524 
Commentators recognised that “the huge noise - on the internet especially - generated by the 
congressional and parliamentary investigations of tax avoiders is probably not good for brand 
Ireland.”1525 Starbucks also attracted palpable condemnation when it became known to the 
public in 2013 that it had not paid corporation tax since 2009.1526 The public became more 
passionate about tackling tax avoiders during this time and took to the streets in protest of 
Starbucks’ tax avoidance schemes.1527 Starbucks fell under public pressure, rather than a legal 
obligation to pay tax, and admitted that “it would pay more corporation tax after a public outcry 
and an investigation by MPs.”1528 Consequently, in 2013, Starbucks paid £5 million in taxes.1529 
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The tactic of damaging a company’s integrity in order to reverse the effects of a tax avoidance 
scheme seems to have worked with Starbucks. Starbucks were particularly vulnerable to the 
effects of public condemnation as their consumers “are ‘mobile’ in the sense that it is relatively 
easy for such customers to switch from buying coffee from Starbucks to buying from another 
coffee shop down the street.”1530 There have also been concerns over the fact that Starbucks’ 
payment of tax was “voluntary”.1531 Ting argues that “taxation should not be discretionary. It 
is an insult to the tax system when taxpayers can decide if they want to pay some tax, and if 
so, when and how much to pay.”1532 Therefore, although Starbucks eventually decided to pay 
tax, the decision demonstrates that the UK’s tax system does not operate effectively. Moreover,  
“labelling a tax preference as ‘tax avoidance’ signals to the popular press and to the 
world at large that a section of the community is benefitting inappropriately in some 
way even though the reason why they are benefitting is not their inappropriate 
behaviour but the failure of government and revenue authority to take more timely 
action.”1533 
Despite the threat of reputational damage seeming to work as a method to reverse tax 
avoidance, others argue that this approach to taxation is undesirable. Devereux believes that 
whilst damaging the integrity of Starbucks has worked in the past, “the only long-term solution 
is fundamental reform, not arbitrary naming and shaming.”1534 Whilst these multinational 
corporations have engaged in tax avoidance and people are entitled to protest, “we have a legal 
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system to ensure that companies pay the right amount of tax.”1535 The problem with media 
frenzies surrounding tax avoidance is that  
“claims that particular companies are exploiting loopholes are typically based on scant 
information, and sometimes appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the tax 
system. Starbucks is a case in point. Part of the argument is that Starbucks has paid little 
UK tax despite having high UK sales, regardless of the location of sales being irrelevant 
for determining existing taxes on profit.”1536 
The reason why Starbucks was able to pay little tax was due to issues regarding the residency 
of the business for tax purposes. Therefore, Devereux recommends that “perhaps, a good case 
could also be made for a reform that allocates taxes on profit according to where sales are 
generated.”1537 Consequently, the real solution should be aimed at reforming the tax system 
rather than causing reputational damage to big corporations which the UK’s economy heavily 
depends on. Shaming businesses into paying tax also sends out a misleading message to the 
public that tax is based on morality rather than the law.  
The ACCA argues that “whether or not businesses in the UK are paying enough tax is not 
something that should be subject to moral pressures but should be determined by the law.”1538 
Consequently, tax law and morality should remain separate as “morality simply clouds the 
issue.”1539 However, Lethaby argues that  
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“I also continue to believe that there is a distinction -- a moral distinction, if we are 
going to have to bring morality into it -- between personal tax avoidance and corporate 
tax avoidance.”1540 
The introduction of the GAAR could therefore be a response to a desire to uphold moral values 
about tax avoidance and an attempt by the “legislators [to] make citizens good by forming 
habits in them…[as] this is the wish of every legislator”.1541 Critics of the GAAR claim that 
tax avoiders are perceived as troublemakers and 
“what our GAAR is intended to do is to deny, under the guise of law, the benefit of the 
words in the statute to some chosen class of alleged miscreants whose only 
misdemeanour is to ask that the law be applied to them honestly.”1542 
5.5 Conclusion 
The GAAR has attempted to avoid vagueness by providing definitions of some of the key terms 
within the legislation. However, the definitions of the targeted GAAR are wide and do little to 
promote certainty. The vague drafting consequently means that judicial interpretation and 
discretion is not only expected but is also needed. However, wide discretions can lead to 
inconsistency because judges will have their own interpretations of what the provisions mean, 
and therefore, what they encompass. HMRC also retain wide continuous power in deciding 
what should be classified as abusive. Consequently, deciding whether the GAAR applies relies 
heavily on the discretions of HMRC and of the judiciary. It is desirable to strive toward the 
“ideal that adjudication should be as unoriginal as possible”.1543 However, Parliament seems 
to have granted judges considerable discretion in applying the GAAR. Such a wide discretion 
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is unfortunate. Cases should be judged on their own merit without the use of judicial anti-
avoidance doctrines such as the Ramsay approach. The UK now has both a targeted GAAR 
and a wide common law anti-avoidance doctrine. The Ramsay approach demonstrates “that the 
judicial urge to search for a unifying principle is hard to resist”.1544  
Although judge-made law can be useful in guiding legislation for future cases, it cannot cure 
the problem of the ambiguous GAAR in the first instance. There is bound to be uncertainty for 
the taxpayers who are expected to test the boundaries of abusive tax avoidance before a 
consistent line of case law is formed. Furthermore, it is Parliament’s role to make legislation. 
Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect the judiciary to fill in the wide gaps left by Parliament. 
Despite the fact that there are some restrictions as to how a judge will decide a case, the breadth 
of the legislation allows scope for judicial creativity, which may generate inconsistency. The 
issue of morality also needs to be excluded from tax law as the GAAR is not about paying 
one’s fair share of taxes but about not engaging in abusive tax avoidance. Issues of morality 
tend to undermine the legality of tax avoidance altogether. Lethaby argues that introducing the 
GAAR had “one potential benefit [which] was freeing the courts from the need to 'strangle' the 
words of the legislation to reach an equitable result.”1545 However, the GAAR has also attracted 





                                                          
1544 Tiley, J. ‘Tax Avoidance Jurisprudence as Normal Law’, [2004], British Tax Review 304, p308 
1545 Lethaby, H. “Analysis- Reflections on Tax and the City”, [2014], Tax Journal Issue 1220, 10, p11 
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Chapter 6: Criticisms of the GAAR 
Introduction  
This chapter explores the various criticisms which the GAAR has attracted. The majority of 
the criticisms that will be referred to in this chapter are from practitioners. Since they are 
entrusted with providing tax advice to their clients, they are most affected by the GAAR in 
practice. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the potential problems with the GAAR when 
it is “applied in the real world”.1546 Criticisms of the main tests within the GAAR will be 
examined, including the main purpose test and the double reasonableness test. Views on the 
scope of the GAAR will also be analysed in order to determine whether the legislation is 
perceived as having clearly identifiable boundaries. Moreover, there have been criticisms 
regarding the extent to which the GAAR guidance can be relied on by taxpayers and tax 
advisors. Therefore, this issue will be explored.  
There have also been widespread concerns about the UK’s international competitiveness 
following the GAAR. Accordingly, the question whether the GAAR could damage the UK’s 
competitive reputation will be examined. Furthermore, the issue of complexity will be 
addressed to analyse the extent to which the GAAR contributes to a complex tax system. In 
addition to this, the issue of uncertainty in the tax system will be examined in order to assess 
whether the GAAR will contribute toward making tax liability uncertain. Certainty is also 
particularly important to corporate taxpayers which need to keep a precise account of their 
outgoings. Lastly, there are various constitutional issues which have been raised due to the 
nature of the GAAR which will be explored. Practitioners had expressed concern about the 
                                                          
1546 ACCA, “The UK General Anti-Abuse Rule”, <http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-
technical/tax-publications/tech-tp-ukgaar.pdf>, accessed 02.06.2016, p4 
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GAAR from before its inception when discussing the draft GAAR. Therefore, practitioner 
views on the draft GAAR will also be included.  
6.1 The Main Purpose Test 
The main purpose test has been strongly criticised and doubts have been cast as to how it will 
operate in practice.1547 Due to the numerous tax avoidance cases which the test will apply to, 
Grant Thornton LLP state that it “cannot be considered a useful filter.”1548 Therefore, it can be 
said that the test does little to aid in uncovering whether an arrangement was abusive. 
Fundamentally, as a tax arrangement is defined in terms of the main purpose test, the definition 
of a tax arrangement has been criticised for being “effectively a general anti-avoidance 
rule.”1549 The main purpose test is wide, although the breadth of the GAAR is reined in by 
virtue of the abuse requirement.  
Mishcon de Reya LLP have also identified problems with the elusive term “purpose” in the 
main purpose test in the GAAR which seeks to uncover whether the “obtaining of a tax 
advantage was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements.”1550 The 
firm argues that the purpose requirement of the test is unfeasible because  
“discussions as to the precise intention behind the arrangements may not have been put 
into writing at the outset or the tax benefits may only have been discovered or pursued 
after the arrangements were agreed.”1551 
                                                          
1547 Grant Thornton LLP, “A general anti-abuse rule: comments on the consultation document released on 12 
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1548 Ibid 
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Therefore, there are concerns that the purpose of an arrangement may not always be evident 
and that purposes are changeable. This argument is persuasive. The argument coincides with 
Krikorian’s view that there can be a “growing purpose of which we become aware at a 
comparatively advanced stage of our action.”1552 If an arrangement does not contain an express 
purpose, this may be constructively imposed on taxpayers if no obvious purpose is found. 
Mischon de Reya LLP have also recognised that not only can there be a link in the terms 
“intention” and “purpose” in the main purpose test but also that the courts should only examine 
the taxpayer’s intentions as evidenced in writing.  
After acknowledging that the purpose of the arrangement may not always be made explicit, 
Mischon de Reya LLP also identified problems with how it will be decided whether the “tax 
advantage was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements”1553 in 
practice. Interestingly, the firm appropriately speculated that perhaps  
“after an individual or company enjoys a significant tax saving, HMRC will seek to 
demonstrate that the obtaining of a tax advantage was the main purpose and that it is 
caught by the GAAR.”1554 
This argument has merit. If this retrospective method is employed, it would be unfair, and 
would illustrate that the test does little to differentiate between acceptable and abusive tax 
avoidance. Therefore, the main purpose test appears to serve as a tool for HMRC to argue that 
a taxpayer did have a tax avoidance purpose. Although courts do not have to accept 
retrospective arguments, this may nevertheless influence the outcome of the case. Furthermore, 
there is the additional concern that, if this is how the main purpose test will be used, it may be 
                                                          
1552 Krikorian, Y.H. ‘The Meaning of Purpose’, [1930], The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 4, p97 
1553 s207(1) Finance Act 2013  
1554 Mischon de Reya LLP, “A General Anti-Abuse Rule: Mischon de Reya response to consultation document-
September 2012”, 
<http://www.mishcon.com/assets/managed/docs/downloads/doc_2611/Mishcon_de_Reya_GAAR_consultation
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employed “several years after the arrangements were entered into and the taxpayer may by that 
point have no evidence to refute HMRC’s allegations.”1555 If this should happen, it would 
violate the rule of natural justice which encompasses that “a man’s defence must always be 
fairly heard.”1556 
The main purpose test has also been criticised for being unnecessarily wide by Sullivan and 
Cromwell LLP as it encompasses “more than just egregious and contrived schemes.”1557 
Therefore, the firm acknowledges that the GAAR does little to rectify the question of what 
amounts to abusive tax planning. This argument accords with the discussion in chapter 3 
regarding the width of the GAAR. Moreover, the requirement of gaining a tax advantage as 
one of the central reasons for embarking on the transaction is also unhelpful as  
“any attempt… to define the dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable tax 
planning by reference to a fiscal purpose risks the GAAR applying to the very 
categories of transactions which the Government wishes to promote.”1558 
Consequently, practitioners argue that the main purpose test is wide and does not serve as a 
meaningful filter. These arguments are in line with what has already been argued herein. 
Therefore, much rests on the double reasonableness test to clarify the dividing line between 
abusive and acceptable tax avoidance.  
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6.2 The Double Reasonableness Test  
The double reasonableness test is what the judiciary will use to determine whether an 
arrangement is abusive or not. Subsequent to the main purpose test, the double reasonableness 
test has been condemned for being unhelpful, because  
“it will be very difficult to persuade the Advisory Panel or the tribunal on an appeal that 
an arrangement which is designed to defeat the will of Parliament is nevertheless a 
reasonable course of action.”1559 
Therefore, the double reasonableness test unrealistically implies that an arrangement will still 
be seen as reasonable even though its main purpose or one of its main purposes was to gain a 
tax advantage. Consequently, the concern is that the main purpose test operates as more than a 
mere filter since satisfying the main purpose test leaves little hope for arrangements to then be 
considered reasonable. Accordingly, “the reasonableness test does not add anything, unless it 
is reasonable to design arrangements to defeat the will of Parliament.”1560 
The double reasonableness test could be better targeted as suggested by McFarlanes LLP. The 
firm recommended that it is essential to include “an express requirement that the arrangement 
must comprise elements which are artificial or contrived.”1561 If these key terms were included 
in this stage of the GAAR, it would “make the second filter a genuine safe harbour for 
responsible tax planning and confine the GAAR to artificial and abusive schemes”.1562 The 
inclusion of an artificiality test would move the UK GAAR in line with the general ant-
avoidance rules of South Africa, Canada and Australia. These countries specifically refer to 
                                                          







artificiality in their anti-avoidance legislation. Therefore, critics have argued that instead “of 
an “abuse” test we have been given a “reasonableness” test.”1563  
Concerns about the GAAR from when the foundations of the legislation were being laid in the 
draft GAAR were expressed by Mischon de Reya LLP. The firm were especially concerned 
about the nature of double reasonableness test which they predicted would generate 
uncertainty.1564 Mishcon de Reya LLP argued that even a “single reasonableness test”1565 “sets 
a range which is difficult to delineate in practice.”1566 Therefore, the double reasonableness test 
fuels uncertainty in the tax system due to the ambiguous nature of the test. Furthermore, in 
regards to reasonableness, it has not been made clear as to “whose tolerance level matters for 
the purposes of judging what is tolerable or intolerable”.1567 Lethaby also argued that the double 
reasonableness test would be construed subjectively as  
whilst “reasonable” is ostensibly a term which implies objective judgement, and indeed 
it is a term which lawyers are supposed to be able to construe given its frequent use in 
statute and contractual documents, “reasonableness” is in real life invariably in the eyes 
of the beholder.1568 
Similar concerns about subjectivity have been raised by McKie 
“because no standard of reasonableness and no principles by which reasonable choices 
may be distinguished from unreasonable ones are provided, we are left to guess how 
                                                          
1563 Whitehouse, C. “A cause for concern II: sleepwalking into a GAAR”, [2012], Private Client Business, 211, 
p212 
1564 Mischon de Reya LLP, “A General Anti-Abuse Rule: Mischon de Reya response to consultation document-
September 2012”, 
<http://www.mishcon.com/assets/managed/docs/downloads/doc_2611/Mishcon_de_Reya_GAAR_consultation
_response.pdf>, accessed 01.06.2016, p2 
1565 Ibid 
1566 Ibid 
1567 Lethaby. H, ‘Aaronson’s GAAR’, [2012], British Tax Review 27, p34 
1568 Ibid, p38 
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the courts will make an unguided judgement of reasonableness which, in practice, must 
be highly subjective.”1569 
Consequently, the reasonableness of an arrangement is for the judiciary to decide in a 
subjective manner.  
The double reasonableness test has been criticised by Sullivan and Cromwell LLP1570 for 
similar reasons as Mishcon de Reya LLP, as aforementioned.1571 However, Sullivan and 
Cromwell LLP recognise a palpable concern which is that “applying the GAAR would involve 
what are necessarily subjective judgments as to whether a set of facts meets the double 
reasonableness test.”1572 Although, the firm does not delve deep into the issue of subjectivity, 
it is valuable to recognise that they have acknowledged that there is scope and genuine concern 
about the likelihood of subjective decisions when the GAAR is applied in practice. 
Furthermore, although the GAAR has provided vague guidelines as to what amounts to 
abuse,1573 Grant Thornton LLP believe that there are still “potential problems arising as a result 
of the subjective interpretation of the term ‘abusive’.”1574 Moreover, it has been argued that 
“the concept of abuse is inherently nebulous.”1575 
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The difficulty in remaining objective has also been raised as “it would be hard to sustain an 
objective distinction between what is “reasonable tax planning” and what is not.”1576 Grant 
Thornton LLP also found various problems with the GAAR and many, interestingly, related to 
the subjective nature of the legislation. For example, the double reasonableness test has been 
criticised due to the “subjective nature of what may be deemed reasonable.”1577 Grant Thornton 
LLP also rightly points out that “there is no attempt to define reasonableness and so the test is 
highly subjective.”1578 Due to the lack of meaningful guidance as to how to measure 
reasonableness, unsurprisingly, “there will be a wide variety of views as to what is reasonable 
tax planning and what is unreasonable.”1579 Until a common definition of reasonableness is 
constructed through case law, there is likely to be considerable uncertainty for taxpayers and 
advisors alike due to the invariable lack of uniformity.1580 Furthermore, the double 
reasonableness test has also been condemned for being subjective due to the fact that  
“as recent newspaper articles have shown, what is reasonable in the view of tax 
advisors, and indeed HMRC, will not be the same as what is reasonable in the view of 
the general public.”1581 
The scope for subjectivity in the GAAR has also been linked to realisations that the legislation 
is wide.1582 Moreover, the Aaronson report states that “what can in any particular case 
reasonably be regarded as a reasonable response will, of court, depend on the precise 
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circumstances.”1583 Therefore, the Aaronson report elucidates that reasonableness will be 
decided on a case by case basis.  
6.3 The Scope of the GAAR 
The breadth of the GAAR has attracted criticism. Some take the view that “what is in truth a 
general anti-avoidance rule is being missold as a general anti-abuse rule.”1584 The GAAR is 
designed to be targeted. However, HMRC state that “because the GAAR will only apply to 
abusive avoidance arrangements this applies equally to any arrangements which might be 
caught by the GAAR.”1585 As the GAAR can apply to those arrangements which might trigger 
the GAAR, it suggests that arrangements other than those which are abusive or are borderline 
cases can fall within the web of the GAAR. Nevertheless, Aaronson warned that the GAAR “is 
not to be wielded as a weapon to intimidate taxpayers in relation to arrangements to which it 
could not apply.”1586 
The scope of the GAAR has also been criticised for not being “entirely clear.”1587 The ACCA 
remarked on the ambiguous scope of the GAAR.1588 They criticised the guidance for “not being 
entirely clear whether ‘less-than abusive’ planning may be caught”.1589 The more tangible 
threat is that the GAAR may “creep into other areas of what are currently perfectly legitimate 
tax planning initiatives”.1590 Therefore, the GAAR or GAAR guidance do little to make clear 
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the distinction between acceptable and abusive tax avoidance. Sullivan and Cromwell LLP 
have also echoed these concerns by stating that “it is far from clear that the revised “double 
reasonableness” test does accept that there is a sphere of legitimate tax minimisation.”1591 
Therefore, the vague nature of the double reasonableness test may lead to legitimate tax 
avoidance cases falling under the GAAR. Furthermore, Whitehouse remarks that the term “tax 
advantage”1592 is “given a familiarly wide meaning to encompass (broadly) all forms of tax 
mitigation.”1593 
The significance attributed to the double reasonableness test has also attracted criticisms that 
“the actual GAAR is capable of being read as a wider general anti-avoidance rule because its 
crucial filter is based on reasonableness, not artificiality.”1594 The bar determining abusive tax 
avoidance is therefore lowered as claiming that an arrangement is not reasonable sets a lower 
threshold than examining artificiality. Consequently, an arrangement may not be artificial but 
still deemed unreasonable. Although the GAAR attempted to be targeted with the inclusion of 
the term “abusive”,  
“neither the revised GAAR legislation nor the Guidance provide any comfort that the 
GAAR will not operate as a general anti-avoidance rule or that it will reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding the scope and application of any such rule.”1595 
Some claim that HMRC welcome the uncertainty inherent in the UK GAAR.1596 Due to the 
central role HMRC play in the operation of the GAAR,  
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“HMRC find a GAAR tempting as a significant new weapon in maximising tax 
revenues because the uncertainty of its application would confer on them a de facto 
power of discretionary taxation”.1597 
Although HMRC may relish the blurred boundaries of the GAAR, “that very uncertainty, 
however, is the reason why business and the professions have opposed it.”1598 
The GAAR has also been criticised as the scope of the GAAR is wider than the Aaronson report 
described.1599 For example, the Aaronson report did not include inheritance tax within the 
GAAR’s scope1600 but nevertheless inheritance tax is included in the GAAR.1601 However, 
Whitehouse rightly points out that the inclusion of inheritance tax is unnecessary due to “the 
plethora of anti-avoidance provisions that already apply in the IHT legislation”.1602 Therefore, 
widening the final GAAR has been criticised as containing “an element of overkill.”1603  
6.4 HMRC GAAR Guidance 
The guidance is important as the “HMRC guidance and explanation on the scope and meaning 
of the legislation pervades all areas of the tax code.”1604 HMRC has been entrusted with the 
drafting of the GAAR guidance therefore, “representations that the Guidance should be totally 
independent went unheeded.”1605 However, the legal nature of the HMRC GAAR guidance has 
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been criticised. The GAAR states that courts “must take into account…HMRC’s guidance”.1606 
However, Grant Thornton LLP question whether this “mean[s] that the judge must review the 
opinion, but can fully disregard it if he believes the opinion is incorrect, as a matter of law”.1607 
In addition to this, Mischon de Reya LLP condemned the use of the supplementary HMRC 
GAAR guidance as although a scheme may satisfy the GAAR guidance, it is not the GAAR 
itself nor is it binding.1608 Although some have described the guidance as having “quasi 
statutory status”1609, advisors can “never be completely sure that the guidance can be followed 
with confidence.”1610 Therefore, there remains much uncertainty about the extent to which the 
guidance should be relied on in practice.  
Sullivan and Cromwell LLP have also raised serious and substantiated reservations about the 
HMRC GAAR guidance in relation to the discretion it gives HMRC.1611 The firm characterise 
HMRC as being “the third player”1612 in tax avoidance cases as “HMRC will draft the guidance 
[therefore,] have more discretion to ignore it.”1613 Similarly, Lethaby also believes that  
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“the inclusion of HMRC materials is potentially controversial because of the perceived 
risk of HMRC making self-serving pronouncements about what they consider falls or 
does not fall within the scope of certain statutory provisions.”1614 
Sullivan and Cromwell LLP provide an example of other HMRC guidance being interpreted in 
favour of HMRC in relation to tax residency1615 which provides an indication as to how the 
HMRC guidance may be applied to cases falling under the GAAR. The firm stated that the tax 
residency “decision underscores the risks in relying on HMRC guidance and – even more so – 
any supposed general HMRC practice.”1616 The cases in question were heard prior to the 
implementation of the statutory residency test although, they do highlight the ability of HMRC 
to depart from the guidance and the difficulty in “hold[ing] HMRC to its word.”1617 
Consequently, the firm has warned that “it will be an uphill struggle for taxpayers to convince 
the courts that HMRC has bound itself to take any particular approach.”1618 Therefore, as 
Sullivan and Cromwell LLP pointed out, there are widespread reservations as to the extent to 
which taxpayers can rely on the HMRC GAAR guidance in practice. The reservations are 
justified given that HMRC have been active in amending and updating the HMRC GAAR 
guidance in 2013 and 2015. Therefore, taxpayers must ensure that they keep up-to-date with 
the changes.  
The general involvement by HMRC has raised concerns as  
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“if they reasonably consider the taxpayer’s conduct to be an abuse of the system, [they 
can] change the law for him alone to deny the tax advantage provided for by the 
purposively construed legislation.”1619 
Consequently, the unfairness does not derive from the denial itself but from the fact that “the 
basis for the denial of the intended advantage is the disapproval of the administrator.”1620 
Due to the difficulty in understanding the meaning of key terms in the GAAR, such as 
“reasonable”, the guidance may be viewed as a helpful supplement. Some have acknowledged 
that “the guidance is a valiant attempt to reduce that uncertainty but, because avoidance is 
treated by HMRC as inherently unreasonable, it ultimately fails in that objective.”1621 However, 
others suggest that the guidance widens the GAAR and “confirms our worst fears that the 
GAAR will be a general anti-avoidance rule in all but name.”1622 
The HMRC GAAR guidance superficially addresses the issue of what does not fall under the 
GAAR’s remit.1623 The guidance broadly states that “any reasonable choice of a course of 
action is kept outside the target area of the GAAR.”1624 However, the guidance provides 
examples of arrangements which would not be caught by the GAAR. The first example is 
simple and discusses that a taxpayer who owns their own company can choose to extract their 
profits by way of a salary or dividend accumulated over time.1625 This example is well-known 
and reveals little about the remits of the GAAR. The second example explains that taxpayers 
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will not be condemned for making use of Individual Savings Accounts wherein taxpayers 
benefit from tax relief.1626 Again, this simple example does not clarify the limits of GAAR in 
terms of more complex arrangements. Lastly, the guidance adds that there would be no abuse 
of inheritance tax laws where parents gifts their child an asset without the parents having a 
benefit in that asset. The GAAR guidance inadvertently admits that these examples are 
unhelpful and do little to educate taxpayers as to the remits of the GAAR as they “clearly fall 
outside the target area of the GAAR.”1627 These elementary examples have unsurprisingly been 
attacked due to the fact that 
“none of the examples in Part B to which the GAAR is said not to apply would pass 
through the first filter, because they are innocuous transactions which do not involve 
avoidance, as properly defined.”1628 
The examples given are arrangements which involve tax avoidance in the technical sense 
although, they do not even come close to the line between acceptable and abusive tax 
avoidance. Therefore, the guidance does not attempt to advise businesses and tax advisors who 
usually carry out more complex arrangements. However, in past tax avoidance cases, judges 
have warned that hypothetical scenarios may not always be helpful as 
“the facts of examples are not always adequate for the purpose of giving informed 
answers. The examples selected are sometimes slanted to vindicate the advocate's 
viewpoint”.1629 
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The examples of acceptable tax avoidance outlined have been rebuked for being immaterial.1630 
The examples do not serve a useful purpose as “they do not pass through the first filter 
[therefore,] their reasonableness is never tested.”1631 Moreover,  
“these examples tell us nothing about what forms of tax planning pass through the 
first filter but nevertheless fall outside the scope of the GAAR because they are 
reasonable.”1632 
Therefore, the guidance would benefit from providing an example of where the main purpose 
test applies but the double reasonableness test does not apply. This illustration would serve to 
clarify the distinction between abusive and acceptable tax avoidance. The Aaronson Report 
also recommended including  
“an authoritative source of guidance as to the sort of cases to which the GAAR should 
apply. This could be achieved by having guidance notes included as a schedule to the 
Finance Act which enacts the GAAR itself, so that it gains the authority attaching to 
legislation.”1633 
However, the types of schemes which the GAAR guidance refers to appear to be less helpful 
than the guidance envisaged by the Aaronson Report.  
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The GAAR guidance also states that making use of the reliefs in the tax legislation will not 
trigger the GAAR.1634 The guidance provides examples of such reliefs including; “business 
property relief, Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS), capital allowances [and] Patent Box)”.1635  
However, the use of reliefs is a contentious issue as the guidance acknowledges that 
“experience has shown that incentives and reliefs can be abused.”1636 Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that “such forms of behaviour are normally ones which taxpayers would not undertake 
if the relief were not given. If it were otherwise, the incentive would be unnecessary.”1637 
 The guidance outlines what arrangements would attract the GAAR and advises that  
“where taxpayers set out to exploit some loophole in the tax laws, for example, by 
entering into contrived arrangements to obtain a relief but incurring no equivalent 
economic risk then they will bring themselves into the target area of the GAAR.”1638 
Therefore, engaging in real economic risk is essential to avoiding the application GAAR. 
However, the example of acceptable tax avoidance given in the guidance can be tackled as 
acquiring an Individual Savings Account does not carry economic risk but nevertheless is a 
form of permissible tax avoidance. The key term in the guidance is therefore “contrived”. In 
spite of the fact that the term “contrived” is significant, as it sets a higher level of 
unacceptability than the test of reasonableness, no examples are given as to what would amount 
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to a contrived arrangement. The broad example nevertheless “tells us about what forms of 
responsible tax planning are excluded from the GAAR.”1639 
6.5 The Lack of a Clearance System 
There has been cynicism as to why there is no prior clearance system in place. HMRC have 
confirmed that they “will not give either formal or informal clearances that the GAAR doesn’t 
apply”.1640 However, there will be “open discussions with taxpayers about commercial 
transactions”.1641 The lack of a clearance procedure means that “no assurances about the tax 
treatment of a transaction will be given in any situation where, in HMRC’s view, the 
arrangements constitute tax avoidance.”1642 
Grant Thornton LLP have also expressed deep concerns about the lack of a clearance procedure 
as it may increase uncertainty for taxpayers.1643 Warnings about the uncertainty which the lack 
of a clearance system will cause have also been echoed by Lethaby.1644 However, Freedman 
explained there were also fears “that a clearance system might degenerate into a de facto 
requirement to apply for clearance for every transaction and so increase costs.”1645 
Nevertheless, Freedman acknowledged that a clearance system would be useful.1646 
The lack of a clearance system has sparked concerns about creating confusion regarding the 
tax system as Sullivan and Cromwell LLP expressed that “there is a real concern that an 
informal system of semi-transparent confirmations is developing, without taxpayers having any 
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reassurance”.1647 However, it is vital that the UK’s tax system is seen to be transparent for 
taxpayers to have certainty in their economic affairs in order to promote certainty.  
Aaronson’s report provided convincing reasons as to why a clearance system should not be 
implemented. Aaronson advised that “an effective clearance system would impose very 
substantial resource burdens on taxpayers and HMRC alike.”1648 Understandably, a clearance 
system would be costly. Disconcertingly, Aaronson also cautioned against a clearance system 
as it “inevitably in practice give[s] discretionary power to HMRC who would effectively 
become the arbiter of the limits of responsible tax planning.”1649 Therefore, the GAAR study 
group acknowledge that too much discretionary power by HMRC is “wrong as a matter of 
constitutional principle.”1650 However, HMRC were assigned the role of the GAAR guidance 
which plays a central role in interpreting the GAAR. Furthermore, claims that a clearance 
system is not necessary as the GAAR is targeted are less convincing.1651 The scope of the 
GAAR is uncertain therefore, assertions that the GAAR’s scope is identifiable are 
unpersuasive.  
The fact that the Aaronson report states that existing clearance systems could also apply to the 
GAAR where available1652 suggests that the GAAR Study Group does not condemn the concept 
of a clearance system but sought to avoid it due to the costs involved. However, the report 
stated that the extension of the clearance systems would be provided for in the GAAR itself1653 
although, no such provision is included in the GAAR.  
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6.6 The UK’s international competitiveness 
One of the pertinent issues is the threat which the GAAR could pose to commercial investment 
in the UK.1654 The Aaronson Report also acknowledged “the fragility of the UK economy”1655 
and that a GAAR with a wide scope could “carry a real risk of undermining the ability of 
business and individuals to carry out sensible and responsible tax planning.”1656  
As aforementioned, the lack of a clearance procedure fuels uncertainty1657 and “international 
businesses and entrepreneurs could be less likely to base themselves in the UK”1658 because of 
this and in order to avoid having to deal with an ambiguous GAAR. Discouraging foreign 
investors could have a disastrous impact on the UK’s economy. However, Aaronson argued 
that a GAAR would create “a more level playing field for business enterprises which conduct 
responsible tax planning”.1659 These businesses “would no longer have their competitiveness 
undermined by others which seek to reduce their tax burden by contrived and artificial 
schemes.”1660 
The ACCA has observed that the GAAR could harm the UK’s international 
competitiveness.1661 With such vague and strict rules in place, the UK could be seen as “not 
business friendly”1662 which could have widespread detrimental effects on the economy. The 
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GAAR could also act as a deterrence in more ways than primarily envisaged as the ACCA 
warn that 
“the GAAR runs the risk… of deterring investment by businesses that look to reinvest 
any savings they have made from financial planning initiatives back into their 
businesses, in research and development or job creation.”1663 
Therefore, the ACCA suggest that money saved through tax avoidance schemes is ultimately 
fed back into the UK’s economy in a positive way. Furthermore, in an attempt to collect more 
taxes, the government may have to deal with the long-term, unintentional side-effects of 
gradually losing future investment which may lose the UK more taxes than it can recover under 
the GAAR. The ACCA also cautioned that “deterring abusive tax planning is one thing, 
deterrence of reinvestment by small and growing businesses is another.”1664 
The ACCA respects the government’s decision to tackle tax avoidance1665 although, it has 
interestingly pointed out that the creation of the GAAR was unnecessary.1666 The ACCA 
logically argues that “if government and Parliament want UK businesses to pay more tax than 
they currently pay, the tax system needs wholesale change on a global basis.”1667 The ACCA 
believe that tax avoidance stems from “transfer pricing and profit shifting”.1668  However, these 
issues will not be explored any further so as to focus the issues on the GAAR. Furthermore, 
the corporation tax rate in the UK is fairly low at 20% which is lower than the global average 
tax rate of 23.87%.1669 Therefore, if the goal of the GAAR is to raise taxes, the government 
could simply raise corporation tax. 
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Some argue that a GAAR would not be damaging to the UK’s international competitiveness. 
Freedman claims that, in reality,  
“most taxpayers are very familiar with GAARs in other countries and with anti-abuse 
laws in domestic law as well as in treaties and many would probably be surprised to 
hear that the UK had no statutory rule.”1670 
Although the concept of a GAAR may not be alien to foreign investors, the ambiguity of the 
UK’s GAAR may prove to be discouraging. For example, Goldberg asserted that “there are 
many examples of GAARs in the world, but our proposed draft is the most objectionable I have 
seen.”1671 Furthermore, due to the fact that taxpayers are not permitted to utilise the 
shortcomings in the law, “it is the uncertainty generated by “what Parliament would have done” 
that in the past has caused business such fear of a general anti-avoidance rule”.1672 Although 
the UK’s focus is on abuse rather than avoidance, there is greater uncertainty with the GAAR 
as the line between abuse and acceptable tax avoidance is not made clear. In contrast, although 
wider, a general anti-avoidance rule is far clearer in terms of what it seeks to tackle.  
As the concerns of the GAAR on the UK’s international competitiveness is a prediction, KPMG 
sought to provide quantifiable evidence to suggest that the impact of the GAAR is minimal. 
KMPG gathered their evidence by surveying companies and comparing their views on the 
expected impact of the GAAR versus the actual impact that the GAAR has had on the workings 
of their company after the GAAR’s implementation.1673 KPMG focused on large companies 
                                                          
1670 Freedman, J. “Analysis- GAAR: challenging assumptions”, [2010], Tax Journal, Issue 1046, 12, p13 
1671 Goldberg, D. “How clear, transparent, accessible and foreseeable is tax law and practice?”, [2013], Private 
Client Business 238, p241 
1672 McFarlanes, “The GAAR: an anti-avoidance rule in all but name”, [2012], cited in 
<http://www.macfarlanes.com/media/382363/the-gaar-an-anti-avoidance-rule-in-all-but-name.pdf>, p2 
1673 KPMG, “KPMG annual survey of tax competitiveness 2014”, (December 2014), cited in 
<https://www.kpmg.com/UK/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/PDF/Tax/annual-tax-
competitiveness-survey-2014.pdf>, accessed 01.10.2016, p5 
273 
 
with 62% of those surveyed having turnovers of more than more than £1bn.1674 102 companies 
were surveyed before the introduction of the GAAR in 2013 and 104 companies were surveyed 
after the implementation of the GAAR in 2014.1675 Assessing company responses during this 
period is helpful as it can show how attitudes may have changed during the pivotal phase in 
which the GAAR was merely a proposal to when it was being introduced.  
The companies were asked various questions. Firstly, the companies were asked whether they 
believed that the GAAR could potentially “catch legitimate tax mitigation”.1676 In 2013, 
significantly, 71% of the companies believed that the GAAR could apply to legitimate 
schemes. 23% of the companies thought that the targeted GAAR would remain within its 
mandated remit and 6% of companies were unsure. These figures show that the majority of the 
companies surveyed largely expected the GAAR to operate wider than it was designed to. 
KPMG then surveyed the companies in 2014 and asked them whether “as a result of the GAAR, 
[they] have…decided not to pursue what [they]…would believe to be legitimate tax 
mitigation.”1677 In response to this, 93% of companies claimed that the GAAR had not 
prevented them from engaging in tax mitigation. However, 4% of companies did believe that 
the GAAR impeded their tax mitigation activities and 3% of companies were undecided. The 
2014 statistics surprisingly show that the companies drastically changed their views about the 
GAAR. However, the question asked in 2014 was narrower than the question asked in 2013 
which may have affected the results.  
KPMG widened the second question posed to the companies by enquiring about whether the 
companies believed that the GAAR would catch genuine commercial transactions.1678 In 2013, 
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56% of the companies surveyed believed that the GAAR could catch genuine commercial 
transactions.1679 37% of companies believed that genuine commercial transactions would not 
be affected1680 and 7% did not know whether genuine transactions could be caught by the 
GAAR.1681 In 2014, KPMG then asked the companies whether the GAAR has dissuaded them 
from carrying out genuine transactions.1682 An overwhelming 97% of companies claimed that 
the GAAR did not dissuade them from engaging in genuine commercial transactions.1683 Only 
3% of companies stated that they did not know whether the GAAR has deterred them and none 
of the companies claimed that the GAAR discouraged them from embarking on genuine 
transactions.1684  
The statistics on the GAAR’s corporate impact appear to suggest that there were grave concerns 
before the implementation of the GAAR but that the introduction of the GAAR seemed to put 
these concerns rapidly to rest. The survey results portray that the idea of a GAAR was initially 
worrying but the final GAAR was well drafted. However, the reliability of the results can be 
criticised on the basis that the “interviews were conducted with 104 senior tax decision 
makers”.1685 Therefore, the interviews were carried out with one person from each company 
and do not reflect the views of the entire company. Furthermore, the job status of 11% of the 
people who took the survey was merely described as “other”1686 which makes it difficult to 
ascertain how or whether the GAAR affected their daily decision making. The survey does not 
help significantly with understanding how overseas investors feel about the impact of the 











GAAR as only 24% of the companies surveyed were foreign owned subsidiaries.1687 Therefore, 
the results of the survey should be treated with caution.  
In addition to the encumbrance the GAAR can cause corporations, “the GAAR risks becoming 
an administrative burden on non-corporate taxpayers”1688 when completing their self-assessed 
tax return.1689 Sullivan and Cromwell LLP also share the same concern as the ACCA in regards 
to those who may omit to consider the GAAR when completing their self-assessed tax return 
and be liable to penalties.1690 The necessity to self-assess based on the GAAR “introduces 
considerable uncertainty in self-assessing accurately.”1691 However, some candidly believe that 
“no taxpayer will self-assess the operation of the GAAR.”1692 
Due to the serious concerns surrounding the GAAR, some are understandably of the opinion 
that it should not have been implemented at all.1693 However, it can also be argued, to a limited 
extent, that “the risk is that any GAAR, however carefully crafted, will undermine the UK's 
attractiveness.”1694 Therefore, with some concerns, like threat to the UK’s competitiveness in 
the global market, the very existence of the GAAR can cause problems. Lethaby also warns 
that “the UK will need to tread carefully to avoid undermining over a decade's worth of inching 
towards a more competitive tax regime”.1695 
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Ideally, an efficient tax system must “be easy for taxpayers to understand and for Government 
to administer.”1696 The UK currently struggles with having the “longest tax code in the 
world”.1697 This is due to the fact that new provisions are continuously introduced by the annual 
Finance Acts for approximately the last 130 years,1698 which indicates that the UK does not 
have a clear and concise tax system. The length of the UK’s tax legislation is problematic as 
“length makes it hard to grasp; the language and the structure make it difficult to 
understand.”1699 Consequently, “complexity is the midwife of taxpayer error, leading to 
incorrect returns.”1700 Complexity matters as it makes the tax system inefficient.1701 It is also 
expensive and burdensome for taxpayers to obtain professional advice on how to arrange their 
affairs effectively, even for mere compliance.1702 In order to establish whether the tax system 
has been made more complex by the GAAR it is important to analyse what factors contribute 
to making a tax system complex. Thereafter, it is helpful to examine views as to whether the 
GAAR has contributed towards complexity.  
The simplicity of a tax system is measured by considering two main factors including; “the 
ease in which a taxpayer may comply”1703 with their tax obligations and “the authorities’ ability 
to administer the Act and collect the tax due”.1704 As aforementioned, there are numerous 
reasons as to why taxpayers may find it challenging to fulfil their tax obligations including the 
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extent to which one should rely on the GAAR guidance1705 and the problems taxpayers may 
encounter if they complete a self-assessed tax return.1706 Therefore, it can be said that the 
GAAR fails to meet the first criterion as the legislation has made it more burdensome for 
taxpayers to satisfy their tax obligations. Moreover, “even the basic tax return, let alone the 
various supplementary pages, is now a formidable document.”1707 Secondly, it is not yet certain 
how the GAAR will be managed by HMRC or the courts although, there was widespread doubt 
as to how the guidance will operate alongside the GAAR in practice1708 and the extent to which 
the judiciary should pay heed to it.1709 Consequently, the GAAR has made the tax system more 
complex than it was. 
The GAAR is a significant piece of legislation which has introduced substantial changes in the 
tax system. It has increased the burden of; taxpayers to comply with the GAAR, courts to 
interpret the various provisions and HMRC to oversee the guidance. The Office of Tax 
Simplification has warned that “change in itself causes complexity”.1710 
As discussed, the GAAR does seem to worsen the existing problem of complexity. However, 
it can be argued that making the tax system simpler was not one of the objects of creating the 
GAAR.1711 Mishcon de Reya have recognised this fact by stating that “it seems unfortunate 
                                                          
1705 Sullivan and Cromwell, “UK Tax Residence: Supreme Court decision in Davies and Gaines-Cooper”, 
(Sullivan and Cromwell 31.10.2011), cited in <https://www.sullcrom.com/UK-Tax-Residence-10-31-2011/>, 
accessed 06.06.2016 
1706 Sullivan and Cromwell, “UK Tax: General Anti-Abuse Rule”, (Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, 16.07.2012), 
cited in <https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_UK_Tax_General_Anti-
Abuse_Rule_2.pdf>, accessed 05.06.2016, p4 
1707 Williams, D.E. “Self-assessment: a practitioner’s view”, [1999], British Tax Review 229, p230 
1708 Sullivan and Cromwell, “UK Tax Residence: Supreme Court decision in Davies and Gaines-Cooper”, 
(Sullivan and Cromwell 31.10.2011), cited in <https://www.sullcrom.com/UK-Tax-Residence-10-31-2011/>, 
accessed 06.06.2016 
1709 Grant Thornton LLP, “A general anti-abuse rule: comments on the consultation document released on 12 
June 2012”, cited in <http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk/Global/GAAR%20consultation%20response.pdf>, 
accessed 06.06.2016, p5 
1710 Office of Tax Simplification, ‘Review of Tax Reliefs: Final Report’, [2011], cited in http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/ots_review_tax_reliefs_final_report.pdf, accessed 06.06.2016, p19 
1711 Mischon de Reya LLP, “A General Anti-Abuse Rule: Mischon de Reya response to consultation document-
September 2012”, 
<http://www.mishcon.com/assets/managed/docs/downloads/doc_2611/Mishcon_de_Reya_GAAR_consultation
_response.pdf>, accessed 01.06.2016, p2 
278 
 
that the GAAR is not intended to assist with simplifying the existing complex tax legislation 
and regime.”1712 However, a complex tax system also heightens the inconvenience to taxpayers 
as the “GAAR… appears more likely to catch tax planning designed simply to avoid the many 
traps in the UK’s very complex tax code.”1713 
Even proponents of the GAAR claim that the GAAR does little to solve the problem of the 
UK’s complex tax system as “a GAAR needs to be backed up by improved legislation and 
possibly further moves towards principles-based legislation”.1714 Parliament’s intention in 
relation to specific provisions may no longer be clear in light of the GAAR as  
 “when an Act attempts…to deal specifically with every class of transaction which the 
draftsman can foresee, it becomes difficult indeed to extract from the mass of detail any 
principle which the Courts can say with confidence Parliament intended to be 
applicable to any class of transaction which the draftsman did not foresee.”1715 
Therefore, judges cannot unreservedly claim that Parliament intended specific cases to fall 
within the GAAR. Moreover, it can be argued that “the pursuit of the intention of Parliament 
is logically incoherent because it makes assumptions about the mental states of members of 
Parliament which do not bear any relation to reality.”1716 Gammie also argues that 
“it is frequently said of particular tax avoidance arrangements that they do not or ought 
not achieve the tax benefit claimed because they are plainly incompatible with the 
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legislative intention of Parliament or the spirit of the law that Parliament has enacted. 
A simple response is that, if it was so plain, why did Parliament not say so?”1717 
Furthermore, “if Parliament knows what it wants to tax, how is it that Parliament makes such 
a consistent mess of the matter by not plainly saying what it intends?”1718 Therefore, Gammie 
asserts that it is fundamental to tackle complexity as “the first-best must always be for 
governments to articulate clearly in legislation what they want to tax rather than make it up 
after the event.”1719 
In order to tackle complexity, the problems in the tax system must be acknowledged as “the 
domestic and cultural features which contribute to a lack of clarity are, first, an unwillingness 
to be honest about the true effects of our tax system”.1720 Complexity is a big problem in the 
UK tax system and it is evident that the government did not seek to simplify the tax system 
when proposing the GAAR. Moreover, “length alone accordingly contributes considerably to 
a lack of clarity, transparency, accessibility and foreseeability in our system.”1721 The GAAR 
inevitably adds to the existing lengthy tax system. Therefore, “we cannot blame business for 
using the rules that policy-makers themselves have put in place.”1722 
6.8 Uncertainty 
The GAAR has also been criticised for increasing the uncertainty in the tax system.1723 The 
main problem strives from the fact that some of the main provisions are vague and subjective 
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which provides uncertainty as to how the legislation will be applied in practice. Although, it is 
“unrealistic to expect that tax laws might not evolve under the common law process”,1724 even 
common law rules depart from previous established rules as demonstrated by the Ramsay 
approach departing from the Westminster approach. Therefore, it would be better to have clear 
legislation that promotes certainty rather than a line of case law which can be overruled at any 
time. Although established case law can help to provide an indication as to how legislation will 
operate in practice, “case law will take some years to develop”.1725 Therefore, there is the risk 
of uncertainty for years to come. The long length of time needed to develop a reliable line of 
case law is due to various factors including, the fact that the GAAR applies to an array of taxes. 
Therefore, a variety of taxes each need to have a clear line of case law established.  
Others argue that the promise of a formation of a body of case law later on is insufficient to 
defend vague legislation in the present. Stroup elucidates that a duration of uncertainty is 
wholly unacceptable as “to know what is the law in a particular case only after it has been 
adjudicated by a court is to know law too late for it to serve as a guide for conduct in that 
situation.”1726 Therefore, the ambiguous tests within the GAAR do little to direct taxpayers as 
to what is considered permissible tax avoidance. The extent to which taxpayers should rely on 
the GAAR guidance adds to the uncertainty of it all. Stroup also indicates that equivocal 
legislation can also undermine the law more generally due to the fact that  
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“it is questionable what social role, if any, law can play when citizens are forced to go 
about their business capable only of "guessing" whether the judiciary will find their 
actions to be within the law.”1727 
Furthermore, due to the rejection of the proposed GAAR in 1998, taxpayers may now be more 
sceptical about having a GAAR of any kind. Worryingly, the 1998 proposed GAAR was 
rejected for failing to generate a fair “balance of interests between tax gatherers and 
taxpayers”.1728 Therefore, there may be inequality in applying the double reasonableness test 
which involves balancing between the competing interests. Significantly, the GAAR was also 
rejected on the grounds that the proposed test involved HMRC substantiating taxpayers’ motive 
to avoid tax which was problematic to prove.1729 The GAAR therefore, appears to be making 
tax compliance more difficult and uncertain for taxpayers which consequently, adds to pre-
existing problems of complexity and length of the tax system.   
Supporters of the GAAR believe that uncertainty helps to reduce tax avoidance because “if 
bright lines are drawn they will be manipulated by those devising schemes.”1730 Therefore, “the 
creation of some uncertainty will be regarded by GAAR supporters as a good thing- achieving 
the goal of deterrence in part relies on it”.1731 Similarly, Pagone believes that “uncertainty plays 
a key part of commerce and social decision-making, and its adoption through taxation by 
discretionary powers is in part a means of combating tax avoidance.”1732 However, “all taxation 
must have a proper legislative basis”.1733 Moreover, the problems found with the double 
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reasonableness test alone “will leave matters in an unacceptably uncertain state.”1734 
Consequently, some believe that the double reasonableness test is unreasonable as “it is 
certainly not “reasonable” (singly or doubly) to leave taxpayers and their advisers in the middle 
of nowhere without a map and a compass.”1735 Others argue that certainty is not the correct test 
and the focus should be on fairness and practicality.1736 Nevertheless, it is difficult to defend 
the proposition that a complex GAAR is fair when it is borne in mind that tax avoidance is a 
legal activity. Moreover,  
“a problem for taxpayers is that tax is a cost. It is a personal cost and a cost of doing 
business and predictability of that cost is often an important ingredient in personal and 
business decision-making. Tax uncertainty may be a net gain to the community but not 
for individual taxpayers.”1737 
It is important that the GAAR is clear as “voluntary compliance, so critical to the tax law’s 
integrity, depends upon its intelligibility.”1738 It has been suggested that certainty could be 
promoted by making “fewer changes in tax so that the people could consider their economic 
choices and make long-term financial plans and decisions.”1739 However, the ideal of making 
fewer changes in the tax system seems like an unattainable goal given that changes from the 
Finance Acts are embedded into the system every year.  
Although certainty is desirable, some theorised that a GAAR which provides certainty cannot 
be achieved as  
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“if one of our leading revenue law QCs, assisted by a distinguished committee, cannot, 
after a year's work, draft a GAAR which provides reasonable certainty of application, 
it cannot be done.”1740 
There is also the undisputable problem of having no cases which have invoked the GAAR thus 
far. Therefore, there is no illustration of how the GAAR will operate in practice. This is a 
problem that is out of the hands of the GAAR Study Group. However, Lethaby has found “it 
imperative that the architects of the GAAR make it clear where on the aggression spectrum 
previously decided cases would, in their view, fall.”1741 This approach would provide an 
indication as to how abuse would be measured in future cases as the cases are unlikely to be 
drastically different from those heard in the past.  
As aforementioned, the subjective nature of the GAAR can yield varying opinions which can 
encourage uncertainty. Therefore, the GAAR has not “remove[d] the uncertainty which has 
debilitated our tax law since the Ramsay decision.”1742 Certainty is imperative as “agreement 
is a necessary feature of the normativity of our practices.”1743 There “must be harmony in 
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6.9 Constitutional issues 
The GAAR has also been criticised for potentially violating fundamental Constitutional Law 
principles, in particular, the Rule of Law. The lack of certainty in the GAAR is unfortunate as 
taxpayers should be fully aware of the demarcations of acceptable and unacceptable tax 
avoidance. Examining the rationale behind the Polish GAAR being struck down as 
unconstitutional, may help to decipher where the shortcomings in the UK GAAR lie.  
This discussion will use Lord Bingham’s conception of the Rule of Law. This is because Lord 
Bingham’s conception of the Rule of Law accords most closely with the issues thrown up by 
the Polish constitutional court which will be discussed. Lord Bingham formulated a detailed 
analysis of eight tenets which encompass the Rule of Law. The first, and most applicable tenet 
is that “the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable.”1746 
This tenet is important as  
“the individual citizen needs to know what the law is- both criminal and civil- in order 
to plan and undertake his or her actions within the legal framework. In terms of 
commercial transactions also, the economy depends on there being a clear system of 
rules to which all can comply and thereby be sure that their dealings are lawful.”1747 
Lord Bingham’s second tenet is also relevant to the discussion in chapter 5 regarding discretion. 
Lord Bingham stated that “questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved 
by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion.”1748 In contrast to 
“Dicey’s opposition to unfettered discretion, Lord Bingham accepts that officials and 
judges need some leeway in decision-making and the application of rules, but insists 
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that the discretion granted must be limited so that its exercise does not become arbitrary. 
Discretion must not be unconstrained.”1749 
The third tenet advocated by Bingham is that “the laws of the land should apply equally to all, 
save to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation.”1750 This rule exemplifies 
“equality before the law”.1751 The fourth tenet relates to ministers and states that  
“ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers conferred on them 
in good faith, fairly and for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, without 
exceeding the limits of such powers.”1752 
Moreover, “public officials must also respect the rules of fairness and natural justice and 
powers must be exercised reasonably and rationally.”1753 Public officials can be held to account 
through judicial review if they exceed their powers. Therefore, HMRC can be held to account 
if they exceed their powers as conferred by Parliament under the GAAR.  
The fifth tenet refers to human rights and states that “the law must afford adequate protection 
of fundamental human rights.”1754 Lord Bingham’s sixth tenet is that “means must be provided 
for resolving, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the 
parties themselves are unable to resolve.”1755 In addition to this, the seventh tenet is that 
“adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair.”1756 This encompasses “the need 
for an independent and politically impartial judiciary”1757 which is particularly relevant as tax 
avoidance is a topical issue. Lastly,  
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“the rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international 
law, the law which whether deriving from treaty or international custom and practice 
governs the conduct of nations.”1758 
It has been argued that the GAAR is “evidence that tax laws are so vague as to be considered 
in violation of the Rule of Law.”1759 The lack of certainty has also led to the conclusion that 
“GAARs breach the Rule of Law by failing to identify the standard of tax law in advance.”1760 
However, an unpersuasive counterargument is that the wide GAAR can actually serve to 
uphold the Rule of Law. It has been rationalised that  
“only those persons with the sophistication to create a novel transaction (to implicate 
the GAAR) would therefore hold the special rights, and be effectively a ruling-class 
from a tax perspective. The wide-penumbra of a GAAR may therefore be necessary to 
maintain the Rule of Tax Law, and not to breach it.”1761 
Other objections to the GAAR include the fact that it places undue burden on taxpayers. 
Greenberg tackles the GAAR from a constitutional standpoint and remarks that   
“what is even more inconceivable, however, is that it is unlawful to “exploit” the 
legislature’s failure to enact what it might have wished to enact [and this provision] was 
itself enacted by the legislature without any serious controversy of a constitutional 
nature.”1762 
The legislation requires the courts to block Parliament’s shortcomings from being utilised and 
examine the spirit of the law where the legislation has not expressly laid this out. However, the 
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guesswork involved in this exercise is wholly inappropriate as it reduces certainty and conflicts 
with Smith’s maxim of certainty in the tax system.1763 Moreover, using the judiciary to levy 
tax where the gaps in the legislation permit avoidance goes beyond the purposive approach.  
There are also palpable concerns over the combination of vague tests within the GAAR, 
coupled with compulsory guidance formulated by HMRC.1764 The guidance has been criticised 
on the basis that  
“by demanding judicial deference to HMRC’s guidance, the GAAR offends against 
established principles, and essentially allows public bodies to put a particular gloss or 
spin on legislation after its enactment.”1765 
Although the GAAR does not make it clear as to the extent to which the courts should use the 
guidance, Greenberg speculates that “the duty would be nugatory if it did not imply at least 
some degree of deference.” The resulting problem is that “taxpayers’ tax liability will in part 
be decided by HMRC and the other members of the advisory panel rather than parliament.”1766 
Greenberg also asserts that the GAAR allows for the erosion of the separation of powers 
doctrine by overlapping the roles of the Executive and judiciary.1767 The problem stems from 
the idea that “the purpose of the GAAR is to give the Executive continual control over the 
meaning of legislation.”1768 However, the Executive interpretation of legislation overlaps with 
the judiciary’s role to interpret legislation in the courts.1769 Furthermore, this is inconsistent 
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with the fact that Parliament has explicitly recognised the need for judicial independence.1770 
Moreover,  
“the task of determining what the legislation means will be performed, on a continual 
basis, by a combination of the Executive and an unelected body of professionals 
appointed by the Executive.”1771 
Therefore, there will be ongoing oversight by the Executive which undermines the separation 
of powers doctrine. It is Parliament’s role to legislate although, the GAAR has been constructed 
in a fragmented way due to the inclusion of the guidance which means that “the scope of the 
GAAR could, therefore, easily be expanded by HMRC without scrutiny by parliament.”1772 
Consequently, it can be said that there are various infringements of Constitutional Law 
principles in the workings of the GAAR. An effective example of how tax legislation may 
breach Constitutional Law doctrines can be demonstrated by the former Polish GAAR. In 2004, 
Poland’s Constitutional court declared that the Polish GAAR was unconstitutional.1773 The 
court stated that the legislation breached Article 2 of the constitution which explicitly upholds 
the Rule of Law.1774 It was made clear that the Rule of Law encompasses; “the principles of 
legal certainty, legal security and protection of trust in the State and its laws.”1775 
The ambiguous nature of the legislation was also criticised for being unconstitutional as  
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“the constitutional requirements of correct legislation are infringed, in particular, when 
the wording of a legal provision is so vague and imprecise that it creates uncertainty 
amongst its addressees as regards their rights and duties, by creating an exceedingly 
broad framework within which authorities charged with applying the provision are 
required, de facto, to assume the role of law-maker in respect of these vaguely and 
imprecisely regulated issues.”1776  
Judges have a difficult task in applying the GAAR due to the various tests and the breadth of 
the legislation which the Polish Constitutional found unacceptable. Furthermore, as 
established, the GAAR can cause uncertainty which the Polish courts found to be unacceptably 
problematic. The court also acknowledged that “where legal provisions exceed a certain degree 
of ambiguity this may in itself constitute grounds for declaring such provisions to be 
unconstitutional”1777 as it conflicts with the Rule of Law.1778 Furthermore, there was doubt as 
to whether the interpretation of vague phrases in the legislation could be “uniform and 
rigorous”1779 when used in practice. Therefore, concerns about resulting uncertainty and lack 
of uniformity were also at the heart of the debate.  
There was also a problem with the fact that the Minister of Finance had the power to “issue 
interpretations of tax law”1780 which were binding.1781 The court acknowledged that  
       “in the event of conflict between the administrative court’s legal assessment of a 
concrete case and the Minister’s abstract interpretation, the court’s legal assessment 
would have absolute priority.”1782  
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However, the argument was that the Minister’s interpretations would nonetheless remain 
binding1783 which would exacerbate the problem of blurring the distinctions “between law-
making and law-interpretation.”1784 The binding interpretations allowed the Minister to “exert 
an influence in the sphere of taxpayers’ rights and freedoms, a sphere whose regulation is 
permissible solely by legal instruments.”1785 Therefore, it was apparent that the Minister was 
charged with a power which he should not have been granted. The Minister’s problematic 
involvement in adjudication also reinforces the fact that the judiciary and executive should 
remain separate, particularly where taxation is at issue. 
The Polish example highlights the requirements for legislation to adhere to the Rule of Law. 
However, the UK’s legal system does not adhere to the practice of constitutional review 
therefore, the UK GAAR cannot be struck down for being unconstitutional as the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty has remained intact.  
6.10 Conclusion 
Since the GAAR is relatively new, some argue that “it is, of course, easy to criticise a GAAR 
and especially one that has no track record.”1786 However, the criticisms of the GAAR 
discussed in this chapter are substantial, and highlight the inadequacies of the GAAR and 
GAAR guidance. The main purpose test in the GAAR would encompass many tax avoidance 
cases. The judiciary are also able to infer that the taxpayer did have a tax avoidance purpose 
and they may do so in practice. The fact that the GAAR has also been condemned for being 
laced with subjectivity is also central as the main purpose test for example, can be interpreted 
so as to require an examination of the taxpayer’s subjective motives. Ascribing a motive to the 
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taxpayer is simpler than examining whether the taxpayer has escaped the GAAR according to 
the statutory provisions which is why judges may opt for the motive approach. Understandably, 
the main purpose test has been criticised for being so wide that its usefulness has diminished. 
The main purpose test is also difficult to reconcile with the double reasonableness test as only 
very innocuous arrangements can have tax avoidance as a main purpose but nevertheless be 
reasonable. Therefore, the requirement of abuse does little to target the scope of the GAAR. 
Consequently, the scope of the GAAR is unclear as to whether unabusive cases can be caught 
within the GAAR’s remit. Moreover, as demonstrated, the GAAR’s scope is wider than the 
original Aaronson Report which did not include inheritance tax as one of the GAAR’s targeted 
taxes. The general scope of the GAAR is unclear as it seeks to examine the reasonableness of 
arrangements rather than a truly targeted consideration such as artificiality which is a better 
factor to examine.  
The extent to which taxpayers can rely on the HMRC GAAR guidance and whether it is in fact 
binding on courts is uncertain. As aforementioned, the guidance introduces rules including that 
the arrangement must be “contrived”1787 to attract the GAAR and it is uncertain as to whether 
this requirement works alongside the abuse requirement in the GAAR or as a supplementary 
factor where cases are ambiguous. Although, the addition of the term “contrived” does help to 
narrow the scope of the GAAR and guide the judiciary to apply the GAAR to a specific group 
of cases. Furthermore, the guidance is generally unhelpful and does not highlight what 
arrangements would not be regarded as abusive as well as the particular circumstances in which 
the main purpose test would apply but the double reasonableness test would not apply. The 
lack of a clearance system is an understandable criticism due to the assurance and certainty a 
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clearance system would provide to taxpayers. However, the costs involved in providing a 
clearance system does adequately justify why it was not set up.   
Although the results from the KMPG survey do show that the UK has not lost its competitive 
edge, the survey is not entirely reliable due to the small sample size in each company. 
Moreover, although countries are familiar with general anti-avoidance rules, a targeted GAAR 
is different from the more familiar general anti-avoidance rules, as discussed in chapter 4. 
Many of the GAAR’s criticisms which have been cited derive from views of law firms which 
have offices in other countries. Therefore, it is unrealistic to presume that firms are content 
with the drafting of the GAAR and view the UK as still internationally competitive. Complexity 
in the UK tax system remains an issue for both the government and taxpayers alike. However, 
it is evident that simplifying the tax system is lower than tax avoidance on the political agenda. 
The GAAR simply adds to the already lengthy tax system due to the addition of rules rather 
than a set of clear principles. Although supporters of the GAAR claim that a degree of 
uncertainty is a positive deterrence, a helpful line of case law will take many years to develop. 
Therefore, the GAAR does promote uncertainty, because before case law is established, 
taxpayers would largely be guinea pigs, subjected to an experiment to test how the GAAR will 
affect those with similar arrangements. The law must be clear beforehand and the current 
GAAR merely shows that the concerns from the 1998 proposed GAAR have not been heeded. 
It is a truism that, “in all areas of law, but especially in the sphere of tax, the law must be certain 
and foreseeable.”1788  
Examining Constitutional Law issues demonstrates that the GAAR can be seen to be 
undermining fundamental doctrines, such as the separation of powers where judicial 
independence is imperative. Judges are charged with the power of filling in the gaps of the 
                                                          




legislation. The ambiguous nature of some of the provisions in the GAAR also serve to belittle 
the Rule of Law. This was found to be unacceptable with the former Polish GAAR. Prior to 
the introduction of the GAAR, Goldberg lamented that, “as a matter of politics, not as a matter 
of necessity or economic good sense or sensible taxation, we are now to have a GAAR.”1789 
The various criticisms of and concerns about the GAAR inevitably raise the question whether 
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Chapter 7: Was the GAAR needed?  
Introduction 
Clearly the government believed that the GAAR’s implementation was desirable. The GAAR 
study group also made it clear in the Aaronson Report that the UK needed a GAAR.1790 The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the GAAR was really needed in terms of whether 
the legislation has added a new dimension to the pre-existing Ramsay approach. A 
comprehensive analysis of what constitutes the Ramsay approach and an outline of the key 
components of the GAAR will be given. Understanding the central components of both the 
Ramsay approach and the GAAR will facilitate a comparison of the two anti-avoidance 
measures which will reveal whether the GAAR’s provisions help to tackle arrangements which 
Ramsay could not be applied to. Although the GAAR may be important in terms of 
supplementing the Ramsay approach, it is also essential to examine case law on tax avoidance 
before and after the GAAR was introduced. Examining case law before the GAAR will reveal 
whether the judges needed more than the Ramsay approach to tackle tax avoidance. Assessing 
case law after the GAAR will uncover whether, despite the existence of the GAAR, Ramsay is 
still being developed. This is because the Aaronson Report stated that the GAAR was 
implemented in order to mitigate the possibility of judges  
“seek[ing] to extend the application of the Ramsay principle beyond the stage already 
reached in the decided cases. This was, again, to reduce uncertainty affecting the centre 
ground of tax planning.”1791 
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If it is found that Ramsay is still being developed, it will strengthen the argument that the 
addition of the GAAR was not needed. Lastly, whether the GAAR is merely a deterrence to 
ensure that people do not engage in abusive tax avoidance will be analysed.  
7.1 Ramsay vs the GAAR 
7.1 (a) The overall Ramsay approach 
The Ramsay approach is an accumulation of the landmark cases which supported Ramsay. 
These cases refined the Ramsay approach and built on it. From the analysis above, it is possible 
to provide a comprehensive explanation as to what the Ramsay approach entails in order to 
compare it to the GAAR.  
The Ramsay approach applies to arrangements with a series of transactions. There is a 
preference for substance over form, giving preference to the substance of the documents, rather 
than the legitimacy of the individual transactions. There is also a preference for the purposive 
approach rather than the literal approach to construing legislation. The transactions are 
constructed so as to be fiscally “self-cancelling”1792 which in turn introduces the concept of 
artificiality. The individual transactions are examined holistically as one “composite 
transaction”.1793 Discussions of artificiality then lead to asking whether the arrangement was 
executed solely to gain a tax benefit. Ramsay also sought to uncover what the taxpayers’ 
intentions were and whether these intentions were fulfilled or not. There is also an objective 
dimension which places emphasis on the aim and effect of the transactions. The level of risk 
involved is also material. Lastly, judges may examine how remote the end result is at the time 
of the intermediate transactions.  
                                                          
1792 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC; Eilbeck v Rawling [1981] 2 W.L.R 449, [1982] A.C. 300, 328 (Lord Wilberforce)  
1793 Ibid, 324 
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Burmah Oil placed greater emphasis on the taxpayer’s intentions in building on the Ramsay 
approach. Lord Diplock added that there should be a “preordained series of transactions”.1794 
In addition to this, the taxpayer should be acting in accordance with a prearranged timetable. 
Burmah Oil also took the artificiality requirement further by introducing the necessity of a 
commercial purpose.1795 The judges overtly stated that steps which are deemed artificial can 
be ignored.1796 Furthermore, the judges are entitled to examine whether there is any real loss 
or hardship suffered.1797 Finally, Burmah Oil echoed Ramsay by reinforcing the necessity to 
examine the effect of the arrangement.  
Furniss also echoed the preordained requirement in Burmah Oil but there was an emphasis that 
the arrangement should be inflexible for Ramsay to apply. Importance was also given to the 
taxpayer’s intentions, the notion of artificiality and the effect of the arrangement. Furniss 
indicated that Ramsay applied to cases where arrangements are executed “solely for fiscal 
purposes”.1798 The connection between the individual steps was further emphasised by adding 
that they should be “clearly interconnected and mutually dependent on one another”1799 to fall 
under the Ramsay approach.  
Ensign Tankers reiterated the applicability of Ramsay to composite transactions. The case also 
reinforced the main principles in the above cases by focusing on the taxpayer’s object and the 
overall effect of the arrangement.  
McGuckian stressed that Ramsay was simply about the purposive approach to statutory 
construction prevailing over the traditional literalist approach. However, there was also an 
                                                          
1794 IRC v Burmah Oil Co Ltd. [1982] S.C. (H.L.) 114, 124 (Lord Diplock)  
1795 Ibid 
1796 Ibid, 126 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton) 
1797 Ibid, 131 




emphasis on the purpose of the transactions in uncovering whether they were artificial. In 
stressing the purposive approach, McGuckian also placed importance on the intention of 
Parliament.  
Tower MCashback reinforced the importance of the purpose in terms of what was acquired at 
the end of the scheme. The court also focused on how much money was actually expended.  
7.1 (b) The main features of the GAAR 
As aforementioned, the provisions of the GAAR are arduous and complex given the fact that 
the HMRC GAAR guidance forms part of it. Therefore, only the main provisions of the GAAR 
legislation itself will be analysed and compared to the Ramsay approach.  
In order for the GAAR to be triggered, first there must be a tax advantage.1800 Secondly, there 
must be a tax arrangement1801 which is the point at which the main purpose test is considered. 
The main purpose test essentially delves into why the taxpayer embarked on the arrangement 
and whether there were other reasons they carried out the transactions which are unrelated to 
tax benefits.1802 Deciphering whether an arrangement is abusive or not is decided using the 
double reasonableness test.1803 In determining abuse, judges are permitted to examine; policy 
considerations,1804 the existence of artificial or abnormal steps1805 and the intention of the 
taxpayer.1806 
                                                          
1800 s208 Finance Act 2013 
1801 s207(1) Finance Act 2013 
1802 Ibid 
1803 s207(2) Finance Act 2013 
1804 s207(2)(a) Finance Act 2013 
1805 s207(2)(b) Finance Act 2013 
1806 s207(2)(c) Finance Act 2013 
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The inclusion of “abuse” is supposedly what gives the GAAR its targeted dimension. Although, 
given the various factors which the courts can analyse when determining “abuse”, the term is 
given a wide meaning. 
7.1 (c) The Ramsay approach verses the GAAR  
The first comparison of the Ramsay approach and the GAAR relates to scope. The Ramsay 
approach is a creation of the common law therefore, there are no limits on the extent to which 
the principle can be developed. For example, in Ensign Tankers the judges narrowed the 
meaning of “purpose” from the original Ramsay formulation. However, there are limits in the 
application of the approach which are provided for by the prerequisites of the approach. In 
contrast, the GAAR is a piece of carefully drafted legislation which is aimed at tackling only 
those arrangements which are abusive. Therefore, the scope of the GAAR was designed to be 
narrow.  
The Ramsay approach and the GAAR have many features in common. For example, the 
Ramsay approach seeks to view the individual transactions holistically. Similarly, the GAAR 
guidance states that a tax arrangement, as provided for under the GAAR, can encompass the 
entire series of transactions.1807 Secondly, the Ramsay approach examines the intention of the 
taxpayers1808 in determining both what the aim of the taxpayer was1809 and whether that 
intention was fulfilled when the arrangement was complete. The court made it clear that it was 
determined to prevent the taxpayers’ crooked intentions from materialising.1810 Furthermore, 
in Ramsay, Lord Wilberforce also made explicit reference to the purpose of the scheme in 
                                                          
1807 ‘HMRC GAAR Guidance: Parts A, B and C’ cited in 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399270/2__HMRC_GAAR_Gu
idance_Parts_A-C_with_effect_from_30_January_2015_AD_V6.pdf>, accessed 24.12.2015, p18 
1808 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC; Eilbeck v Rawling [1981] 2 W.L.R 449, [1982] A.C. 300, 333 (Lord Fraser of 
Tullybelton) 
1809 Ibid, 324 
1810 Ibid, 326 (Lord Wilberforce)  
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concluding that the taxpayer’s purpose was to avoid tax.1811 Correspondingly, the GAAR has 
the main purpose test which specifically examines whether a tax advantage was one of the main 
purposes of the arrangement.1812 Moreover,  the GAAR examines “whether the arrangements 
are intended to exploit any shortcomings in those provisions.”1813 Therefore, the Ramsay 
approach are equally wide in examining the intentions of the taxpayers. This is due to the fact 
that the Ramsay approach examines the taxpayers’ intention to gain a tax advantage whereas 
the GAAR analyses the existence of an intention to avoid tax.  
The GAAR and Ramsay approach differ at the stage at which the GAAR becomes targeted. 
The GAAR is targeted at abusive arrangements which is determined by the double 
reasonableness test.1814 In contrast, the judges in Ramsay did not seek to limit the scope of the 
principle by stating that the principle is targeted at those arrangements which are abusive. 
Nevertheless, the court expressed the limitations of the principle and mentioned the possibility 
of a general anti-avoidance rule being introduced although, acknowledged that “if so general 
an attack upon schemes for tax avoidance as the revenue suggest is to be validated, that is a 
matter for Parliament.”1815 However, later decisions highlighted “the general scope of the 
Ramsay principle”1816 which indicates that the principle is not limited to certain taxes like the 
GAAR. Consequently, despite the similarities, the Ramsay approach is broader than the 
GAAR. Nevertheless, there are situations that will escape Ramsay but will be caught by the 
GAAR.  
Despite the fact that the GAAR appears to be narrower than the Ramsay approach, this is not 
the case when determining what amounts to abuse. The GAAR mirrors the Ramsay approach 
                                                          
1811 Ibid, 323 
1812 s207(1) Finance Act 2013 
1813 s207(2)(c) Finance Act 2013 
1814 s207(2) Finance Act 2013 
1815 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC; Eilbeck v Rawling [1981] 2 W.L.R 449, [1982] A.C. 300, 325 (Lord Wilberforce)  
1816 The Commissioners for HMRC v Mayes [2011] EWCA Civ 407, [21] (Mummery L.J.) 
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where it allows the intentions of the taxpayer to be examined1817 and scruitinises the existence 
of artificial steps.1818 Artificial steps may be ascertained by examining one of the Ramsay 
requirements of whether the transactions are “self-cancelling”.1819 If what makes the GAAR 
unique is the inclusion of abuse, it largely fails in its attempt to be targeted if determining an 
abusive transaction mirrors the Ramsay approach. However, it can be argued that the GAAR 
is wider than the Ramsay approach due to a provision which is a determinative factor of abuse 
where the “result was not the anticipated result when the relevant tax provisions were 
enacted.”1820 This provision is very wide and can be interpreted in HMRC’s favour where the 
taxpayer has utilised an unexpected loophole in the tax system.  
The similarities between the GAAR and Ramsay approach are numerous. The main feature that 
the GAAR has which the Ramsay approach does not make reference to is the double 
reasonableness test. As aforementioned, this test has been criticised for not contributing much 
to the application of the GAAR.  
If the crux of the GAAR is the inclusion of the undefined term of “abuse”, it should contain 
elements which are unique when compared to Ramsay. Determining abuse by reference to the 
taxpayer’s intentions and the existence of artificiality does not help in making the GAAR 




                                                          
1817 s207(2)(c) Finance Act 2013 
1818 s207(2)(b) Finance Act 2013 
1819 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC; Eilbeck v Rawling [1981] 2 W.L.R 449, [1982] A.C. 300, 328 (Lord Wilberforce)  
1820 S207(4)(c) Finance Act 2013 
1821 Lethaby, H. “Analysis- Reflections on Tax and the City”, [2014], Tax Journal Issue 1220, 10, p11 
301 
 
7.2 Contemporary tax avoidance before the GAAR  
Aaronson’s report clearly highlighted that the GAAR was needed as Ramsay could not prevent 
some abusive schemes from being successful.1822 Therefore, the cases cited in Aaronson’s 
report as being immune to a purposive construction will be discussed in order to ascertain 
whether the GAAR was needed.  
The notorious Mayes1823 case was undoubtedly a catalyst for the creation of the GAAR. 
Aaronson cited Mayes in his report and stated that the judge “was unable to find a purposive 
interpretation sufficient to defeat it.”1824 Ramsay could not be applied to the case despite the 
judge stating that there were “pre-ordained, composite, artificial and tax-motivated events”.1825 
The scheme targeted high-net worth individuals in the UK.1826 Therefore, the court did not 
want the scheme to succeed as “if it did, about £24m would be lost in tax”.1827  
Mayes involved a tax scheme called SHIPS 2. The aim of the scheme was to “use the 
corresponding deficiency relief as loss, pay less income tax and claim capital gains tax (CGT) 
loss relief.”1828 The scheme involved non-resident companies purchasing life insurance policies 
in which the companies eventually made a loss. The main question was whether the taxpayer 
was entitled to “corresponding deficiency relief”1829 which was generated by the inclusion of 
steps 3 and 4 of the scheme. Therefore, the court discussed at length whether these two steps 
could be disregarded as “commercially pointless”.1830  
                                                          
1822 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2012] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf>, accessed 04.06.2016, p20 
1823 The Commissioners for HMRC v Mayes [2011] EWCA Civ 407 
1824 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2012] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf>, accessed 04.06.2016, p20 
1825 The Commissioners for HMRC v Mayes [2011] EWCA Civ 407, [1] (Mummery L.J.) 
1826 Ibid, [2] 
1827 Ibid, [14] 
1828 Ibid, [2] 
1829 Ibid 
1830 Ibid, [30] 
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The scheme in Mayes involved seven individual steps. Firstly, a man from Jersey used money 
he had borrowed to purchase 2 premiums and 2 Bonds, which included 20 life insurance 
policies, from the American Insurance Group (AIG). He then allocated the Bonds to a company 
in Luxembourg for £256,085, referred to as JSI. In step 3 of the scheme, for each policy in one 
of the Bonds, JSI then paid a top-up premium of £375,000 to AIG. JSI also subsequently paid 
£50,000 to AIG for each policy in the second Bond which totalled £150m for both Bonds. 
However, a few weeks later, in step 4 of the scheme, JSI withdrew the money paid to AIG 
which was viewed as a partial surrender of the policies; leaving £5000 in each Bond.1831 JSI 
then assigned the Bonds to a company in England which were then assigned to Mr Mayes for 
£125,949 for the first Bond and £7,155 for the second Bond. In the final step, the taxpayer 
surrendered both Bonds to AIG and took the £1780.94 proceeds. He then claimed he was 
entitled to both ““corresponding deficiency relief” i.e. a loss”1832 of almost £2m and an 
allowable loss of over £100,000 for capital gains tax purposes.1833 The court held that he was 
entitled to these tax reliefs.1834  
Despite the Ramsay approach being considered, it could not be applied. Ramsay’s holistic 
approach made the court speculate that the steps involving JSI paying the top-up premium and 
withdrawing them a few weeks later, should be ignored due to their self-cancelling nature.1835 
However, Ramsay could not be applied as  
“the tax avoidance purpose and self-cancelling nature of the steps did not by themselves 
entitle the court to disregard the steps, when there was nothing in the ICTA provisions 
                                                          
1831 Ibid 
1832 Ibid, [2] 
1833 Ibid, [30] 
1834 Ibid, [85] 
1835 Ibid, [32] 
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indicating or contemplating that, as a matter of construction, such steps were not to 
count.”1836 
Steps 3 and 4 could not be disregarded as “they were genuine legal events with real legal 
effects”1837 despite the fact that they were “commercially unreal”.1838 To do so would be an 
error of law.1839 Furthermore, the court claimed that the legislation could not be purposively 
interpreted to deny the tax relief as the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (ICTA) 
“provisions… [did] not readily lend themselves to a purposive commercial construction”.1840 
For example, s549 of the ICTA, which the taxpayer’s relied on, states that 
“a corresponding deficiency occurring at the end of the final year shall be allowable as 
a deduction from his total income for that year of assessment, so far as it does not exceed 
the total amount treated as a gain”.1841 
Therefore, the literal approach was applicable.  
Ramsay began to falter in Mayes as a case to which all judges must refer to. Mummery L.J. 
indicated that Ramsay is not an anti-avoidance principle to be applied in all cases as he 
“doubt[ed] whether, since Mawson, it really is necessary to return each time to the base camp 
in Ramsay and trek through all the authorities from then on.”1842 He also explicitly stated that 
“Ramsay did not lay down a special doctrine of revenue law”1843 and that “the Ramsay principle 
is the general principle of purposive and contextual construction of all legislation”. Thomas 
L.J. reluctantly concurred with Mummery L.J.’s decision1844 although seemed to disagree with 
                                                          
1836 Ibid, [56] 




1841 s549 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 
1842 The Commissioners for HMRC v Mayes [2011] EWCA Civ 407, [71] (Mummery L.J.) 
1843 Ibid, [74] 
1844 Ibid, [100] (Thomas L.J.) 
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the decision because the taxpayer was wealthy. He stated that the result of the Mayes case was 
that  
“the higher rate taxpayers with large earnings or significant investment income who 
have taken advantage of the scheme have received benefits that cannot possibly have 
been intended and which must be paid for by other taxpayers.”1845 
Toulson L.J. also reluctantly agreed with Mummery L.J.’s decision which he felt concluded 
“in a result which instinctively seems wrong, because it bears no relation to commercial reality 
and results in a windfall which Parliament cannot have foreseen or intended.”1846 The words of 
Toulson L.J. are reminiscent of s207(4)(c) of the Finance Act 2013 which states that an 
arrangement is indicative of abuse where the “result was not the anticipated result when the 
relevant tax provisions were enacted.”1847 The similarity could suggest that the words of 
Toulson L.J. were taken into account when drafting the GAAR. 
Mummery L.J. signalled that Parliament should take action if the result of the case was viewed 
as objectionable.1848 The judge warned that “if the taxpayer succeeds and HMRC and 
Parliament do not like the result, the law can be re-adjusted for the future in a Finance Act”.1849 
It is clear from the implementation of the GAAR and the specific dislike of the Mayes case as 
described in the Aaronson report1850 that Parliament paid heed to the words of Mummery L.J. 
Thomas L.J. echoed the words of Mummery L.J. by stating that “it must be for Parliament to 
consider the wider implications of the decision as it relates to the way in which revenue 
legislation is structured and drafted.”1851 
                                                          
1845 Ibid 
1846 Ibid, [101] (Toulson L.J.)  
1847 S207(4)(c) Finance Act 2013 
1848 The Commissioners for HMRC v Mayes [2011] EWCA Civ 407, [20] (Mummery L.J.) 
1849 Ibid 
1850 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2012] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf>, accessed 04.06.2016, p20 
1851 The Commissioners for HMRC v Mayes [2011] EWCA Civ 407, [100] (Thomas L.J.) 
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Aaronson stated that “SHIPS 2 shows the inadequacy of the existing means of combating 
highly artificial tax avoidance schemes”1852 in concluding that the UK did need a GAAR. The 
fact that Aaronson specifically mentioned Mayes in his report suggests that the type of scheme 
involved in this case would be caught by the GAAR for being abusive. Nevertheless, the GAAR 
seems like an extreme response given that Mayes was “a rare taxpayer victory in a pure 
avoidance case”.1853 The Mayes case also seems to suggest that the judiciary is powerless 
without the GAAR and that the Ramsay approach can only be applied in certain circumstances. 
Therefore, it is helpful to examine cases after the implementation of the GAAR to determine 
the extent to which the judiciary is relying on the Ramsay approach and whether the GAAR 
could have been applied by HMRC. 
7.3 Tax avoidance since the GAAR 
Mayes seemingly demonstrated that the UK does need a GAAR. However, as aforementioned, 
HMRC have not invoked the GAAR since its inception despite Mayes illustrating that the 
Ramsay approach alone is insufficient to tackle tax avoidance. Instead, four years after the 
GAAR was implemented, the courts are still relying on Ramsay because HMRC have not found 
it appropriate to invoke the GAAR.  
Ramsay was relied on in the joint appeals of UBS AG v Commissioners for HMRC1854 (UBS) 
and DB Group Services (UK) Ltd v Commissioners for HMRC (DB Group Services). The UBS 
case involved the bank, UBS, seeking to provide bonuses to their employees in a manner which 
avoided liability to tax on the bonuses. In order to accomplish their objective, the bank 
                                                          
1852 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2012] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf>, accessed 04.06.2016, p21 
1853 Self, H. “Do we still need a GAAR”, [2016], Tax Journal, Issue 1321, 15, [no pagination] 




established an offshore company based in Jersey, ESIP Ltd, with the aim of providing their 
employees shares in ESIP Ltd. The money injected into ESIP Ltd by UBS was equal to the 
amount of the employee bonuses. UBS instructed ESIP Ltd to place the money given to ESIP 
Ltd into an account which would generate interest. UBS sought to give the shares the character 
of restricted securities within the meaning of s423(1) of the Income Tax (Earnings and 
Pensions) Act 2003 (ITEPA). The shares were regarded as restricted securities as the rights of 
the employees as shareholders stated that there would be an automatic sale of the shares where 
the value of the FTSE 100 Index exceeded 6.5% above its original value. If this improbable 
event occurred within the stipulated three-week period, the shares would then be sold for 90% 
of their market value.  
Under s425(2) of the ITEPA 2003, restricted securities are exempt from tax where they are 
related to employment. However, s426 of the ITEPA 2003 states that the securities will be 
taxable where there is a chargeable event, such as the cessation of the securities being 
considered restricted securities. Nevertheless, UBS sought to rely on s429 of the ITEPA 2003 
which states that no tax will arise where the restriction affects an entire class of shares in the 
same manner and the company is controlled by the employees.  
The scheme was further reinforced by ensuring that ESIP purchased call options from UBS. 
This purchase had the effect of safeguarding against the unlikely possibility that the value of 
the FTSE 100 Index exceeded 6.5% above its original value and the shares would be 
automatically sold for 90% of their market value. If this eventuality took place, the shares’ 
market value would then be worth 110% of their original value and the employees would be 
entitled to 99.2% of the share value.1855 However, this eventuality did not take place. ESIP also 
bought shares in UBS so that ESIP shares would be judged in accordance with the success of 
                                                          
1855 Ibid, [32] (Lord Reed) 
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the UBS shares. ESIP ceased operating and closed when all the employees redeemed their 
shares. Chapter 3 of the ITEPA 2003 was also discussed which imposes a tax on securities 
where the market value of the securities has been artificially reduced by 10% or more.  
In the DB Group Services case, Deutsche Bank AG employed a similar scheme as in the UBS 
case. Deutsche Bank also wanted its employees to benefit from bonuses in the form of shares 
in an offshore company they created. In order to give the shares the appearance of restricted 
securities, the shares could be forfeited where the employee who held the share ceased to be 
employed by Deutsche Bank AG “for any reason other than redundancy, death or disability, or 
without cause.”1856 The court found it unlikely that any employee would voluntarily resign or 
be dismissed by reason of misconduct because their shares were at stake.1857 However, in order 
to qualify for the tax exemption under s429 of the ITEPA 2003, the offshore company had to 
be unrelated to Deutsche Bank AG. Although, the court found that the bank did control the 
offshore company.1858  
In forming its opinion, the court sought to unravel the unexpressed purpose of Chapter 2 of the 
ITEPA 2003.1859 Following the case of Abbott v Philbin,1860 Parliament amended Chapter 2 of 
the ITEPA 2003 to ensure that the tax was levied when employees acquired their shares and 
not when restrictions on the shares were lifted.1861 Therefore, the court surmised that  
“Chapter 2 was introduced partly for the purpose of forestalling tax avoidance schemes 
[which] makes it difficult to attribute to Parliament an intention that it should apply to 
                                                          
1856 Ibid, [52] 
1857 Ibid 
1858 Ibid [59] 
1859 Ibid, [74] 
1860 Abbott v Philbin [1961] A.C. 352 
1861 UBS AG v Commissioners for HMRC; DB Group Services (UK) Ltd v Commissioners for HMRC [2016] 
UKSC 13, [75] (Lord Reed) 
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schemes which were carefully crafted to fall within its scope, purely for the purpose of 
tax avoidance.”1862 
The court also found it  
“difficult to accept that Parliament can have intended to encourage by exemption from 
taxation the award of shares to employees, where the award of the shares has no purpose 
whatsoever other than the obtaining of the exemption itself”.1863 
Therefore, much of the court’s rationale lay in determining the purposes of why Chapter 2 was 
amended and why the shares were awarded. The discussion as to what Parliament did not intend 
also corresponds with what amounts to abuse in the GAAR.1864 Therefore, if HMRC sought to 
invoke the GAAR, it is possible that the arrangement would be deemed abusive.  
The general permissibility of such share schemes was also questioned. The court condemned  
“the encouragement of such schemes, unlike the encouragement of employee share 
ownership generally… [as they] would have no rational purpose, and would indeed be 
positively contrary to rationality, bearing in mind the general aims of income tax 
statutes.”1865 
The wide argument regarding share schemes in general is reminiscent of Barak’s argument 
mentioned in chapter 5. He argued that “the purpose of taxing statutes is to collect tax and to 
approach tax cases on that understanding of their purpose may lead to a bias against the 
taxpayer.”1866 Nevertheless, in determining that the purpose of amending Chapter 2 of the 
                                                          
1862 Ibid, [77] 
1863 Ibid 
1864 S207(4)(c) Finance Act 2013 
1865 Ibid 
1866 Barak, A., “Purposive Interpretation in Law”, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p17 
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ITEPA 2003 was to prevent tax avoidance schemes,1867 the court applied this rationale to the 
relevant provisions. Under s423 of the ITEPA 2003, in order to qualify as restricted securities, 
there must be the existence of  “any contract, agreement, arrangement or condition which 
makes provision to which any of subsections (2) to (4) applies”.1868 However, in light of the 
purpose of the Act, the court interpreted this provision  
“as being limited to provision having a business or commercial purpose, and not to 
commercially irrelevant conditions whose only purpose is the obtaining of the 
exemption.”1869 
Thereafter, the court sought to determine whether the restrictions placed on the securities had 
a business or commercial purpose as advocated by the Ramsay approach. In regards to the 
UBS case, the court concluded that the automatic sale provision where the value of the FTSE 
100 Index exceeded 6.5% above its original value, within the given three week, period “had 
no business or commercial rationale beyond tax avoidance.”1870 Furthermore, “the benefit to 
the employee was not truly dependent on the contingency set out in the condition”.1871 
Consequently, the court decided to ignore the conditions attached to the shares which had 
the effect of preventing the shares from being regarded as restricted securities. However, had 
HMRC invoked the GAAR at an earlier stage, the arrangement in this case would have been 
likely to satisfy the main purpose test. Therefore, the UBS and DB Group Services cases 
would have been sufficient to trigger the GAAR had HMRC sought to apply it.  
In relation to the DB Group Services case, the court believed that the restrictions which were 
                                                          
1867 UBS AG v Commissioners for HMRC; DB Group Services (UK) Ltd v Commissioners for HMRC [2016] 
UKSC 13, [77] (Lord Reed) 
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placed on the shares were artificial.1872 The court reasoned that  
“the forfeiture provision operated for only a very short period, during which the 
possibility that it might be triggered lay largely within the control of the employee 
who would be adversely affected. It had no business or commercial purpose, and 
existed solely to bring the securities”.1873 
The cases supporting the Ramsay approach were followed as Lord Reed stated that “the 
appeals thus belong to the line of cases mentioned in Barclays Mercantile”.1874 This line of 
cases included Furniss and Burmah Oil.1875 Chapter 2 of the ITEPA 2003 was purposively 
applied in order to conclude that the conditions attached to the employees’ securities did not 
have a business or commercial purpose and took into account the practical effect of the 
conditions.1876 
The intentions of the taxpayers were examined and the court concluded that due to the “minor 
risk”1877 involved, “the scheme should therefore be considered as it was intended to operate, 
without regard to the possibility that it might not work as planned.”1878 Therefore, the scale 
of risk is a factor which the judiciary considers when deciding whether an arrangement will 
be considered as unacceptable tax avoidance. Moreover, the case demonstrates that the 
intentions of the taxpayer are still being sought after the implementation of the GAAR. As 
the GAAR specifically refers to the taxpayer’s intentions,1879 it would have been permissible 
to scrutinise the taxpayer’s intentions under the GAAR. Finally, the court decided that 
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“income tax is payable on the value of the shares as at the date of their acquisition”.1880 The 
court was able to hinder the “sophisticated attempts of the Houdini taxpayer… [from] 
escap[ing] from the manacles of tax”.1881 
The court also applied the Ramsay approach in Chappell v The Commissioners for 
HMRC1882(Chappell). In Chappell, the taxpayer sought to make a tax deduction totalling 
£303,123. He acquired two manufactured overseas dividends which together amounted to the 
sum of the deduction sought. The scheme involved various steps. Firstly, the taxpayer and 
Barsbury Limited entered into an agreement called a Global Masters Securities Lending 
Agreement.1883 Barsbury lent securities to the taxpayer under the agreement that the taxpayer 
would pay an amount equal to the interest and dividends to Barsbury. Thereafter, by using 
borrowed funds, Barsbury were in turn issued loan notes worth over £6m by Santi Crescent 
Limited (SCL) which were then temporarily borrowed by the taxpayer. By virtue of another 
agreement, SCL were then obliged to pay interest on the loan notes. The taxpayer then disposed 
of the loan notes by transferring them to Berry Lane Limited (BLL) which paid over £6m for 
the notes. When the interest subsequently became due, the taxpayer gave the money to 
Barsbury. The amount of interest paid is also the sum which the taxpayer sought to deduct. The 
taxpayer then acquired additional loan notes from Qintar Limited (QL) which were worth over 
£6m. He then transferred these notes to Barsbury to repay what he had borrowed earlier.  
The main issue concerned the source of the various sums being transferred in the scheme which 
derived from loans, predominantly from the Société Générale Bank and Trust (SGBT), based 
in Luxembourg. The monies were transferred using a company named Brecknock using SG 
                                                          
1880 UBS AG v Commissioners for HMRC; DB Group Services (UK) Ltd v Commissioners for HMRC [2016] 
UKSC 13, [98] (Lord Reed) 
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1882 Chappell v The Commissioners for HMRC [2016] EWCA Civ 809 
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Hambros Bank & Trust (Jersey) Limited (SGH). SGH also held the loan notes on behalf of the 
taxpayer. The companies SCL, Brecknock and Barsbury all had accounts at SGBT. Brecknock 
transferred over £6m to Barsbury to subscribe for the loan notes.1884 On behalf of Barsbury, 
SCL then paid in the subscriptions funds into Brecknock’s account. The taxpayer then used the 
loan notes to repay Barsbury the loan of the notes. Therefore, the monies in the scheme flowed 
from the same SGBT account which the court found circularly involved; the taxpayer selling 
the notes to BLL, the sum which the taxpayer sought to deduct being transferred to Barsbury 
and the taxpayer acquiring loan notes from QL.1885 The court held that the 
“amounts…cancelled each other out.”1886 The fact that SCL “did not carry on a trade and its 
only purpose was to service this and other similar tax schemes”1887 was not fatal to the 
taxpayer’s case. 
Despite the fact that Mummery L.J. in Mayes found it unnecessary to assess Ramsay and the 
subsequent supporting cases,1888 Patten L.J. assessed the Ramsay approach and the subsequent 
supporting cases in a patchwork of lengthy quotes cited from these cases. The taxpayer lost his 
case as “the scheme was not Ramsay -proof”.1889 
Rather than focus on whether the arrangement was abusive, the question the court focused on 
was whether the scheme should  
“fall to be construed and treated like those in MacNiven so as to confer tax relief even 
though the transaction in question forms part of a scheme which was designed solely 
                                                          
1884 Ibid, [17] 
1885 Ibid, [19] 
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1888 The Commissioners for HMRC v Mayes [2011] EWCA Civ 407, [71] (Mummery L.J.) 
1889 Thomas, R. “Chappell v HMRC: The swan really has sung its last: The Court of Appeal considers the 
deductibility of annual payments”. [2017], British Tax Review 27, p28 
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for the purpose of obtaining that relief and has no wider or other commercial 
justification.”1890 
The taxpayer relied on regulation 2B of the Income Tax (Manufactured Overseas Dividends) 
Regulations 1993 which relates to the lending of securities. The court considered whether 
Parliament intended for the type of transaction in Chappell under these Regulations. The 
taxpayer’s argument was that the payments made in the scheme were annual payments and 
he was therefore entitled to deduct this sum from his taxable earnings under s349(1) Income 
and Corporation Tax Act 1988. However, the Revenue argued that the scheme “had no 
commercial or other purpose apart from the avoidance of tax.”1891 This conclusion indicates 
that the arrangement would have failed the GAAR’s main purpose test, had it been invoked 
by HMRC. Moreover, the court was not persuaded by arguments made on behalf of the 
taxpayer that the literal approach should be applied.1892 The judges acknowledged that in 
applying a literal construction to the legislation, it would  
“confer tax relief even though the transaction in question forms part of a scheme which 
was designed solely for the purpose of obtaining that relief and has no wider or other 
commercial justification.”1893 
UBS and DB Group Services both demonstrate that Ramsay is still being invoked since the 
GAAR’s implementation, despite the fact that the GAAR could also have been applied. Some 
have indicated that this reliance on Ramsay may continue as “we may have to wait until the 
mid-2020s before the true impact of the GAAR can be measured.”1894 This estimation may be 
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1894 Self, H. “Do we still need a GAAR”, [2016], Tax Journal, Issue 1321, 15, [no pagination] 
314 
 
true as “the Australian GAAR remained untested in the courts for eight years before what has 
become an avalanche of cases commenced.”1895 
7.4 The GAAR as a deterrence  
As the Ramsay approach and the GAAR have similar components, the dormant GAAR may 
have been introduced to serve as a mere deterrence. Moreover, as aforementioned, tax 
avoidance is the lowest contributing factor to the tax gap which began to decline before the 
GAAR was even introduced.1896 Gammie argues that “the Ramsay principle has ensured that 
HMRC have prevailed in most cases without the need for a statutory GAAR.”1897 
Bloom remarked that “the United Kingdom GAAR is sleeping”.1898 Even if the GAAR is a 
mere deterrent, Lethaby argues that “evidence suggests that it is having some deterrent effect, 
at least around the margins.”1899 However, she also contends that the GAAR has not lessened 
the volume of legislation being implemented as “HMRC's kneejerk reactions to newly 
disclosed schemes have not abated, with the corporate profits transfer TAAR…just being the 
latest example.”1900 Moreover, Lethaby suggests that the GAAR is not being implemented even 
where  
“apparently, HMRC had received disclosures of schemes designed to circumvent an 
only just announced new rule aimed at stopping profit stripping using total return swaps 
                                                          
1895 Calvert, T. and Dabner, J. “GAARs in Australia and South Africa: Mutual Lessons”, [2012], Journal of 
Journal of the Australian Tax Teachers Association, Vol.7, No.1, 53 p54 
1896 HMRC, “UK tax gap at a glance in 2014-2015”, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/561312/HMRC-measuring-tax-
gaps-2016.pdf>  accessed 28.01.2017, p19 
1897 Gammie, M. “When is avoiding tax not abusive? Comparative approaches to a GAAR in Australia and the 
United Kingdom”, [2013], 42 Australian Tax Review 279, p292 
1898 Bloom, D. “Tax avoidance- a view from the dark side”, [2016], 39 Melbourne University Review 950, p980 




with tax havens, and so it responded with another hastily drafted bit of legislation which 
wildly overreaches.”1901  
Therefore, Lethaby questioned “what on earth is the GAAR for if not to counteract contrived 
attempts to get around some new anti-avoidance rules? Why couldn't HMRC just be bold 
enough to rely on it?”1902 Consequently, there appears to be a reluctance to invoke the GAAR 
and the tendency to add to the volume of pre-existing tax legislation remains.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The GAAR overtly shows that Parliament sought hard to win in the “the contest between the 
state and the citizen”.1903 The Ramsay approach will continue to be invoked as long as a 
purposive interpretation of the legislation can be used to defeat an unacceptable scheme. Where 
the Ramsay approach cannot be applied, HMRC may seek to invoke the GAAR in order to 
argue that Parliament did not intend the result. The GAAR will be used where a scheme may 
be technically compliant but Parliament did not intend for the provisions to be used in the 
manner in which they were. However, at the stage of applying the GAAR, the court may still 
examine elements of the Ramsay approach. Nevertheless, as aforementioned, one of the main 
reasons the GAAR was implemented was to prevent the extension of the Ramsay approach.1904 
The cases discussed which were heard after the implementation did not extend the Ramsay 
approach. Nonetheless, the reliance on Ramsay can lead to the Ramsay approach being further 
developed in the future.  
                                                          
1901 Ibid 
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The GAAR and the Ramsay approach have many limbs in common. Both seek to; examine 
arrangements holistically, including the purpose of the arrangement, the intentions of the 
taxpayer and the existence of artificial steps. The double reasonableness test is the main 
element which genuinely distinguishes the GAAR from the Ramsay approach. However, as 
discussed in chapter 3, as the GAAR omits to define what amounts to “reasonable”, this test is 
largely open to subjective interpretation. Therefore, the double reasonableness test could 
contribute to widening the scope of the GAAR which does not in reality distinguish sufficiently 
Ramsay and the GAAR in terms of scope.  
Mayes illustrated the need for a GAAR which could apply to cases where Parliament had not 
envisaged that the provisions of the relevant Act could be used to avoid tax. The court was 
unable to ignore the steps they found to be artificial because the relevant Act did not permit 
them to do so even though the arrangement was regarded as “commercially unreal”.1905 The 
GAAR should therefore make reference to the need for a commercial purpose and to examine 
the existence of artificial steps. The scope of Ramsay was restricted in Mayes. It was in Mayes 
that all the elements which make up the Ramsay approach were pushed to the side and the court 
focused on Ramsay in terms of the purposive approach. The court’s final decision was 
unwillingly in the taxpayer’s favour as discussions of whether it was right for the wealthy 
taxpayer to lose his case overshadowed the case. Mayes was significant because the judges 
suggested that Ramsay alone was insufficient to tackle all tax avoidance. The government may 
have also introduced the GAAR to placate the public into believing that lost tax revenue from 
cases like Mayes is unlikely to recur.  
Ramsay was successfully relied on in the UBS and DB Group Services cases. These conjoined 
cases did not allow the lack of a GAAR to permit the tax avoidance schemes. Although the 
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court was more readily able to confirm Parliament’s intentions by reference to the amended 
Chapter 2 of the ITEPA 2003, it also believed that the outcome of the schemes would not have 
been what Parliament intended.1906 The rationale of what Parliament would not have intended 
could have also been applied in Mayes. However, Mayes represented a point at which the 
judiciary were unwilling to fill the gaps in legislation left by Parliament by holding that “it is 
not for judges to shoulder the law-making responsibilities of Parliament.”1907 In UBS and DB 
Group Services, importance was also placed on the purpose of the schemes and unlike in 
Mayes, this factor contributed to deciding that the schemes should not succeed. The court also 
added that the arrangement should have “a business or commercial purpose”1908 which was an 
extra-statutory requirement used to frustrate the scheme. The “commercial purpose”1909 
requirement echoes the words of Lord Diplock in Burmah Oil. Therefore, Ramsay was 
followed unlike in Mayes wherein the judges appeared hindered by having to “return each time 
to the base camp in Ramsay and trek through all the authorities from then on.”1910 In UBS and 
DB Group Services, the court focused on traditional elements of the Ramsay approach such as 
the fact that the scheme was self-cancelling and the purpose of the scheme. The cases also 
demonstrate that the taxpayer’s intentions are being sought by virtue of invoking the Ramsay 
approach despite the fact that Parliament legitimises examining the taxpayer’s intentions under 
the GAAR. This reliance on Ramsay is likely to continue and it has been predicted the GAAR 
will not be utilised until well after the year 2020.1911 Consequently, the Ramsay approach has 
survived the enactment of GAAR. Aaronson stated that the GAAR was not designed to make 
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the Ramsay approach redundant but to ensure that the approach would not need to be further 
extended by the judiciary in future cases.1912 
The GAAR’s most lethal provision to tackle abusive tax avoidance schemes seems to be where 
it defines abuse as being where the “result was not the anticipated result when the relevant tax 
provisions were enacted.”1913 Under Ramsay, the courts could consider Parliament’s intentions. 
However, examining whether Parliament anticipated a tax avoidance scheme is wider as it 
examines what Parliament omitted rather than what Parliament intended as evidenced in the 
legislation. Determining what Parliament would have anticipated is largely for the judiciary to 
decide by using their discretion. However, the discretion of the judges would not be arbitrary. 
It is likely that the courts will examine the end result of a scheme to ascertain whether it would 
have been rejected had Parliament considered it. However, the anticipation provision in the 
GAAR can eradicate those schemes which do not fall under Ramsay as it goes further than 
purposively construing the legislation.  
As a case has not attracted the GAAR thus far, it can be argued that it is serving as an effective 
deterrent against the more egregious and abusive schemes. Therefore, it can be said that a 
GAAR was needed, or at least, that having one seems to be proving helpful. However, with the 
uncertain remit of the GAAR and the ability to decide what Parliament anticipated, some argue 
that “at least with Ramsay one could hazard a guess as to which page one was on, even if not 
the precise coordinates.”1914 While Lethaby may be correct, the discussions in this chapter have 
shown that Ramsay does require a helping hand in cases where judges find themselves unable 
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to intervene in view of their proper constitutional role. That helping hand, it seems, could very 




















Chapter 8: Conclusion and recommendations for reform 
It has been established that motive, intention and purpose are occasionally used 
interchangeably. This is undesirable as motives and intentions are highly subjective cognitive 
influences.1915 Motives are unconscious influences which are usually emotional responses to 
situations. Intentions are consciously made and are the interim plans one makes before 
fulfilling the eventual purpose. Lastly, purposes are formed consciously in relation to a 
predetermined goal which is typically specific. In tax law, it is more objective to examine the 
purpose of an arrangement which is identifiable by the nature of the transactions executed. The 
majority of the dividend stripping cases examined did not give importance to the taxpayer’s 
motives.1916 However, the cases on trading showed how, although motive is a badge of trade, 
the court also examined taxpayers’ purposes and intentions.1917 Taylor illustrated how the 
taxpayer’s intentions can change. The disparities in similar cases like Kirkham, Iswera and 
Reinhold demonstrate how examining the taxpayer’s motives, intentions and purposes can 
generate inconsistencies.  
The taxpayer’s motive, intention and purpose were predominantly examined in the cases 
supporting Ramsay. Supporters of the Westminster approach preferred to scrutinise 
Parliament’s intentions1918 and apply the remoteness test which examined how remote the end 
result was at the time of the intermediate transactions.1919 In Ramsay, the court referred to the 
taxpayer’s motive, intention and purpose. However, these were not always discussed in the 
correct context. Burmah Oil also scrutinised the taxpayer’s intentions in determining whether 
the scheme was pre-planned.1920 It is evident how motives can be ascribed as the trading cases 
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of Iswera and Wisdom demonstrated. The ability to examine both primary and secondary 
motives confuses matters further. Therefore, even in trading where there has been a long-
established practice of examining taxpayer motives, there is still unpredictability and 
inconsistency. Expenditure permits scrutinising purpose1921 although, a purpose can also be 
ascribed without the taxpayer’s knowledge of that purpose.1922 Familiar anti-avoidance 
principles facilitate motive, intention and purpose being considered, including the substance 
over form doctrine, the step transaction doctrine1923 and the holistic approach. 
The provisions of the GAAR can be widely interpreted. The various stages of the GAAR are 
layered in nature which uses sub-tests to explain each requirement. The main purpose test 
encapsulates many arrangements. In contrast, the approach in Halifax scrutinises whether the 
sole purpose of the arrangement was to acquire a tax advantage.1924 The double reasonableness 
test unrealistically implies that a tax advantage can be the main purpose of an arrangement 
which is also considered reasonable according to the standards of the double reasonableness 
test. The definition of what amounts to reasonable is also open to wide interpretation. Abuse 
relates to whether a taxpayer “intended to exploit any shortcomings”1925 in the tax legislation. 
Furthermore, the Aaronson report also states that it is necessary to examine the intentions of 
all those involved in the arrangement.1926 However, the GAAR guidance stated that examining 
intentions was both unnecessary and inappropriate.1927 Moreover, the Aaronson report stated 
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that intentions should not be considered due to their subjective connotations.1928 An intention 
can be imputed or the tax advisor’s intentions could be imputed on the taxpayer. Rather than 
examine whether the taxpayer sought to utilise loopholes,1929 Emsland merely asks whether a 
tax advantage was intended and examines the existence of artificial steps.1930 Moreover, 
Emsland confirms that examining intentions is a subjective test.1931 The purposive approach 
and the anticipation requirement in the GAAR1932 ensure that what Parliament did and did not 
intend can both be broadly examined. The GAAR guidance creates a triple reasonableness test 
by adding that if an arrangement can be viewed as reasonable, that view must also be tested as 
to its reasonableness.1933 Although, a view which rejects the taxpayer’s arrangement does not 
have to be tested for its reasonableness. HMRC’s approval of certain practices is subject to 
change and gives the GAAR’s remit a fluctuating quality.  
New Zealand, South Africa and Canada all mention abuse in the general anti-avoidance 
legislation. However, none of the jurisdictions analysed put the ability to examine the 
taxpayer’s intentions on statutory footing like the UK GAAR.1934 Rather than seeking to strike 
down an arrangement by examining whether a tax advantage was a main purpose of the scheme, 
the American and Canadian approaches seek to vindicate the arrangement by examining 
whether there was another “substantial purpose”1935 or any “bona fide purposes other than to 
obtain the tax benefit”.1936 New Zealand1937 and Australia1938 scrutinise the purposes of others 
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in the scheme. Concerns have also been raised that “the purpose of the relevant taxpayer may 
be imputed”1939 which is also a concern for the UK GAAR under the main purpose test. 
However, unlike with the UK GAAR, the Australian general anti-avoidance rule laid down 
objective criteria,1940 to ascertain whether a person had that purpose.1941 Although New Zealand 
examines both purpose and effect, the legislation becomes targeted where it refers to abuse.1942 
The New Zealand approach examines whether the tax advantage was the taxpayer’s “dominant 
purpose”1943 which is narrower than the UK GAAR’s main purpose test.1944 However, the abuse 
provision in the South African general anti-avoidance rule1945 has been criticised for being open 
to subjective interpretation.1946 Similarly, the Canadian cases of Canada Trustco and Lipson 
criticised the Canadian abuse provision for being ill-defined1947 and broad.1948 As 
demonstrated, the UK GAAR’s main purpose test and means to ascertain abuse are both wide 
when compared with the anti-avoidance legislation of other jurisdictions. 
The Canadian case of Lipson rightly criticised the term abuse for being too wide. Therefore, 
the test for abuse in the UK GAAR is capable of significant judicial discretion. Determining 
abuse has been stretched by the sub-tests which constitute abuse. Judges can examine 
underlying policy considerations.1949 However, leaving tax policy considerations to the 
judiciary was criticised in Canada Trustco as the judiciary’s views would ultimately override 
taxing statutes and is inappropriate because formulating policy is not within the courts’ 
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jurisdiction.1950 The GAAR has proven to be ambiguous due to the way in which an abusive 
arrangement has been defined. The various tests which are used to establish whether an 
arrangement is abusive examine the taxpayer’s intentions and inevitably involve judicial 
discretion. Moreover, HMRC decides what is not abusive and this view is subject to change 
which can prove to be burdensome for taxpayers in keeping up-to-date with the changes. 
Judicial discretion can lead to extra-statutory considerations, as demonstrated by the cases 
supporting Ramsay, and promote uncertainty. Ambiguity can lead to the GAAR being extended 
through the formation of common law principles. The purposive approach is also being over-
stretched as tax avoidance now involves examining the purpose of; the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s 
arrangement, the taxing provisions and the GAAR. It is unsurprising if judges get swayed by 
policy matters in practice but tax law and morality should remain separate.  
The GAAR’s criticisms have merit. The main purpose test is not very helpful, since purposes 
are subject to change. Furthermore, purposes may be constructively imposed by HMRC or the 
judiciary if they are not evidenced in writing. The standard of reasonableness has not been 
made clear. Therefore, the double reasonableness test is likely to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis by balancing competing interests and using discretion. This would fuel uncertainty. The 
scope of the GAAR is broad and it is far from clear what is abusive and what is not abusive. 
Furthermore, HMRC wrote the GAAR guidance. This gives HMRC wide discretionary powers 
to amend it at will. Although simplification was not a goal, the GAAR contributes to the 
complexity of the current tax system by adding to the volume of existing tax legislation and 
potentially making compliance difficult. The GAAR also contributes to uncertainty due to the 
vague double reasonableness test, main purpose test and the tests to ascertain abuse. There are 
serious constitutional issues raised by the GAAR including the fact that the vagueness of legal 
rules is contrary to the Rule of Law. All these factors can damage the UK’s international 
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competitiveness by discouraging potential investors from doing business in the UK due to the 
uncertainty in the tax system caused by the GAAR.  
The Ramsay approach and the GAAR have similarities whereby both take a holistic approach, 
assess the existence of artificial steps, scrutinise the taxpayer’s intentions, examine the 
arrangement’s purpose and have scope to analyse the taxpayer’s purpose. However, the GAAR 
is designed to be targeted at abuse whereas Ramsay is aimed at tax avoidance schemes in 
general, which makes Ramsay broader. Mayes demonstrated that Ramsay style arguments, such 
as the purposive approach, the existence of a self-cancelling arrangement and a tax avoidance 
purpose were insufficient to defeat the arrangement. Mayes also pushed for the implementation 
of a GAAR. However, UBS, DB Group Services and Chappell illustrated that Ramsay is still 
being relied on after the implementation of the GAAR. In UBS and DB Group Services, the 
court went further than examining what Parliament intended by scrutinising what Parliament 
would not have intended. Ascertaining what Parliament intended uses the legislation as the 
basis of the decision. In contrast, deciphering what Parliament did not intend requires a larger 
degree of judicial discretion. The tax gap figures show that tax avoidance has the lowest source 
of lost revenue and the study does not specify what percentage is lost to abusive arrangement 
nor acceptable tax avoidance. The government should tackle legal interpretation issues and 
money lost through the hidden economy1951 which have further reaching benefits such as 
catching criminals and simplifying the tax system. 
Recommendations for reform 
Repealing the GAAR is unlikely to happen as  
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“adopting a GAAR, as the UK has done in 2013, marks the crossing of the Rubicon and 
one would not suppose that having done so Parliament will be tempted in the future to 
repeal the GAAR.”1952 
However, there are ways in which the GAAR could be improved to reduce uncertainty and 
reliance on subjective factors. The scope of the GAAR could also be better targeted by 
confining the applicability to income tax, capital gains tax, corporation tax and petroleum 
revenue tax, as recommended by the Aaronson Report.1953  
The main purpose test should also be amended which would change the way an arrangement 
is defined. The scope of the GAAR could be made better targeted by adopting the EU approach 
in Halifax. The principle in Halifax states that one of the factors that points to abuse is where 
the sole purpose of the arrangement was to acquire a tax advantage.1954 Therefore, the main 
purpose test would be replaced by the sole purpose test. As discussed in chapter 6, the double 
reasonableness test, which defines what amounts to abuse, fuels subjective discretion as to how 
“reasonableness” should be interpreted. Therefore, the double reasonableness test should be 
replaced. Abuse should instead be determined by whether a taxpayer repeatedly avoids “the 
same type of income”1955 annually.1956 Consequently, the abuse requirement would be targeted 
at “serial avoiders”1957 as stated in HMRC’s consultation document. Targeting the most 
persistent offenders is likely to narrow the scope of the current wide GAAR. 
                                                          
1952 Gammie, M. “When is avoiding tax not abusive? Comparative approaches to a GAAR in Australia and the 
United Kingdom”, [2013], 42 Australian Tax Review 279, p282 
1953 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2011] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf> accessed 25.08.2014, p7 
1954 Halifax Plc and others v Customs and Excise Commissioners (C-255/02) [2006] Ch. 387, 435 (Advocate 
General Poiares Maduro) 
1955 HMRC ‘Strengthening Sanctions for Tax Avoidance’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399823/Strengthening_sanction





The double reasonableness test also has criteria which should be taken into account.1958 The 
provision pertaining to the intention of the arrangement1959 should be removed due to the 
problems raised throughout this thesis regarding the ability to scrutinise the taxpayer’s motive, 
intention and purpose. The provision relating to the examination of policy considerations 
should also be removed due to the reasons outlined in chapter 3. Therefore, rather than 
intentions and policy considerations being at the fore of determining abuse, abuse should 
instead be based on objective hallmarks. These hallmarks will help to uncover whether an 
arrangement could be considered artificial rather than reasonable. The double reasonableness 
test would therefore be replaced with an artificiality test.  
The GAAR would be made clearer if it listed the hallmarks of tax avoidance as with the 
Australian general anti-avoidance rule.1960 Many of the hallmarks of tax avoidance are extra-
statutory considerations listed in the Ramsay approach. Therefore, it would also help to give 
legitimisation to Ramsay. For example, the UK GAAR could put the consideration of a 
commercial purpose on statutory footing1961 rather than explore whether gaining a tax 
advantage was one of the main purposes. Furthermore, the GAAR could also include objective 
factors considered in the Australian general anti-avoidance rule and raised in Burmah Oil and 
Ensign Tankers such as the timing and length of the arrangement.1962 Courts should also be 
permitted to consider “any change in the financial position… that has resulted…  from the 
scheme,”1963 which adopts the Australian approach. Other considerations can include whether 
the scheme is self-cancelling1964 which would further legitimise Ramsay. The amended GAAR 
could also adopt the remoteness test devised in Craven which involves examining how remote 
                                                          
1958 s207(2) Finance Act 2013 
1959 s207(2)(c) Finance Act 2013 
1960 s177D(2) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1961 Furniss v Dawson [1984] 2 W.L.R. 226, [1984] A.C. 474, 492 (Oliver L.J.) 
1962 s177D(2)(c) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1963 s177D(2)(e) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
1964 WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC; Eilbeck v Rawling [1981] 2 W.L.R 449, [1982] A.C. 300, 328 (Lord Wilberforce) 
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the end result is at the time of the intermediate transactions.1965 Another objective requirement 
can be to evaluate the level of risk involved in the scheme which was the approach adopted in 
Barclays.1966 A reformed GAAR would benefit from retaining the provision in the current 
GAAR regarding examining “contrived or abnormal steps”.1967  
If Parliament was to be reluctant in devising a list of the hallmarks of tax avoidance, Lethaby 
has also pointed out that it would be useful to provide an indication as to how aggressive 
decided anti-avoidance case law would be considered post the GAAR.1968 Placing decided 
cases on the “aggression spectrum”1969 would serve to provide examples of the types of 
schemes deemed abusive by the GAAR and clarify its scope. For example, Westminster may 
be on the lower end of the spectrum whereas Mayes would be on the upper end of the aggression 
scale.  
Abuse is currently decided in terms of the subjective double reasonableness test. However, 
rather than having reasonableness as a standard for abuse, the GAAR could also be better 
targeted by requiring schemes to have elements of artificiality.1970 This recommendation would 
ensure that the UK GAAR has a high standard of abuse like South Africa, Canada and Australia 
which all refer to artificiality in their general anti-avoidance rules. Alternatively, the GAAR 
could include the term “artificial”.1971 
                                                          
1965 Craven v White; IRC v Bowater; Property Developments Ltd v Gregory [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423, [1989] A.C. 
398, 481 (Lord Keith) 
1966 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance v Mawson [2002] EWCA Civ 1853, [2002] WL 31676325, [36] 
(Peter Gibson L.J.) 
1967 s207(2)(b) Finance Act 2013 
1968 Lethaby. H, ‘Aaronson’s GAAR’, [2012], British Tax Review 27, p38 
1969 Ibid 
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329 
 
Some of the terms used in the GAAR should also be explicitly defined. For example, where 
the GAAR gives examples of abuse, the term “economic purposes”1972 has not been defined in 
the GAAR and does not have a generic meaning to warrant the omission of a definition. As 
recommended in chapter 3, the term “economic purposes”1973 could be defined as meaning a 
tax advantage. Therefore, the requirement would specify that the arrangement must obtain a 
higher profit than the tax advantage gained or that large losses or unusually generous 
deductions are indicative of abuse. This would also accord with the definition proposed in the 
Aaronson report. Unusually large losses or deductions can also be a hallmark of abuse. 
Moreover, the provision allowing scrutiny into whether the result of the scheme was anticipated 
by Parliament should be amended for reasons outlined in chapter 3. Instead, the requirement 
which qualifies the examples of abuse should relate to whether the purpose of the relevant tax 
provisions was to give effect to those types of arrangements. Consequently, the emphasis 
should be on what Parliament did intend rather than what it did not intend.  
To maintain impartiality, HMRC should not have written the GAAR guidance. The Aaronson 
report also stated that guidance should be drawn up independent of HMRC.1974 Working 
towards simplifying the tax system in general would also help to decrease lost sources of 
revenue. For example, as chapter 7 illustrated, a high level of revenue is being lost due to legal 
interpretation problems and taxpayer error.1975 These recommendations would facilitate a fairer 
playing field between HMRC and the taxpayer in their “fiscal chess game.” 1976                                                              
                                                          
1972 s207(4)(a) Finance Act 2013 
1973 Ibid 
1974 Aaronson. G, ‘A Study to Consider whether a General Anti-Avoidance Rule Should be Introduced into the 
UK Tax System’, [2012] cited in <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
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